. 


3arnes  1k. 


No. ./. 


PAULINE  FORE  MOFFITT 
LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
GENERAL  LIBRARY,  BERKELEY 


THE  CIVIL  WAR   AND 
THE  CONSTITUTION 


THE  AMERICAN   HISTORY  SERIES 


Seven  volumes,  12mo,  with  maps  and  plans. 
Price  per  volume.  $1.W,  net. 

THR  COLONIAL  ERA.— By  Rev.  GEORGE  P.  FISHER, 
D.D.,  LL.D.,  Professor  of  Ecclesiastical,  History  in 
Yale  University. 

THE  FRENCH  WAR  AND  THE  REVOLUTION.-By 
WILLIAM  M.  SLOANE,  Ph.D.,  Professor  of  History  in 
Columbia  University. 

THE  MAKING  OF  THE  NATION.— By  General  FRANCIS 
A.  WALKER,  LL.D.,  late  President  of  the  Massachusetts 
Institute  of  Technology. 

THE  MIDDLE  PERIOD.— By  JOHN  W.  BUBGEPS,  Ph.D., 
LL.D.,  Professor  of  Political  Science  and  Constitutional 
Law  in  Columbia  University. 

THE  CIVIL  WAR  AND  THE  CONSTITUTION.— By 
JOHN  W.  BURGESS,  Ph.D.,  LL.D.,  Professor  of  Political 
Science  and  Constitutional  Law  in  Columbia  University. 
2  vols. 

RECONSTRUCTION  AND  THE  CONSTITUTION. -By 
JOHN  W.  BURGESS,  Ph.D.,  LL.D.,  Professor  of  Political 
Science  and  Constitutional  Law  in  Columbia  University. 


THE  AMERICAN  HISTORY  SERIES 

THE  CIVIL  WAK  AND 
THE  CONSTITUTION 

1859-1865 


BY 


JOHN  W.  BUKGESS,  PH.D.,  LL.D. 

PROFESSOR  OP  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  AND  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW,  AND  DEAN  OP 
THE  FACULTY  OP  POLITICAL  SCIENCE,  IN  COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY 


VOLUME    I 


NEW   YORK 

CHAELES   SCKIBNEK'S    SONS 
1901 


COPYRIGHT,  1901,  BY 
CHAKLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 


PUBLISHED  SEPTEMBER,  1901 


TROW  DIRECTORY 

HTINfl  AND  800KBINDING   COMPANr 
NEW   YORK 


GIFT 


To  the  memory 

of 

SAMUEL   B.  RUGGLES,  LL.D., 

for  many  years  one  of  the  most  prominent  of  the 

Trustees  of  Columbia  College, 

to  whose  efforts, 
more  than  to  those  of  any  other  single  man, 

the  Faculty  and  School  of  Political  Science 
in  Columbia  University  owe  their  foundation, 

these  two  volumes 

are  reverently  and  affectionately  inscribed 
by  the  Author 


V. 

PREFACE 


THE  preface  to  "The  Middle  Period  "  was  intended  to 
serve  for  all  the  volumes  of  this  series  proceeding  from 
my  pen.  I  do  not  feel  inclined  to  interfere  with  that 
arrangement  now,  and  I  shall  not  do  so.  Perhaps, 
however,  it  is  due  to  my  readers  that  I  should  make 
some  explanation  in  regard  to  the  delay  in  the  appear 
ance  of  these  volumes  after  the  publication  of  "  The 
Middle  Period."  I  can  do  this  in  a  single  sentence.  J 
found  the  task  of  going  carefully  through  the  immense 
mass  of  Congressional  debates,  Executive  orders,  diplo 
matic  correspondence  and  military  reports  so  prolonged 
that,  in  the  midst  of  the  exactions  of  my  University 
labors,  I  was  unable  to  complete  them  earlier. 

I  desire,  further,  to  express  in  these  introductory  lines 
my  continued  obligation  to  my  friend  and  former  pupil, 
and  now,  I  rejoice  to  say,  my  colleague,  Dr.  Harry  A. 
Gushing,  for  his  invaluable  aid  in  the  preparation  of 
these  volumes. 

JOHN  W.  BURGESS. 

COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY, 
June  12,  1901. 


CONTENTS   OF  VOLUME  I 


CHAPTER   I 

PAGE 

DAVIS,  LINCOLN  AND  DOUGLAS         ......       1 


CHAPTER   II 

ANTI-SLAVERY  SENTIMENT   IN  THE  SOUTH  BETWEEN  1857  AND 

I860 28 

CHAPTER    III 
THE  PRESIDENTIAL  ELECTION  OF  18GO     .  ...     45 

CHAPTER  IV 
SECESSION         ..........     74 

CHAPTER   V 

THE  INAUGURATION  OF  LINCOLN  AND  THE  CONDITION  OF  THE 

GOVERNMENT  HE  WAS  CALLED  TO  ADMINISTER        .         .   138 

CHAPTER   VI 

THE  ATTEMPT  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  CONFEDERACY  TO  NEGOTIATE 

WITH  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES        .         .151 
ix 


X  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  VII 

PAOE 

THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  SUMTER  AND  THE  CALL  TO  ARMS    .     167 

CHAPTER   VIII 
THE  THREE  MONTHS'  AVAR '.  206 

CHAPTER   IX 
PREPARATIONS  FOR  THE  THREE  YEARS'  WAR          .         .        .  226 

CHAPTER  X 

THE  MILITARY  MOVEMENTS   IN   THE    LATE    SUMMEI;   AND  AU 
TUMN  OF  18(51 248 

CHAPTER  XI 

MILL  SPRINGS,  FORT  HENRY,  DONELSON,  SIIILOH,  PEA  RIDGE. 

AND  ISLAND  No.   10  ......  .  276 


LIST  OF  MAPS 


FACING 
PAGE 

CHARLESTON  HARBOR        ........     02 

THE  BLOCKADED  COAST    .         .         ,         .         .         .         .         .   1H1 

THE  WEST  VIRGINIA  BATTLES          ......  208 

THE  MANASSAS  CAMPAIGN        .         .         .         .         .    •  .  210 

THE    FIELD   OF    OPERATIONS   IN   MISSOURI    AND    NORTHERN 

ARKANSAS  ..........  248 

FIELD  OF  OPERATIONS  IN  VIRGINIA  .....  200 
NEW  MADRID  AND  ISLAND  NUMBER  TEN  .  .  .  .314 
MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY—  HELENA  TO  VICKSBT-RG  .  318 


THE  CIVIL  WAR 

CHAPTER  I 

DAVIS,   LINCOLN   AND     DOUGLAS 

The  Need  of  New  Leaders— Davis,  Lincoln  and  Douglas— Re 
semblances  of  the  Three  Men  in  Character — Differences 
between  the  Three  Men — In  Personal  Appearance— Circum 
stances  of  Birth  and  Education— And  Mind  and  Character— 
The  Political  Differences  between  Davis,  Douglas  and  Lin 
coln  in  1860. 

THE  Kansas-Nebraska  Act,  the  Dred  Scott  decision, 
and  the  anti-Lecompton  triumph  had  brought  the  poli 
tics  of  the  country  into  a  nebulous  condition.  The  ueedof 
New  centres  of  cohesion  must  be  developed  new  Leaders, 
around  which  the  vapors  should  become  solidified  and 
clarified,  in  order  that  the  conflicting  forces  might  ap 
pear  distinct  in  principle  and  purpose.  It  was  a  situa 
tion  which  required  the  advent  of  strong  personalities, 
and  their  advance  to  the  front,  personalities  who  should 
rear  their  heads  above  the  dead  level  of  democracy,  and 
around  whom  the  people  must  gather  for  the  great 
struggle. 

Between  the  years  1857  and  18GO  these  appeared. 
They  were  Jefferson  Davis,  Abraham  Lincoln,  and 
Stephen  Arnold  Douglas.  The  first  and  last  ^^  L.Q_ 
were  then,  by  no  means,  new  names  to  the  J)^^a8'and 
country,  and  the  bearer  of  the  second  had 
already  before  1857  won  an  enviable  local  reputation. 
VOL.  I.— 1  1 


2  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

Davis  was  the  oldest  and  Douglas  the  youngest  of  the 
three,  while  Lincoln,  who  stood  between  the  two  in  the 
chronology  of  birth,  was  strangely,  not  to  say  fatefully, 
connected  with  both  in  the  events  of  his  career. 

Davis  and  Lincoln  were  born  upon  the  soil  of  the  same 
Commonwealth,  Kentucky,  the  one  in  June  of  1808,  and 
the  other  in  February  of  1809.  It  has  been  said  that  they 
met  for  the  first  time  at  Dixon,  in  Illinois,  in  the  year 
1831,  and  that  then  and  there,  Davis,  at  that  time  a 
Lieutenant  in  the  regular  army,  administered  to  Lincoln 
the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  United  States,  as  Captain  of 
a  company  of  Illinois  volunteers  mustered  into  the  service 
of  the  United  States  for  the  Black-Hawk  War.  They 
met  again  in  Congress  between  1846-48,  both  members 
of  the  House  of  Representatives,  when  Davis  upheld  the 
cause  of  his  country  against  Mexico,  and  then  proved  his 
patriotic  devotion  by  resigning  his  seat  and  going  to  the 
front,  as  Colonel  of  the  first  Mississippi  regiment,  where 
he  distinguished  himself  as  a  brave  and  successful  soldier 
and  commander  on  the  fields  of  Monterey  and  Buena 
Vista;  while  Lincoln  joined  with  the  Northern  Whigs  in 
denouncing  the  war,  and  thereby  ruined  his  political 
prospects  in  Illinois  for  several  years  afterward.  They 
never  met  again  personally,  but  as  commanders-iii-ehief 
of  the  great  hosts,  who  struggled  through  the  bloodiest 
war  of  modern  times,  they  became  the  commanding 
figures  of  our  history  in  the  first  half  of  the  seventh 
decade  of  the  century. 

Likewise  Lincoln  and  Douglas,  though  born  as  far 
apart  in  place  as  Kentucky  and  Vermont,  and  in  time  as 
1809  and  1813,  met  early  upon  the  prairies,  and  became 
rivals  in  courtship,  rivals  in  law  practice,  and  rivals  in 
politics,  until  at  last  their  rivalry  culminated  in  the  great 
presidential  contest  of  1860,  in  which  Lincoln  triumphed, 
and  Douglas  pledged  him  allegiance  in  upholding  the 


DAVIS,    LINCOLN    AND   DOUGLAS  3 

Union  in  the  conflict  of  arms  which  Davis  was  inaugu 
rating  against  it. 

In  two  things  these  three  great  characters  resembled 
one  another,  viz.,  in  personal  bravery  and  in  loyal  te 
nacity  to  conviction.  Nobody  has  disputed  R  e  B  e  m  - 
the  former  quality  to  either  of  them,  but  in  thSfLen^n 
regard  to  the  latter  there  is,  and  has  always  character- 
been,  difference  of  opinion.  At  this  time  it  may  be 
said  that  it  is  more  universally  attributed  to  Lincoln 
than  to  either  of  the  others,  and  less  so  to  Douglas. 
There  was  undoubtedly  a  difference  in  degree  between 
them  in  this  respect,  but  that  is  probably  to  be  ascribed 
to  the  fact  that  Lincoln  saw  farther  than  Davis,  and 
both  farther  and  more  clearly  than  Douglas.  It  would 
be  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  find  any  act  in  Davis's 
life  which  proves  any  lack  of  devotion  to  the  truth, 
as  he  saw  it,  or  any  lack  of  readiness  to  sacrifice  himself 
for  it.  And  certainly  the  unbending  attitude  which 
Douglas  preserved  in  the  two  great  crises  of  his  polit 
ical  career,  the  Lecompton  struggle  and  the  presiden 
tial  nomination  of  1860,  and  his  ready  and  unreserved 
declaration  of  loyalty  to  his  great  rival  at  the  outset  of 
the  struggle  for  the  preservation  of  the  Union,  can  be 
explained  on  no  other  satisfactory  theory  than  that  of 
self-sacrificing  adherence  to  principle.  If  it  was  not 
always  so  witli  Mr.  Douglas,  it  came  to  be  so  in  the  latter 
years  of  his  great  life.  While  as  to  Lincoln,  so  many  of 
his  old  foes  have  come  to  recognize  the  correctness  of 
the  opinion  of  his  friends,  that  absolute  truthfulness 
was  the  fundamental  principle  of  his  character,  that 
there  is  no  need  of  adducing  instances  of  his  conduct  in 
proof  of  it. 

In  most  other  respects,  however,  the  three  men  were 
very  different.  In  personal  appearance,  the  contrast  was 
very  striking.  Davis  was  tall,  well-formed,  erect,  hand- 


4  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

some,  dignified,  and  graceful.  He  bore  all  the  marks  of 
a  well-born,  well-bred,  cultured  gentleman.  Lincoln 

Differences*   was  vei'^  tall>  lank>  ungainly,  homely,  and 
between  the  awkward,   but  dignified  and  grave  even  to 

three     men. 

Personal  ap-  melancholy.  No  one  could  doubt,  after  a  lit 
tle  contact  with  him,  that  he  was  on  the  inside 
a  true  gentleman,  although  the  outward  polish  failed 
him  almost  completely.  Douglas  was  rather  short  and 
thick-set,  with  a  massive  head,  well-developed  forehead, 
and  deeply  planted  brilliant  blue  eyes,  which  in  moments 
of  excitement  seemed  to  emit  electric  sparks.  He  was, 
withal,  good-looking  and  very  genial  and  courteous. 

The  circumstances  of  their  birth  and  education  differed 
also  very  widely.     Davis  was  descended  from  Welsh  an- 
circum-  cestors  on  his  father's  side  and  Scotch-Irish 
birthnand8edu-  on  n^s  mother's.     His  father  was  a  country 
cation.  gentleman    of    considerable    property,    who 

resided  first  in  Georgia,  then  in  Kentucky,  afterward 
moved  to  Louisiana,  and  finally  settled  in  Mississippi. 
His  mother  was  said  to  have  been  a  lady  of  rare  beauty 
and  intelligence.  He  received  his  preparatory  education 
in  the  ordinary  schools  about  his  home,  was  then  sent  to 
Transylvania  University,  at  Lexington,  Kentucky,  and 
when  near  graduation  from  that  institution,  had  a  West 
Point  cadetship  conferred  upon  him.  He  graduated 
from  the  Military  Academy  in  July  of  1828,  and 
immediately  entered  the  regular  army,  as  a  second  lieu 
tenant,  and  was  assigned  to  service  on  the  western  fron 
tier.  After  seven  years  of  arduous  and  well-performed 
duty,  he  resigned  from  the  army,  married  the  daughter 
of  Colonel  Zachary  Taylor,  afterward  President  of  the 
United  States,  and  settled  down  at  Briarfield,  in  Missis 
sippi,  as  a  planter.  The  sudden  death  of  his  young  wife, 
a  few  months  after  their  marriage,  broke  his  health  and 
deranged  his  affairs.  A  severe  illness,  and  a  long  tour 


DAVIS,    LINCOLN   AND   DOUGLAS  C) 

of  travel  necessitated  by  it,  occupied  the  better  part  of 
the  next  two  years  of  his  life.  From  1837  to  1845,  he 
directed  the  cultivation  of  his  plantation,,  won  wealth, 
and  read  widely  in  political  philosophy,  political  econo 
my,  and  public  law.  In  February  of  1845,  he  married  the 
accomplished  daughter  of  W.  15.  llowell,  of  Natchez,  and 
with  her  founded  one  of  those  typical  Southern  homes 
so  justly  noted  for  refinement  and  hospitality.  In  1844,, 
he  was  elected  a  presidential  elector  on  the  Polk  ticket, 
and  in  1845,  he  was  elected  Representative  to  Congress 
from  the  district  in  which  he  resided.  From  this  time 
forward  he  was  almost  continuously  in  public  life  until 
the  downfall  of  the  Southern  Confederacy  in  18G5. 

No  greater  contrast  to  this  brilliant  preparation  and 
education  for  political  leadership  can  be  imagined  than 
the  lowly  and  humble  course  through  which  Mr.  Lin 
coln  worked  his  way.  His  father  was  a  dull,  ignorant, 
lazy,  shiftless,  poor  white,  of  Kentucky  backwoods  life, 
the  son  of  a  man  of  the  same  sort,  who  immigrated  into 
Kentucky  from  Virginia,  about  the  year  1790  ;  and  his 
mother  was  the  daughter  of  one  Lucy  Hanks,  whose  fam 
ily  belonged  likewise  to  the  class  of  "poor  white  trash." 

Lincoln's  childhood,  boyhood,  and  young  manhood, 
were  spent  in  the  most  abject  poverty,  and  amid  sur 
roundings  of  the  most  humble,  demoraliz-  Lincoln's 
ing,  and  common  character.  About  the  time  early  nietory- 
he  reached  his  seventh  year,  his  worthless  father  had 
taken  care  of  his  family  as  long  as  he  could  in  a 
country  which  had  become  somewhat  civilized,  and 
moved  onward  into  a  newer  region.  The  more  fertile 
maiden  lands  of  Indiana  seemed  to  offer  richer  winnings 
to  the  stupid,  thriftless  Kentuckian.  Thither  he  took 
his  family,  and  in  a  miserable  cabin  in  the  wilderness 
he  housed  them.  For  ten  years  now  Abraham  Lincoln 
worked  for  his  father  under  greater  severity  than  the  av- 


6  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

erage  slave  of  the  South  worked  for  his  master.  During 
this  time  he  received  altogether  not  more  than  one  year 
of  schooling.  He  had  no  books,  except  the  Bible  and  a 
copy  of  ^Esop's  Fables,  and  could  get  none.  He  was 
thoughtful,  meditative,  thirstful  for  knowledge,  and 
ambitious,  and  the  uncongeniality  and  hopelessness  of 
his  surroundings  induced  in  him  a  dejection  of  spirit 
and  a  settled  melancholy,  which  immediately  impressed 
everyone  who  came  into  contact  with  him  as  one  of  his 
chief  peculiarities.  He  had,  indeed,  already  revealed  his 
rich  vein  of  humor,  which  was  not  exactly  the  humor  of 
pessimism,  but  very  much  like  the  humor  of  despair.  His 
tree-felling,  rail-splitting,  digging,  ploughing  and  lifting, 
had  made  him  a  full-grown,  powerful  man  at  seventeen. 
At  nineteen  he  took  his  first  journey  into  the  great 
world  as  a  "hand"  on  a  flat-boat,  destined  for  New 
Orleans.  Upon  this  journey,  and  a  subsequent  one  to 
the  same  place,  made  some  three  years  later,  he  saw 
slavery  under  some  of  its  most  forbidding  aspects,  and 
conceived  thus  early  in  his  life  a  deep  hatred  for  the 
institution.  In  the  spring  of  1830,  just  as  he  had  at 
tained  his  majority,  and  his  legal  freedom  from  his 
father's  control,  the  family  moved  again  in  search  of 
Removal  to  r^cner  lands.  They  settled  this  time  upon  a 
Illinois.  bluff  overlooking  Sangamon  River,  in  Macon 

County,  Illinois.  Lincoln  now  went  to  work  at  all 
kinds  of  jobs  for  himself.  He  was  a  great  rail-splitter, 
and  was  occupied  chiefly  with  such  employment  until  he 
fell  in  with  one  Denton  Offut,  a  bluff,  sanguine,  enter 
prising  fellow,  without  much  capacity  for  making  a 
success  of  anything,  but  with  indefatigable  genius  for 
planning,  who  hired  him  to  go  upon  his  second  journey 
to  New  Orleans,  and,  on  his  return,  gave  him  employ 
ment  in  a  store  at  New  Salem.  Offut's  almost  imme 
diate  failure  in  the  mercantile  business  set  Lincoln 


DAVIS,    LINCOLN   AND   DOUGLAS  7 

afloat  again,  not,  however,  until  the  slovenly  clerk  had 
made  many  acquaintances  among  Offut's  customers,  and 
some  reputation  as  a  good  story-teller  and  a  promising 
politician  among  the  loafers  who  congregated  every 
evening  in  the  back-room  of  Offut's  store. 

Lincoln  now  tried  military  life  in  the  Black-Hawk 
War,  to  which  reference  has  already  been  made,  and 
owing  to  the  popularity  which  he  had  acquired,  and  to 
his  great  physical  powers,  he  was  elected  Captain  of  his 
company.  At  the  close  of  this  service,  which  lasted  only 
a  few  months,  he  returned  to  New  Salem,  and  in  1832 
tried  to  secure  an  election  to  the  Legislature.  Defeated 
in  this  first  political  effort,  he  turned  again  to  store- 
keeping,  bought  the  stock  of  the  Herndon  Brothers,  and 
set  himself  up,  with  one  William  Berry  for  partner,  as  a 
merchant.  In  less  than  a  year,  this  venture  proved  a 
failure.  Lincoln  was  now  involved  in  debt,  and  scarcely 
knew  which  way  to  turn.  He  worked  around  at  odd 
jobs,  earning  a  bare  pittance,  and  reading  borrowed  law 
books  at  every  spare  moment.  At  this  juncture  the 
Surveyor  of  the  county,  one  John  Calhoun,  made  him 
Deputy  Surveyor.  He  now  studied  his  mathematics 
with  great  assiduity,  and  soon  became  proficient  in  the 
work  of  his  office.  At  the  same  time  he  secured  the  place 
of  Postmaster  of  New  Salem.  The  two  positions  gave 
him  the  means  of  livelihood,  and  from  this  time  forward 
he  was  able  to  exist  without  being  compelled  to  employ 
any  considerable  portion  of  his  time  in  manual  labor. 

He  allied  himself  politically  with  the  Whig  party,  and 
developed  his  political  opinions  under  the  influence  of 
its  national  creed.     In  1834,  he  was  elected, 
as  a  Whig,   to  the  Illinois  Legislature,  and  first  political 
again  in  1836.     In  1837,  he  migrated  from   experi 
New  Salem  to   Springfield,  to   which  latter  place  the 
capitol  of  the  Commonwealth  had  just  been  removed, 


8  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

in  some  degree  through  his  influence  and  efforts.  He 
was  still  so  poor  that  he  could  not  pay  the  sum  of  seven 
teen  dollars  for  the  necessary  furnishings  of  a  room  in 
which  to  sleep,  and  was  literally  compelled  to  accept  the 
hospitality  of  Joshua  F.  Speed,  who  offered  to  share 
room  and  bed  with  him.  He  was  now  twenty-eight 
years  of  age,  and  certainly  this  was  a  bad  showing  from 
the  point  of  view  of  worldly  success.  He  now  began 
the  practice  of  law,  as  the  partner  of  John  T.  Stuart, 
but  broke  away  from  this  career  almost  immediately  for 
another  term  in  the  Legislature. 

It  was  one  of  Lincoln's  traits  that  he  liked  the  society 
of  men  better  than  that  of  women.  Nevertheless  he  was 
not  blind  to  feminine  attractions,  and  was  not  unsuc 
cessful  in  his  suits.  In  1835,  he  entered  into  an  engage 
ment  of  marriage  with  a  charming  young  girl  of  New 
Salem,  Annie  Rutledge,  by  name,  who  died  before  the 
consummation  of  vows.  This  sad  event  deepened  greatly 
the  habitual  melancholy  of  his  life.  In  1840,  he  sought 
successfully  the  hand  of  Miss  Mary  Todd,  a  bright,  vi 
vacious,  pretty,  and,  in  comparison  with  himself,  highly 
Lincoln's  horn  and  highly  bred  Kentucky  girl.  The 
marriage.  strange  conduct  of  Lincoln  in  not  appearing 
on  the  evening  appointed  for  the  wedding,  when  the 
bride  and  guests  were  awaiting  anxiously  his  coming, 
and  the  still  stranger  conduct  of  Miss  Todd  in  marry 
ing  him  nearly  two  years  afterward,  despite  the  morti 
fication  and  chagrin  which  he  had  caused  her,  are 
scarcely  subjects  to  be  treated  in  a  constitutional  history 
of  the  United  States,  and  yet  these  things  had  their  in 
fluence  in  shaping  the  course  of  that  history.  They  had 
their  part  in  creating  that  domestic  incompatibility  be 
tween  Mr.  Lincoln  and  his  wife,  which  drove  him  so 
constantly  from  the  seclusion  of  his  own  fireside  into 
the  haunts  of  men,  thus  widening  his  acquaintance 


DAVIS,    LINCOLN   AND   DOUGLAS  9 

among  men  and  increasing  his  influence  with  them, 
and  which  helped  to  cultivate  in  him  that  sense  of 
aloneness,  the  twin  of  self-reliance,  and  that  silent  pa 
tience,  which  were  snch  marked  ingredients  of  his  great 
personality. 

Lincoln's  nearest  friend,  Herndon,  says  that  Lincoln 
finally  married  Miss  Todd  simply  because  he  felt  that 
he  was  bound  in  honor  to  do  so  ;  and  that  Miss  Todd  so 
far  condoned  the  offence  which  he  had  given  her  by  ab 
sconding  upon  the  date  originally  set  for  the  wedding  as 
to  marry  him  nearly  two  years  later,  because  she  had 
discerned  his  coming  greatness,  and  because  she  desired 
the  satisfaction  of  an  ultimate  triumph  over  the  man 
who  had  so  shamefully  left  her  in  the  lurch  upon  the 
evening  of  January  1st,  1841.  It  was  certainly  a  very 
bad  beginning,  and  it  resulted  most  disastrously  to  the 
peace  and  comfort  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  domestic  life,  but  it 
is  altogether  probable  that  such  discipline  as  his  con 
stant  unhappiness  at  home  imposed  upon  him  chastened 
his  character,  developed  his  self-reliance,  his  patience 
and  his  conciliatory  spirit,  and  thus  fitted  him  all  the 
better  for  the  great  work  which  lay  before  him  in  the 
hidden  future.  The  year  following  his  marriage  to 
Miss  Todd,  Lincoln  associated  with  himself,  in  the 
practice  of  law,  William  H.  Herndon.  This  arrange 
ment  proved  most  advantageous  to  both  parties.  Hern 
don  was  faithful  to  Lincoln's  political  fortunes  to  the 
end,  and  their  business  union  was  dissolved  only  by  the 
shot  of  the  assassin  Booth. 

Mr.   Lincoln   began  his   political    career    upon    the 
broader  stage  of  national  politics  at  the  same  time  and 
in  the  same  manner  with  Mr.  Davis.     That 
is,  he  was  a  candidate  for  presidential  elec-   national  poii- 
tor  in  the  campaign  of  1844.     He  canvassed 
the  Commonwealth  of  Illinois    for  Mr.  Clay  and  won 


10  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

considerable  reputation  by  his  speeches.  He  also  en 
tered  Congress  at  very  nearly  the  same  time  as  Mr. 
Davis,  and  they  were  both  members  of  the  House  of 
Representatives  at  the  period  of  the  Mexican  war. 
Lincoln's  attitude  toward  the  war  was  almost  the  very 
opposite  of  that  taken  by  Davis.  While  Davis  support 
ed  the  war  policy,  and  shed  his  blood  upon  the  battle 
field  in  its  execution,  Lincoln  denounced  it,  and  discour 
aged  its  execution  as  far  as  he  could  without  actually 
voting  to  withhold  the  necessary  supplies.  The  splen 
did  triumph  of  the  American  arms  damaged  greatly  the 
political  prospects  of  many  of  the  men  who  opposed 
the  war,  and  among  them  those  of  Mr.  Lincoln.  At  the 
expiration  of  his  term  he  returned  to  private  life,  and 
for  the  next  five  years  devoted  himself  to  the  practice  of 
his  profession.  The  agitation  over  the  Kansas-Nebraska 
Bill,  and  the  repeal  of  the  restriction  upon  slavery  in  the 
Louisiana  territory  above  the  line  of  thirty-six  degrees 
and  thirty  minutes,  called  him  again  into  the  political 
arena.  From  this  time  onward  to  1860  he  was  develop 
ing  in  his  thought  and  utterances  that  "body  of  Repub 
lican  doctrine "  which  led  to  the  final  triumph  of  his 
party  and  to  his  own  election  to  the  presidency.  He 
was  chosen  again  to  the  Legislature  in  1854,  but  almost 
immediately  resigned  his  seat,  in  order  to  improve  his 
chances,  as  he  thought,  for  the  United  States  senatorship, 
which  was  to  be  filled  at  that  session.  In  this  plan  he 
was  disappointed  by  the  sharp  practice  of  the  five  Free- 
soil  Democrats  of  the  Legislature,  who  persisted  in  vot 
ing  for  Trumbull  until  it  became  manifest  to  Lincoln  and 
his  supporters  that  they  must  go  for  Trumbull  or  see  a 
"Nebraska  Democrat"  elected,  when  Lincoln  himself 
gave  the  word  to  elect  Trumbull.  It  was  probably  un 
derstood  at  the  time  that  the  friends  of  Trumbull,  the 
Free-soil  Democrats,  would  assist  to  put  Lincoln  in  the 


11 

seat  then  occupied  by  Mr.  Douglas,  at  the  close  of  the 
hitter's  term  in  1858.  Whether  or  not  it  was  so  planned, 
it  so  happened,  and  the  summer  and  autumn  of  that 
year  witnessed  the  ever-memorable  debate  between  the 
two  "Giants,"  in  which  the  doctrines  of  the  Douglas 
democracy  and  the  Lincoln  republicanism  were  quite 
distinctly  formulated.  Mr.  Lincoln  was  again  defeated 
for  the  senatorship,  but  his  nobly  fought  campaign  made 
him  the  nominee  of  his  party  for  the  presidency  in  1860, 
and  destroyed  the  chances  of  Douglas  for  uniting  the 
Democratic  party  of  the  South  with  that  of  the  North 
in  the  great  struggle  of  that  year. 

Mr.  Douglas,  finally,  was  a  descendant  of  very  dif 
ferent  stock  from  the  ancestry  of  Mr.  Lincoln.  He  was 
as  highly  born  as  Mr.  Davis.  To  be  exact 

ii  •     i    •  i  -111,1  Douglas. 

upon  that  point  it  must  be  said  that  he  was 
even  more  highly  born  than  Mr.  Davis.  On  his  father's 
side  he  came  from  the  Douglases  of  Scotch  fame,  and 
on  his  mother's  from  that  William  Arnold,  of  Rhode 
Island,  who  was  the  associate  of  Roger  Williams  in  the 
founding  of  that  Province,  and  whose  son  was  appointed 
by  King  Charles  II.  its  first  governor  under  the  royal 
charter.  Mr.  Douglas's  father  was  a  respectable,  not  to 
say  distinguished,  physician  of  Brandon,  Vermont. 

Dr.  Douglas  died  on  the  1st  day  of  July,  1813,  when 
the  subject  of  this  sketch  was  about  two  months  old. 
He  was  poor  at  the  time  of  his  death,  and  his  wife  and 
two  children  were  provided  for  during  the  next  fifteen 
years  by  Mrs.  Douglas's  brother,  a  well-to-do  farmer 
of  Vermont,  by  the  name  of  Fisk.  The  inability  of  Mr. 
Fisk  to  defray  the  expenses  of  an  academic  education 
for  young  Stephen  caused  him  to  begin  life  for  himself. 
He  was  only  fifteen  years  of  age,  but  went  forth  bravely 
to  meet  the  hardships  of  the  struggle  for  existence.  He 
walked  from  Brandon  to  Middlebury  with  all  of  his  pos- 


12  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

sessions  in  a  little  pack  upon  his  back,  and  apprenticed 
himself  to  a  cabinet  maker.  For  two  years  he  worked 
industriously  at  his  trade  until  his  health  failed.  He 
then  attended  Brandon  Academy  for  a  year,  devoting 
himself  with  great  enthusiasm  to  classical  study.  Mean 
while  his  mother  had  married  Mr.  Gehazi  Granger,  of 
Canandaigua,  New  York,  and  had  removed  her  residence 
to  that  place.  Thither  young  Douglas  now  went  by  the 
invitation  of  his  step-father,  and  became  a  student  in  the 
once  famous  Canandaigua  Academy.  For  three  years 
he  pursued  the  courses  of  instruction  in  that  institution 
with  great  avidity  and  success,  and,  during  a  portion  of 
the  time,  also  read  law  in  the  office  of  the  Hubbells. 
He  here  began  to  develop  his  talent  for  extemporaneous 
debate  and  political  management. 

In  June  of  1833  he  started  westward,  locating  first  in 
Cleveland,  Ohio,  as  a  clerk  in  the  law  office  of  the  Hon. 
S.  J.  Andrews.  His  health  soon  suffered  here  from  the 
malaria  of  the  country,  and  by  the  advice  of  his  physician 
he  left  Cleveland,  but  instead  of  returning  to  the  East 
he  went  farther  westward.  He  tried  Cincinnati,  Louis 
ville,  and  St.  Louis,  with  no  success.  He  then  pushed 
on  to  Jacksonville  in  Illinois,  arriving  there  in  the  last 
days  of  November  (1833),  with  only  thirty-seven  cents  in 
his  pocket.  He  found  nothing  here  to  do,  and  was  ob 
liged  to  sell  some  of  his  books  for  bread.  In  a  few  days 
he  was  again  compelled  to  face  hunger.  To  attempt  to 
practise  law,  at  such  a  moment,  was  out  of  the  question. 
He  would  starve  before  he  could  find  a  client.  He  heard 
of  a  chance  to  organize  a  school  at  a  place  called  Win 
chester,  a  few  miles  distant  from  Jacksonville,  and  one 
November  morning  he  walked  over  to  the  little  town 
and  set  himself  up  as  a  teacher  of  a  three  months'  school. 
He  now  had  bread  and  shelter,  and  conld  devote  a  little 
spare  time  to  continuing  his  law  reading. 


DAVIS,    LINCOLN   AND   DOUGLAS  13 

On  the  4th  of  March,  1834,  when  not  yet  quite 
twenty-one  years  of  age,  he  received  his  license  to 
practise  before  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  Common 
wealth.  He  was  a  successful  practitioner  from  the 
first.  The  same  month  in  which  he  obtained  ad 
mission  to  the  bar  was  signalized  by  his  entrance  into 
political  life.  He  made  a  strong  political  speech  at 
Jacksonville  in  support  of  President  Jackson's  Anti- 
bank  policy.  It  was  considered  by  those  who  heard  it 
and  many  of  his  subsequent  efforts  as  among  his 
best.  It  was  upon  this  occasion  that  he  was  hailed 
for  the  first  time  as  the  "Little  Giant."  The  re 
sult  of  this  immediate  success  at  the  bar  and  on 
the  hustings  was  his  election,  in  February  of  1835, 
as  prosecuting  attorney  for  the  first  judicial  district  of 
the  Commonwealth  over  the  highly  accomplished  and 
much  respected  John  J.  Hard  in.  He  was  an  able, 
fearless  and  successful  prosecutor,  and  his  services  in 
this  capacity  contributed  greatly  to  the  establishment 
of  law  and  order  in  the  then  comparatively  new  com 
munity. 

In  the  winter  of  1835-36,  he  began  the  work  of  or 
ganizing  the  Democratic  party  in  Illinois.  Down  to 
that  time  it  had  been  customary  in  Illinois 
for  candidates  for  public  place  to  present  apartjforgan- 
themselves,  or  be  presented  by  a  small 
number  of  political  friends,  and  to  conduct  their 
own  canvasses,  either  alone  or  with  the  aid  of  a 
few  such  friends.  Douglas  now  conceived  the  plan  of 
winning  Morgan  County,  the  county  of  his  residence, 
from  the  Whigs  by  a  strict  organization  of  the  Demo 
cratic  party  in  county  convention,  which  should 
nominate  candidates,  and  plan  and  control  the  cam 
paign  for  their  election.  He  would  thus  be  able  to  op 
pose  a  regular  ticket,  with  only  a  single  candidate  for 


14  THE   CIVIL   WAK 

each  place,  to  the  loose  methods  of  the  Whigs.  He  suc 
ceeded  in  his  purpose,  and  although  the  Whigs  were 
driven  by  this  movement  also  to  unite  upon  a  single 
ticket,  yet  they  were  beaten  by  the  Douglas  organiza 
tion,  and  the  county  passed  under  the  control  of  the 
Democratic  party  for  a  long  period.  This  was  the  be 
ginning  of  the  "  Douglas  Machine  "  in  Illinois.  In  this 
election  Mr.  Douglas  himself  was  chosen  to  the  Legislat 
ure,  and  on  the  first  Monday  of  December,  1836,  when 
only  a  little  over  twenty-three  years  of  age,  he  began  his 
career  as  a  legislator.  In  four  months  from  this  date 
his  fame  had  reached  Washington,  and  he  received  from 
the  new  President,  Mr.  Van  Buren,  the  appointment  to 
the  office  of  Land  Eegister  at  Springfield,  in  Illinois. 
Mr.  Douglas  held  this  office  for  a  little  longer  than  one 
year,  and  during  this  time,  he  was  working  upon  the 
problem  of  organizing  the  Democratic  party  in  the  Con 
gressional  districts  and  in  the  Commonwealth,  after  the 
model  of  the  Morgan  County  organization. 

In  November  of  1837,  he  was  nominated  by  the 
Democratic  district  convention  of  the  northern  district 
in  the  Commonwealth  as  candidate  for  the  House  of 
Representatives  of  the  National  Congress.  His  oppo 
nent  Avas  the  Hon.  John  T.  Stuart,  Lincoln's  former 
partner,  and  one  of  the  ablest  and  most  popular  citizens 
of  Illinois.  Mr.  Douglas  was  defeated  by  only  five 
votes,  and  it  was  a  question  whether  this  was  not  at 
tributable  to  an  error  in  the  making  up  of  the  ticket. 

For  the  next  two  years  he  devoted  himself  to  the 
practice  of  his  profession,  but  in  the  presidential  con 
test  of  1840,  he  again  mounted  the  hustings,  and,  pitted 
against  Cyrus  Walker  and  Mr.  Lincoln,  opened  the 
campaign  in  Illinois.  This  was  the  beginning  of  his 
political  rivalry  with  Mr.  Lincoln  which  was  to  culmi 
nate  in  the  great  struggle  of  1860,  Probably  it  was  owing 


DAVIS,    LINCOLN   AND   DOUGLAS  15 

to  his  efforts  more  than  to  those  of  any  other  one  man 
that  the  Commonwealth  of  Illinois  chose  Democratic 
electors.  In  January  of  1841,  he  was  appointed  Secre 
tary  of  State  of  Illinois,,  and,  in  a  little  over  one  month 
afterward,  he  was  elected  by  the  Legislature  a  judge  of 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  Commonwealth.  He  was  not 
yet  twenty-eight  years  of  age,  but  he  made  an  able, 
fearless  and  just  magistrate.  In  December  of  1842  he 
was  put  forward  by  his  friends  as  a  candidate  for 
United  States  Senator,  although  he  had  not  completed 
his  thirtieth  year.  He  came  within  five  votes  of  an 
election  in  a  total  of  one  hundred  and  eleven  votes 
cast  by  the  Legislature  in  joint  session. 

In  the  spring  of  1843,  he  was  again  nominated  as  a 
candidate  for  a  seat  in  the  National  House  of  Repre 
sentatives.  His  competitor  this  time  was  Douglas  in 
the  Hon.  0.  H.  Browning,  a  man  of  great  CoDsre88- 
ability  and  popularity.  He  immediately  resigned  his 
judicial  office,  and  in  a  most  hotly  waged  contest 
won  the  election.  From  this  time  forward  to  the 
end  of  his  life,  he  was  a  member  of  the  National 
Congress.  He  served  in  the  House  until  1847  and 
after  that  in  the  Senate.  He  was  early  appointed 
chairman  of  the  House  committee  on  Territories,  and, 
upon  his  transfer  to  the  Senate,  was  soon  elected  chair 
man  of  the  Senate  committee  on  the  same  subject.  In 
these  positions  he  developed  those  peculiar  doctrines 
about  Territorial  government  and  relations  entitled 
"  Popular  Sovereignty,"  or  "  Squatter  Sovereignty/' 
which  led  to  the  unsettling  of  the  customary  views  upon 
these  subjects,  and  to  the  rupture  of  the  old  agree 
ments  and  understandings  in  regard  to  the  question  of 
slavery  in  the  Territories  which  have  been  recounted 
and  described  in  the  preceding  volume  of  this  Avork. 

Such  was  the  origin  and  such  the  education  of  the 


16  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

three  great  personalities  around  whom  and  whose  doc 
trines  the  history  of  the  country  chiefly  turned  in  those 
momentous  years  from  1857  to  1861,  and  around  two  of 
whom  it  continued  to  turn  for  four  years  more  as  the 
chiefs  of  the  mighty  hosts  of  war,  who  decided  at  last 
by  the  issue  of  arms  what  could  not  be  settled  by  peace 
ful  adjustment. 

These  differences  of  origin,  surroundings,  and  educa 
tion  account,  in  large  degree,  for  the  differences  in  mind 

Differences  an^  character  obtaining  between  them, 
chaste?  abed  The  Celtic  blood;  military  education,  and 
Lincoln  Da  ri  d  slaye'n°lding  experiences  of  Mr.  Davis  will 
Douglas.  easily  explain  the  chief  points  in  his  intel 
lectual  and  moral  constitution.  He  saw  very  clearly, 
but  not  deeply.  He  was  logical  rather  than  intuitive, 
and  possessed  little  real  imagination.  From  given  prem 
ises  he  reasoned  with  great  exactness,  but  had  neither 
the  inductive  power  nor  the  power  of  insight  necessary 
to  the  discovery  of  the  principles  or  axioms  upon  which 
he  based  his  syllogisms.  The  letter  of  the  Constitution, 
as  the  fathers  made  it  and  understood  it,  was  his  politi 
cal  bible,  and  he  manifested  nowhere  the  slightest  appre 
ciation  of  the  consideration  that  the  fathers  might  have 
failed  to  give  exact  expression,  in  the  instrument,  to  the 
political  and  social  conditions  of  the  country,  or  of 
the  consideration  that  those  conditions  might  have  so 
changed  through  the  natural  course  of  human  develop 
ment  as  to  require  either  a  revision  of  the  instrument, 
or  the  employment  of  methods  of  liberal  interpretation, 
such  as  would  enable  the  political  forces  and  ideas,  exist 
ing  at  any  given  moment,  to  find  some  expression  through 
it.  He  ridiculed  the  idea  of  the  "  higher  law,"  which  is 
only  an  unfortunate  name  for  a  profound  truth,  the  truth 
that  jurisprudence  has  its  basis  in  ethics,  and  must  de 
velop  with  the  unfolding  of  the  common  consciousness 


AND   DOUGLAS  17 

of  right  and  wrong.  Mr.  Da  vis's  rhetoric  corresponded 
in  character  closely  with  his  logic.  It  was  pure,  perspic 
uous,  and  rather  terse.  It  must  have  been  a  great  relief 
to  the  Senate,  after  listening  to  the  ornate  sentences, 
mixed  metaphors,  and  far-fetched  similes  of  most  of  the 
Southern  members,  to  have  Mr.  Davis  tell  them  briefly, 
plainly,  and  distinctly,  just  what  it  was  all  about.  As 
discussion  and  debate  approach  the  point  of  action  such 
personalities  are  indispensably  necessary  to  formulate  the 
creeds  for  which  men  fight  and  die.  His  bearing  and 
conduct  were  likewise  in  accord  with  the  character  of 
his  thought  and  speech.  He  was  dignified,  grave,  almost 
severe,  and  decided  even  to  imperiousness.  He  was 
rather  impatient,  and  rather  inclined  to  suspect  those 
who  differed  with  him  in  opinion  of  being  influenced  by 
wrong  motives.  But  withal  he  was  noble,  kind,  generous 
in  his  feelings,  if  not  in  his  intellect,  brave,  self-sac 
rificing,  and  grandly  devoted  to  duty  as  he  understood 
it.  It  was  not  accident  that  such  a  mind 
and  character  stood  as  the  representative,  reseantativpe 
in  1860,  of  that  narrow  but  distinct  view  charac 
of  the  Constitution,  which  claimed  that  the  "  States " 
were  copartners  in  the  Territories,  and  that  the 
emigrant  from  any  "  State "  into  a  Territory  carried 
with  him  the  law  of  the  "  State  "  from  which  he  emi 
grated  with  reference  to  property,  and  the  represen 
tative  of  that  imperious  demand  which  claimed  the 
protection  of  the  rights  based  upon  such  law  by 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  for  so  long  as 
the  Territorial  status  should  continue.  Mr.  Davis  had 
advanced  this  theory  as  far  back  as  1848  in  his 
famous  12th  of  July  speech  upon  the  question  of  the 
organization  of  Oregon  Territory.  Mr.  Calhoun  had 
given  utterance  to  it  before  Mr.  Davis,  and  so  had 
Mr.  Rhett  ;  but  Mr.  Calhoun  died  ten  years  before  the 
VOL.  I.— 2 


18  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

matter  was  ripe  for  the  trial  by  battle,  and  his  mantle 
fell  upon  Mr.  Davis ;  while  Mr.  Rhett  was  too  extravagant 
in  his  notions  and  expressions,  too  utterly  lacking  in 
the  elements  of  commandership,  to  rival  Mr.  Davis  as  the 
chief  representative  of  the  Southern  view  and  purpose. 

The  Celtic  component  in  Mr.  Douglas's  blood  also  was 
clearly  manifested  in  his  intellectual  constitution.  He 
was  more  superficial  than  Mr.  Davis  in  his 
traits crfDoug-  mental  action,  and  also  less  clear.  On  the 
other  hand,  his  volubility  was  extraordinary. 
In  fact,  his  tongue  frequently  ran  away  with  his  brain. 
He  was  always  the  readiest  man  in  debate,  whether  he 
had  studied  the  subject  under  discussion  or  not,  al 
though  it  cannot  be  said  that  he  did  not  study  carefully 
his  subject.  He  was  vacillating  concerning  the  details 
of  his  opinions,  but  he  clung  to  the  general  principles 
involved  in  them  with  great  tenacity,  though  not  with 
the  fanaticism  of  Mr.  Davis.  He  diifered  greatly  from 
Mr.  Davis  in  feelings  and  disposition.  He  was  always 
brim  full  of  good  cheer,  hail  fellow  well  met  with  every 
body,  and  perfectly  adored  by  the  young  men  who  sur 
rounded  him.  He  was  a  thorough  believer  in  the  wis 
dom  and  capacity  of  the  people,  especially  of  the 
people  of  the  great  West,  and  in  their  innate  fitness  for 
self-government.  He  was  a  real  thorough-going,  boast 
ful,  vainglorious  Democrat,  while  Mr.  Davis,  though  pro 
fessing  democracy  and  believing  himself  to  be  a  Demo 
crat,  was  a  high-toned,  reserved,  aristocratic  gentleman 
of  the  old  school.  Mr.  Douglas  was  impulsive,  but  not 
quick  to  anger,  generous  with  his  assistance  to  everybody 
who  sought  it,  honest  and  upright  in  all  private  deal 
ings,  but  decidedly  inclined  to  the  Celtic  view  that  all 
things  are  fair  in  politics.  He  was  constantly  on  the 
lookout  for  some  new  thing,  and  made  a  great  point  of 
never  being  left  behind.  It  was  not  at  all  accidental 


DAVIS,    LINCOLN    AND    DOUGLAS  19 

that  the  doctrine  that  the  people  resident  within  a  Ter 
ritory  should  he  entrusted  with  about  the  same  degree 
of  self-government  as  those  residing  within  a  Common 
wealth  found  its  chief  exponent  in  him.  He  was  just 
the  man  to  believe  that  the  Western  adventurers,  hunt 
ers,  and  cowboys  were  as  fully  equipped  for  states 
manship  as  the  transcendentalisms  of  Boston  or  the  gold 
bugs  of  New  York,  and  needed  no  period  of  pupilage  or 
guardianship  under  the  Washington  Government  to  pre 
pare  them  for  civilization  and  the  customs  of  settled  life. 
He  was  also  just  the  man  to  fall  into  helpless  confusion 
when  it  came  to  the  work  of  distinctly  fixing  and  formu 
lating  the  practical  details  of  this  doctrine,  and  to  bury 
the  real  question  at  issue  under  a  mountain  of  verbiage. 
He  was  never  able  to  give  a  clear  and  satisfactory 
answer  to  Mr.  Lincoln's  noted  question,  in  the  famous 
joint  debates  in  Illinois  in  the  year  1858. 

J  The    debate 

whether  there  was  any  way,  under  the  doc-   between  Lin- 

,    .  j.,,-r»          i        n  •  »  i.         ,1  colnand 

trine  of  "  Popular  Sovereignty,  for  the  peo-  Douglas  in 
pie  in  a  Territory  to  prohibit  the  exist 
ence  of  slavery  during  the  Territorial  period.  He  had 
declared  his  adherence  to  the  Dred  Scott  decision,  and 
that  decision  was  considered  by  him  and  his  party  to 
hold  that  Congress  had  no  power  to  prohibit  slavery  in 
the  Territories.  Of  course,  if  Congress  had  no  power 
to  do  it,  neither  the  Territorial  legislature  nor  the  peo 
ple  resident  within  a  Territory  could  do  it,  since  a  Ter 
ritory  is  a  purely  Congressional  creation,  and  can  have 
no  powers  except  such  as  are  conferred  upon  it  by  Con 
gress,  and  Congress  is  not  authorized  to  confer  upon  a 
Territory  any  powers  which  Congress  itself  cannot  exer 
cise,  or  empower  the  President  of  the  United  States  to 
exercise. 

Lincoln's  famous  question,  as  he  finally  formulated  it, 
was  :    "  Can  the  people  of  a  United  States  Territory, 


20  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

under  the  Dred  Scott  decision,  in  any  lawful  way,  against 
the  wish  of  any  citizen  of  the  United  States,  exclude 
slavery  from  its  limits,  prior  to  the  formation  of  a  State 
constitution  ?  "  Douglas's  intellectual  insight  was  not 
clear  enough  and  penetrating  enough  to  discover  the 
inconsistency  between  the  dictum  of  the  Dred  Scott 
opinion  and  his  doctrine  of  "  Popular  Sovereignty/'  or 
really  to  appreciate  it  after  it  had  been  pointed  out  to 
him.  This  is  very  evident  from  the  fact  that  there  was 
a  way  out  of  the  difficulty,  simply  to  hold,  as  the  best 
lawyers  do  now  and  did  then,  that  the  point  decided 
in  the  Dred  Scott  case  was  only  that  a  negro  descended 
from  a  slave  mother  was  not,  and  could  not  be,  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States,  and  that  the  declaration  in  the 
opinion  about  the  inability  of  Congress  to  prohibit  slav 
ery  from  the  Territories  was  mere  dictum  obiter.  Under 
this  view  of  the  case  there  was  no  necessary  inconsistency 
involved  in  professing  allegiance  both  to  the  decision 
and  to  the  doctrine  of  "Popular  Sovereignty."  But 
Douglas  did  not  take  this  way  out.  There  is  no  evi 
dence  in  anything  he  said  that  he  saw  this  way  out.  His 
very  superficial  answer  was  that  the  people  within  a 
Territory  might,  despite  the  Dred  Scott  decision,  under 
his  doctrine  of  "  Popular  Sovereignty,"  exclude  slavery 
from  the  Territory,  prior  to  the  forming  of  a  "  State  " 
constitution,  by  failing  to  enact  the  police  regulations 
for  the  protection  of  slave  property  therein,  and  by 
Territorial  legislation  unfriendly  to  the  maintenance  of 
such  property.  It  did  not  take  Lincoln  five  minutes  to 
show  that  slavery  could  exist  without  any  police  regula 
tions  in  its  favor,  that  it  did  so  exist  in  the  earliest 
period  of  its  history  in  the  country,  that  Dred  Scott 
himself  was  held  in  slavery  in  Minnesota  Territory  with 
out  any  such  regulations,  that  under  the  Dred  Scott 
decision,  as  Judge  Douglas  and  the  Democrats  under- 


DAVIS,    LINCOLN    AND    DOUGLAS  21 

stood  it,  the  enactment  by  any  Territorial  legislature 
of  regulations  unfriendly  to  slave  property  would  be  in 
violation  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  itself, 
and  that  the  failure  of  a  Territorial  legislature  to  enact 
regulations  for  the  protection  of  slave  property  would 
be  the  transgression  of  a  duty  laid  upon  it  by  the  Con 
stitution  of  the  United  States. 

After  this,  Douglas  did  get  down  deep  enough  in 
thought  to  obtain  some  faint  glimmerings  of  the  in 
consistency  in  which  he  was  involved.  He  Douglas's 
subsequently  stated  his  answer  in  different 
language.  He  said  that  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States,  as  interpreted  by  the  Dred  Scott  de 
cision,  "did  not  carry  slavery  into  the  Territories  beyond 
the  power  of  the  people  of  the  Territories  to  control  it 
as  other  property/7  It  did  not  take  Mr.  Lincoln  live 
minutes  more  to  show  that,  since  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  contained  the  provision  that  no  one  should 
be  deprived  of  his  property  without  due  process  of  law, 
and  since  the  Dred  Scott  decision  held,  according  to  Mr. 
Douglas's  understanding,  that  slave  property  was  recog 
nized  by  the  Constitution,  the  Territorial  control  of 
slave  property,  as  other  property,  could  never  mean  a 
power  in  the  people  of  a  Territory  to  destroy  slave  prop 
erty,  but  must  mean  only  a  power  to  protect  it  for  the 
benefit  of  the  owner.  Mr.  Douglas  was  never  able  to 
comprehend  fully  the  self-contradiction  under  which  he 
labored,  nor  to  extricate  himself  from  the  political  em 
barrassments  resulting  therefrom.  His  answer,  prob 
ably,  saved  him  from  defeat  in  the  Senatorial  contest  of 
1858,  but  it  lost  him  the  nomination  of  the  Democratic 
party,  as  a  whole,  for  the  presidency  in  1860,  and,  of 
course,  it  thereby  destroyed  his  chances  of  election  to 
the  presidency. 

Superficial  as  he  always  was  when  compared  with  Lin- 


THE   CIVIL   WAR 

coin,  yet  lie  had  a  most  effective  way,  to  the  ordinary 
mind,  of  stating,  pressing,  and  refuting  things.  He  would 

Hie  method  take  a  point  advanced  by  an  opponent,  de- 
of  argument.  Vei0p  jt  iuto  a  general  proposition,  which  car 
ried  falsehood  on  its  very  face,  and  would  then  attack  it 
savagely  and  demolish  it  triumphantly.  It  was  in  this 
manner  that  he  dealt  with  Lincoln's  famous  dictum  that 
the  Union  could  not  permanently  exist  half  slave  and 
half  free,  but  must  ultimately  become  all  slave  or  all  free. 
Douglas  developed  this  into  the  proposition  that  there 
must  be  uniformity  of  law  and  custom  in  all  respects  in 
the  several  Commonwealths  in  order  to  the  perpetuity  of 
the  Union,  and  then  proceeded  to  show  how  this  idea 
would  bring  about  the  establishment  of  a  centralized  em 
pire  upon  the  ruins  of  the  federal  republic.  Mr.  Douglas 
really  believed  that  he  had  completely  answered  Mr.  Lin 
coln's  proposition,  and  he  made  a  vast  number  of  his 
hearers  believe  likewise.  Many  of  the  critics  of  Mr. 
Douglas  incline  to  the  view  that  this  habit  was  a  bit  of 
conscious  sophistry  on  his  part,  but  it  is  far  more  prob 
able  that  it  was  the  natural  result  of  his  superficial 
mental  processes,  of  the  rough  and  ready  character  of 
his  thinking. 

In  very  decided  contrast  with  the  intellectual  power 
and  methods  of  Mr.  Davis  and  Mr. Douglas,  stood  those  of 
Mr.  Lincoln.  Mr.  Lincoln  was  slow  in  his  mental  move 
ments,  and  phlegmatic  and  melancholy  in  his  tempera 
ment,  but  his  thinking  was  unceasing  and  progres 
sive,  and  it  went  down,  down,  down  into  depths  of 
which  neither  Davis  nor  Douglas  had  ever  dreamed. 

Lincoln's  m-  He  was  conservative  and  law-abiding  in 
power  °  aVd  h*8  instincts  and  conduct,  fully  as  much 
methods.  so  as  either  of  the  others,  but  law  with 
him  must  be  based  on  ethical  right  in  order  to  be 
perpetual,  and  in  order  to  command  permanent 


DAVIS,    LINCOLN   AND    DOUGLAS  23 

obedience.  One  of  his  maxims  was  that  "he  who 
moulds  public  opinion  goes  deeper  than  he  who  makes 
statutes  or  pronounces  decisions ;  he  makes  the  execu 
tion  of  statutes  and  decisions  possible/'  The  care,  pa 
tience,  and  thoroughness  with  which  he  worked  out  his 
political  science  and  his  constitutional  law  are  the  high 
est  evidence  of  the  power  and  incessant  persistence  of 
his  thought.  With  him  it  was  quite  possible  that  a  de 
cision  of  the  Supreme  Court  might  be  erroneous,  yea, 
that  a  constitutional  provision  itself  might  be  erroneous  ; 
and  while  he  would  yield  obedience  to  such  a  decision 
or  provision  as  being  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Government,  he  saw  no  treason  in  endeavoring  to  expose 
the  error  in  it  to  the  people,  or  in  urging  the  people  to 
rectify  it  in  the  legally  appointed  way.  He  not  only  saw 
no  treason  in  such  conduct,  but  he  saw  positive  politi 
cal  duty  in  it.  The  legalism  of  Davis  and  of  Douglas 
would,  according  to  Lincoln's  view,  have  prevented  all 
reform  in  the  law  itself.  While  Davis  and  Douglas  took 
the  Constitution  as  interpreted  by  the  Supreme  Court 
to  be  the  sole  and  original  basis  of  all  there  was  of  the 
United  States,  and  saw  only  anarchy  back  of  the  Consti 
tution,  Lincoln  was  able  to  see  the  Nation  behind  the 
Constitution,  with  its  ideals  of  law  and  justice,  and  its 
plastic  power  to  mould  law  and  justice  into  the  forms  of 
these  ideals. 

Notwithstanding  the  depth  of  his  philosophy,  he  did 
not  lose  himself  in  transcendental  politics.  He  had 
thought  out  his  constitutional  law  as  care-  Linco]nasa 
fully  and  as  thoroughly  as  he  had  his  politi-  constitutional 
cal  ethics.  He  was  the  master  both  of  Davis 
and  of  Douglas  upon  the  ground  of  positive  law  and 
constitutional  history,  as  well  as  upon  the  ground  of 
public  morality.  When  Douglas  in  loud  triumphant 
accents  proclaimed  that  Lincoln  had  taken  the  posi- 


24  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

tion  that  the  Union  could  not  permanently  exist  half 
slave  and  half  free,  as  the  fathers  made  it,  Lincoln 
quietly  reminded  him  that  the  fathers  never  made 
the  Union  half  slave  and  half  free,  but  found  it  so, 
or  rather,  found  it  almost  entirely  slave,  and  by 
authorizing  Congress  to  prohibit  the  African  slave- 
trade  after  1808  to  any  part  of  the  United  States, 
and  by  prohibiting  slavery  from  going  into  the  North 
west  Territory,  gave  unmistakable  evidence  that 
they  regarded  slavery  as  a  temporary  status,  and  in 
tended  to  put  it  on  the  course  of  ultimate  extinction, 
and  thought  they  had  done  so.  In  a  few  of  his  terse, 
logical  sentences,  he  showed  that  Mr.  Douglas's  "  Popu 
lar  Sovereignty  "  doctrine  was  the  innovation,  the  de 
parture  from  the  ideas  and  purposes  of  the  fathers  of 
the  Constitution,  while  the  Republican  doctrine  of  pre 
venting  the  extension  of  slavery  by  Congressional  statute 
was  in  strict  accord  therewith.  Nothing  ever  exceeded 
the  vigor  and  the  clearness  with  which  he  exposed  the 
sham  of  "  Popular  Sovereignty  "  in  the  Territories  when 
taken  with  the  Dred  Scott  decision,  as  the  Democrats 
understood  the  decision.  He  summed  the  whole  miser 
able  sophism  up  in  a  single  sentence,  and  called  it  the 
doctrine  which  taught  "  that  a  thing  may  be  lawfully 
driven  away  from  where  it  has  a  lawful  right  to  be." 

The  soundness  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  distinctions  between 
the  social  sphere,  the  political  sphere,  and  the  sphere  of 
civil  liberty,  are  to-day  unquestioned  by  any  true  jurist 
and  political  scientist.  But  when  he  made  them,  they 
were  to  most  minds  very  much  like  discoveries.  Mr. 
Douglas  never  seemed  able  to  comprehend  them.  As 
Lincoln  humorously  remarked,  Douglas  seemed  to 
think  that  a  man  must  have  a  negro  woman  for  his  wife, 
if  he  did  not  want  her  for  his  slave. 

The  most  surprising  thing  about  Mr.  Lincoln's  mental 


DOUGLAS  25 

constitution  was  his  real  conservatism.  His  low  birth, 
his  common,  even  vulgar  rearing,  and  his  poverty,  are 
conditions  which  have  for  their  results,  in  Mr  Lin 
most  cases,  radical,  reckless  hatred  of  vested  coin's  con- 
interests  and  readiness  to  embrace  revolu 
tionary  methods.  But  Mr.  Lincoln  never  once  recom 
mended  anything  except  that  wise  reform  which  is 
necessary  in  this  imperfect,  changing  world  to  preserve 
what  is  sound  in  existing  conditions  ;  and  he  never 
once  recommended  revolutionary  methods  to  attain 
such  reform.  Extraordinary  patience,  forbearance  and 
conciliatoriness  were  chief  elements  in  his  thinking  and 
his  conduct.  Mr.  Douglas  exerted  himself  to  the  ut 
most  to  show  that  Lincoln's  famous  utterance  at  Spring 
field  on  June  17th,  1858,  in  the  presence  of  the  conven 
tion  which  nominated  him  as  the  candidate  of  the 
Republican  party  of  Illinois  for  United  States  Senator, 
was  revolutionary.  Lincoln  said  :  "A  house  divided 
against  itself  cannot  stand.  I  believe  this  Government 
cannot  endure  half  slave  and  half  free.  I  do  not  expect 
the  Union  to  be  dissolved  ;  I  do  not  expect  the  house  to 
fall,  but  I  do  expect  it  will  cease  to  be  divided.  It  will 
become  all  one  thing  or  all  the  other.  Either  the  op 
ponents  of  slavery  will  arrest  the  further  spread  of  it, 
and  place  it  where  the  public  mind  shall  rest  in  the  be 
lief  that  it  is  in  the  course  of  ultimate  extinction,  or  its 
advocates  will  push  it  forward,  till  it  shall  become  alike 
lawful  in  all  the  States,  old  as  well  as  new,  North  as  well 
as  South." 

Mr.  Douglas  at  once  made  this  proposition  his  chief 
point  of  attack,  and  declared  that  it  meant  the  ex 
tinction  of  slavery  in  the  "States"  where  it  existed 
by  revolutionary  means.  But  Mr.  Lincoln  first  re 
minded  him  that  it  was  rather  of  the  nature  of  a 
prophecy  than  of  a  party  platform,  and  that  it  did  not 


26  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

even  express  a  preference  for  a  free  republic  over  a  slave 
empire.  He  said,  however,  that  he  was  willing  to  give 
Judge  Douglas  the  advantage,  if  such  it  might  be,  of 
the  assumption  that  he  preferred  the  extinction  to  the 
extension  of  slavery  ;  but  he  contended  that  this  was 
the  spirit  of  the  Constitution  itself,  and  that  the  trend  of 
our  history  had  been  toward  this  consummation,  at  least 
down  to  1850.  He  showed  plainly  that  constitutional 
means  might  be  employed  for  this  purpose,  among  them 
the  prohibition  of  slavery  in  the  Territories,  and  the 
prevention  of  foreign  importation  of  slaves,  means  that 
had  been  employed  down  to  1850.  And  he  solemnly 
averred  that  he  intended  the  employment  of  no  other 
means  than  those  which  were  lawful.  It  is  true  that 
the  proposition  was  a  little  in  advance  of  what  the  Ee- 
publicans  in  Middle  and  Southern  Illinois  were  prepared 
for,  but  it  had  no  necessary  element  of  revolution  in  it. 
In  fact  it  was  a  conservative  proposition  in  the  truest 
sense  of  the  word.  Had  it  been  accepted  by  the  slave 
holders,  and  supported  by  them,  it  would  probably  have 
preserved  slavery  in  the  Commonwealths  where  it  then 
existed  for  many  years  beyond  the  actual  date  of  eman 
cipation.  The  absence  of  prejudice  and  the  love  of 
truth  can  alone  explain  this  quality  of  Mr.  Lincoln's 
mental  constitution.  Though  one  of  the  "  plain 
people,"  he  had  not  the  slightest  tinge  of  the  dema 
gogue  in  him.  He  was  ambitious;  but  his  ambition  was 
rather  of  the  altruistic  sort.  To  attain  a  power  and  an 
influence  which  might  be  effective  in  producing  some 
great  good  for  humanity,  was  his  own  interpretation  of 
his  ambition,  and  it  can  scarcely  be  questioned  that  he 
read  himself  correctly. 

It  was  not  adventitious  that  three  such  characters  as 
those  just  described  were  the  exponents  of  the  doctrines 
which  met  in  the  famous  contest  of  I860,  and  it  was  no 


DAVIS,    LINCOLN   AND   DOUGLAS  27 

more  adventitious  that  each  stood  for  what  he  did — 
Davis,  lucid  but  superficial,  insisting  that  the  letter  of 
the  law  as  interpreted  by  courts  should  be  lived  up  to, 
as  both  right  and  politic,  and  demanding  that  The  a_ 
since  the  Constitution  carried  slavery  into  the  £Swe^nreiDa8 
Territories,  under  the  latest  judicial  inter-  vis,  Douglas 

..  ,  ,  ,    .,     ~  ,     and  Lincoln  in 

pretation,  as  he  understood  it,  Congress  and  iseo  summed 
the  President  must  protect  it  there,  as  other 
property ;  Douglas,  less  lucid  and  more  superficial, 
endeavoring  to  hold  to  the  same  literal  legalism  with 
one  hand,  and  to  his  Democratic  panacea,  his  ((  Popular 
Sovereignty  "  doctrine,  with  the  other,  and  perishing  at 
last  from  their  inconsistency ;  and  Lincoln,  equally  lucid 
in  thought  and  language  with  either,  but  far  more  pro 
found,  truthful,  and  self-forgetful,  holding  that  Con 
gress  was  empowered  by  the  Constitution  to  exclude 
slavery  from  the  Territories,  and  contending  that  the 
ethics  of  the  nineteenth  century  required  that  Congress 
should  so  use  the  power  as  to  purify  every  foot  of  them 
from  the  great  curse.  While  founding  powers  upon 
law,  he  thus  founded  policy  upon  morality.  In  this  he 
differed,  to'to  cwlo,  from  the  others,  both  of  whom  made 
interests  the  basis  of  policy. 

When  the  political  contest  became  acute  the  Douglas 
doctrine  was  virtually  swept  from  the  field,  and  the  op 
posing  forces  were  ranged  under  the  principle  of  Con 
gressional  prohibition  of  slavery  from  the  Territories, 
on  the  one  hand,  or  Congressional  protection  of  slavery 
in  all  the  Territories,  on  the  other.  This  was  clear, 
exact,  and  comprehensive,  and  the  triumph  of  the  first 
at  the  polls  in  1860  was  the  earnest  of  its  triumph  on 
the  battle-field  in  1865. 


CHAPTER  II 

ANTI-SLAVERY   SENTIMENT  IN  THE  SOUTH  BETWEEN 
1857    AND    1860 

Statistics  of  Slave-ownership,  in  I860— Reasons  for  the  Lack  of  In 
quiry  into  the  Sentiments  of  the  non-Slaveholders  in  the  South 
in  Regard  to  Slavery — Hostility  to  Slavery  and  to  the  Slave 
owners  at  the  South,  in  1860,  Chiefly  Social — Social  Hostility 
Was  Leading,  however,  to  Political  Differences — The  Leader 
ship  of  the  Southern  Whigs  After  the  Death  of  Henry  Clay— 
Hinton  Rowan  Helper,  and  His  Book— Anti- Slavery  Sentiment 
at  the  South,  in  1858,  Estimated — The  Common  Fear  of  Slave 
Insurrection — The  Harper's  Ferry  Catastrophe,  and  Its  Results 
— The  Leaders  of  the  South  and  Slave  Insurrection— The  Har 
per's  Ferry  Outrage  and  the  Solid  South — End  and  Means  in 
Civilization. 

THE  most  generous  estimate  that  can  be  made  will 
show  that  not  over  two  millions  of  the  eight  millions  of 
whites  inhabiting  the  slaveholding  Common- 
-  wealths,  in  the  sixth  decade  of  the  century, 
ship,  mia  were  Directly  interested  in  slave  property. 
The  usual  statement,  as  derived  from  the  Census  of  1850, 
is  that  there  were  about  three  hundred  and  twenty-five 
thousand  slave  owners  in  the  South  at  that  date.  Count 
ing  each  one  of  these  as  the  head  of  a  family  of  five  or 
six  white  persons,  we  obtain  about  the  number  above 
stated  as  directly  interested  in  such  property.  Some 
six  millions  of  whites  then  had  no  such  interest,  and 
the  inquiry  as  to  what  their  sentiments  were  in  regard 
to  slavery  is  one  of  the  most  neglected  parts  of  our  his 
tory. 

28 


ANTI-SLAVERY    SENTIMENT   IN   THE   SOUTH      29 

There  are  reasons  for  this,  of  course.  The  first  of 
these  is  the  great  difficulty  of  discerning  any  such  senti 
ments,  since  the  press  of  the  South  was  Reasons  for 
either  in  the  hands  of,  or  under  the  pay  of,  the  lack  of  m- 

.  •     i  quiry  into  the 

the  slaveholders.     That  is,  the  anti-slavery  sentiments  of 

, .        „        t.     ,    fl  IT,  the  non-plave- 

sentiments  in  the  south  leit  no  such  literary  holders  in  the 

-,  ,  ,  -.  -, .  South    in    re- 

reSllltS  as  would   enable  succeeding  genera-   gard  to  eiav- 

tions  to  gain  any  satisfactory  knowledge  of 
their  character  or  their  extent.  The  second  reason  is 
that  the  development  of  these  sentiments  received  a 
rude  shock,  in  1859,  by  the  Harper's  Ferry  massacre, 
before  they  had  gained  sufficient  strength  and  clearness 
to  make  a  manifestation,  before,  really,  the  mass  of  those 
who  entertained  them  knew  that  they  were  anti-slavery 
sentiments.  But  that  such  sentiments  did  exist  and 
were  becoming  formidable,  no  one  who  had  any  accurate 
personal  acquaintance  with  the  South  during  that 
period  will  dispute. 

The  hostility  to  slavery,  or  rather  to  the  slave-owners 
at  the  South  in  1860,  was  chiefly  social,  but  in  some 
degree  also  political.  In  some  portions  of  Hostility  to 
the  South  a  certain  town  civilization  had 
been  developed,  which  had  become  conscious, 
to  say  the  least,  of  its  lack  of  full  sympathy 
with  the  plantation  order  of  life.  Large  cities  were 
indeed  few  in  number,  but  throughout  the  whole 
of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  and  in  the  major  part 
of  all  of  the  other  Southern  Commonwealths,  a  very 
large  number  of  handsome  and  fairly  enterprising  and 
prosperous  county  towns  had  grown  up  where  there 
resided  lawyers,  merchants,  bankers,  teachers,  and  some 
mechanics,  men  who  had  little  property  interest  in  the 
perpetuation  of  slavery,  who  felt  their  own  intellectual 
superiority  to  the  country  squires  and  their  fox-hunting, 
horse-racing,  quarrelsome  sons,  and  who  consequently 


30  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

asserted  social  independence  of  them  and  social  equality 
with  them.  There  were  constant  social  feuds  between 
the  young  men  of  the  towns  and  the  young  squires  of 
the  country  in  athletic  contests,,  and  sometimes  in  intel 
lectual  jousts,  but  chiefly  over  the  fair  ones  of  the  towns, 
who,  in  spite  of  their  urban  residence,  rather  inclined  to 
look  with  more  favor  upon  the  dashing  knights  of  the 
country.  So  high  did  this  hostility  run  at  times,  and 
so  constant  had  it  become  in  the  years  between  1845 
and  1860,  that  a  tolerably  fair  picture  of  the  condition 
of  the  Middle  Ages  was  obtainable  from  the  state  of  so 
ciety  which  prevailed  in  these  parts  of  the  South.  It 
needed  only  a  clear  consciousness  on  the  part  of  this 
young  bourgeoisie  that  the  power  of  their  country  rivals 
lay  in  the  institution  of  slavery  to  have  turned  their  en 
mity  against  that  institution.  In  fact,  the  merchants 
in  these  towns  had  already  begun  to  see  that  their  pecu 
niary  interests  were  suffering  from  the  system  of  plan 
tation  slavery.  The  masters  of  these  great  plantations 
had  developed  the  practice  of  purchasing  their  supplies 
immediately  from  the  wholesale  dealers  in  Northern 
cities,  and  the  smaller  slaveholders  had  begun,  by 
threats  of  doing  likewise,  to  secure  from  these  Southern 
town  merchants  special  low  rates  of  charges  for  their 
supplies.  These  merchants  had  thus  been  made  to  see 
that  a  large  population  of  small  farmers  and  towns 
people  would  be  far  more  advantageous  to  their  inter 
ests  than  the  oligarchy  of  plantation  lords  with  their 
retinues  of  slaves. 

While,  as  above  indicated,  this  hostility  between  the 
bourgeoisie  and  the  planters  was  mainly  social,  still  it 
had  influence  in  determining  political  preferences.  Those 
who  would  express  their  hostility  politically  to  the  slave- 
holding  planters  went  with  the  Whig  party,  and  then  the 
so-called  Know-nothing  party,  and  lastly  the  American 


ANTI-SLAVERY   SENTIMENT   IN   THE  SOUTH      31 

Union  party.  The  great  leader  of  the  Whig  party  in 
the  South,  especially  in  the  Southwest,  to  the  time  of 
his  death,  was,  of  course,  Henry  Clay.  He 

.J  ,        J  Social    hos- 

was  opposed  to  the  extension  of  slavery  into  tmtywasiead- 
the  Territories,  and  in  favor  of  gradual  to j> dm? ca"i 
emancipation  in  the  slaveholding  Common-  dl*erence8- 
wealths.  Had  he  lived  in  I860,  there  is  little  ques 
tion  that  he  would  have  been  a  Republican  in  principle. 
The  Whig  party  in  the  Southwest  was  not,  and  could 
not  be,  a  pro-slavery  party  in  the  same  sense  as  was  the 
Democratic  party  in  that  section.  It  looked  upon 
slavery  as  a  temporary  necessity,  and  entertained  the 
hope  and  the  purpose  of  its  ultimate  extinction.  Its 
strength  was  in  the  towns,  and  its  members  were  chiefly, 
though  not  exclusively,  from  among  the  developing 
bourgeoisie  already  described.  The  large  slaveholders 
who  belonged  to  it  were  generally  men  of  superior  intel 
ligence  and  tender  hearts,  who  ruled  their  slaves  in 
mercy  and  kindness,  felt  compassion  for  their  condition, 
and  were  not  averse  to  considering  plans  for  their  im 
provement,  and  for  their  ultimate  emancipation. 

The  death  of  Clay  left  the  party  momentarily  without 
a  chief.  The  rivalry  for  the  leadership  was,  however, 
soon  narrowed  down  to  John  J.  Crittenden,  The  leader- 
of  Kentucky,  and  John  Bell,  of  Tennessee, 
At  the  time  of  Clay's  death,  Crittenden  was 
Attorney-General  in  President  Fillmore's 
Cabinet,  and  Bell  was  a  Senator  in  Congress  from  Ten 
nessee.  Bell's  noble  stand  against  the  repeal  of  the 
Missouri  Compromise,  in  1854,  made  him  the  Whig 
leader  in  the  South,  especially  in  the  Southwest,  as  was 
clearly  manifested  by  his  nomination  for  the  presidency 
in  1860  ;  but  the  fact  that  almost  all  of  the  Whig  mem 
bers  from  the  South,  in  the  Congress  of  1853-54,  voted 
in  favor  of  the  repeal,  while  all  of  the  Whig  members 


32  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

from  the  North  voted  against  it,  caused  the  absorption 
of  the  Whig  party  in  the  North  by  the  Republican  party, 
and  threw  it  into  great  confusion  in  the  South.  Had 
Bell  possessed  the  power  and  influence  of  Clay,  he  might 
have  reorganized  the  Whig  strength  in  the  South,  and 
have  held  it  true  to  its  quasi-anti-slavery  principle.  He 
did  succeed  to  a  considerable  degree  in  so  doing,  and 
except  for  the  untoward  events  of  1859  in  Northern  Vir 
ginia,  his  success  would  have  been  much  larger,  if  not 
complete.  The  signs  were  certainly  quite  favorable  in 
1858. 

At  that  juncture  there  appeared  a  most  significant 
expression  of  the  feelings  of  the  bourgeoisie  of  this  sec- 
H  i  n  t  o  n  tion  from  a  native  of  North  Carolina,  one 
S?waand  HhelPs  Hinton  Rowan  Helper.     It  is  true  that  the 
book-  Senators  in  Congress  from  North  Carolina, 

Mr.  Biggs  and  his  successor,  Mr.  Clingman,  repudiated 
the  North  Carolina  citizenship  of  Mr.  Helper,  and  un 
dertook  to  brand  him  as  a  disreputable  character.  On 
the  5th  of  April,  1858,  Mr.  Biggs,  who  had  been  irritated 
by  a  reference  made  by  Senator  Wilson,  of  Massachusetts, 
to  Mr.  Helper's  book,  as  a  true  representation  of  Southern 
conditions,  gave  the  Senate  an  account  of  Mr.  Helper, 
which,  while  it  was  an  extravagant  exaggeration  of 
Helper's  youthful  faults,  manifested  the  intense  hostil 
ity  of  the  slaveholders  to  the  publication  of  the  differ 
ences  in  political  opinion  in  reference  to  slavery  obtain 
ing  at  the  South. 

It  is  quite  evident  from  all  that  came  out  that  Helper 
was  an  exceedingly  intelligent,  brave,  and  resolute  fel 
low  for  his  years.  He  had  certainly  discovered,  before 
he  was  thirty  years  of  age,  what  most  of  the  statesmen 
of  the  South  gave  no  evidence  of  understanding  until 
driven  thereto  by  four  years  of  disastrous  war,  name 
ly,  the  immense  superiority  of  the  resources  of  the 


ANTI-SLAVERY    SENTIMENT   IN   THE   SOUTH      3o 

North  over  those  of  the  South.  Helper  described  him 
self  as  a  native  of  the  South,  born  and  bred  in  North 
Carolina,  of  slaveholding  parents,  although  he  himself 
had  engaged  in  mercantile  pursuits  in  the  town  of  Salis 
bury,  a  Southerner  in  instinct,  thought,  and  habit,  and 
having  the  desire  and  purpose  to  live  and  die  in  the 
South.  He  was  in  the  North  somewhere  at  the  time  his 
book  appeared.  In  the  preface  of  this  book,  entitled 
the  "  Impending  Crisis  of  the  South/'  which  gave  such 
mortal  offence  to  the  slaveholders  of  the  South,  Mr. 
Helper  addressed  himself  with  great  earnestness  to  his 
Southern  brethren,  besought  them  to  read  his  book  with 
out  prejudice,  and  declared  that  an  irrepressible  desire 
"  to  do  something  to  elevate  the  South  to  an  honorable 
and  powerful  position  among  the  enlightened  quarters 
of  the  globe  "  had  been  the  principle  which  had  actuated 
him  in  the  preparation  of  the  work. 

The  language  of  the  book  is  generally  too  violent ; 
some  of  the  conclusions  reached  were  exaggerations  ;  and 
threats  were  indulged  in  with  a  frequency  Theim  end 
and  to  a  degree  that  gave  the  composition  ing  crisis. 
an  incendiary  flavor  ;  but  the  statistics  were  reliable,  and 
proved  satisfactorily  the  vast  superiority  of  the  wealth, 
resources,  and  civilization  of  the  North  over  those  of  the 
South  ;  the  history  was  correct,  and  demonstrated  the 
apostacy  of  the  slaveholders  from  the  principles  of  their 
ancestors  in  the  establishment  of  the  Republic  ;  the  con 
clusion  as  to  the  moral  sense  of  the  modern  civilized 
world  upon  the  question  of  slavery  was  truthful ;  and 
the  expressions  of  opinion  by  the  world's  great  thinkers 
and  actors,  upon  which  the  conclusion  was  based,  were 
numerous,  well  chosen,  and  convincing  ;  while  the  hostile 
class-spirit  manifested  throughout  the  book  against  the 
"Oligarchs,"  "  Slaveocrats,"  "Lords  of  the  Lash," 
"Terror  Engenderers  of  the  South/'  was  in  large  degree 
VOL.  I.— 3. 


34  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

participated  in  by  the  classes  to  which  the  name  bour 
geoisie  has  been  above  given.  It  is,  in  fact,  probably 
quite  true  that  Helper's  denunciations  of  the  great  slave 
holders  were  an  approximately  fair  expression  of  a  quite 
general  feeling  among  them,  or,  at  least,  a  large  part  of 
them.  Left  entirely  to  themselves,  this  hostility  to  the 
class  of  large  slave-owners  would  probably  have  developed 
into  an  attack  upon  slavery  itself,  as  it  did  in  Mr.  Helper's 
mind.  Any  pressure  from  without,  however,  for  the 
hastening  of  such  a  development  would,  on  the  other 
hand,  call  forth  a  spirit  of  resentment,  the  Southerner's 
besetting  sin,  that  would  allay  internal  strife  and  con 
fuse  the  mind  in  the  work  of  getting  at  the  secret  of  the 
feeling  which  was  slowly  creating  this  anti-slavery  class 
in  the  Middle  South. 

Mr.  Helper's  plan  for  the  abolition  of  slavery  was 
the  natural  outcome  of  the  class  hostility  just  de 
scribed.  He  recommended  the  political  organization  of 
the  non-slaveholders,  with  the  slaveholders  in  favor  of 
abolition,  for  the  purpose  of  capturing  the  Common 
wealth  governments,  the  social  boycott  of  the  slavehold 
ers  by  this  class,  and  the  levy  of  such  heavy  taxes  upon 
slave  property  by  the  regenerated  governments  as  would 
make  it  entirely  worthless.  Mr.  Helper's  scheme  also 
contemplated  the  removal  of  the  negroes  from  the  South, 
and  a  great  immigration  of  whites  from  the  Northern 
section  of  the  Union  and  from  Europe.  In  all  of  this 
he  was  giving  expression  to  impulses  and  feelings  ex 
isting  throughout  the  Middle  South  that  had  almost 
risen  to  the  stage  of  mental  consciousness.  And,  on  the 
whole,  it  may  be  said  that,  in  1858,  slavery  had  little 

Anti-slavery  strength  in  Delaware  and  Maryland,  and  no 
fhe^south  in  great  strength  in  Kentucky,  Tennessee,  Mis- 
i858,e6timated.  sour^  Western  Virginia,  North  Carolina, 
Northern  Georgia,  Northern  Alabama,  and  Northern 


ANTI-SLAVERY    SENTIMENT   IN   THE   SOUTH      35 

Texas,  and  that  its  strength  in  these  parts  was  on  the 
decline.  These  facts  were  not  then  appreciated  at  the 
North.  The  North  then  judged  the  sentiments  of  the 
South  only,  or  almost  only,  by  the  speeches  and  votes  of 
the  Southern  Senators  and  Representatives  in  Congress, 
and  by  its  slavery-subservient  press.  The  great  slave 
holders  were,  however,  cognizant  of  them,  and  were 
anxious  to  bring  matters  to  a  crisis  before  the  hostile  de 
velopment  close  around  them  should  proceed  further. 

There  was  one  feeling,  however,  which  the  white  popu 
lation  in  the  South  of  all  classes  shared  in  common,  and 
that  was  the  fear  of  slave  insurrection.  It  was 

......         ,  „    . ,         ,  The  common 

a  curious  trait  in  the  character  01  the  slaves  fear  of  slave 
that  what  hostility  they  manifested  against  the 
whites  was  directed  chiefly  against  the  non-slaveholders 
and  the  poorer  slaveholders.  It  was,  however,  fully  as 
significant  as  curious,  since  it  is  entirely  intelligible. 
The  richer  slaveholders  lived  in  greater  state,  of  course, 
wore  finer  raiment,  rode  in  more  splendid  equipages,  had 
more  courtly  manners.  Such  a  master  had  only  to  ex 
ercise  a  little  friendly  condescension  in  order  to  win  the 
respect,  reverence,  and  good- will  of  the  slave.  More 
over,  the  patrol  duty  was  imposed  chiefly  upon  the  com 
moner  whites.  Thus,  while  the  master  granted  the  pass 
to  the  slave,  it  was  the  poor  white  who  held  him  up, 
examined  it,  and,  if  it  was  not  satisfactory,  imposed  the 
stripes.  Hence  the  non-slaveholders  and  the  smaller 
slaveholders  knew  well  that  a  servile  insurrection  would 
be  to  them  and  to  their  families  an  even  more  terrible  dan 
ger  than  to  the  great  masters.  If,  therefore,  the  fear  of 
"  negro  rising,"  as  they  were  accustomed  to  call  it,  could 
be  excited  and  sustained  in  their  breasts,  the  developing 
social  conflict  between  them  and  the  great  slaveholders 
would  be  repressed,  and,  instead  of  it,  they  would  be 
come  conscious  of  a  solidarity  of  interest  with  the  slave- 


36  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

holders  against  the  negroes,  which  would  grow  more  in 
tense  as  the  fear  which  produced  it  increased,  and  sub 
ordinated  all  other  sentiments  to  itself.  The  great 
slaveholders  understood  this,  and  were  not  so  very 
greatly  disturbed  by  the  existence  of  any  such  excite 
ment,  as  they  would  otherwise  have  been.  It  was  a 
capital  string  for  them  to  play  upon,  especially  if  the 
original  impulse  to  hostile  plans  and  movements  among 
the  slaves  could  be  imputed  to  the  wickedness  of  the 
inhabitants  of  the  non-slaveholding  Commonwealths. 

Seen  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  influence  of  such 
fears  upon  the  growth  of  the  still  half-conscious  anti- 
TheHarper's  slavery  spirit  existing  throughout  large  sec- 
tfSuSSSZ  tions  of  the  South,  nothing  could  have  been 
suits.  more  untoward,  wrickedly  harmful,  and  posi 

tively  diabolical  than  the  John  Brown  raid  on  Harper's 
Ferry  on  the  night  of  the  16th  of  October,  1859.  If  the 
whole  thing,  both  as  to  time,  methods,  and  results,  had 
been  planned  by  His  Satanic  Majesty  himself,,  it  could 
not  have  succeeded  better  in  setting  the  sound  conserva 
tive  movements  of  the  age  at  naught,  and  in  creating  a 
state  of  feeling  which  offered  the  most  capital  opportu 
nities  for  the  triumph  of  political  insincerity,  radicalism, 
and  rascality  over  their  opposites.  No  man  who  is  ac 
quainted  with  the  change  of  feeling  which  occurred  in 
the  South  between  the  16th  of  October,  1859,  and  the 
16th  of  Kovember  of  the  same  year  can  regard  the  Har 
per's  Ferry  villainy  as  anything  other  than  one  of  the 
chiefest  crimes  of  our  history.  It  established  and  re 
established  the  control  of  the  great  radical  slaveholders 
over  the  non-slaveholders,  the  little  slaveholders,  and 
the  more  liberal  of  the  larger  slaveholders,  which  had 
already  begun  to  be  loosened.  It  created  anew  a  soli 
darity  of  interest  between  them  all,  which  was  felt  by  all 
with  an  intensity  which  overcame  every  other  sentiment. 


ANTI-SLAVERY   SENTIMENT   IN   THE   SOUTH      37 

It  gave  thus  to  the  great  radical  slaveholders  the  willing 
physical  material  for  the  construction  of  armies  and  na 
vies,  and  for  the  prosecution  of  war. 

There  was,  indeed,  little  in  the  exact  facts  of  the 
event  which  strictly  necessitated  these  results.  The 
long  and  thorough  examination  made  by  the  The  Con. 


Senate  committee  did  not    reveal   the  con-  '5 


scions  complicity  of  anybody  in  the  atrocity  it;- 
outside  of  the  twenty-one  villains  who  followed  Brown. 
This  committee  was  composed  of  Senators  Mason  of 
Virginia,  Davis  of  Mississippi,  Fitch  of  Indiana,  Colla- 
mer  of  Vermont,  and  Doolittle  of  Wisconsin.  It  is  no 
reproach  to  the  memories  of  the  two  gentlemen  first 
named  to  say  that  they  sought  diligently  to  find  some 
connection  between  Brown  and  influential  men  at  the 
North  in  the  commission  of  this  great  crime.  The 
facts  of  the  case  as  drawn  from  the  two  reports  of 
this  committee,  the  majority  report  signed  by  Sena 
tors  Mason,  Davis,  and  Fitch,  and  the  minority  report 
signed  by  Senators  Collamer  and  Doolittle,  were,  briefly 
told,  that  Brown,  after  having  been  cut  short  in  his 
nefarious  career  in  Kansas  by  the  triumph  of  the 
"  Free  State"  party,  which  repudiated  him,  had  or 
ganized  a  little  force  of  his  Kansas  desperadoes  at 
Springdale  in  Iowa  ;  had  instructed  them  in  military 
tactics  ;  had  taken  them  to  Chatham  in  Canada,  in  the 
spring  of  1858,  where  he  claimed  to  have  organized  a 
provisional  government,  as  a  first  step  toward  an  attack 
upon  some  Commonwealth  of  the  Union  in  which  slavery 
was  lawful  ;  had  then  gone  with  his  party  into  Ohio, 
where  he  permitted  them  to  separate  subject  to  his 
call  ;  had  sent  one  of  them,  John  E.  Cook  by  name,  to 
Harper's  Ferry  with  instructions  to  remain  there,  find 
out  everything,  and  report  to  him  ;  had  appeared  him 
self,  under  the  assumed  name  of  Smith,  with  two  sons 


38  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

and  a  son-in-law,  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  place  about 
July  of  1859,  and  taken  a  farm  some  five  miles  from 
the  town  on  the  Maryland  side  of  the  Potomac  ;  and 
had  here  secretly  gathered  his  followers,  his  arms,  and 
his  ammunitions.  From  this  point  he,  with  seventeen 
of  his  gang,  sneaked  into  Harper's  Ferry  on  the  night  of 
the  16th  of  October,  between  the  hours  of  eleven  and 
twelve,  when  the  little  village  was  wrapped  in  peaceful 
slumber.  They  seized  upon  the  railroad  bridge  across 
the  river,  the  engine  house,  the  watch  house,  the  arsenal 
and  the  rifle  works ;  held  up  a  train  on  the  Baltimore 
and  Ohio  Railroad  which  was  attempting  to  cross  the 
bridge ;  and  shot  to  death  a  free  negro  named  Hay  ward, 
a  porter  on  the  train,  whose  only  offence  was  that  he 
fled  in  terror  when  ordered  to  halt  and  stand.  They 
employed  the  remainder  of  the  night  in  going  to  the 
homes  of  prominent  Virginia  gentlemen,  such  as  Colonel 
Lewis  Washington,  Mr.  Allstadt,  and  Mr.  Byrne,  mak 
ing  prisoners  of  them,  assuming  to  free  such  of  their 
men-slaves  as  they  could  find,  and  forcing  the  newly 
emancipated  into  their  ranks.  As  day  broke,  they  seized 
all  the  white  men  who  appeared  in  the  streets,  and  con 
fined  them  in  the  watch  house  and  the  engine  house. 
News  of  the  outrage  having  by  this  time  reached 
Charleston  and  Martinsburg,  the  citizens  of  these  towns 
armed  themselves,  proceeded  to  the  scene  of  action,  at 
tacked  the  watch  house  in  which  most  of  the  prisoners 
were  confined,  and  succeeded  in  liberating  them.  By 
this  time  a  company  of  marines,  commanded  by  Colonel 
Robert  E.  Lee,  arrived,  stormed  the  engine  house,  lib 
erated  the  rest  of  the  prisoners,  and  captured  Brown  and 
the  survivors  of  his  band,  with  the  exception  of  a  single 
man.  The  Virginia  negroes,  who  had  been  pressed  into 
the  service,  threw  down  their  arms  and  deserted  their 
liberator  at  the  first  opportunity. 


ANTI-SLAVERY   SENTIMENT   IN   THE   SOUTH      39 

The  whole  attempt  was  a  complete  fiasco,  and  was  to 
any  calm  and  judicious  mind  satisfactory  proof  both 
of  the  impotence  of  secret  insurrectionary 

J        Evidences 

movements  prepared  in  the  JNorth.   and  of  of  complicity 

.111..  .-  •    -,  in    the    Har- 

the  lack  of  any  insurrectionary  spirit  among  per's  Ferry  in- 
the  slaves  themselves.  But  there  were  some 
suspicious  things  connected  with  the  affair  which  even 
calm  and  judicious  people  required  to  have  explained. 
Where,  for  example,  did  Brown  get  the  money  to  sup 
port  his  band  of  twenty-two  men  for  so  long  a  period, 
and  to  procure  arms  for  fifteen  hundred  men,  as  he  had 
done,  and  have  them  transported  to  his  Maryland  farm 
house.  He  was  a  notorious  dead  beat  himself,  had  never 
succeeded  in  any  legitimate  business,  had  never  earned 
any  money,  had  had  two  wives  and  some  twenty  chil 
dren,  and  had  left  them  to  shift  for  themselves  in 
penury  and  misery,  while  he  was  careering  around  re 
forming  things.  Somebody  had  assisted  him,  that  was 
certain  ;  and  it  was  probable  that  a  good  many  persons 
had  helped  him.  It  was  possible,  of  course,  that  they 
did  so  with  full  knowledge  of  his  purpose,  but  this  was 
by  no  means  a  necessary  conclusion. 

The  evidence  taken  by  the  Senate  committee  showed 
that  a  large  number  of  men  and  some  women  were  in 
the  habit  of  going  about  through  the  North,  giving 
abolition  lectures  and  sending  the  net  proceeds  from 
the  sale  of  tickets  or  the  voluntary  contributions  to 
Brown.  No  statement  of  plans  or  account  of  expendit 
ures  was  required  of  him.  He  always  resisted  any  ap 
proach  toward  anything  of  the  kind.  Brown  had  gotten 
into  his  first  paying  business,  and  he  was  determined  not 
to  have  it  ruined  by  publicity.  And  it  certainly  did  seem 
that  some  of  the  people  with  whom  he  had  gotten  in 
were  so  anxious  to  keep  out  of  sight  that  they  were 
quite  contented  not  to  know  what  he  was  doing.  The 


40  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

evidence  before  the  committee  also  showed  that  such 
men  as  Gerritt  Smith,  Dr.  Samuel  G.  Howe,  and  Mr. 
George  L.  Stearns  had  given  Brown  large  sums  of  money 
without  requiring  from  him  any  information  in  regard 
to  the  use  of  it.  Mr.  Stearns  went  so  far  in  his  testi 
mony  before  the  committee  as  to  say  that,  while  he 
would  have  disapproved  of  the  Harper's  Ferry  plan 
had  he  known  of  it  before  it  was  undertaken,  he  had 
come  to  view  it  as  one  of  the  greatest  events  in  our  his 
tory,  that  he  thought  it  would  free  America.  Finally, 
the  evidence  before  the  committee  showed  that  the  most 
important  and  expensive  weapons  which  Brown  had,  the 
two  hundred  Sharp's  rifled  carbines,  were  the  property  of 
the  ' '  Massachusetts  State  Kansas  Committee,"  and  that 
the  two  hundred  pistols  had  been  bought  and  paid  for 
by  Mr.  Stearns.  It  appeared  that  the  "Massachusetts 
State  Kansas  Committee  "  had,  some  time  before,  trans 
ferred  the  carbines  to  the  "National  Kansas  Aid  Com 
mittee,"  and  that  this  latter  committee  had  sent  them  to 
Chicago  ;  that  Brown  had  asked  the  National  Committee 
for  them,  but  that  this  Committee  had  required  of  him 
some  information  in  regard  to  his  purposes,  and  that, 
having  received  no  satisfactory  reply,  had  refused  his 
request,  and  had  voted  to  return  the  arms  to  the  Massa 
chusetts  Committee  ;  and  that  Mr.  Stearns,  then  chair 
man  of  the  Massachusetts  Committee,  had  delivered 
them  to  Brown  at  Tabor,  in  Iowa,  for  safe  keeping.  It 
also  appeared  that  one  Forbes,  whom  Brown  had  em 
ployed  to  teach  military  tactics  to  his  band  at  Spring- 
dale,  but  who  subsequently  quarrelled  with  Brown,  had 
revealed  to  Senator  Henry  Wilson  and  Dr.  Howe  some 
thing  of  the  dangerous  character  of  Brown's  plans,  and 
that  these  gentlemen  had  communicated  with  Mr. 
Stearns  about  them,  and  had  expressed  their  uneasiness 
that  Brown  should  have  been  entrusted  with  the  arms 


ANTI-SLAVERY   SENTIMENT   IN   THE   SOUTH      41 

belonging  to  the  Massachusetts  Committee,  and  that  Mr. 
Stearns  did  nothing  for  their  reclamation. 

It  was  certainly  a  most  reckless  and  reprehensible 
thing,  to  call  it  by  the  mildest  name,  in  Mr.  Stearns 
and  the  Massachusetts  Committee  to  entrust  Disquieting 
those  arms  to  a  man  of  Brown's  antecedents.  theTevcia- 
They  had  been  procured  to  furnish  the  "  Free  tions- 
State"  settlers  in  Kansas  with  the  means  of  defence 
against  attack  upon  their  persons  and  their  homes.  Dis 
order  in  Kansas  had  been  quelled  by  the  triumph  of  the 
"  Free  State"  party,  and  the  arms  were  not  needed  there 
or  anywhere  else  for  any  lawful  purpose.  They  should 
certainly  have  been  returned  to  the  immediate  custody 
of  the  Committee,  and  given  into  the  charge  of  some 
person  whose  character  was  a  guarantee  that  they  would 
not  be  put  to  any  unlawful  use.  There  is  no  question 
that  these  revelations  were  a  little  disquieting  even  to 
cool  and  impartial  minds.  They  seemed  to  show  that 
there  were  many  respectable  people  at  the  North  who 
were  willing  to  put  the  means  of  doing  mischief  into  the 
hands  of  desperate  men,  and  then  designedly  keep  them 
selves  in  ignorance  of  how  these  means  were  being  em 
ployed.  They  were  immensely  disquieting  to  Southern 
minds  that  were  not  cool  and  impartial,  and  it  must  be 
conceded  that  a  majority  of  Southern  minds  of  that 
day  belonged  to  this  class,  and,  as  for  that,  a  majority 
of  minds  everywhere. 

Long,  however,  before  the  reports  of  this  Senate  com 
mittee  were  published  to  the  world,  even  before  the 
motion  for  its  appointment  had  been  made, 

x  ^  .  .  .  Demonprra- 

rauch  more  disquieting  things  in  connection  tions  of  sym- 

.,,     ,,  x    ,      ,  °  ,,  pathy    with 

with  the  outrage  had  occurred  than  the  rev-  Brown  at  the 
elations  of  the  report  would  have  been  had 
they  been    made  in  November  of  1859,   instead  of  in 
June,  1860.  These  were  the  demonstrations  indulged  in 


42  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

throughout  many  parts  of  the  North  on  the  day  of  the 
execution  of  Brown.  Brown  and  his  band  had  mur 
dered  five  men  and  wounded  some  eight  or  ten  more  in 
their  criminal  movement  at  Harper's  Ferry.  If  they 
had  done  nothing  more  than  kill  the  free  negro  Hay- 
ward,  they  had  made  themselves  common  murderers, 
and  were  deserving  of  nothing  but  the  punishment  for 
murder  and  the  execration  of  all  decent  men.  Add  to 
this  the  consideration  that  Brown  certainly  intended 
the  wholesale  massacre  of  the  whites  by  the  blacks  in 
case  that  should  be  found  necessary  to  effect  his  pur 
poses,  and  it  was  certainly  natural  that  the  tolling  of 
the  church  bells,  the  holding  of  prayer-meetings  for  the 
soul  of  John  Brown,  the  draping  of  houses,  the  half- 
masting  of  flags,  etc.,  in  many  parts  of  the  North,  should 
appear  to  the  people  of  the  South  to  be  evidences  of 
a  wickedness  which  knew  no  bounds,  and  which  was 
bent  upon  the  destruction  of  the  South  by  any  means 
necessary  to  accomplish  the  result.  It  was  reported 
throughout  the  South  that  the  Senate  of  Massachusetts 
came  within  three  votes  of  passing  a  resolution  for  ad 
journing  on  the  day  of  the  execution. 

It  was  of  course  possible  for  people  far  removed  from 
any  peril  to  make  a  distinction  between  approval  of 
Brown's  act  and  commiseration  for  his  fate,  and  to  attrib 
ute  all  of  these  demonstrations  to  the  latter  feeling ;  but  it 
was  simply  impossible  for  those  surrounded  by  all  the 
dangers  which  Brown's  movements  threatened  to  call  up 
to  appreciate  any  such  distinctions.  To  them  they  ap 
peared  the  veriest  cant  and  hypocrisy.  Especially  did 
terror  and  bitterness  take  possession  of  the  hearts  of  the 
women  of  the  South,  who  saw  in  slave  insurrection  not 
only  destruction  and  death,  but  that  which  to  feminine 
virtue  is  a  thousand  times  worse  than  the  most  terrible 
death.  For  those  who  would  excite  such  a  movement 
or  sympathize  with  anybody  who  would  excite  such  a 


ANTI-SLAVEUY    SENTIMENT   IN   THE    SOUTH      43 

movement,  the  women  of  the  South  felt  a  hatred  as  un 
dying  as  virtue  itself.  Men  might  still  hesitate,  and 
consider,  and  argue,  but  the  women  were  united  and 
resolute,  and  their  unanimous  exhortation  was  :  "  Men 
of  the  South,  defend  the  honor  of  your  mothers,  your 
wives,  your  sisters,  and  your  daughters.  It  is  your 
highest  and  most  sacred  duty  I" 

It  has  been  often  said  that  the  leaders  among  the 
slaveholders  knew  that  there  was  no  such  danger  of 
slave  insurrection  as  the  masses  believed  there  The  leaders 
was,  and  also  knew  that  the  sympathy  at  the 
North  for  any  such  movement,  or  for  any- 
body  who  would  take  part  in  any  such  movement,  was 
not  one  thousandth  part  as  great  as  the  masses  believed  it 
to  be,  but  designedly  kept  this  knowledge  to  themselves, 
and  either  remained  silent  when  they  might  have  quiet 
ed  fears,  or  by  wicked  misrepresentations  increased  these 
fears  and  intensified  the  hatred  born  thereof.  This  was 
probably  true  in  many  cases,  but  not  to  the  extent  and 
degree  generally  supposed  at  the  North.  The  leading 
slaveholders  had  no  such  clear  knowledge  of  the  charac 
ter  and  impulses  of  their  slaves,  or  of  the  intentions  of 
the  North,  as  subsequent  opinion  has  attributed  to  them. 
They  themselves  were  not  wholly  free  from  the  fear  which 
possessed  the  masses,  and  they  could  not  have  created 
this  terror  among  the  masses  except  for  the  actual  at 
tempt  to  excite  slave  insurrection,  and  the  apparently 
widespread  sympathy  for  the  same  in  many  parts  of  the 
North.  From  the  Harper's  Ferry  outrage  onward  the 
conviction  grew  among  all  classes  that  the  Har 

white  men  of  the  South  must  stand  together,   per's  Ferry 

n-  T         «•  '     outrage    and 

and  must  harmonize  all  internal  differences  the    solid 
in   the  presence   of  the   mortal   peril,  with 
which,  as  a  race,  they  believed  themselves  threatened. 
Sound  development  in  thought  and  feeling  was  arrested. 
The  follies  and  the  hatreds  born  of  fear  and  resentment 


44  THE    CIVIL   WAR 

now  assumed  the  places  of  common  sense  and  common 
kindliness.  And  war  and  bloodshed  became  a  necessity 
for  the  relief  of  burning  hearts. 

A  sound  philosophy  will  undoubtedly  hold  that  there 

is  a  plan  of  world   civilization,  and  that  man  cannot 

thwart  its  ultimate  realization  :  but  it  will 

End    and 

means  in  civ-  also  hold  that  man  can  and  does,  in  large  de 
gree,  at  least,  determine  the  nature  of  the 
means  employed  in  the  attainment  of  the  predestined 
results.  Whether  they  shall  be  destructive  or  construc 
tive,  or  more  or  less  destructive,  whether  they  shall  be 
vicious  or  virtuous,  honorable  or  degrading,  these  are 
things  which  are  within  the  power  and  control  of  man. 
Here  lies  his  responsibility.  Here  is  his  realm  of  duty. 
It  is  from  this  point  of  view  that  the  event  at  Harper's 
Ferry  must  be  judged.  And  from  this  point  of  view  it 
was  crime,  and  nothing  but  crime,  common  crime  and 
public  crime,  crime  that  made  violent  and  destructive 
means  possible  and  actual,  and  seemingly  necessary  for 
the  attainment  in  the  United  States  of  that  principle  of 
the  world's  civilization  which  has  decreed  the  personal 
freedom  of  all  men.  Unless  we  are  fatalists  or  Jesuits  in 
philosophy,  we  are  bound  to  condemn  this  crime  to  the 
end  of  time,  and  execrate  the  committers  of  it,  even 
though  we  should  ascribe  to  it  the  emancipation  of  the 
bondmen.  It  is  an  affront  to  Divinity  itself  to  assert 
that  the  world's  civilization  cannot  be  realized  except 
through  violence  and  destruction,  blood,  crime,  and  sin. 
It  is  the  cardinal  fallacy  of  orientalism  to  hold  that  what 
has  happened  must  have  been  inevitable,  not  only  as  to 
the  end  secured,  but  also  as  to  the  means  by  which  the 
end  was  secured.  It  is  the  passionate  haste  of  sinful 
man  which  dares  to  hurry  the  plans  of  Providence  by 
the  employment  of  means  which  rob  the  plans  of  their 
glory  and  their  divinity. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE   PRESIDENTIAL   ELECTION   OF    1860 

The  Cincinnati  Platform  of  1856  and  the  Dred  Scott  Doctrine  of 
1857 — Buchanan  and  Douglas  After  the  Dred  Scott  Decision- 
Threatened  Breach  in  the  Democratic  Party — The  Davis  Reso- 
lutions  of  February  2,  1860— The  Revised  Draft  of  Mr.  Davis's 
Resolutions — The  Purpose  of  These  Resolutions,  and  of  Others 
Like  them — Criticism  and  Debate  upon  Mr.  Davis's  Resolutions 
— Assembly  of  the  National  Convention  of  the  Democratic 
Party — The  Platform  as  Proposed  by  the  Majority  of  the  Com 
mittee — The  Platform  as  Proposed  by  the  Minority  of  the  Com 
mittee — The  Resistance  of  the  Northern  Democrats  to  the 
Platform  of  the  Majority  of  the  Committee — Secessions  from 
the  Convention — The  Failure  to  Make  a  Nomination,  and  the 
Adjournment  of  the  Convention — The  Seceders'  Convention — 
Advance  in  the  Slaveholders'  Demands — The  Events  of  the  In 
terim  between  the  Adjournment  and  Reassembly  of  the  Demo 
cratic  Conventions — Adoption  of  the  Davis  Resolutions — The 
Republican  National  Convention — The  Republican  Platform 
— The  Doctrine  of  the  Platform  Concerning  Slavery  in  the  Ter 
ritories—The  Tariff  Plank— Its  Connection  with  the  Question 
of  Free  Territories — The  Nomination  of  the  Candidates  by  the 
Republican  Convention — The  Constitutional  Union  Party,  and 
Its  Convention— The  Nomination  of  John  Bell  for  the  Presi 
dency  by  It — The  Danger  to  the  Slaveholders  in  the  South 
from  This  Party — Reassembly  of  the  Convention  of  the  South 
ern  Democracy — Reassembly  of  the  Convention  of  the  North 
ern  Democracy— Work  of  the  Two  Conventions— The  Political 
Campaign  of  1860 — The  September  and  October  Elections— 
The  Election  of  November,  1860. 
45 


46  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

THE  fundamental   doctrine   of   the  Cincinnati  plat 
form  of  1856,  the  doctrine  of  "Popular  Sovereignty"' 

The  cincin-  in  the  Territories,  had,  as  we  have  seen,  been 
3?8$28S  contradicted  by  the  Dred  Scott  opinion  of 
doectr1ne°of  1857>  Notwithstanding  this  fact,  however, 
185L  the  Northern  Democrats  led  by  Mr.  Douglas 

continued  to  hold,  as  we  have  also  seen,  that  in  some 
way  or  other,  either  by  unfriendly  police  regulation, 
or  by  refusing  friendly  police  regulation,  the  people  of 
a  Territory  might  make  the  existence  of  slavery  in  it 
impossible,  if  they  so  willed,  during  the  Territorial 
period,  and  prior  to  the  formation  of  a  Commonwealth 
government.  Except  for  this  claim  Mr.  Douglas  could 
not  have  secured  the  election  of  a  majority  of  Demo 
crats  as  members  of  the  Illinois  Legislature  in  1858, 
and  his  own  election  by  that  Legislature  as  United 
States  Senator,  against  the  combined  efforts  of  the  Re 
publicans  and  the  Buchanan  Democrats. 

President  Buchanan  had,  after  the  Dred  Scott  decision, 
given  up  the  doctrine  of  "Popular   Sovereignty"  in 

Buchanan  the  Territories  entirely,  and  for  this  reason, 
after  th?pgread  together  with  the  defeat  of  his  Lecompton 
Scott  deci8ion.  pjan  for  Kansas,  effected  chiefly  by  the  op 
position  of  Mr.  Douglas,  he  and  the  wing  of  the  Demo 
cratic  party  which  he  represented  had  developed  a  bitter 
hostility  to  Mr.  Douglas,  which  was  manifested  first  in 
the  senatorial  contest  in  Illinois  in  1858,  and  then  upon 
the  larger  field  of  the  presidential  contest  in  1860.  Mr. 
Lincoln  had  foreseen  the  latter  result  during  the  sena 
torial  contest,  and  had  said  that  Mr.  Douglas  could  not 
so  answer  the  famous  Freeport  question  as  to  secure 
both  the  senatorship  in  1858  and  the  presidency  in  1860. 
He  did  so  answer  it  as  to  secure  the  senatorship.  tl 
now  remained  to  be  tested  whether  the  answer  would 
prevent  his  attainment  of  the  presidency. 


THE   PRESIDENTIAL   ELECTION    OF    1860          47 

During  the  year  1859,  the  contradiction  between  the 
"Popular  Sovereignty"  doctrine  and  the  Dred  Scott 
opinion  became  more  and  more  clear  and  Threatened 
more  and  more  generally  appreciated,  until  Democratic 
by  the  opening  of  the  spring  of  the  year  party- 
1860  it  was  evident  that  the  Democratic  party  would,  in 
the  coming  campaign,  probably  split  upon  this  issue,  the 
Northern  Democrats  holding  to  the  former  doctrine, 
and  the  Southern  Democrats  to  the  latter.  If  this 
should  actually  come  to  pass  the  Democratic  party,  as  a 
national  party,  would  be  disrupted,  and  the  last  bond  of 
party  unity  between  the  two  sections  would  be  severed. 
The  outlook  was  most  portentous.  Not  many  men  recog 
nized  the  greatness  or  the  imminence  of  the  danger,  and 
the  mass  of  men  went  forward  to  meet  it  with  a  light 
ness  of  heart  which  can  be  attributed  only  to  ignorance. 
Meanwhile  the  agitation  of  the  slavery  question  in  Con 
gress  was  kept  up  with  ever-increasing  excitement  in 
the  Senate  over  the  question  of  investigating  the  Har 
per's  Ferry  outrage,  and  in  the  House  over  the  resolution 
introduced  by  Mr.  J.  B.  Clark,  of  Missouri,  in  condem 
nation  of  Mr.  Helper's  book  and  of  those  members  of 
Congress  who  had  approved  of  it  and  recommended  its 
perusal  to  the  people. 

Such  was  the  state  of  feeling  and  opinion  in  Congress 
and  throughout  the  country,  when,  on  the  2d  day  of 
February,  1860,  Mr.  Jefferson  Davis  intro-  The  Davis 
duced  into  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  SuarT  s! 
the  noted  resolutions  which  indicated  the  186°- 
doctrines  upon  which  the  Democrats  of  the  South 
would  stand  in  the  coming  contest.  These  resolutions 
were  six  in  number.  The  first  affirmed  the  sovereignty 
of  the  "  States/'  and  the  subordinate  character  of  the 
United  States  Government,  and  denounced  the  inter 
meddling  of  one  "State,"  or  a  combination  of  the  citi- 


48  THE    CIVIL    WAR 

zens  of  one  "  State  "  with  the  domestic  institutions  of 
another.  The  second  proclaimed  negro  slavery  to  be  an 
important  domestic  institution  in  fifteen  "  States  "  of 
the  Union,  recognized  and  protected  by  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States,  and  declared  any  attack  upon  it 
by  any  "  State"  of  the  Union,  or  by  the  citizens  of  any 
"  State  "  of  the  Union,  to  be  a  manifest  breach  of  faith, 
and  a  violation  of  the  most  solemn  obligations.  The 
sixth  asserted  the  constitutionality  of  the  existing  Fugi 
tive  Slave  law  and  denounced  the  attempts  of  "State" 
Legislatures  to  defeat  its  purpose  by  the  passage  of  the 
so-called  "personal  liberty  bills,"  or  in  any  other  man 
ner.  The  third,  fourth,  and  fifth  of  the  series  contain, 
however,  the  real  gist  of  the  questions  at  issue,  and  must, 
therefore,  be  quoted  verbatim.  They  ran  as  follows  : 

tl  Resolved,  that  the  unity  of  these  States  rests  on  the 
equality  of  rights  and  privileges  among  its  members, 
and  that  it  is  especially  the  duty  of  the  Senate,  which 
represents  the  States  in  their  sovereign  capacity,  to  re 
sist  all  attempts  to  discriminate  either  in  relation  to 
person  or  property,  so  as,  in  the  Territories — which 
are  the  common  possession  of  the  United  States — to  give 
advantages  to  the  citizens  of  one  State  which  are  not 
equally  secured  to  those  of  every  other  State  : " 

"Resolved,  that  neither  Congress  nor  a  Territorial 
Legislature,  whether  by  direct  legislation  or  legislation  of 
an  indirect  and  unfriendly  nature,  possesses  the  power  to 
annul  or  impair  the  constitutional  right  of  any  citizen 
of  the  United  States  to  take  his  slave  property  into  the 
common  Territories ;  but  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Federal 
Government  there  to  afford  for  that,  as  for  other  species 
of  property,  the  needful  protection ;  and  if  experience 
should  at  any  time  prove  that  the  judiciary  does  not 
possess  power  to  insure  adequate  protection,  it  will  then 
become  the  duty  of  Congress  to  supply  such  deficiency : " 


THE    PRESIDENTIAL   ELECTION   OF    18GO          49 

"  Resolved,  that  the  inhabitants  of  an  organized  Ter 
ritory  of  the  United  States  when  they  rightfully  form  a 
constitution  to  be  admitted  as  a  State  into  the  Union 
may  then,  for  the  first  time,  like  the  people  of  a  State 
when  forming  a  new  constitution,  decide  for  themselves 
whether  slavery,  as  a  domestic  institution,  shall  be  sus 
tained  or  prohibited  within  their  jurisdiction  ;  and  if 
Congress  shall  admit  them  as  a  State,  they  shall  be  re 
ceived  into  the  Union  with  or  without  slavery,  as  their 
constitution  may  prescribe  at  the  time  of  their  admis 
sion." 

Mr.  Davis  asked  that  these  resolutions  should  be 
printed  and  made  a  special  order  for  the  following 
Wednesday,  which  was  agreed  to.  Their  consideration 
was,  however,  postponed  from  time  to  time,  until  on  the 
1st  of  March  Mr.  Davis  asked  to  be  allowed  to  withdraw 
them  and  offer  them  anew  in  a  somewhat  modified  form, 
since  conference  with  friends  had  convinced  him  that  a 
slight  change  in  them  was  desirable. 

An  examination  of  the  revised  draft  shows  that  the 
only  change  of  any  importance  was  in  the  fourth  reso 
lution,  which  in  the  revision  was  divided  The  revised 
into  two  resolutions,  the  first  of  which  Dav?B's0resoru- 
read  :  "  Resolved,  that  neither  Congress  nor  tions- 
a  Territorial  legislature,  whether  by  direct  legislation, 
or  legislation  of  an  indirect  and  unfriendly  character, 
possesses  power  to  annul  or  impair  the  constitutional 
right  of  any  citizen  of  the  United  States  to  take  his 
slave  property  into  the  common  Territories  and  there 
hold  and  enjoy  the  same  while  the  Territorial  condition 
remains  :  "  and  the  second  of  which  reads  :  "  Resolved, 
that  if  experience  should  at  any  time  prove  that  the 
judiciary  and  executive  authority  do  not  possess  means 
to  insure  adequate  protection  to  constitutional  rights 
in  a  Territory,  and  if  the  Territorial  government  shall 
VOL.  I.— 4 


50  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

fail  or  refuse  to  provide  the  necessary  remedies  for  the 
purpose,  it  will  be  the  duty  of  Congress  to  supply  the 
deficiency."  No  objection  was  made  to  the  substitution 
of  this  revision  of  the  resolutions  for  the  original  draft, 
and  they  were  so  substituted. 

The  purpose  of  these  resolutions  was  the  construction 

of  a  creed  for  the  Democratic  party  in  the  rapidly  ap- 

The  ur  os  -  Proacning  presidential  election,  and  the  de- 

of  the^eTesS  feat  of  Mr.  Douglas's  candidacy.     Some  five 


of  others  like  other  sets  of  resolutions,  having  the  like  pur 

pose,  had  been  already  offered  when  Mr.  Da 

vis  presented  these.    Among  them,  those  brought  forward 

by  Mr.  Davis's  colleague   in   the   Senate,  Mr.  Brown, 

were  most  noted  for  their  radical  character.     They  pro 

vided  for  positive  and  immediate  action  by  Congress 

for  the  protection  of  property  in  slaves  in  every  Terri 

tory  already  organized,  or  to  be  organized  in  the  future. 

Mr.  Brown  criticised  Mr.  Davis's  resolutions  as  being 

weak  and  worthless.     Evidently  there  were  already  peo' 

pie  in  Mississippi  more  advanced  than  Mr. 

Criticism    r 

and  debate  Davis  himself  on  the  subject  of  the  claimed 
v?s'ns  resoiu-  constitutional  duty  of  the  United  States  Gov 
ernment  to  protect  slave  property  in  the  Ter 
ritories.  The  debate  upon  Mr.  Davis's  resolutions  began 
on  April  2d,  and  from  that  time  forward  the  other  sets 
of  propositions  having  the  same  purpose,  in  whole  or 
part,  dropped  out  of  consideration.  Mr.  Davis  was  anx 
ious  to  get  a  vote  so  soon  as  possible  upon  his  decla 
ration  of  principles,  and,  for  this  reason,  discouraged 
extended  debate  upon  them  ;  but  the  Senators  kept  up 
the  battle  of  words,  and  the  Democratic  National  Con 
vention  met  before  a  single  one  of  the  resolutions  had 
been  put  to  vote. 

This  convention  assembled  at  Charleston,  South  Car 
olina,  on  the  23d  day  of  April.     Delegates  were  present 


THE   PRESIDENTIAL    ELECTION   OF    1860          61 

from  every  Commonwealth  in  the  Union,  then  thirty- 
three  in  number,  Minnesota  having  been  admitted  in 
May  of  1858,  and  Oregon  in  February  of 

J  '  °     .  ii  i  Assembly  of 

1859.    Counting  by  heads,  it  was  well  known  the  National 

, ,     ,   _r       _          ,  ,    ,  .  f   L   -\i  T      Convention  of 

that  Mr.  Douglas  and  his  now  fatally  modi-  the  Democrat- 
fied  "  Popular  Sovereignty  "  doctrine  prepon 
derated  ;  but  the  convention  appointed  its  committees 
by  Commonwealths,  and  as  the  Democrats  of  California 
and  Oregon  adhered  to  the  Southern  party,  the  majority 
in  the  committees  fell  to  Mr.  Douglas's  opponents.  The 
committee  on  the  platform  being  so  constituted  naturally 
reported  a  party  creed  upon  which  Mr.  Douglas  could 
never  stand  without  the  grossest  stultification,  and  upon 
which,  in  so  far  as  it  referred  to  slavery  in  the  Territo 
ries,  he  had  declared  he  would  not  stand  even  for  the 
presidency.  Moreover,  the  presiding  officer  of  the  con 
vention,  the  Hon.  Caleb  Gushing,  was  a  Dred  Scott  de 
cision  Democrat,  and  a  warm  personal  friend  of  Senator 
Jefferson  Davis.  The  influence  of  the  chair  was  thus 
against  Mr.  Douglas. 

The  platform,  as  finally  perfected  by  the  majority  of 
the  committee,  and  presented  by  its  chairman,  Mr. 
A  very,  of  North  Carolina,  to  the  convention,  The  ut_ 

declared,  "  that  the  government  of  a  Terri-  form  as  pro 
posed  by  the 
tory  organized  by  an  act  of  Congress  is  pro-  majontyofthe 

.    .J        f  J  .    ,       . &       .,  .    ,       committee. 

visional  and  temporary,  and  during  its  exist 
ence  all  citizens  of  the  United  States  have  an  equal 
right  to  settle  with  their  property  in  the  Territory  with 
out  their  rights  either  of  person  or  property  being  de 
stroyed  or  impaired  by  Congressional  or  Territorial 
legislation  ;  that  is,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Federal  Gov 
ernment,  in  all  its  departments,  to  protect,  when  neces 
sary,  the  rights  of  person  and  property  in  the  Terri 
tories,  and  wherever  else  its  constitutional  authority 
extends  ;  that  when  the  settlers  in  a  Territory  having  an 


52  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

adequate  population  form  a  State  constitution,,  the  right 
of  sovereignty  commences,  and,  being  consummated  by 
admission  into  the  Union,  they  stand  on  an  equal  foot 
ing  with  the  people  of  the  other  States,  and  the  State 
thus  organized  ought  to  be  admitted  into  the  Federal 
Union,  whether  its  constitution  prohibits  or  recognizes 
the  institution  of  slavery."  It  also  contained  provisions 
favoring  the  annexation  of  Cuba,  the  construction  of  a 
railway  to  the  Pacific,  and  the  protection  of  the  rights 
of  naturalized  citizens,  and  denouncing  the  acts  of  the 
Commonwealth  Legislatures  of  the  North  passed  for  the 
purpose  of  defeating  the  execution  of  the  Fugitive  Slave 
law. 

The  minority  of  the  committee  also  presented,  through 
the  Hon.  Henry  B.  Payne,  of  Ohio,  the  draft  of  a  plat 
form  to  the  convention.    It  differed  from  the 

The  plat 
form  as  pro-   report  of  the   majority   only  m   the  article 

posed  by  a  mi-  .          '    „      , 

nority  of  tbe  upon  the  subject  oi  slavery  in  the  Territo 
ries.  The  proposition  of  this  report  in  refer 
ence  to  that  all-absorbing  matter  was  as  follows  :  ' l  Inas 
much  as  differences  of  opinion  exist  in  the  Democratic 
party  as  to  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  powers  of  a 
Territorial  Legislature,  and  as  to  the  powers  and  duties 
of  Congress,  under  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  over  the  institution  of  slavery  within  the  Terri 
tories  :  Resolved,  that  the  Democratic  party  will  abide 
by  the  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  on  the  questions  of  constitutional  law." 

Mr.  Avery  stated,  in  presenting  the  report  of  the  ma 
jority  of  the  committee,  that  "  Popular  Sovereignty"  in 
Mr  Avery'a  ^ne  Territories  was  as  dangerous  to  Southern 
statement  in  interests  as  the   Wilmot  proviso  itself,   be- 

connection 

with  the  ma-  cause  experience  had  shown  that  the  South 

jority  report.  ....  _, 

could    not   compete    successfully   with    the 
North  in  the  settlement  of  the  Territories,  since  it  was 


THE    PRESIDENTIAL    ELECTION    OF    I860          53 

costing  the  emigrant  aid  societies  of  the  North  only 
about  two  hundred  dollars  to  place  a  voter  in  the  Terri 
tories,  while  it  cost  a  Southern  man  about  fifteen  hundred 
dollars  to  place  himself  in  a  like  position.  Of  course,  he 
meant  a  Southern  man  encumbered  with  a  retinue  of 
slaves.  Mr.  Avery  went  on  to  attack  the  proposition  of 
the  minority  to  hold  to  the  Cincinnati  platform  as  mod 
ified  and  interpreted  by  the  proposed  pledge  to  " abide 
by  the  decisions  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court 
on  the  questions  of  constitutional  law,"  and  also  the  prop 
osition  of  Mr.  Benjamin  F.  Butler  to  reaffirm  the  Cin 
cinnati  platform  without  any  explanations  or  modifica 
tions.  He  declared  that  the  Cincinnati  platform  was 
susceptible  of  two  meanings,  and  told  his  Northern 
brethren  plainly  that  the  South  was  no  longer  to  be  be 
fooled  and  befogged  with  ambiguous  statements,  but  was 
now  determined  to  have  something  which  would  mean 
the  same  thing  everywhere.  It  was  in  vain  that  the 
Northern  Democrats  pleaded  that  they  should  not  be 
weighted  down  with  a  platform  which  meant  certain  de 
feat  of  the  party  in  the  North,  and,  therefore,  in  the 
whole  country.  The  great  slaveholders  preferred  the 
chances  of  defeat  to  any  further  uncertainties  about 
their  rights  in  the  Territories,  or  about  the  disposition 
of  the  North  concerning  them.  They  knew  that  a  soli 
darity  of  feeling  between  them  and  the  lesser  slavehold 
ers  and  the  non-slaveholders  had  been,  at  last,  attained, 
which  had  not  before  existed,  and  which  might  be  lost 
again.  They  felt  instinctively  that  now  was  the  time  to 
take  the  firm  stand,  and  bring  their  Northern  friends 
squarely  up  to  the  mark. 

To  their  surprise  the  Northern  Democrats  developed 
an  independence  and  a  resoluteness  which  they  had 
never  before  manifested.  Under  the  leadership  of  Mr. 
Henry  B.  Payne  and  Mr.  George  E.  Pugh,  they  trium- 


54  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

phantly  carried  the  report  of  the  minority  of  the  com 
mittee  on  the  platform  in  the  convention  by  a  vote  of 

The  resist-  one  hundred  and  sixty-five  to  one  hundred 
Nnoert°herhn  and  thirty-eight.  All  the  Northern  Derno- 
crats>  except  the  delegates  from  California 
and  Oreg°n>  and  Part  of  tne  delegates  from 
mittee.  Massachusetts,  New  Jersey,  and  Pennsyl 

vania,  voted  for  the  report.     Twelve  delegates  from  the 
border  Commonwealths  of  the  South  also  voted  for  it. 

So  soon  as  the  result  was  made  known  the  Southerners 
began  to  secede  from  the  convention.     The  Alabama 

secessions  men  led  off.  The  chairman  of  the  delegation, 
from  the  cou-  Mr.  L.  P.  Walker,  informed  the  convention 
that  the  "State"  of  Alabama  in  convention 
assembled  had  instructed  her  delegates  not  to  submit  to  a 
(t  squatter  sovereignty  "  platform,  but  to  withdraw  from 
the  general  convention,  if  such  a  one  should  be  adopted. 
The  Mississippians  immediately  followed.  Then  the 
delegations  from  South  Carolina,  Florida,  and  Texas 
went  out.  Finally,  all  but  two  of  the  Louisiana  dele 
gates,  all  but  one  of  the  Arkansas  delegates,  and  twenty- 
six  of  the  thirty-four  Georgians,  withdrew. 

There  still  remained,  however,  in  the  convention,  a 
substantial  majority  of  the  whole  number  of  delegates 

The  failure  cnosen  from  all  °f  the  Common  wealths.  They 
to  make  a  proceeded  to  ballot  for  candidates  for  Presi- 

nomination,    A 

and  the  ad-  dent  and  Vice-President  upon  the  two- 
theconven-  thirds  rule  adopted  by  the  convention.  Mr. 
Douglas  received  a  good  majority,  but  could 
not  reach  a  majority  of  two-thirds  of  all  of  the  votes 
cast.  After  fifty-seven  unsuccessful  ballots,  the  conven 
tion  adjourned,  May  3d,  to  reassemble  in  Baltimore  on 
the  18th  of  the  following  June.  Before  adjourning,  it 
passed  a  resolution  recommending  the  party  organiza 
tions,  in  the  several  Commonwealths,  whose  delegates 


THE   PRESIDENTIAL   ELECTION   OF    1800          55 

had  withdrawn  from  the  convention,  to  elect  and  send 
forward  new  members  to  occupy  the  seats  of  the  seceders. 

The  seceding  delegates  had  assembled  in  separate 
convention  under  the  presidency  of  Senator  James  A. 
Bayard  of  Delaware.  They  adopted  the 
resolutions  reported  by  the  majority  of  the  ers'convcn- 
committee  of  the  general  convention  on  the 
platform,  the  Avery  principles,  talked  for  four  days, 
and  then  adjourned  to  meet  on  the  second  Monday  of 
the  following  June  at  Richmond,  Virginia.  The  division 
of  the  Democratic  party  on  sectional  lines  was  now  an 
accomplished  fact.  It  remained  to  be  seen  whether  it 
was  final,  or  whether  six  weeks  of  reflection  would  bring 
wisdom  and  conciliation. 

To  the  historian  there  is  no  question  that  the  slave 
holders  had  demanded  an  advance  upon  the  Cincinnati 
doctrine  of  1856,  which  was  then  universally 

,     ,  r>       T,  r™  n       i    •  Advance  in 

accepted  as  a  finality.     That  doctrine  was, 


i  -I  i        /-•<  ers'  demands. 

as  we  know,  non-intervention  by  Congress, 
either  in  the  Commonwealths  or  the  Territories,  upon 
the  subject  of  slavery.  The  slaveholders  now  said  that 
by  non-intervention  in  the  Territories  upon  that  subject 
they  understood,  both  in  I860  and  1856,  the  same  sort 
of  neutrality  which  Congress  observed  toward  slavery 
in  the  District  of  Columbia,  which  was  that  Congress, 
having  found  slavery  an  existing  institution  in  the  Dis 
trict,  could,  as  a  neutral  body  toward  it,  legislate  only 
for  its  protection.  If  Congress  should  fail  to  do  this, 
they  now  said,  Congress  would  be  acting  against  it, 
and  would  thus  violate  neutrality  with  regard  to  it. 

In  a  very  concise  and  able  speech  upon  Mr.  Davis's 
resolutions,  made  in  the  Senate  Chamber  on  April  2d 
preceding,  Senator  Wigfall  of  Texas  had  developed  this 
idea  in  a  most  subtile  juristic  manner.  He  took  the 
ground  that  no  legislature  merely  in  the  political  sys- 


56  THP:  CIVIL  WAR 

tern  of  the  United  States,  whether  it  were  Congress  or 

the  Legislature  of  a  Commonwealth  of  the  Union,  could 

Mr  wig-  determine  in  what  property  should  consist; 

fairs  reason-  that  that  could  be  done  only  by  the  sovereign 

mg  upon  the    .  j      j 

meaning    of  m  the  system  i    and  that  the  only   powers 

Congressional        ,  .    , 

neutrality  in  which  government  had,  or  could  have,  in  a 
vel?ry  in  fhe  republican  system,  in  reference  to  property, 
ies-  were  powers  to  protect  that  which  the  sov 
ereign  had  defined  to  be  property.  Hence  the  conclu 
sion,  that  if  government  failed  to  protect  property  it 
was  attempting  to  thwart  the  will  of  the  sovereign 
power,  was  disobedient,  and  thus  really  intervening 
against  the  organic  law.  This  reasoning  was  sound,  in 
respect  to  the  question  of  slavery  in  the  Territories, 
provided  the  sovereign  in  the  Territories  was  sovereign 
over  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  and  had 
established  property  in  slaves  in  the  Territories. 

Now,  this  doctrine  was  not  held  by  the  Democratic 
party  in  1856.  It  appeared  first  in  the  Dred  Scott  opin 
ion  in  1857,  and  what  the  slaveholders  proposed  at 
Charleston  was  to  make  the  Dred  Scott  opinion  the 
platform  of  the  party.  Whatever  may  be  said  about 
the  rightfulness  or  wrongfulness,  the  wisdom  or  unwis 
dom  of  this,  it  was  certainly  a  new  thing,  and  it  cer 
tainly  marked  an  advance  by  the  slaveholders  beyond 
their  position  in  1856.  It  was  an  encroachment  upon 
the  North.  The  slaveholders  said,  and  with  some  show 
of  reason,  that  they  asked  only  what  the  Supreme  Court 
had  declared  to  be  their  constitutional  right,  a  right 
which  was,  therefore,  as  old  as  the  Constitution,  and  of 
which  they  had  been  deprived  by  Congressional  legisla 
tion.  But  it  was  at  least  questionable  whether  the 
Supreme  Court  had  decided  the  point  contended  for  by 
the  slaveholders.  Justice  Curtis  asserted  that  it  had 
not,  as  we  have  seen,  and  the  consensus  of  opinion 


among  the  best  constitutional  lawyers  of  this  day  is  that 
he  was  correct.  Admitting,  however,  for  the  sake  of 
argument  that  the  Court  had  decided  the  point,  the 
whole  duty  of  Congress  would  have  been  discharged  by 
furnishing  the  courts  and  the  executive  with  the  general 
power  to  execute  judicial  decisions.  The  nullification 
of  an  act  of  Congress  by  a  judicial  decision  does  not 
obligate  Congress  to  pass  any  other  act.  The  proposi 
tion  of  the  minority  of  the  committee  on  the  platform 
met  the  case  entirely  in  pledging  the  Democratic  party 
to  abide  by  the  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  ques 
tions  of  constitutional  law.  The  demand  of  the  slave 
holders  that  the  opinion  of  the  court  should  be  incorpo 
rated  in  the  platform  was,  under  the  most  generous 
aspect  in  which  it  can  be  viewed,  a  demand  that  the 
duty  of  obedience  to  judicial  decision  in  a  specific  case 
should  be  so  magnified  and  exaggerated  as  to  make  the 
decision  a  binding  rule  of  political  action — an  irrefutable 
principle  of  political  opinion.  This  was  certainly  a  new 
demand.  It  was  a  demand  to  which  the  Democrats  of 
the  North  could  not  accede,  unless  they  were  willing  to 
make  the  Supreme  Court  the  determiner  of  policy  and 
opinion  as  well  as  of  law,  unless  they  were  willing  to 
acknowledge  sovereignty  itself  as  belonging  to  the  Su 
preme  Court,  unless  they  were  willing  to  accept  an 
oligarchic  state  as  the  form  of  the  American  system. 

Between  the  date  of  the  adjournment  of  The  eventg 
the  two  Democratic  conventions  in  early  of  the  interim 

.  .        /     between    the 

May    and   their  reassembling  111  the  middle  adjournment 

.     T  -.  .    ,  .  and    reaseem- 

oi  June,  events  which  were  to  exercise  an  t>iy  of  the 
influence  upon  their  final  action  crowded  Inventions!0 
in  thick  and  fast. 

In  the  first  place,  the  discussion  in  the  Senate  upon 
the  Davis  resolutions  continued  and  grew  more  earnest 
and  excited.  On  the  7th  of  May  Mr.  Davis  himself 


58  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

made  a  powerful  effort  to  crash  Mr.  Douglas  and  his 
"  Popular  Sovereignty  "  doctrine  to  earth.  On  the  15th 
Mr.  Douglas  undertook  to  answer  and  controvert  the 
main  points  of  Mr.  Davis's  resolutions  and  speech.  To 
the  historian  it  appears  that  he  did  do  so  conclusively, 
but  to  the  Democratic  Senators  it  manifestly  appeared 
that  he  did  not.  The  vote  was  taken  upon  the  resolu 
tions  separately  beginning  on  the  24th  and 

Adoption  of  .  J  A,&    ^          ,  .,          , 

the  Davis  res-  ending  on  the  25th.  Mr.  Douglas  aside  of 
course,  every  Democratic  Senator,  except  Mr. 
Pugh,  voted  for  all  of  the  resolutions,  and  they  were  all 
adopted  by  a  majority  of  almost  two  to  one,  and  without 
any  modification  in  principle.  So  far  as  the  Democratic 
members  of  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  could  make 
it  so,  the  confederatization  of  the  political  system  of  the 
United  States  was  complete.  They  had  also  thrown 
themselves  upon  the  side  of  the  Southern  Democracy, 
which  signified  their  encouragement  to  the  seceders  from 
the  Charleston  convention  to  persevere  in  the  division 
of  the  party  and  dissolve  the  last  bond  of  political  party 
unity  between  the  North  and  the  South. 

The  second  great  event  of  the  interim  was  the  assem 

bly  of  the  Republican  National  convention  at  Chicago, 

on  the  16th  day  of  May.      It  was  called  a 

The  Repub-  .  \.  i      •      »      .     •. 

ational  national  convention,  although,  in  fact,  it  was 


lon<  geographically  sectional,  no  delegates  from 
the  slaveholding  Commonwealths  being  present,  except 
from  what  were  then  called  the  "  border  States/'  The 
organization  of  the  convention  was  quickly  accomplished, 
and  the  platform  was  promptly  drafted  and  unanimously 
adopted.  It  was  evident  that  there  was  no  disposition 
to  allow  differences  of  opinion  upon  points  of  minor 
importance,  or  even  points  of  considerable  importance, 
to  interfere  with  success  at  the  polls.  The  enthusiasm 
of  a  new  party,  composed  chiefly  of  comparatively  young 


THE   PRESIDENTIAL    ELECTION    OF    18GO          59 

men,  determined  upon  the  arrest  of  a  great  evil,  gave 
forceful  unity  to  feeling,  thought,  and  action,  and  prom 
ised  victory  from  the  outset. 

The  platform  was  something  of  a  pronunciamento  both 
in  length  and  style  of  composition.  It  reaffirmed  the 
Declaration  of  Independence.  It  denounced 
disunion.  It  anathematized  Buchanan's  ad-  lican6  puV 
ministration  for  its  Kansas  policy,  its  finan 
cial  extravagance  and  corruption,  and  its  inhuman  con 
ception  of  the  relation  of  slave  and  master.  It  pro 
nounced  for  a  homestead  law,  for  a  railroad  to  the 
Pacific,  for  river  and  harbor  improvements,  for  the 
full  and  efficient  protection  of  the  rights  of  naturalized 
citizens,  etc. 

But  the  two  subjects  of  transcendent  importance 
with  which  it  dealt  were  slavery  in  the  Territories  and  a 
protective  tariff.  In  regard  to  these  it  will  be  best  to 
quote  verbatim  the  resolutions.  They  ran  as  follows  : 
"  Resolved,  that  the  new  dogma  that  the  Constitution, 
of  its  own  force,  carries  slavery  into  any  or  all  of  the 
Territories  of  the  United  States  is  a  dangerous  political 
heresy,  at  variance  with  the  explicit  provisions  of  that 
instrument  itself,  with  contemporaneous  exposition,  and 
with  legislative  and  judicial  precedent ;  is  revolutionary 
in  its  tendency  and  subversive  of  the  peace  and  harmony 
of  the  country  ;  that  the  normal  condition  of  all  the 
territory  of  the  United  States  is  that  of  freedom  ;  that, 
as  our  Republican  fathers,  when  they  had  abolished 
slavery  in  all  our  national  territory,  ordained  that  '  no 
person  should  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty  or  property 
without  due  process  of  law/  it  becomes  our  duty  by 
legislation,  whenever  such  legislation  is  necessary,  to 
maintain  this  provision  of  the  Constitution  against  all 
attempts  to  violate  it ;  and  we  deny  the  authority  of 
Congress,  of  a  Territorial  legislature,  or  of  any  indi- 


60  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

viduals,  to  give  legal  existence  to  slavery  in  any  Terri 
tory  of  the  United  States  : 

"Resolved,  that,  while  providing  revenue  for  the 
support  of  the  general  government  by  duties  upon  im 
ports,  sound  policy  requires  such  an  adjustment  of  these 
imposts  as  to  encourage  the  industrial  interests  of  the 
whole  country  ;  and  we  commend  that  policy  of  national 
exchanges  which  secures  to  the  workingmen  liberal 
wages,  to  agriculture  remunerative  prices,  to  mechanics 
and  manufacturers  an  adequate  reward  for  their  skill, 
labor  and  enterprise,  and  to  the  nation  commercial  pros 
perity  and  independence." 

There  was  no  doubt  about  the  meaning  of  this  plat 
form  in  respect  to  the  question  of  slavery  in  the  Terri- 
The  doc-  tories,  no  ambiguity  in  the  statement  of  the 
piatformfcone  principle.  The  Republicans  agreed  with  the 
cernmg^s i^a-  Southern  Democrats  that  property  is  a  f  unda- 
Temtories.  mental  conception,  that  the  definition  of  prop 
erty,  the  determination  of  what  it  shall  embrace,  is,  there 
fore,  a  subject  of  constitutional  law.  They  differed  from 
the  Southern  Democrats,  on  the  other  hand,  differed  as 
widely  as  direct  contradiction  can,  in  regard  to  the 
status  of  the  individual  in  the  Territories,  as  fixed  by 
constitutional  law.  The  Republicans  held  that  the 
Constitution  not  only  did  not  carry  slavery  into  the 
Territories,  but  that  it  made  the  freedom  of  every 
human  being  the  nominal  status  in  the  Territories,  by 
not  expressly  legalizing  slavery,  and  by  providing  that 
"  no  person  shall  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty  or  property 
without  due  process  of  law." 

The  Southern  Democrats  held,  as  we  have  seen,  that 
property  in  slaves  existed  everywhere  in  the  country  at 
the  time  of  the  formation  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  that  it  was  recognized  as  lawful  every 
where  by  that  instrument,  and  that  its  abolition  or 


THE   PRESIDENTIAL   ELECTION   OF    1860          61 

prohibition  anywhere  rested  in  every  case  upon  some 
positive  enactment  to  that  effect.  The  Southern  Demo 
crats  were  nearer  right  in  their  constitutional  history 
than  the  Republicans,  and  both  were  wrong  in  their 
constitutional  law.  The  Republicans  were  Theantithe- 
wrong  in  holding  that  Congress  could  not  ^e8  itepS 
legalize  property  in  slaves  in  the  Territories  ; 
and  the  Democrats  were  wrong  in  holding 
that  Congress  could  not  abolish  or  prohibit  property  in 
slaves  in  the  Territories.  Where  a  constitution  creates 
a  government  of  general  powers,  as  distinguished  from 
one  of  enumerated  powers,  that  government  can,  so  far 
as  constitutional  power  is  concerned,  do  anything  which 
the  sovereign  can  do,  unless  forbidden  by  the  sovereign 
in  some  provision  of  the  Constitution.  Such  a  govern 
ment  can  determine  in  what  property  shall  consist, 
unless  restrained  from  so  doing  by  an  express  provision 
of  the  Constitution.  The  Government  of  the  United 
States  was  a  government  of  general  powers  in  the  Ter 
ritories,  and  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  did 
not  then  prohibit  it  from  defining  property  therein, 
either  generally  or  specifically.  The  Republican  inter 
pretation  of  the  clause  in  the  Constitution  relied  upon 
by  the  Republicans  for  disabling  Congress  from  legaliz 
ing  property  in  slaves  in  the  Territories,  viz.,  that  "no 
person  shall  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty  or  property  with 
out  due  process  of  law,"  was  as  far-fetched  as  the  doctrine 
of  the  Southern  Democrats,  that  the  United  States  had 
no  sovereignty  at  all,  and,  therefore,  could  not  define 
property,  was  false.  No  definition  which  the  Supreme 
Court  had  to  that  time  given  or  indicated  of  the  phrase 
"  due  process  of  law,"  would  have  deprived  Congress  of 
the  power  of  legalizing  slavery  in  the  Territories  ;  while 
the  Democratic  doctrine  that  the  United  States  had  no 
sovereignty,  and,  therefore,  could  not  determine  in  what 


62  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

property  should  consist  anywhere,  and  that  the  separate 
"States"  alone  had  that  power  in  our  political  system, 
and  could  themselves  exercise  it  only  as  a  constituent 
power,  can  stand  the  test  neither  of  historic  fact  nor  of 
the  sound  principles  of  political  science.  Every  tyro  in 
American  constitutional  history  knows  that  property  in 
slaves  was  legalized,  and  abolished,  in  many  Common 
wealths  of  the  Union  by  mere  legislative  enactments, 
and  that  the  Commonwealth  Legislatures  have  from  the 
first  been  defining  and  redefining  the  rights  to  property 
within  the  general  limitations  of  constitutional  law. 
And  even  Mr.  Jefferson  Davis  himself  said,  in  his  7th 
of  May  speech,  "I  admit  that  the  United  States  may 
acquire  eminent  domain.  I  admit  that  the  United 
States  may  have  sovereignty  over  territory  ;  otherwise 
the  sovereign  jurisdiction  which  we  obtained  by  con 
quest  or  treaty  would  not  pass  to  us.  I  deny  that  their 
agent,  the  Federal  government,  under  the  existing  Con 
stitution  can  have  eminent  domain.  I  deny  that  it  can 
have  sovereignty."  Here  is  certainly  a  distinction  be 
tween  the  United  States  as  sovereign  and  the  United 
States  as  government,  and  the  attribution  of  that  power 
to  the  United  States  which  could  define  property.  Had 
Mr.  Davis  been  called  upon  to  explain  what  he  meant 
by  the  phrase  "  United  States  as  sovereign,"  he  would 
probably  have  said  that  he  meant  the  separate  "sov 
ereign  States"  in  partnership.  It  does  not  matter, 
however,  how  he  might  have  explained  it,  here  was  an 
admission  from  the  chief  of  the  Southern  Democracy 
that  there  was  another  kind  of  sovereignty  in  our  sys 
tem  than  that  of  the  separate  "States,"  which  he,  for 
this  once,  called  the  sovereignty  of  the  United  States. 
It  was  sufficient  to  show  that  the  theory  upon  which 
the  Southern  Democrats  rested  to  prove  that  Congress 
could  not  prohibit  slavery  in  the  Territories  would  not 


THE   PRESIDENTIAL   ELECTION   OF    I860          63 

hold  in  all  the  cases  which  occurred  to  the  minds  of 
those  same  Democrats  themselves. 

While  thus  it  is  easily  seen  that  the  doctrines  of  both 
of  these  platforms  respecting  the  power  of  Congress 
over  the  subject  of  slavery  in  the  Territories  were 
erroneous,  yet  they  contained  the  advantage  of  a  direct 
issue.  The  one  distinctly  and  flatly  contradicted  what 
the  other  asserted,  and  vice  versa. 

The  other  very  important  provision  of  the  Republican 
platform,,  the  advocacy  of  a  protective  tariff,  was  ex 
pressed  in  a  crude,  half-hesitating,  though  The  tariff 
politic,  manner.  The  country  had  been 
since  1857  passing  through  a  period  of  Platform- 
financial  panic  and  business  stagnation,  chiefly  in  con 
sequence,  as  it  was  thought,  of  the  lowering  of  the 
duties  by  the  Act  of  1857.  The  tariff  law  of  1846 
had  brought  a  surplus  of  revenue  into  the  Treasury, 
which  the  Congress  of  1857  thought  to  curtail  by  re 
ducing  the  duties.  The  immediate  effect  of  the  reduc 
tion  was,  however,  largely  increased  importation,  and  a 
steady  drain  upon  the  specie  of  the  country.  The  panic 
followed  with  its  inevitable  attendant,  long  business 
depression.  From  the  autumn  of  1857,  the  protection 
feeling  was  growing,  especially  throughout  the  North, 
and  when  the  Republican  convention  met  a  great  num 
ber  of  the  leading  men  of  the  country  were  of  the  opin 
ion  that  a  revival  of  prosperity  could  be  effected  only  by 
an  increase  of  the  duties  up  to  the  protective  point. 
The  Whig  element  in  the  Republican  party  was  naturally 
easily  won  for  it,  but  the  Freesoil  Democrats  of  the  party 
were  attached  to  the  principle  of  free  trade,  and  had  to 
be  led  up  gently  to  a  protective  policy.  Hence  the 
moderation  and  almost  ambiguity  of  the  tariff  provision 
in  the  platform. 

The  doctrine  advanced  was  very  cleverly  connected 


64  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

with  the  question  of  freedom  in  the  Territories.     It  in 
dicated  that  the  two  things  which  stood  in  the  way  of 
better  pay  for  free  labor  in  the  North,,  were 
tion  with  the  the  unpaid  labor  of  the  slave  at  the  South, 

question     of  „   ,    ,          .       -„  T 

tree  Temtor-  and  the  low  wages  oi  labor  in  -burope.  In 
its  endeavor  to  neutralize  or  minimize  the 
influence  of  both  of  these  forces,  the  Republican  party 
now  represented  itself  as  the  true  friend  of  the  laboring 
man  of  the  North.  Some  of  the  shrewdest  of  the  Re 
publican  leaders,  among  them  Mr.  James  G.  Elaine, 
have  affirmed  that  the  Republican  party  could  not  have 
carried  the  election  of  1860  without  this  provision  of  the 
platform.  Pennsylvania,  they  think,  would  not  have 
gone  Republican  on  the  slavery  question  alone.  If  their 
view  is  correct,  it  demonstrates  most  decidedly  the  po 
litical  cleverness  of  the  leaders  in  the  convention  at 
Chicago. 

The  unanimity  of  the  convention,  expressed  in  the 
enthusiastic  vote  upon  the  platform,  manifested  itself 
The  nomi-  again  in  the  choice  of  the  candidates.  Down 
candidates  'by  to  within  a  few  months  before  the  meeting 
can  ^onven-  of  the  convention,  Mr.  Seward,  on  account 
tion-  of  his  activity  in  the  organization  of  the 

party,  and  his  leadership  of  it  in  Congress,  and  in  the 
great  Commonwealth  of  New  York,  as  well  as  on  account 
of  his  great  ability  as  a  statesman  and  a  politician,  had 
been  generally  regarded  as  the  man  for  the  first  place  on 
the  ticket.  But  the  wiser  heads  had,  by  the  opening  of 
the  year  1860,  begun  to  see  that  Mr.  Seward  was  not  the 
surely  available  candidate  necessary  to  success.  It  was 
thought  that  his  opinions  upon  all  points,  secondary  as 
well  as  cardinal,  were  too  well  known,  and  that,  conse 
quently,  too  many  differed  with  him  upon  one  subject 
or  another.  It  was  also  thought  that  he  was  too  radical, 
and  his  "  higher  law  "  doctrine  was  interpreted  to  mean 


THE   PRESIDENTIAL   ELECTION    OF    I860          65 

that  he  would  disregard  the  Constitution  in  his  hostility 
to  slavery.  And  it  was  thought,  finally,  that  he  lacked 
in  conciliatoriness  of  spirit  toward  the  South,  and  that 
he  was  especially  hated  by  the  slaveholders.  Still  more 
weighty,  however,  were  the  considerations  that  Mr. 
Greeley  had  turned  against  him,  and  was  doing  every 
thing  in  his  power  to  defeat  bis  candidacy,  and  that  the 
leaders  in  Pennsylvania  and  Indiana  were  asserting  that 
he  could  not  carry  these  Commonwealths.  The  East 
had,  however,  no  other  candidate  of  great  strength,  and 
it  was  not,  under  the  circumstances,  unnatural  that  the 
West  should  claim  the  prize,  and,  with  the  advantage  of 
western  surroundings  about  the  convention,  win  it. 

Lincoln  has  sometimes  been  represented  as  a  sort  of 
"dark  horse,"  but  this  claim  manifests  very  little  ap 
preciation  of  his  qualities,  or  of  the  great  shrewdness 
with  which  his  candidacy  was  managed.  His  speeches 
from  1858  to  18GO  contain  the  best,  most  concisely 
stated,  conservative  body  of  Republican  doctrine  to  be 
found  in  all  our  political  literature,  and  his  candidacy 
for  the  nomination  had  been  an  established  fact  for  at 
least  a  year  before  the  meeting  of  the  convention.  His 
managers,  chief  among  whom  were  the  Hon.  David 
Davis,  the  Hon.  0.  II.  Browning,  and  Governor  Richard 
B.  Oglesby,  three  of  the  most  astute  politicians  that  the 
country  has  ever  produced,  presented  him,  not  as  the 
rival  of  Seward,  but  as  a  substitute  for  Seward,  in 
case  Seward  should  be  found  unavailable.  They  were 
greatly  aided,  and  at  no  point  embarrassed,  by  Lincoln 
himself,  who  was  also  an  old  and  skilled  hand  in  poli 
tics.  They  furthermore  had  the  advantage  of  the  en 
tourage.  About  all  Illinois  had  assembled  in  and  around 
the  locus  of  the  convention,  cheering  and  shouting  and 
singing  just  at  the  right  moment  to  advance  Lincoln's 
cause.  There  was  also  shrewd  trading  in  his  behalf. 
VOL.  I.— 5 


66  THE   CIVIL   WAE 

The  Pennsylvanians  were  asked  the  price  of  their  sup 
port,  and  a  place  in  the  cabinet  was  pledged  for  it  to 
Mr.  Cameron.  Lincoln  knew  nothing  of  this,  at  the 
moment,  of  course.  He  was  at  his  home  in  Springfield, 
and  was  telegraphing  David  Davis  to  make  no  contracts 
that  would  bind  him.  Davis,  however,  paid  no  atten 
tion,  of  course,  to  Lincoln's  directions. 

On  the  first  ballot  Seward  led,  but  fell  sixty  votes 
short  of  the  nomination.  On  the  second  Lincoln  came 
up  even  with  him,  within  three  and  a  half  votes.  On 
the  third  Lincoln  was  nominated.  It  was  something  of 
a  surprise  to  the  country,  and  the  abolitionists  were  not 
happy  over  it.  Wendell  Phillips  inquired  :  "  Who  is 
this  huckster  in  politics,  who  is  this  county  court  advo 
cate  ?  "  But  the  nomination  was  no  mistake.  The  con 
vention  had  builded  better  than  it  knew  itself.  Lincoln 
was  not  only  more  available  than  Seward,  but  he  had 
sounder  morals  and  better  judgment  than  Seward,  or 
any  of  the  others.  He  was  far  better  equipped  than  any 
of  them  to  meet  the  great  emergency. 

After  the  nomination  of  the  candidate  for  the  presi 
dency,  a  very  important  question  confronted  the  con- 
Theques-  vention.  It  was  the  long-settled  custom  of 
ond0pia^ee6on  the  Republic  that  the  two  names  upon  the 
the  ticket.  ticket  should  come  from  the  two  sections, 
North  and  South.  The  national  character  of  the  parties 
was  thus  indicated.  The  question  now  was  whether 
the  Republican  party  would  follow  this  precedent  or 
would  manifest  its  sectional  nature  by  abandoning  it. 
There  were  delegates  present  in  the  convention  from 
Delaware,.  Maryland,  Virginia,  Kentucky,  and  Missouri ; 
and  there  were  able  men  from  some  of  these  Common 
wealths  who  were  sound  anti-slavery  men,  good  Repub 
licans  in  principle,  and  already  affiliated  with  the  party. 
Among  them  were  Edward  Bates  and  the  Blairs 


THE   PRESIDENTIAL   ELECTION    OF    1860          67 

of  Missouri,  Cassius  M.  Clay,  of  Kentucky,  and  the 
brilliant  Henry  Winter  Davis,  of  Maryland.  It  does 
seem  as  if  it  would  have  been  judicious  as  well  as  con 
ciliatory  to  have  nominated  one  of  these  men  for  the 
second  place  on  the  ticket.  It  would  have  enabled  the 
Republicans  to  represent  themselves  as  a  national  party. 
There  is  little  doubt  that  the  nomination  of  Hannibal 
Hamlin  for  the  vice-presidency,  from  the  extreme  north 
eastern  Commonwealth  of  the  Union,  gave  far  more  of 
fence  to  the  South  than  the  nomination  of  Lincoln  for 
the  presidency.  It  certainly  appeared  to  stamp  the  Re 
publican  party  as  a  sectional  party.  It  seems  to  have 
been  thought  that  it  was  necessary  in  order  to  make 
sure  of  the  East.  It  is  certainly  true  that  under  no 
combination  of  candidates  which  could  have  been  made 
would  the  Republicans  have  carried  any  slaveholding 
Commonwealth,  and,  if  the  East  was  in  any  danger  of 
disaffection,  it  was  good  policy,  from  the  point  of  view 
of  success  in  the  election,  to  strengthen  the  line  in 
that  quarter.  Of  course  it  can  never  be  known  whether 
the  nomination  of  Mr.  Hamlin  saved  any  Northern 
Commonwealth  at  the  polls  or  not.  One  cannot,  how 
ever,  help  feeling  that  the  purposes  of  the  Republican 
party  would  have  been  better  understood  at  the  South 
had  a  man  of  known  intelligence  and  probity  from 
the  South  been  selected  for  the  second  place  on  the 
ticket. 

Of  even  greater  importance  than  the  movements  of 
the  Republican  party  in  determining  the  course  which 
the  Democratic  leaders  would  take  upon  re-  The 
assembling  in  nominating  convention  was 
the  attitude  now  assumed  by  the  remnant  of  convention, 
the  old  Whig  party,  which  had,  after  its  disruption  in 
1855,  taken  the  name  of  "  the  American  Party,"  and 
now  manifested  its  obsoleteness  by  calling  itself  "  the 


68  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

Constitutional  Union  Party."  All  the  parties,  except 
perhaps  the  abolitionists,  were  as  yet  Constitutional 
Union  parties.  They  all  proposed  to  stand  on  that 
general  ground.  The  question  had  progressed,  however, 
far  beyond  that  general  statement  of  principles.  The 
question  now  at  issue  was  as  to  the  meaning  of  the 
Constitutional  Union  in  reference  to  a  given  point,  viz., 
slavery  in  the  Territories.  Upon  this  specific  question 
the  "Constitutional  Union  Party"  was  silent.  Its 
platform  was  expressed  in  a  single  line.  It  was  :  "  The 
Constitution  of  the  country,  the  Union  of  the  States 
and  the  enforcement  of  the  laws."  Undoubtedly  the 
party  conceived,  in  May  of  1860,  that  it  had  a  timely 
object  in  view.  Undoubtedly  it  meant  to  say  that 
under  no  circumstances  whatever  would  it  yield  to  dis 
union  sentiments ;  that  the  Union,  with  or  without 
slavery,  but  always  the  Union,  was  its  cardinal  principle. 
But,  as  we  shall  see  further  on,  it  did  not  stand  by  its 
colors  when  the  fire  grew  hot  and  near. 

The  convention  of  the  party  met  in  Baltimore,  on  the 

19th  day  of  May,  and  nominated  John  Bell,  of  Tennes- 

The  nomi    see>  anc^  Edward  Everett,  of  Massachusetts, 

nation  of  John  as  its  candidates  for  the  presidency  and  the 

Bell  for  the       .  .  ,  T,     .,        r.     ., 

presidency  by  vice-presidency.  Both  of  these  statesmen 
were  "old-line  Whigs,"  and  gentlemen  of 
the  "old  school,"  courteous,  kind,  conciliatory,  patri 
otic,  and  high  minded.  They  had  both  served  the 
country  long  and  nobly,  and  everybody  knew  that  their 
characters  were  guarantees  of  peace,  union,  mutual  re 
gard  of  rights,  deference  in  matters  of  opinion,  temper 
ance  in  speech,  and  gentleness  in  manners.  But  the 
age  was  passed  for  all  these  virtues.  In  their  place 
vulgar  radicalness  in  thought,  belligerency  in  feeling, 
coarseness  in  language,  and  brutality  in  conduct  were 
to  be  found  on  all  sides. 


THE   PRESIDENTIAL    ELECTION    OF    1860          G9 

There  was  not  from  the  first  the  slightest  chance  of 
their  election.  They  were  formidable  from  but  a  single 
point  of  view — from  the  point  of  view  of  the  The  danger 
necessity  to  the  slaveholders  of  the  unity  of 
the  South  under  the  rule  of  the  Southern 
Democracy.  The  South  must  be  made  solid  this  party. 
and  kept  solid.  The  slaveholders  must  not  risk  the  loss 
of  a  single  Southern  Commonwealth  for  the  chance  of 
winning  a  Northern  one.  They  must  beat  Mr.  Bell  in 
all  the  Commonwealths  of  the  South,  and  they  knew 
they  could  not  do  this  with  any  Northern  man  for  their 
candidate. 

Such  was  their  conviction  when  their  leaders  reassem 
bled,  on  the  llth  of  June,  at  Richmond.  They  mani 
fested  no  disposition  whatever  to  compromise 

..,     .,      .     ,T       .,  1,1  ,.  Reassembly 

with  their  .Northern  brethren  on  the  question  of  the  conveu- 
of  the  platform,  and  now  was  added  the  Southern  ne- 
danger  of  losing  control  of  some  of  their 
own  communities  by  the  success  of  Mr.  Bell  at  the 
polls.  They  remained  some  days  in  Richmond  revolv 
ing  plans,  and  then  adjourned  to  meet  on  the  28th  in 
Baltimore. 

The  regular  convention  of  the  Democratic  party  met, 
pursuant  to  adjournment,  at  Baltimore,  on  the  18th  of 
June.  In  place  of  any  approach  of  the  two 

.  L  "  Reassembly 

bodies,  however,  toward  each  other,  the  del-  of theconven- 

'        ,-.    .         tioii   of   the 

egates  to  the  regular  convention  irom  Dela-  Northern  De- 
ware,  Maryland,  Virginia,  North  Carolina, 
Tennessee,  and  Missouri  withdrew,  in  whole  or  part,  and 
went  over  to  the  other  side.  The  Hon.  Caleb  Gushing, 
of  Massachusetts,  resigned  the  presidency  of  the  regular 
convention,  and  was  made  the  presiding  officer  of  the 
seceders'  body,  when  its  members  reassembled  on  the 
28th. 

The  regular  convention  then  nominated  Mr.  Douglas 


70  THE    CIVIL    WAR 

for  the  presidency  and  Mr.  Fitzpatrick,  of  Alabama,  for 

the  vice-presidency,  and  upon  the  refusal  of  Mr.  Fitz- 

patrick    to    accept   the  nomination,  substi- 

Work  of  the    * 

two  conven-  tuted    the    Hon.    Herscliel    V.   Johnson,  of 

tions.  ^  .        .      ,  .        , 

Georgia,  in  his  place. 

The  seceders  organized  their  convention  on  the  28th, 
consisting  of  delegates  from  twenty-one  Commonwealths, 
under  the  presidency  of  the  Hon.  Caleb  Gushing,  adopt 
ed  by  a  unanimous  vote  the  platform  proposed  by  Mr. 
A  very  at  Charleston,  and  nominated  John  C.  Brecken- 
ridge,  of  Kentucky,  and  Joseph  Lane,  of  Oregon,  as 
candidates  for  the  presidency  and  vice-presidency.  Mr. 
Yancey  pronounced  the  valedictory  in  a  style  which  can 
be  described  by  no  more  appropriate  title  than  "fire- 
eating,"  and  they  went  forth  to  their  mad  work,  which 
resulted  in  their  own  destruction. 

The  campaign  was  earnest  and  serious.  It  was  a  bat 
tle  of  principles  as  well  as  of  candidates.  Mr.  Douglas 
led  his  own  hosts,  speaking  both  in  the  North 

The    politi-  '  .  . 

cai  campaign  and  in  the  South,  and  endeavoring  to  inspire 
his  followers,  his  hearers,  and  the  readers  of 
his  speeches,  with  some  of  his  own  enthusiasm.  The 
greatest  debaters  of  the  country  went  on  to  the  hustings, 
and  everywhere  the  issues  were  discussed  with  great 
force.  The  machinery  for  rousing  the  feelings  of  the 
masses,  not  given  to  decision  by  judgment,  was  also  put 
in  motion.  Music,  parades,  torchlight  processions,  fire 
works,  etc.,  were  seen  and  heard  on  all  sides. 

As  the  campaign  advanced  two  things,  at  least,  be 
came  manifest.  The  first  was  the  fact  that  Lincoln  was 
gaining  in  the  North  at  the  expense  of  Douglas.  The 
obstinacy  of  the  Southern  Democrats  at  Charleston  and 
Baltimore  had  greatly  angered  many  of  the  Northern 
Democrats  and  was  operating  to  drive  them  into  the 
Republican  ranks.  The  second  was  the  increasingly 


THE   PRESIDENTIAL   ELECTION   OF   1860         71 

threatening  attitude  which  the  slaveholders  were  assum 
ing  toward  the  Union  in  case  of  the  election  of  Lincoln. 
It  came  to  be  generally  believed  before  October  that 
they  would  not  submit  to  a  Republican  administration. 
The  Republicans,  however,  refused  to  be  intimidated  by 
the  situation  and  were  determined  to  test  the  question 
whether  a  constitutionally  elected  President  would  be 
refused  recognition  by  any  part  of  the  country.  In  sev 
eral  of  the  Northern  Commonwealths,  the  other  parties 
betrayed  much  more  agitation.  In  New  York,  New 
Jersey,  and  Rhode  Island,  they  arranged  a  fusion  ticket, 
dividing  the  number  of  electors  assigned  to  each  of  these 
Commonwealths  between  them  in  the  proportion  of 
their  relative  voting  strength  in  each,  thus  uniting  their 
strength  against  Lincoln.  In  the  Southern  Common 
wealths,  the  adherents  of  Breckenridge  were  as  tena 
cious  as  the  Republicans  in  the  North.  They  would 
not  fuse  with  the  Douglas  Democrats,  even  to  rescue  the 
"border  States"  from  the  "Constitutional  Unionists." 
Their  purpose  to  rule  or  ruin  became  more  and  more 
manifest  from  day  to  day. 

As  the  October  elections  in  Pennsylvania  and  Indi 
ana  approached,  the  tension  became  almost  unbearable. 
Everybody  knew  that  these  elections  would  The  Sep. 
indicate  the  result  of  the  presidential  election  pctSbbe?re?S? 
in  the  next  month.  Maine  and  Vermont  tious- 
had,  in  September,  gone  Republican  by  large  majorities. 
Still  uncertainty,  as  to  the  two  pivotal  Commonwealths, 
was  not  wholly  dispelled.  It  was  well  known  that  the 
Republicans  could  not  carry  Pennsylvania  upon  the 
question  alone  of  slavery  prohibition  in  the  Territories. 
The  managers  in  Pennsylvania,  therefore,  shrewdly 
brought  the  question  of  protection  to  the  front  and 
made  it  a  principal,  if  not  the  principal,  issue  of  the 
campaign.  Mr.  Curtin  himself,  the  Republican  candi- 


72  THE    CIVIL   WAK 

date  for  Governor,  made  protection  the  chief  subject  of 
his  addresses,  and  the  shrewdest  among  the  Republican 
politicians  have  attributed  his  success  in  the  campaign 
to  that  fact.  Both  Pennsylvania  and  Indiana  were  won 
by  safe  majorities,  and  it  was  now  reasonably  certain 
that  Mr.  Lincoln  would  receive  the  electoral  vote  of  all 
the  Northern  Commonwealths,  except  perhaps  New 
Jersey  and  Rhode  Island,  and  would  be  elected  Presi- 
dent. 

When  the  news  of  the  results  of  the  elections  in  Penn 
sylvania  and  Indiana  reached  the  South,  it  Avas  received 
by  a  few  with  sinister  delight,  but  despon- 
izmg   of  the  dency  and  terror   mastered   the   minds  and 

masses  at  the         ••,-,»  T,  •  ~>  n  -,       ,-, 

south  by  their  wills  oi  most.  It  was  said,  and  by  the  masses 
believed,  that  such  men  as  John  Brown  and 
Hinton  Rowan  Helper  would  be  appointed  to  the 
United  States  offices  in  the  South,  and  that  every  offi 
cial  bureau  would  become  a  rendezvous  for  conspirators 
against  the  peace  and  security  of  the  South,  and  a  hatch 
ing-place  of  negro  insurrections.  If  such  was  really  the 
intention  of  the  administration,  which  now  seemed  on 
the  eve  of  being  chosen  to  power,  it  was  said,  and  largely 
believed,  that  there  was  no  way  of  escape  from  murder, 
rape  and  pillage,  except  by  withdrawal  from  the  Union. 
Never  did  a  nation  go  to  the  ballot-box  with  a  more 
serious  spirit  than  did  the  people  of  these  United  States 
}  on  that  noted  November  day  of  1860.  The 
tion  of  NO-  Tuesday  following  the  first  Monday  fell  that 

vember,  1860.  ,  -,         •    ^  ^  ,  i  •  *  >  i 

year  on  the  sixth,  and  on  the  morning  01  the 
seventh  it  was  known  that  the  Republicans  had  won  a 
complete  victory  in  every  Northern  Commonwealth,  ex 
cept  New  Jersey,  and  had  elected  four  of  the  seven  elec 
tors  in  New  Jersey.  Lincoln  and  Hamlin  would  have 
one  hundred  and  eighty  of  the  three  hundred  and  three 
electoral  votes.  The  two  Northern  candidates,  for 


THE   PRESIDENTIAL    ELECTION    OF    1860          73 

whom  no  tickets  had  been  put  in  the  field  in  any  of 
the  Southern  Commonwealths,,  except  those  along  the 
Northern  border,  had  been  chosen.  The  Northern  sec 
tion  of  the  Union  had,  at  last,  got  the  Government,  and 
the  question  became  now  the  query  whether  it  could 
administer  it  throughout  the  whole  Union. 

An  analysis  of  the  popular  vote  will  show  that  the  Re 
publican  Electors  had  received  only  about  two-fifths  of 
the  popular  vote,  1,857,610  out  of  4,645,390.  It  will 
also  show  that  the  Southern  Democracy  had  not  carried 
the  South,  counting  by  the  popular  vote.  The  Bell  elec 
tors  had  received  in  the  South  515,973  votes,  the  Doug 
las  electors  163,525  votes,  and  the  Breckenridge  electors 
571,871  votes.  That  is,  the  Union  candidates,  as  we 
may  call  them,  had  received  together  679,498  votes 
against  571,871  for  the  candidate  whose  following  con 
tained  the  disunion  elements.  Such  figures  indicated 
that  the  Republican  party  was  not  strong  enough  to  un 
dertake  a  radical  programme,  and  that  the  slaveholders 
were  not  powerful  enough  to  refuse  recognition  to  the 
Republican  Administration.  The  prospect  of  an  under 
standing  and  an  arrangement  seemed  fair,  and  good  and 
wise  men  resolved  to  lend  their  influence  and  their  ener 
gies  to  the  accomplishment  of  the  same.  A  little  pa 
tience,  calmness,  good  judgment  and  patriotism  seemed 
all  that  was  necessary  to  preserve  the  country  in  its  ac 
customed  course  of  action. 


CHAPTER  IV 

SECESSION 

The  Secession  Theory — South  Carolina  and  Secession— Georgia 
and  Secession — President  Buchanan's  Message  of  December 
3,  1860,  in  Regard  to  Secession — The  President's  Solution  of 
the  Question  of  Slavery — Acceptability  of  the  Message  to  the 
Southern  Leaders — Consideration  of  the  Message  in  Congress 
— The  Secession  of  South  Carolina — The  President  in  the 
Face  of  the  Emergency — The  South  Carolina  Commissioners 
and  the  President — The  North  Encouraged  by  the  President's 
Stand— The  Crittenden  Resolutions — The  Position  of  the  Re 
publicans — Mr.  Seward's  Propositions— Failure  of  the  Senate 
Committee  to  Agree  upon  a  Proposition — Mr.  Toombs's  Ad 
dress  to  the  People  of  Georgia — The  Proceedings  in  the  House 
Committee — The  Caucus  of  Southern  Senators  of  January  5, 
1861— The  President's  Special  Message  of  January  8,  1861 — 
The  Seizure  of  the  Forts— The  "  Star  of  the  West  "  Affair— 
The  Effect  of  the  Failure  to  Relieve  Major  Anderson — Mr. 
Clark's  Resolution  in  the  Senate — Withdrawal  of  the  Southern 
Senators  and  Representatives  from  Congress — The  Formation 
of  the  Southern  Confederacy — The  Election  of  the  President 
of  the  Confederacy,  and  the  Organization  of  the  Confederate 
Government — The  Vice-President — The  First  Confederate 
Cabinet — Texas  Joins  the  Confederacy — The  Inauguration  of 
President  Davis — The  Peace  Convention  and  Its  Work — 
Failure  of  the  Propositions  of  the  Peace  Conference — Last 
Attempts  in  the  Senate  to  Save  the  Union  by  Compromise — 
Republican  Attitude  toward  Pacification — Confederate  Prep 
arations  for  War. 

THE  theory  upon  which  the  claimed  right  of  secession 
was  based  was  that  the  United  States  were  a  confedera- 

74 


SECESSION  75 

tion  of  sovereignties,,  connected  with  each  other  by  an 
agreement,  from  which  each  might  recede  at  its  own 
pleasure,  without  any  legal  power  on  the  The  eeces. 
part  of  the  others  to  prevent  it.  It  was  eion  theory, 
held  by  most  of  those  who  espoused  this  doctrine  that 
secession  was  both  a  sovereign  and  a  legal  right.  In 
support  of  the  view  that  it  was  a  sovereign  right,  they 
argued  that  a  sovereign  is  not  subject  to  law,  and  that 
there  can  be,  therefore,  no  limitation  upon  a  sovereign's 
rights.  In  support  of  the  view  that  it  was  a  legal 
right,  they  cited  that  clause  of  the  Constitution,  the 
tenth  amendment,  which  provides  that  powers  not  dele 
gated  to  the  United  States  by  the  Constitution,  nor 
prohibited  by  rit  to  the  "  States,"  are  reserved  to  the 
"  States "  respectively  or  to  the  people,  and  argued 
from  it  that,  no  power  having  been  delegated  to  the 
United  States  to  forbid  secession,  and  no  prohibition 
having  been  placed  by  the  Constitution  on  the  right 
of  the  "  States "  to  secede,  the  right  was  reserved 
to  the  "States  "or  to  the  people  by  the  Constitution 
itself. 

It  would  be  strange  indeed  if  the  fathers  of  the  Union 
did  intentionally  legalize  disunion  and  anarchy,  and  it 
was  unfortunate  that  they  used  words  which  criticism 
could  be  tortured  into  such  a  meaning.  It  of  jt- 
is  altogether  incredible  that  they  attached  any  such  sig 
nification  to  the  language  of  the  tenth  amendment,  and 
there  is  not  the  slightest  grammatical  necessity  for  the 
invention  of  any  such  by  their  successors.  For,  in  the 
first  place,  that  provision  of  the  Constitution  which  de 
clares  that  the  "  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  and 
the  laws  of  the  United  States  which  shall  be  made  in 
pursuance  thereof,  and  all  treaties  made,  or  which  shall 
be  made,  under  the  authority  of  the  United  States, 
shall  be  the  supreme  law  of  the  land,"  undoubtedly  con- 


76  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

tains  the  prohibition  of  the  power  of  any  Common 
wealth  of  the  Union  to  withdraw  itself  from  the  juris 
diction  of  that  "supreme  law  of  the  land."  And,  in 
the  second  place,  the  reservation  of  powers  not  dele 
gated  to  the  general  government  nor  prohibited  to  the 
"States/' is  not  to  the  "States"  alone,  but  "to  the 
States  respectively  or  to  the  people."  Unless  the  last  four 
words  of  the  provision  mean  the  same  as  the  first  three, 
that  is,  unless  they  are  tautologic,  why  may  not  the 
clause  be  interpreted  to  mean  that  if  any  power  to  de 
termine  the  question  of  disunion  is  reserved  to  anybody 
by  the  Constitution,  that  reservation  is  to  the  people 
of  the  whole  United  States  ?  This  is  certainly  the 
more  natural  interpretation.  It  is,  however,  entirely 
evident  to  any  impartial  mind  that  the  Congress 
which  proposed  this  amendment  never  intended  to 
reserve  by  it  the  power  of  disunion  or  secession  to 
anybody.  They  were  evidently  thinking  only  of  the 
powers  of  local  government  in  the  Commonwealths, 
and  the  civil  rights  of  the  citizens,  when  they  drafted 
this  article. 

The  argument  of  the  secessionists  from  the  constitu 
tional  provision  was,  from  every  point  of  view,  a  mere 
jugglery  with  words.  Some  of  the  better  thinkers 
among  them  made  no  use  of  it  at  all,  but  fell  back  upon 
the  doctrine  that  secession  was  a  sovereign  right  alone. 
They  sought  to  distinguish  between  a  sovereign  right 
and  a  right  of  revolution.  There  is  a  certain  distinc 
tion.  The  right  of  revolution  is  the  right  of  a  body 
claiming  sovereignty,  of  a  body  which  is,  at  the  given 
moment,  in  the  process  of  organizing,  establishing, 
and  vindicating  its  sovereignty  by  successful  violent 
resistance  to  existing  legal  power.  It  is  what  the  Ger 
mans  would  call  the  right  of  a  sovereignty  im  Werden 
begriffen,  and  which  Mr.  Emerson  would  have  trans- 


SECESSION  77 

lated,  the  right  of  a  sovereignty  in  the  making.  The 
secessionists  denied  that  secession  was  this  kind  of  a 
sovereign  right.  They  held  it  to  be  the  right  of  an 
already  established  and  recognized  sovereign.  Here  is 
certainly  a  very  important  distinction.  It  would  de 
liver  secession  entirely  from  the  stage  of  rebellious 
experiment,  the  stage  of  hazarded  right  between  the 
outbreak  of  resistance  to  existing  legal  power  and  the 
triumph  of  that  resistance,  provided  the  seceding  body 
were  acknowledged  to  be  already  a  sovereign  body,  as 
the  secessionists  claimed  the  "States'"  of  the  Union 
were.  If  revolution  should  be  committed  in  such  a 
case,  it  would  not  be  by  the  seceding  sovereign,  but  by 
the  body  defeating  the  attempted  secession,  and  thereby 
subjecting  the  old  sovereignty  to  a  new  sovereignty  de 
veloped  in  and  through  the  struggle. 

It  is  from  this  point  of  view  that  the  secessionists 
still  contend  that  secession  was  right  in  principle,  a 
" lost  cause,"  although  the  attempt  to  realize  it  was 
overcome  by  superior  power ;  a  result  which,  in  sound 
political  science,  stamps  violent  resistance  to  existing 
order  as  rebellion.  The  secessionists  can  be  shown 
to  have  been  in  the  wrong,  legally,  only  by  demon 
strating  that  the  ''States"  of  the  Union  were  not,  at 
the  time  they  attempted  secession,  sovereign  bodies, 
which,  indeed,  can  be  easily  done.  But,  ethically,  the 
triumph  of  the  principle  of  the  sovereignty  of  the 
nation  over  the  doctrine  of  "  State  sovereignty,"  in 
the  appeal  to  arms,  establishes  the  presumption  of  the 
righteousness  of  the  former  and  the  unrighteousness  of 
the  latter,  no  matter  whether  the  sovereignty  of  the 
nation  was  the  already  recognized  legal  order,  or  only 
became  such  through  the  course  and  result  of  the 
struggle. 

We  have  become  generally  conscious  of  these  distinc- 


78  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

tions,  however,  chiefly  through  our  experiences  since 
1860.  At  that  date  a  large  majority  of  the  people 
of  the  country  confounded  sovereignty  with  the  pow 
ers  of  residuary  government,  and  recognized  what 
they  conceived  to  be  a  certain  kind  of  sovereignty 
as  belonging  to  the  "States."  Many  of  the  secession 
ists  honestly  befooled  themselves,  as  well  as  befooled 
others,  by  their  sophistries  based  upon  these  confused 
premises.  The  majority  of  the  secession  leaders  were 
undoubtedly  sincere  in  the  belief  that  they  were  right 
in  principle. 

Naturally  the  Commonwealth  in  which  the  doctrine 
of  "State  sovereignty"  had  been  elaborated  into  a  sys- 
south  caro  ^em  °^  Pos^iye  science,  so  to  speak,  and  had 
Una  and  seces-  been  so  generally  embraced  as  to  have  be 
come  the  political  creed  of  its  inhabitants, 
assumed  the  role  of  leader  in  the  secession  movement. 
Chance  seemed  also  to  favor  South  Carolina  with  the  op 
portunity.  It  was  the  only  Commonwealth  in  which 
the  presidential  electors  were  still  chosen  by  the  Legis 
lature.  This  occasioned  the  meeting  of  the  Legislature 
on  November  5th,  several  weeks  earlier  than  it  would 
otherwise  have  assembled,  and  several  weeks  before  the 
meeting  of  the  Legislature  of  any  other  Common 
wealth  except  that  of  Georgia.  The  South  Carolina 
Legislature  remained  in  session  to  learn  the  result 
of  the  election,  and  in  the  height  of  the  first  excite 
ment  throughout  the  South  over  the  choice  of  Mr. 
Lincoln,  issued  the  call  for  the  convention  of  the 
people  of  the  "  State,"  the  sovereign  body,  accord 
ing  to  the  South  Carolina  doctrine,  in  our  political 
system. 

The  chief  secessionists  of  the  Commonwealth  had 
reached  an  understanding  upon  the  subject  some  ten 
days  previous  to  the  assembly  of  the  Legislature.  The 


SECESSION  79 

Governor,  Mr.  Gist,  United  States  Senators  Hammond 
and  Chesnut,  the  members  of  the  delegation  to  the  na 
tional  House  of  ^Representatives,  and  several  others  of  the 
leaders  were  present  at  the  conference  held  at  Senator 
Hammond's  house,  and  all  joined  in  the  opinion  that, 
in  the  event  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  election,  the  convention 
should  be  called,  and  should  pass  a  secession  ordinance  ; 
or,  as  they  expressed  it,  should  resume  the  exercise  of 
the  powers  delegated  by  South  Carolina  to  the  United 
States. 

There  were  many  members  of  the  Legislature  who 
desired  to  avoid  precipitation,  and  to  consult  with 
the  political  leaders  in  the  other  Commonwealths  of 
the  South,  and  await  co-operation,  but  the  secession 
ist  chiefs  paid  no  attention  to  their  remonstrances, 
which  were  indeed  feeble  and  hesitating.  Senator  Ches 
nut  and  the  United  States  judicial  officers  in  South 
Carolina  resigned  their  positions  before  the  Legislature 
had  even  voted  to  call  the  convention,  and  Senator 
Hammond  did  the  same  thing  immediately  after  the 
vote,  anticipating,  thus,  and  prejudicing,  the  work  of 
the  convention. 

The  Legislature  passed  the  act  calling  the  conven 
tion  on  the  12th  day  of  November.  It  appointed  the 
Gth  day  of  the  following  December  for  the  election  of 
the  delegates  to  it,  and  the  17th  for  their  assembly 
in  convention.  On  the  next  day,  the  13th,  the  Leg 
islature  elected  Francis  W.  Pickens  Governor,  who 
immediately  proceeded  to  form  a  cabinet  or  minis 
try,  after  the  manner  of  the  executives  of  sovereign 
nations. 

Meanwhile  the  Legislature  of  Georgia  had  assembled 
and  was  debating  the  question  of  calling  a  convention. 
On  the  14th  day  of  the  month  (November),  Mr.  Alex 
ander  H.  Stephens  made  his  noted  speech  against  the 


80  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

proposition  of  Mr.  Robert  Toombs  to  refer  the  question 
of   secession  immediately  to  the  voters  by  submitting 

Georgia  and  ^°  them  for  ratification  a  resolution  of  the 
secession.  Legislature  not  to  submit  to  the  rule  of  the 
Abolitionists.  Mr.  Stephens  carried  the  day,  and  the 
convention  was  called  to  meet  on  the  17th  of  the  fol 
lowing  January. 

President  Buchanan  was  naturally  greatly  disturbed 
by  these  movements  in  South  Carolina  and  Georgia, 

Mr  BI  k's  an<^  on  ^e  l*^1  °^  the  month  (November),  he 
opinion  con-  addressed  an  inquiry  to  his  legal  adviser,  At- 

cerning     the  i  \>i      i  XT        A 

powers  of  the   torney-General  Black,  concerning  the  Pres- 

President     to     .  ,       , ,  .  ,,  0,     ,     ,,     ,         ,  , 

prevent  seces-  ident  s  power  in  case  a  "btate     should  un 
dertake  secession,  or  resistance  to  the  laws  of 
the  United  States. 

The  opinion  sent  by  Mr.  Black  to  the  President, 
under  date  of  November  20th,  is  one  of  the  most  unfort 
unate  state  papers  of  our  history.  It  was  the  founda 
tion  of  the  President's  even  more  unfortunate  message 
of  December  3d.  Mr.  Black  instructed  the  President 
that  the  President  had  the  power  to  take  such  measures 
as  he  might  deem  necessary  to  protect  the  public  prop 
erty  of  the  United  States,  and  to  recapture  it  when 
unlawfully  seized  by  anybody ;  and  that  he  had  the  power 
to  use  the  army  and  the  navy  and  the  militia  to  assist 
the  civil  officers  of  the  United  States  in  the  execution 
of  the  laws  "whenever  the  laws  of  the  United  States 
shall  be  opposed  or  the  execution  thereof  obstructed  in 
any  State  by  combinations  too  powerful  to  be  suppressed 
by  the  ordinary  course  of  judicial  proceedings,  or  by 
the  power  vested  in  the  marshals "  ;  but  that  in  case 
there  were  no  civil  officers  of  the  United  States  within 
the  supposed  ' '  State  "  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  United 
States,  the  President  could  not  use  the  military  to  uphold 
the  powers  of  the  United  States  Government  in  such 


SECESSION  81 

" State"  at  all.  "If,"  said  Mr.  Black,  '< troops  may 
be  sent  to  aid  courts  and  marshals,  there  must  be  courts 
and  marshals  to  be  aided.  The  existing  laws  put  and 
keep  the  Federal  Government  strictly  on  the  defensive. 
You  can  use  force  only  to  repel  an  assault  on  the  public 
property,  and  aid  the  courts  in  the  performance  of  their 
duty."  Mr.  Black  did  not,  however,  content  himself 
with  reducing  the  President  to  impotence  in  case  the 
United  States  civil  officers  in  any  et  State "  should 
resign,  and  no  persons  could  be  found  to  succeed  them, 
which  would  be  the  situation  produced  by  secession  ;  but 
he  argued  that  if  Congress  should  undertake  to  authorize 
the  President  to  send  the  military  into  such  a  "  State" 
to  enforce  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  Congress  would 
thereby  simply  declare  war  upon  that  "  State,"  a  thing 
which  Congress  had  no  power,  under  the  Constitution, 
to  do,  and  that  the  attempt  to  do  it  would  amount  to 
the  expulsion  of  such  a  "State"  from  the  Union,  mak 
ing  it  a  foreign  enemy,  between  whom  and  the  United 
States  all  future  relations  would  be  regulated  by  the 
principles  and  customs  of  international  law.  He  declared 
that  "  there  was  undoubtedly  a  strong  and  universal 
conviction  among  the  men  who  framed  and  ratified  the 
Constitution,  that  military  force  would  not  only  be  use 
less,  but  pernicious,  as  a  means  of  holding  the  States 
together." 

Had  Mr.  Black  been  a  secessionist  himself,  he  could 
not  have  stated  the  case  more  strongly  against  the 
Government  of  the  United  States.  He  was,  Mr  Black,B 
on  the  other  hand,  a  stanch  Union  man,  a  reputation 

...      and  influence 

great  jurist,  a  man  of  letters,  a  pure  patriot,  as  a  man  and 
and  a  man  of  high  moral  and  religious  char 
acter.  He  was,  however,  a  Pennsylvania  Democrat  of 
the  "  States-rights "  school,  and  he  believed  that  the 
Abolitionists  and  the  Republicans  were  the  enemies  of 
VOL.  I.— 6 


82  THE   CIVIL   WAE 

the  Union.  He  was  evidently  not  averse  to  pointing 
out,  with  great  emphasis,  the  danger  which  the  country 
had,  as  he  thought,  unrighteously  incurred  by  allowing 
the  triumph  of  the  Republican  party. 

President  Buchanan  had  the  very  highest  respect  and 
regard  for  Mr.  Black's  learning,  judgment,  and  integrity. 
President  They  were  also  close  personal  friends,  and 
snared  eacn  other's  feelings  concerning  the 
cr^cal  situation  into  which  the  country  had 
to  secession,  been  brought.  It  was  natural,  then,  that 
the  President's  message  to  Congress  should,  in  deal 
ing  with  the  secession  movement,  contain  the  same 
destructive  doctrines,  and  that  the  weaker  intellect  of 
the  President  should  have  accentuated  them  in  higher 
degree. 

The  President  began  the  message  with  a  declaration 
that  the  threatened  danger  to  the  Union  was  caused  by 
"  the  long-continued  and  intemperate  interference  of 
the  Northern  people  with  the  question  of  slavery  in  the 
Southern  States."  He  said  that  the  immediate  peril 
arose  neither  from  the  claims  that  Congress  or  the  Ter 
ritorial  Legislatures  might  control  the  question  of  slavery 
in  the  Territories,  nor  from  opposition  to  the  execution 
of  the  Fugitive  Slave  Act,  but  "from  the  fact  that  the 
incessant  and  violent  agitation  of  the  slavery  question 
throughout  the  North  for  the  last  quarter  of  a  century 
had  at  last  produced  its  malign  influence  upon  the  slaves 
and  inspired  them  with  vague  notions  of  freedom."  In 
short  the  President  asserted  that  the  sense  of  domestic 
security  at  the  South  had  been  attacked  by  the  intem 
perate  and  incessant  agitation  of  the  question  of  slavery 
at  the  North,  and  that  union  between  the  North  and 
the  South  could  not  continue,  if  the  people  of  the  South 
should  come  generally  to  feel  that  the  security  of  their 
homes  and  firesides  could  not  be  preserved  under  it. 


SECESSION  83 

He  said  that  if  the  people  of  the  North  would  only  let 
the  people  of  the  Southern  "  States"  alone  in  regard  to 
their  domestic  institutions,  and  would  obey  the  Consti 
tution  and  laws  of  the  United  States  in  respect  to  sla 
very,  the  existing  peril  would  pass  away.  He  declared 
that  no  "State"  had  any  constitutional  right  to  with 
draw  from  the  Union,  but  he  conceded  that  the  people 
of  any  "  State"  or  section  have  the  revolutionary  right 
to  resist  intolerable  oppression,  and  relieve  themselves 
of  it  if  they  can.  He  insisted,  however,  that  the  elec 
tion  of  a  sectional  President,  if  accomplished  in  accord 
ance  with  the  Constitution  and  the  laws,  was  not  op 
pression,  and  did  not  necessarily  lead  to  oppression. 
He  stated  that  the  duty  of  the  President  was  "  to  take 
care  that  the  laws  be  faithfully  executed,"  but  he  con 
tended  that  the  laws  could  be  executed  only  by  civil 
officers,  and,  if  there  were  no  civil  officers  in  a  "State," 
that  the  President  could  not  undertake  to  have  the 
laws  of  the  United  States  executed  by  the  military  forces, 
since  according  to  the  laws  enacted  by  Congress  the 
military  power  could  be  used  only  in  aid  of  the  United 
States  marshals,  and  then  only  after  the  inability  of  the 
posse  comitatus  of  the  marshal  had  been  demonstrated. 
He  concluded,  however,  that  he  might  hold  the  prop 
erty  of  the  United  States  by  force,  if  attacked.  He 
simply  stood  upon  the  ground,  in  respect  to  his  powers, 
furnished  him  in  Mr.  Black's  opinion. 

It  would  have  been  better  had  he  stopped  with  the 
confession  of  his  own  impotence  to  cope  with  secession, 
bad  as  that  was.  It  could  have  been  re-  criticism  of 
garded  as  an  appeal  to  Congress  for  larger  and  statement 
means  and  a  freer  hand  in  the  discharge  of  destructive 
his  duty  to  see  to  the  faithful  execution  of  propositions, 
the  laws  ;  but,  like  Mr.  Black,  he  went  on  to  declare 
the  impotence  of  Congress  also  in  the  face  of  secession. 


84  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

He  repeated  with  emphasis  Mr.  Black's  proposition 
that  the  coercion  of  a  "  State"  attempting  secession 
was  the  making  of  war  upon  that  "  State/'  a  power  not 
confided  by  the  Constitution,,  according  to  his  view,  to 
Congress  or  to  any  department  of  the  Government.  He 
evidently  intended  to  convey  the  view  that  an  act  of 
Congress  vesting  the  President  with  the  power  to  use  the 
military  for  the  enforcement  of  the  laws  in  any  "  State  " 
in  which  there  were  no  United  States  civil  officials  was 
tantamount  to  a  declaration  of  war  by  Congress  upon 
such  "  State."  He  deprecated  the  exercise  of  any  such 
power,  even  if  the  Government  possessed  it,  as  destruc 
tive  of  the  Union,  which,  he  declared,  rested  upon  public 
opinion,  and  could  never  be  cemented  by  the  blood  of 
its  citizens  shed  in  civil  war. 

He  concluded  his  message  upon  this  subject  by  rec 
ommending  the  settlement  of  the  differences  between 
The  Presi-  the  North  and  the  South  by  a  constitutional 
ofthequSon  amendment,  which  should  include  "an  ex- 
of  slavery.  press  recognition  of  property  in  slaves  in 
the  States  where  it  now  exists  or  may  hereafter  exist," 
an  express  declaration  of  "the  duty  of  protecting  this 
right  in  all  the  common  Territories  throughout  their 
Territorial  existence,  and  until  they  should  be  admitted 
as  States  into  the  Union,  with  or  without  slavery,  as 
their  constitutions  may  prescribe,"  and  "  a  like  recog 
nition  of  the  right  of  the  master  to  have  his  slave,  who 
has  escaped  from  one  State  to  another,  restored  and 
delivered  up  to  him,  and  of  the  validity  of  the  Fugitive 
Slave  law  enacted  for  this  purpose,  together  with  a 
declaration  that  all  State  laws  impairing  or  defeating  this 
right  are  violations  of  the  Constitution,  and  are  conse 
quently  null  and  void." 

President  Buchanan  was  a  man  of  fair  judgment,  of 
pure  patriotism,  and  of  fine  feeling.  He  was  well-read 


SECESSION  85 

in  history  and  political  science,  and  was  a  good  lawyer. 
How  he  could  have  written  such  a  message  is  to  the  men 
of  the  present  almost  past  comprehension.  It  was  the 
greatest  encouragement  to  secession  which  could  have 
possibly  been  given.  It  meant,  whether  the  President 
so  intended  it  or  not — and  he  certainly  did  not  intend  it 
— that  the  secessionists  should  have  until  the  4th  of  the 
following  March  to  withdraw  their  "  States  "  from  the 
Union,  and  organize  a  new  government  of  their  own 
without  any  serious  impediment  from  the  Administra 
tion  at  Washington.  The  President  undoubtedly  hoped 
to  appease  the  secessionist  leaders,  and  induce  them  to 
refrain  from  destroying  the  Union,  but  he  had  wofully 
misread  the  real  character  of  the  men  whose  courtly 
manners  had  enlisted  his  sympathies.  The  message 
was  the  most  convincing  demonstration  of  the  inherent 
error  and  viciousness  of  the  "  States-rights  "  theory  of 
the  Union,  which  had  to  that  moment  appeared.  It 
was  to  be  surpassed  only  by  secession  itself. 

It  has  been  said  in  justification  of  the  President  that 
he  had  the  letter  of  the  old  law  with  him,  and  that  his 
sense  of  duty  as  well  as  his  conservative  nature  led  him 
therefore  in  the  direction  which  he  pursued.  But  what 
was  there  in  the  letter  of  the  old  law  that  prevented  the 
President  from  sending  true  Union  men  from  the  loyal 
Commonwealths  into  a  Commonwealth  attempting  seces 
sion  to  occupy  the  civil  offices  of  the  United  States  with 
in  the  latter,  and  then  sustaining  their  authority  by  the 
aid  of  the  military  forces  of  the  Union  ?  And  what  was 
there  in  the  letter  of  the  old  Constitution  that  prevented 
Congress  from  authorizing  the  President  to  use  the  mili 
tary  officers  for  the  immediate  execution  of  the  laws  of 
the  United  States  ?  Clearly  the  President  was  befooled 
by  his  "  States-rights  "  theories,  his  timid  nature,  and 
his  personal  regard  for  the  Southern  leaders. 


86  THE   CIVIL   WAK 

These  leaders  were  overjoyed  by  the  tone  of  the  mes 
sage,  not  that  they  thought  it  might  lead  to  compromise 

Acce  tabu    an(^  conci^ation,  but  because  it  pronounced 
tty  of  the  mes-   the  impotence  of  the  United  States  Govern- 

Bage     to    the 

southern  lead-  ment  to  prevent  them  from  destroying  the 
Union.  Some  of  them  had  been  consulted 
by  the  President  in  regard  to  its  contents,  and  he  cer 
tainly  had  accepted  their  representation  of  the  state  of 
feeling  at  the  South. 

Of  all  men  the  President  stood  in  the  position  to  defeat 
secession  by  simply  filling  the  civil  offices  of  the  United 
Probable  m-  States  with  loyal  men,  and  then  sustaining 
fed^hTpS  ^nese  officers  by  his  military  power,  but  he 
euch  to&  uSs  wou^  have  regarded  the  sending  of  citizens 
sage.  Of  one  Commonwealth  into  another  to  occupy 

the  United  States  offices  in  the  latter,  as  such  a  departure 
from  long-established  usage  as  to  amount  almost  to  a 
violation  of  the  Constitution.  Moreover,  he  was  old  and 
timid,  and  was  surrounded  by  disloyal  advisers,  who  not 
only  misled  him,  but  who,  in  some  way  or  other,  roused 
the  fear  of  assassination  in  his  mind  if  he  crossed  too  far 
their  purposes.  There  was  undoubtedly  one  other  con 
sideration  which  moved  the  President,  and  that  was  the 
feeling  that  those  who  had  brought  the  danger  upon  the 
country,  the  Abolitionists  and  Republicans,  as  he  thought, 
should  shoulder  the  responsibility  of  meeting  it.  He 
thought  it  was  fair  to  leave  the  problem  for  his  succes 
sor  to  wrestle  with.  When,  then,  his  trusted  friend  and 
legal  counsellor,  Mr.  Black,  whom  he  knew  to  be  able 
and  loyal,  took  the  same  view  of  the  impotence  of  the 
Government  in  the  event  of  secession  that  his  secession 
ist  advisers  did,  it  is  hardly  to  be  marvelled  at  that  he 
struck  the  suicidal  blow.  He  did  not  go  quite  as  far 
as  they  wanted  him  to  go.  They  asked  that  he  would 
acknowledge  secession  to  be  a  constitutional  right  of  each 


SECESSION  87 

"State,"  and  some  of  them  even  suggested  that  he 
ought  to  justify  its  exercise  in  the  existing  contingen 
cies.  But  he  went  far  enough  to  encourage  them  in 
high  degree,  and  to  fill  the  souls  of  loyal  men  with 
gloomy  forebodings. 

Between  the  communication  of  Mr.  Black's  opinion 
and  the  presentation  of  the  President's  message  to  the 
Houses  of  Congress,  the  Legislatures  of  Miss-  consider  - 
issippi  and  Florida  had  met,  and  passed  acts  messagVin 
calling  conventions  to  consider  the  question  Congrese- 
of  secession.  The  spirit  manifested  in  both  of  them  was 
hostile  to  the  Union,  and  it  was  evident  that  danger 
ous  movements  threatened.  When,  therefore,  Congress 
came  to  the  consideration  of  the  President's  message,  its 
members  were  entirely  aware  of  the  serious  nature  of  the 
work  before  them.  Motions  were  immediately  made 
in  both  Houses  to  refer  that  part  of  the  message  treating 
of  the  perilous  state  of  the  country  to  a  special  commit 
tee  in  each.  In  the  House  of  Kepresentatives  the  motion 
was  quickly  adopted,  with  but  little  debate.  In  the 
Senate,  on  the  other  hand,  the  debate  upon  it  lasted  for 
nearly  two  weeks,  during  which  it  became  entirely  evi 
dent  that  the  members  from  the  "planting  States" 
had  made  up  their  minds  for  secession.  Six  of  the 
Southern  Legislatures,  those  of  South  Carolina, 
Georgia,  Mississippi,  Florida,  Alabama,  and  Louisiana, 
had  now  called  conventions  ;  and  the  members  of  the 
Senate  of  the  United  States  from  these  Commonwealths 
simply  informed  the  Senate  that  the  question  of  the 
"federal  relations  "of  their  "States"  was  now  to  be 
decided  in  these  conventions,  and  no  longer  by  any  branch 
of  the  United  States  Government.  One  of  the  Senators 
from  Georgia,  Mr.  Iverson,  said  that  all  the  Southern 
"  States "  would  decide  this  question  in  the  sovereign 
conventions  of  their  people,  and  that  nothing  could  pre- 


88  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

vent  the  following  of  this  course.  Referring  to  the  re 
fusal  of  Governor  Houston  of  Texas  to  permit  the  call 
of  a  convention  in  that  "  State,"  he  said  :  "  Some  Texan 
Brutus  will  arise  to  rid  his  country  of  the  hoary-headed 
incubus  that  stands  between  the  people  and  their  sover 
eign  will."  Senator  Wigfall,  of  Texas,  immediately  re 
pudiated  this  imputation  of  barbarism  to  his  commun 
ity,  and  said  that  Texas  would  find  means  of  seceding 
from  the  Union,  without  having  recourse  to  assassina 
tion.  Mr.  Jefferson  Davis  said  that  the  difficulty  was 
deeper  than  any  acts  of  Congress  could  reach,  that  it 
was  the  fact  that  a  Union  of  hostile  sections  had  taken 
the  place  of  a  Union  of  friendly  "  States."  He  declared 
that  a  change  of  view  and  feeling  among  the  Northern 
people  was  the  only  remedy  for  the  case.  It  was,  thus, 
manifest  that  nothing  which  Congress  could  do  would 
be  satisfactory  to  the  secessionists.  It  was  equally  man 
ifest  that  the  Northern  Democrats,  and  a  large  number 
of  the  Republicans,  would  go  almost  any  length  to  con 
ciliate  them. 

The  passage  of  the  ordinance  of  secession  by  unani 
mous  vote  in  the  South  Carolina  convention,  on  the 
20th    of    the    month    (December),    brought 

The    Seces-  ,.  . 

Bion  of  south  matters  to  the  direct  issue,  and  caused  great 
alarm  in  Congress  and  throughout  the  coun 
try,  much  as  some  of  the  Northern  journals  jeered  at 
it.  The  thing  which  had  been  threatened  for  thirty 
years,  threatened  so  often  indeed  as  to  have  lost  some 
of  its  terrors,  had  now  come  at  last,  when  men  had 
almost  ceased  to  expect  it.  It  is  true  that  the  causes 
alleged  for  it  by  the  South  Carolinians  were  false  and 
puerile,  and  that  the  manner  of  its  realization  was  a 
travesty  of  dignity  and  a  mockery  of  statesmanship, 
but  there  it  was,  and  must  be  dealt  with  as  a  stern 
fact. 


SECESSION  89 

First  of  all,  what  would  the  President  do  about  it  ?  He 
was  bound  to  execute  the  laws  in  South  Carolina,  as  else 
where  in  the  Union.  He  had  no  power  to  The  Pre8i. 
recognize  the  independence  of  South  Caro- 
lina.  He  must  proceed  as  though  no  ordi- 
nance  of  secession  had  been  passed.  It  is  true  that  he 
had  no  judges  and  marshals  in  South  Carolina,,  as  we 
have  seen,  but  he  could  appoint  them,  and  he  had  col 
lectors  of  the  revenue,  and  was  in  possession  of  the  forts. 
He  had  delayed  strengthening  the  garrisons  so  as  not  to 
excite  the  secessionists  ;  and  General  Cass,  his  Secretary 
of  State  had,  on  the  12th  of  the  month  (December),  re 
signed  his  position  on  account  of  difference  of  opinion 
with  the  President  on  this  subject.  This  action  on  the 
part  of  the  venerable  statesman  was  so  popular  through 
out  the  North  as  to  make  the  President  feel  that  he  had 
committed  a  grave  error.  The  new  Secretary  of  State, 
Mr.  Black,  also  felt  the  force  of  the  popular  approval  of 
General  Cass,  and  realized  that  he  himself  had  made  a 
serious  mistake,  both  as  regarded  his  views  of  the  con 
stitutional  powers  of  the  President,  and  of  the  temper 
of  the  people  of  the  North,  and  also  of  the  temper  of 
the  people  of  the  South.  In  addition  to  this,  the  suc 
cessor  of  Mr.  Black  in  the  office  of  Attorney-General, 
Mr.  Edwin  M.  Stanton,  proved  to  be  a  powerful  sup 
port  to  the  stronger  view  of  the  President's  powers. 
He,  Mr.  Black  and  Mr.  Holt,  the  Postmaster- General, 
who  though  a  Southerner,  was  a  stanch  Union  man, 
now  displaced  the  Southerners  in  the  confidence  of  the 
President,  and  roused  the  Administration  to  the  dis 
play  of  more  courage  and  firmness.  It  was  well  that 
this  happened  when  it  did.  If  these  changes  had  been 
deferred  a  few  days,  it  is  probable  that  Mr.  Buchanan 
would  have  committed  himself  irretrievably  to  the  seces 
sionists. 


90  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

On  the  26th  (December),  the  three  commissioners, 
Messrs.  Adams,  Barnwell,  and  Orr,  appointed  by  the 
The  south  South  Carolina  convention  to  treat  with  the 
SSStomSa  Government  of  the  United  States  for  the  de- 
the  President.  iiverv  Of  the  forts,  lighthouses,  magazines, 
and  other  United  States  property  in  South  Carolina,  to 
the  authorities  of  the  now  self-declared  independent 
nation  of  South  Carolina,  and  for  other  purposes, 
appeared  in  Washington.  On  the  28th,  they  sent  to 
the  President  the  following  extraordinary  communi 
cation  : 

"To  the  President  of  the  United  States  :  Sir  :  We 
have  the  honor  to  transmit  to  you  a  copy  of  the  full 
powers  from  the  convention  of  the  People  of  South  Car 
olina  under  which  we  are  authorized  and  empowered  to 
treat  with  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  etc. 
.  .  .  In  the  execution  of  this  trust,  it  is  our  duty  to 
furnish  you,  as  we  now  do,  with  an  official  copy  of  the 
ordinance  of  secession,  by  which  the  State  of  South 
Carolina  has  resumed  the  powers  she  delegated  to  the 
Government  of  the  United  States,  and  has  declared  her 
perfect  sovereignty  and  independence.  It  would  also 
have  been  our  duty  to  have  informed  you  that  we  were 
ready  to  negotiate  with  you  upon  all  such  questions  as 
are  necessarily  raised  by  the  adoption  of  this  ordinance, 
and  that  we  were  prepared  to  enter  upon  this  negoti 
ation  with  the  earnest  desire  to  avoid  all  unnecessary 
and  hostile  collision,  and  so  to  inaugurate  our  new  rela 
tions  as  to  secure  mutual  respect,  general  advantage, 
and  a  future  good-will  and  harmony  beneficial 

Their    com-     .         ,,  ..  -,         T^,     ,     .  -,  . 

munication  to  to  all  parties  concerned.  r>ut  the  events  of 
the  President.  ^  jagt  twenty-f  our  hours  render  such  an  as 
surance  impossible.  We  came  here  the  representatives 
of  an  authority  which  could,  at  any  time  within  the  past 
sixty  days,  have  taken  possession  of  the  forts  in  Charles- 


SECESSION  91 

ton  harbor,  but  which,  upon  pledges  given  in  a  man 
ner  that  we  could  not  doubt,  determined  to  trust  to  your 
honor  rather  than  to  its  own  power.  Since  our  arrival 
here  an  officer  of  the  United  States,  acting,  as  we  are 
assured,  not  only  without  but  against  your  orders,  has 
dismantled  one  of  the  forts  and  occupied  another,  thus 
altering,  to  a  most  important  extent,  the  condition  of 
affairs  under  which  we  came.  Until  these  circumstances 
are  explained  in  a  manner  which  relieves  us  of  all  doubt 
as  to  the  spirit  in  which  these  negotiations  shall  be  con 
ducted,  we  are  forced  to  suspend  all  decision  as  to  any 
arrangements  by  which  our  mutual  interests  might  be 
amicably  adjusted.  And,  in  conclusion,  we  would  urge 
upon  you  the  immediate  withdrawal  of  the  troops  from 
the  harbor  of  Charleston.  Under  present  circumstances 
they  are  a  menace  which  renders  negotiation  impossible, 
and,  as  our  recent  experience  shows,  threatens  speedily 
to  bring  to  a  bloody  issue  questions  which  ought  to  be 
settled  with  temperance  and  judgment." 

The  insolence  of  this  communication  is  apparent 
enough  on  its  face.  The  representatives  of  a  petty 
power,  as  yet  unrecognized,  and  destined  never  to  be 
recognized,  announcing  to  one  of  the  most  powerful 
governments  in  the  world  that  they  would  not  treat  with 
it  was  a  ridiculous  spectacle.  But  when  we  come  to 
consider  what  this  power  was  which  these  men  professed 
to  represent,  and  to  inquire  into  the  reasons  for  this 
bantam  audacity,  we  must  conclude  that  they  were  not 
far  removed  from  stark  madness. 

It  seems  that  on  the  8th  day  of  the  month  (December) 
the  members  of  the  House  of  Representatives  in  Congress 
from  South  Carolina  had  gone  to  the  Presi-  The  expla. 
dent  and  undertaken  to  give  him  some  nation  of  it. 
assurances  about  the  matter  of  the  forts  in  the  harbor 
at  Charleston.  The  President  asked  them  to  put  what 


92  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

they  had  to  say  in  writing.  They  did  so,  and  presented 
the  same  to  him  on  the  10th.  This  document  read  as 
follows  :  "  To  his  Excellency  James  Buchanan,  Pres 
ident  of  the  United  States  :  In  compliance  with  our 
statement  to  you  yesterday,  we  now  express  to  you  our 
strong  conviction  that  neither  the  constituted  author 
ities,  nor  any  body  of  the  people  of  the  State  of  South 
Carolina,  will  either  attack  or  molest  the  United  States 
forts  in  the  harbor  of  Charleston,  previously  to  the 
action  of  the  convention,  and,  we  hope  and  believe,  not 
until  an  offer  has  been  made,  through  an  accredited 
representative,  to  negotiate  for  an  amicable  arrangement 
of  all  matters  between  the  State  and  the  Federal  gov 
ernment,  provided  that  no  re-enforcements  shall  be  sent 
into  those  forts,  and  their  relative  military  status  shall 
remain  as  at  present." 

When  this  document  was  read  to  the  President  by  these 
gentlemen  he  objected  to  the  use  of  the  word  "  provided," 
lest  it  should  be  held  to  imply  an  agreement  on  his  part, 
and  said  that  he  would  not  enter  into  any  agreement  with 
them  upon  the  subject.  They  replied  to  him  that  they 
did  not  understand  it  as  implying  any  agreement  what 
ever  on  his  part.  The  next  day  Mr.  John  B.  Floyd,  the 
Secretary  of  War,  issued  an  order  to  Major  Anderson,  in 
command  of  the  forts  in  Charleston  Harbor,  of  the  fol 
lowing  tenor  :  "  You  are  carefully  to  avoid  every  act  which 
would  needlessly  tend  to  provoke  aggression  ;  and,  for 
that  reason,  you  are  not,  without  evident  and  immediate 
necessity,  to  take  up  any  position  which  could  be  con 
strued  into  the  assumption  of  a  hostile  attitude ;  but  you 
are  to  hold  possession  of  the  forts  in  the  harbor,  and,  if 
attacked,  you  are  to  defend  yourself  to  the  last  extremity. 
The  smallness  of  your  force  will  not  permit  you,  per 
haps,  to  occupy  more  than  one  of  the  three  forts ;  but 
an  attack  on,  or  an  attempt  to  take  possession  of,  either 


Charleston  Harbor. 


SECESSION  93 

of  them,  will  be  regarded  as  an  act  of  hostility,  and  you 
may  then  put  your  command  in  either  of  them  which 
you  may  deem  most  proper,  in  order  to  increase  its 
power  of  resistance.  You  are  also  authorized  to  take 
similar  defensive  steps  whenever  you  have  tangible 
evidence  of  a  design  to  proceed  to  a  hostile  act."  This 
order  from  Mr.  Floyd  was  not  brought  to  the  notice  of 
the  President  until  the  21st  day  of  the  month  (De 
cember).  He  saw  no  reason  to  disapprove  it,  and  did 
not  do  so.  Major  Anderson  was  at  the  moment  in  Fort 
Moultrie  with  a  very  small  force  of  men.  He  became 
convinced  that  he  was  in  a  dangerous  position,  and  be 
lieved  that  an  attack  upon  him  by  the  South  Carolinians 
was  imminent.  On  the  night  of  the  26th  he,  therefore, 
left  Fort  Moultrie  and  occupied  Fort  Sumter,  which  he 
considered  a  stronger  position. 

These  acts  by  Major  Anderson  were  the  events  re 
ferred  to  by  Messrs.  Adams,  Barnwell,  and  Orr  as  preclud 
ing  any  discussion  in  regard  to  the  amicable  adjustment 
of  the  mutual  interests  of  South  Carolina  and  the  United 
States,  since  they  held  the  same  to  be  a  violation  of  the 
faith  of  the  United  States  Government  with  South  Car 
olina,  as  pledged  by  the  President. 

The  President  would  have  been  entirely  justified  in 
consigning  this  communication  from  these  gentlemen  to 
his  waste-basket,  but  he  took  counsel  of  his  The  Preg} 
fine  sense  of  courtesy  instead  of  a  proper  dent's  answer, 
sense  of  the  dignity  and  prerogatives  of  his  office,  and 
sent  them  an  answer.  Thanks,  however,  to  the  influ 
ence  of  Black,  Stanton,  and  Holt,  the  answer,  though 
most  polite  and  kindly  in  its  language,  was  a  firm  dec 
lination  to  withdraw  the  United  States  troops  from 
Charleston  Harbor  or  to  have  anything  to  do  with  the 
commissioners  except  in  the  character  of  private  gentle 
men. 


94  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

The  day  after  the  transfer  of  the  United  States  troops 
from  Fort  Moultrie  to  Fort  Sumter,  the  South  Carolin 
ians  seized  Castle  Pinckney  and  Fort  Moultrie,  and  raised 
the  flag  of  the  State  of  South  Carolina  upon  them.  On 
the  same  day  they  raised  their  flag  over  the  United  States 
Custom  House  and  Post  Office  in  Charleston,  and  took 
possession  of  these  properties.  It  was  undoubtedly  the 
condition  of  readiness  to  accomplish  these  things  into 
which  the  South  Carolinians  had  brought  themselves 
that  had  caused  Major  Anderson  to  conclude  that  an 
attempt  might  be  made  at  any  time  upon  one  or  the 
other  of  the  forts. 

The  South  Carolina  gentlemen  answered  the  Presi 
dent's  reply  to  them  with  a  communication,,  which  he, 
with  all  his  conservatism,  kindliness,  courtesy, 

Reply  to  the  .  ,   ,.      .  ,.,       ,      , .        ,    , 

President's  conciliatormess  and  timidity  declined  to  re 
ceive.  They  wrote  the  President  that  they 
had  no  solicitude  about  the  character  in  which  he  might 
recognize  them.  They  accused  him  of  misconceiving 
and  misconstruing  their  first  note  to  him.  They  de 
clared  that  he  had  made  pledges  to  South  Carolina, 
impliedly  if  not  expressly,  and  that  he  did  not  deny  this 
when  they  called  upon  him  to  redeem  them.  They 
charged  him  with  failing  to  redeem  those  pledges  by  not 
ordering  Major  Anderson  back  to  Fort  Moultrie ;  and 
cited  as  proof,  both  of  the  giving  of  the  pledges  and  their 
violation,  the  action  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Floyd, 
who  resigned  his  seat  in  the  cabinet  for  the  avowed 
reason  that  the  action  of  Major  Anderson  had  violated 
the  plighted  faith  of  the  Government,  and  that  the 
failure  of  the  President  to  restore  the  status  in  Charles 
ton  Harbor  had  dishonored  him.  They  accused  him  of 
seeking  to  escape  from  the  obligations  of  his  pledges  by 
misrepresenting  the  contents  of  their  first  communica 
tion,  and  by  exaggerating  the  import  of  what  had  been 


SECESSION  95 

done  by  the  South  Carolinians  on  the  day  following  the 
movement  of  Major  Anderson. 

The  paper  ended  with  the  following  pronnnciamento  : 
"  By  your  course  you  have  probably  rendered  civil  war 
inevitable.  Be  it  so.  If  you  choose  to  force  this  issue 
upon  us,  the  state  of  South  Carolina  will  accept  it,  and, 
relying  upon  him  who  is  the  God  of  justice,  as  well  as 
the  God  of  hosts,  will  endeavor  to  perform  the  great 
duty  which  lies  before  her,  hopefully,  bravely  and  thor 
oughly." 

The  effect  of  this  extraordinary  communication  upon 
the  President  was  most  beneficial.  He  saw  now  plainly 
that  the  Southern  members  of  his  Cabinet  The  effect 
had  used  their  positions  to  betray  the  Gov- 
eminent,  and  to  compromise  him  and  his 
honor  before  the  country  ;  and  he  saw  that  President, 
the  South  Carolinians  were  traitorously  bent  upon  seiz 
ing  the  forts  and  property  of  the  United  States,  which 
he  had  declared  he  should  defend  with  all  the  means  in 
his  power.  He  began  now  to  feel  the  bitterness  against 
them  which  follows  the  discovery  of  misplaced  and 
abused  confidence ;  while  they,  together  with  the 
Southern  Senators  who  had  had  his  ear,  now  turned 
upon  him  with  the  rage  of  men  disappointed,  at  the  last 
moment,  in  the  accomplishment  of  their  purposes.  Even 
the  self-contained  and  debonair  Mr.  Benjamin  de 
nounced  Mr.  Buchanan  as  "a,  senile  executive  under 
the  influence  of  insane  counsels." 

The  people  of  the  North  were  made  to  understand  by 
these  attacks  that  the  President  had  at  last  nerved  him 
self  to  break  with  the  secessionists,  and  do  his  The  North 
duty  for  the  Union.  Hope  and  encourage-  JJceou?f?yjy_ 
ment  now  began  to  displace  the  despondency  dent'8  Btand- 
and  despair  which  had  rested  upon  the  mind  and  heart 
of  the  North  since  the  fatal  message  of  December  3d. 


96  THE   CIVIL    WAE 

Meanwhile  the  Congressional  committees  of  concilia 
tion  had  been  in  session  struggling  with  the  great  ques- 
The  con-  tion  of  pacification,  under  the  form  of  propo- 
f ommfttees  of  sitions  amendatory  of  the  Constitution.  In 
an^thVir  *ne  Senate  committee,  composed  of  Messrs. 
work.  Davis,  Douglas,  Toombs,  Hunter,  Powell, 

Bigler,  Rice,  Seward,  Collamer,  Doolittle,  Wade, 
Grimes,  and  Crittenden,  seven  Democrats,  five  Republi 
cans,  and  one  Independent,  the  Southern  Democrats, 
Davis,  Toombs,  and  Hunter,  took  the  ground  that  they 
would  accept  nothing  which  the  Republicans  would  not 
support.  They  gave  as  their  reason  for  this,  their  be 
lief  that  any  settlement  effected  without  the  concur 
rence  of  the  Republicans  would  prove  futile.  We  must 
credit  them  with  sincerity,  although  it  was  gravely  sus 
pected  that  they  sought  in  this  way  to  prevent  any 
agreement  at  all,  and  at  the  same  time  to  throw  the 
blame  for  the  failure  upon  the  Republicans.  The  de 
mands  which  these  men  made  of  the  committee  as  the 
price  of  their  further  allegiance,  and  that  of  the  South, 
to  the  United  States  were  formulated  by  Mr.  Toombs. 
They  were,  in  his  own  language,  "  that  the  people  of 
the  United  States  shall  have  an  equal  right  to  emigrate 
to  and  settle  in  the  present,  or  any  future  acquired,  Ter 
ritories,  with  whatever  property  they  may  possess,  in 
cluding  slaves,  and  be  securely  protected  in  its  peaceable 
enjoyment  until  such  Territory  may  be  admitted  as  a 
State  into  the  Union,  with  or  without  slavery,  as  she 
may  determine,  on  an  equality  with  all  existing  States  ; 
that  property  in  slaves  shall  be  entitled  to  the  same  pro 
tection  from  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  in 
all  of  its  departments,  everywhere,  which  the  Constitu 
tion  confers  the  power  upon  it  to  extend  to  any  other 
property,  provided  nothing  herein  contained  shall  be 
construed  to  limit  or  restrain  the  right  now  belonging 


SECESSION  97 

to  every  State  to  prohibit,  abolish,  or  establish  and  pro 
tect  slavery  within  its  limits  ;  that  persons  committing 
crimes  against  slave  property  in  one  State,  and  fleeing  to 
another,  shall  be  delivered  up  in  the  same  manner  as 
persons  committing  crimes  against  other  property,  and 
that  the  laws  of  the  States  from  which  such  persons  flee 
shall  be  the  test  of  criminality  ;  that  fugitive  slaves 
shall  be  surrendered  under  the  provisions  of  the  Fugi 
tive  Slave  Act  of  1850,  without  being  entitled  either  to  a 
writ  of  Habeas  Corpus,  or  trial  by  Jury,  or  other  similar 
obstructions  of  legislation  in  the  State  to  which  they  may 
flee  ;  and  that  Congress  shall  pass  efficient  laws  for  the 
punishment  of  all  persons  in  any  of  the  States  who  shall 
in  any  manner  aid  and  abet  invasion  or  insurrection  in 
any  other  State,  or  commit  any  other  act  against  the 
law  of  Nations,  tending  to  disturb  the  tranquillity  of  the 
people  or  government  of  any  other  State." 

Mr.  Toombs  and  his  Southern  associates  required  that 
these  propositions  should  be  incorporated  in  the  Consti 
tution  as  irrepealable,  unamendable  amendments.  In. 
respect  only  to  one  of  them  were  they  willing  to  accept 
a  modification.  They  agreed  to  compromise  upon  Mr. 
Crittenden's  proposition  for  a  division  of  the  Territories 
between  North  and  South  on  the  line  of  thirty-six 
degrees  and  thirty  minutes.  It  was  upon  this  point 
chiefly  that  Mr.  Crittenden's  famous  resolutions  differed 
from  the  demands  formulated  by  Mr.  Toombs. 

Upon  other  points  the  Crittenden  resolutions  were 
but  little  more  than  a  restatement  of  the  Toombs  propo 
sitions.  They  proposed  by  irrepealable,  un-  The  Critteu 
amendable  amendments  to  the  Constitution  to  den  resoiu- 
disable  Congress  from  touching  slavery  in  the 
"  States,"  or  the  Territories,  or  in  the  District  of  Colum 
bia  so  long  as  the  institution  should  exist  in  Maryland 
or  Virginia,  or  in  places  subject  to  the  exclusive  jurisdic- 
VOL.  L— 7 


98  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

tion  of  the  United  States  Government  in  slaveholding 
"States";  from  interfering  with  commerce  in  slaves 
between  slaveholding  "States"  and  Territories;  and 
from  prohibiting  members  of  Congress  and  United 
States  officers  from  bringing  slaves  with  them  into  the 
District  of  Columbia  for  domestic  use. 

The  Crittenden  resolutions  also  proposed  by  an  irre- 
pealable,  unamendable  amendment  to  the  Constitution 
to  secure  payment  by  the  Government  to  the  slave- 
masters  for  the  loss  of  their  slaves,  whenever  the  loss 
should  be  occasioned  through  interference  with  the 
officers  charged  with  the  capture  and  rendition  of  such 
slaves  by  the  people  of  the  community  in  which  the  ap 
prehension  was  sought  to  be  made,  or  in  which  the  res 
cue  was  effected. 

These  resolutions  proposed  further  to  make  the  ex 
isting  provisions  of  the  Constitution  in  respect  to  the 
rendition  of  fugitive  slaves,  and  in  respect  to  the  count 
ing  of  the  slaves  in  the  apportionment  of  the  represen 
tation  in  Congress  and  in  the  presidential  electoral  col 
leges,  irrepealable  and  unamendable.  And  they  finally 
pronounced  the  legality  and  sacred  obligation  of  the 
Fugitive  Slave  Act  of  1850,  and  recommended  to  the 
Northern  Commonwealths  the  repeal  of  their  personal 
liberty  laws,  which  were  held  to  contravene  it.  Nat 
urally  Davis,  Toombs,  and  Hunter  were  willing  to  take 
this  statement  of  their  demands,  although  coupled  with 
a  division  of  the  Territories  by  the  line  of  the  thirty-six 
degrees  and  thirty  minutes  to  the  Pacific,  instead  of  rec 
ognizing  the  legality  of  slavery  in  all  of  them.  Of 
course  the  other  Democrats  on  the  committee  could  ask 
no  more  than  the  triumvirate  named. 

But  the  Republicans  were  obliged  to  answer  non  JPOS- 
sumus.  The  cardinal  principle  of  the  Republican  creed 
was  the  arrest  of  the  further  extension  of  slavery.  It 


SECESSION  99 

was  with  them  not  simply  a  party  platform,  or  a  political 
policy,  which  might  he  sacrificed  withont  the  violation 
of  any  principle  of  justice  or  morality,  but 

J  ,\  ,    ,       .,   .      ,          •        •    i          »       The  position 

it  was  the  fundamental  ethical  principle  or   of  the  Repub- 
their  existence.     To  agree  to  Mr.  Toombs's 
demands,   or  to  Mr.   Crittenden's  propositions,  would 
have   been   for   the    Republicans    political   and   moral 
suicide. 

Mr.  Seward  said  that  he  was  ready  to  vote  for  an  ir- 
repealable,  unamendable  amendment  to  the  Constitution 
securing  slavery  in  the  "States"  where  it  Mr.seward's 
already  existed  ;  that  he  was  also  ready  to  Pr°Poeition8- 
vote  for  proper  laws  for  the  punishment  of  citizens  of 
one  "State"  invading  another  and  stirring  up  insurrec 
tion,  or  for  aiding  and  abetting  in  .the  same  ;  and  that 
he  disapproved  of  all  "  State  "  legislation  in  contraven 
tion  of  the  acts  of  Congress  required  by  the  Constitu 
tion  for  the  execution  of  the  provision  for  the  rendition 
of  fugitive  slaves.  The  other  Republicans  considered 
these  propositions  to  be  quite  generous,  but  the  South 
erners  regarded  them  so  slightly  as  to  affirm  that  the 
Republicans  never  indicated  by  word  or  sign  any  con 
cession  which  they  would  be  willing  to  make. 

The  historians  and  publicists  are  bound  to  say  that 
Mr.  Seward's  propositions  were  not  only  generous,  but, 
upon  one  point,  too  generous.  An  irrepeal- 

~         \  .  .  Criticism  of 

able,  unamendable  provision  in  a  Oonstitu-  Mr. 


tion  in  regard  to  anything  is  a  rotten  spot,  propos 
which  threatens  decay  to  the  whole  Constitution.  It  is 
a  standing  menace  to  the  peaceable  development  of  any 
political  system.  It  is  the  most  direct  contradiction  pos 
sible  of  one  of  the  most  fundamental  principles  of  politi 
cal  science,  the  principle  that  the  amending  power  in  a 
constitution,  the  legally  organized  sovereign  power  in  the 
political  system  of  a  country,  must  be  able  to  deal  with 


100  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

any  and  every  subject.  If  matters  are  excepted  from 
its  jurisdiction,  then  they  can  be  dealt  with  only  by 
revolution — that  is,  by  the  forcible  intervention  of  su 
perior  physical  power  not  recognized  by  existing  law. 
In  other  words,  the  withdrawal  of  any  subject  from  the 
amending  power  is  the  destruction  of  constitutional  de 
velopment  as  to  that  subject,  and  the  destruction  of 
constitutional  development  in  general  will  work  the  in 
evitable  overthrow  of  the  Constitution  and  constitu 
tional  government.  For,  despite  the  sneers  of  Mr. 
Toombs,  politics  are  progressive,  and  if  they  cannot 
progress  through  the  regular  forms  of  amendment,  they 
will  do  so  through  the  violent  course  of  revolution.  It 
was  this  consideration  which  moved  the  framers  of  the 
Constitution  to  construct  the  regular  method  of  amend 
ment  as  a  constitutional  provision,  the  most  important 
provision  of  the  Constitution  ;  and  now  the  proposition 
to  withdraw  from  its  operation  the  most  serious  and 
burning  question  of  our  political  ethics  was  a  proposi 
tion  to  set  the  clock  of  ages  back  a  century  and  more, 
so  far  as  concerned  the  advancement  of  liberty  and  of 
the  science  of  government.  It  simply  could  not  be  ac 
corded.  It  was  an  attempt  to  thwart  the  purposes  of  the 
unseen  but  almighty  power  which  conducts  the  devel 
opment  of  man  toward  his  ultimate  destiny. 

Naturally  with  such  demands  as  those  made  by  Mr. 

Toombs,  or  with  such  propositions  as  those  advanced  by 

Failure   of  ^r*  Crittenden,  and  declared  by  the  South- 

the   senate  erners  to  be  the  ultimatum,  no  agreement 

committee  to 

agree  upon  a  could  be  arrived  at  by  the  Senate  committee. 

proposition.        „.,  ...  •    -i  i  -in          •  i 

The  committee  quickly  recognized  the  situ 
ation,  and  on  the  last  day  of  the  month  (December),  re 
ported  to  the  Senate  their  inability  to  agree. 

When  the  committee  had  been  sitting  only  a  single 
day,  Senator  Toombs  telegraphed  an  address  to  the  peo- 


SECESSION  101 

pie  of  Georgia  through  the  Savannah  News,  in  which  he 
declared  to  them  that  his  demands  had  been  received  by 
the  Republican  members  of  the  committee  Mr.Toombs's 
with  derision  ;  that  they  had  rejected  the 
Crittenden  propositions,  and  had  announced 
that  they  themselves  had  no  guarantees  to  offer  ;  that 
they  were,  furthermore,  fair  representatives  of  the  Re 
publican  majority  of  the  House  committee  on  the  same 
subject  ;  that,  therefore,  nothing  was  to  be  expected 
from  either  of  these  committees  or  from  Congress  ;  and 
that  he,  therefore,  advised  the  secession  of  Georgia  be 
fore  the  4th  day  of  the  coming  March.  Mr.  Toombs 
undoubtedly  thought  that  the  moral  impossibility  of 
the  Republicans  yielding  to  his  demands  was  an  impos 
sibility  which  was  created  by  the  execrable  immorality 
of  their  principles.  However  that  may  be,  he  recog 
nized  very  quickly  that  impossibility,  and  hastened  to 
advise  his  friends  and  constituents  that  they  must  hang 
no  hopes  upon  Republican  concessions. 

The  Republicans  of  the  House  committee  were  more 
yielding  than  their  party  brethren  of  the  Senate  com 
mittee,  and  the  prospect  seemed  for  a  time  The  proceed- 
fairly  good  that  this  committee  might  be  able  i£,eln  ^ 
to  agree  upon  a  modus  vivendi  between  the  mittee- 
North  and  the  South.  It  had  been  at  work,  however, 
for  nearly  a  month,  without  attaining  a  final  result, 
when  the  Senate  committee  reported  inability  to  agree. 
There  was  indeed  some  ground  for  believing  that  it  too 
would  fail  to  accomplish  anything,  certainly  in  the 
minds  of  those  who  were  indifferent  to  its  failure  or  suc 
cess. 

Five  days  more  now  passed  after  the  Senate  commit 
tee's  report  without  the  reaching  of  any  conclusion  by 
the  House  committee.  Already  on  the  13th  of  Decem 
ber,  Mr.  Reuben  Davis,  member  of  the  committee  from 


102  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

the  Mississippi  delegation,  had  procured  from  some 
twenty  of  his  Southern  associates  in  Congress  a  man- 
The  mani-  ifesto  to  their  constituents  and  to  the  people 
KbeSfDa^fs  of  tlie  South  generally,  in  which  it  was  de- 
and  MB  asso-  ciared  that  "  all  hope  of  relief  in  the  Union, 

C1UL68     tO     CDC  •*• 

south.  through  the  agencies  of  committees,  congres 

sional  legislation,  or  constitutional  amendments,  is  ex 
tinguished,  and  we  trust  the  South  will  not  be  deceived 
by  appearances  or  the  pretence  of  new  guarantees.  The 
Republicans  are  resolute  in  the  purpose  to  grant  noth 
ing  that  will  or  ought  to  satisfy  the  South.  We  are  sat 
isfied  that  the  honor,  safety,  and  independence  of  the 
Southern  people  are  to  be  found  only  in  a  Southern 
Confederacy,  a  result  to  be  obtained  only  by  separate 
State  secession,  and  that  the  sole  and  primary  aim  of 
each  slaveholding  State  ought  to  be  its  speedy  and  ab 
solute  separation  from  an  unnatural  and  hostile  Union." 

This  was  the  tenor  of  almost  all  of  the  information 
furnished  the  Southern  people  from  their  representa- 
HeBitationof  ^ves  ^n  Washington  during  that  fateful 
the  southern  month.  Still  the  Southern  people  hesitated. 
Eight  of  the  most  reputable  citizens  of  Geor 
gia  joined  in  a  telegram  to  Senators  Douglas  and  Crit- 
tenden,  dated  at  Atlanta,  December  26th,  inquiring  of 
these  Senators,  if  the  advices  from  Mr.  Toombs  that 
there  were  no  hopes  for  Southern  rights  in  the  Union 
were  correct,  and  declaring  that  they  were  for  the  Union 
if  only  their  rights  would  be  respected  therein.  These 
loyal  Senators  replied  that  Southern  rights,  as  the  rights 
of  every  "  State"  and  section,  could  be  protected  in  the 
Union,  and  exhorted  them  not  to  despair  of  the  Republic. 

The  progress  of  secession  was  evidently  halting,  and  it 
appeared  still  possible  to  arrest  i^  peaceably,  when  the 
Senators  from  Georgia,  Alabama,  Mississippi,  Florida, 
Louisiana,  Arkansas,  and  Texas  held  that  fateful  caucus 


SECESSION  103 

of  January  5,  1861,  and  sent  out  from  it  the  advice  to 
the  people  of  these  Commonwealths  to  secede  from  the 
Union.  The  Republican  historians  generally 

.,       ..  ..  .  ,.°  .  J        The  caucus 

ascribe  the  passage  of  secession  ordinances  by  of  southern 
these  ''States"  to  that  advice.  The  seces-  January8?, 
sionist  historians,  on  the  other  hand,  regard  3 
this  view  as  erroneous.  These  latter  declare  that  seces 
sion  was  a  great  popular  movement,  and  that  the  influ 
ence  of  the  Southern  members  of  Congress  at  Washington 
was  in  restraint  of  it,  rather  than  calculated  or  intended 
to  advance  it.  Mr.  Davis,  in  his  work  upon  the  "  Rise 
and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,"  gives  the  text 
of  the  resolutions  adopted  by  this  caucus  and  sent  to  the 
constituents  of  its  members.  They  read  as  follows  : 

"Resolved,  that  in  our  opinion,  each  of  the  States 
should,  as  soon  as  may  be,  secede  from  the  Union ;  that 
provision  should  be  made  for  a  convention  to  organize 
a  confederacy  of  the  seceding  States,  the  convention  to 
meet  not  later  than  the  fifteenth  of  February,  at  the  city 
of  Montgomery,  in  the  State  of  Alabama ;  that  in  view 
of  the  hostile  legislation  that  is  threatened  against  the  se 
ceding  States,  and  which  may  be  consummated  before  the 
fourth  of  March,  we  ask  instructions  whether  the  dele 
gations  are  to  remain  in  Congress  until  that  date,  for 
the  purpose  of  defeating  such  legislation  ;  and  that  a 
committee,  consisting  of  Messrs.  Davis,  Slidell,  and  Mai- 
lory,  be  and  are  hereby  appointed  to  carry  out  the  object 
of  this  meeting." 

Mr.  Davis  said,  "  the  significance  of  these  resolutions 
was  the  admission  that  we  could  no  longer  advise  delay, 
and  even  that  was  unimportant  under  the 

.  Mr.    Davis'B 

circumstances,  for  three  of  the  States  con-   interpretation 
cerned  had  taken  final  action  on  the  subject  tions  of  the 
before  the  resolutions  could  have  been  com 
municated  to  them."     Mr.  Davis  referred,  of  course,  to 


104  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

the  passage  of  the  secession  ordinances  by  the  conven 
tions  in  Mississippi,  Florida,  and  Alabama,  which  took 
place  on  the  9th,  10th,  and  llth  of  January,  respectively. 
Mr.  Davis  does  not,  it  is  true,  explain  why  resolutions 
adopted  on  the  5th  of  the  month  at  Washington  could 
not  have  been  communicated  to  the  secession  conven 
tions  at  Jackson,  Tallahassee,  and  Montgomery  before 
the  9th,  10th,  and  llth  of  the  month,  with  telegraphic 
lines  and  postal  service  in  full  operation  between  Wash 
ington  and  the  principal  cities  in  the  South,  nor  does  he 
assert  that  they  were  not.  He  simply  claimed  that  they 
could  not  have  been.  In  this  he  may  have  been  mis 
taken,  although  it  is  hardly  probable. 

Mr.  Davis  said  again  and  again  that  the  great  mass  of 
the  people  of  Mississippi  considered  him  too  slow,  and 

Mr.  Davis  that  some  suspected  him  of  a  stronger  attach- 
too  slow.  ment  to  tjie  Union  than  to  the  rights  of  the 
South.  He  certainly  did  take  a  more  serious  view  of 
the  situation  than  did  most  of  his  Southern  colleagues. 
He  expressed  the  opinion  that  war  would  follow,  and 
that  the  South  was  not  well  prepared  for  that  eventual 
ity.  He  declared,  however,  that,  as  a  firm  believer  in 
the  doctrine  of  the  sovereignty  of  his  "  State/'  he  would 
obey  her  decision. 

While,  then,  it  is  probably  true  that  the  Republican 
historians  have  somewhat  exaggerated  the  importance  of 

True  esti-  the  event  of  January  5th  in  making  it  the 
event  <S  Janu^  cause  °^  the  passage  of  the  secession  ordi- 
arysth.  nances  by  all  of  the  "Cotton  States/'  ex 

cept  South  Carolina,  yet  we  must  still  hold  that  it  re 
moved  the  last  obstacle  out  of  the  way  of  that  course  of 
procedure.  Had  the  advice  of  the  caucus  been  the  ex 
act  opposite  to  what  it  was,  it  is  certainly  very  probable 
that  not  another  "  State"  would  have  joined  South  Car 
olina  in  her  mad  project. 


SECESSION  105 

Whether  the  resolutions  of  this  caucus  became  imme 
diately  known  to  the  President,  and  whether,  therefore, 
they  exerted  any  influence  in  provoking  him      ^^ 
to  his  special  message  of  January  8th  (1861),   dent's  special 

-  ,          .,,  .    .  m1         message  of 

we  are  not  able  with  certainty  to  say.  Ine  January  sth, 
suspicion,  however,  that  such  was  the  case 
is  very  natural,  and  there  is  internal  evidence  of  it  in 
the  message  itself.  The  President  was  now  fully  under 
the  influence  of  the  Unionist  members  of  the  reorgan 
ized  Cabinet,  although  General  Dix  did  not  come  into 
the  Cabinet  until  the  llth.  He  evidently  consulted  only 
the  Unionist  members  in  the  preparation  of  this  mes 
sage.  In  it,  he  firmly  declared  that  he  must  execute  the 
laws  of  the  United  States  throughout  the  entire  extent 
of  the  country  with  all  the  means,  both  civil  and  mili 
tary,  placed  in  his  hands,  and  that  he  purposed  to  do  so. 
He  appealed  to  Congress  to  settle  the  differences  by 
compromise  and  mutual  concession,  but  at  the  same 
time  he  affirmed  that  the  right  and  duty  of  the  Presi 
dent  "to  use  military  force  defensively  against  those 
who  resist  the  Federal  officers  in  the  execution  of  their 
legal  functions,  and  against  those  who  assail  the  prop 
erty  of  the  Federal  Government,  are  clear  and  unde 
niable." 

He  informed  Congress  that  he  had  not,  to  that  time, 
sent  any  re-enforcements  to  Charleston  Harbor,  in  order 
not  to  arouse  any  excitement  there,  and  he  sent  with 
the  message  an  extract  from  a  communication  from 
Major  Anderson,  which  contained  information  that, 
contrary  to  assurances,  the  South  Carolinians  were  pre 
paring  for  a  hostile  movement,  and  also  the  statement 
that  the  transfer  of  his  command  from  Fort  Moultrie  to 
Fort  Sumter  had  been  caused  by  the  conviction  that  the 
troops  were  in  great  danger  of  being  captured  in  Fort 
Moultrie.  The  President  also  transmitted  with  his 


106  THE    CIVIL    WAIi 

message  the  communications  which  had  passed  between 
him  and  the  South  Carolina  commissioners. 

At  the  date  of  this  message  all  the  forts  and  coast  de 
fences  in  South  Carolina,,  Georgia,  and  Alabama,  except 

The  seizure  Fort  Sumter,  had  been  seized  by  the  respec- 
of  the  forts.  tiye  "State"  authorities,  although  Georgia 
and  Alabama  had  not  yet  enacted  their  secession  ordi 
nances.  It  is  now  a  well-settled  fact  that  these  seizures 
were  made  in  Georgia  and  Alabama  upon  the  advice  of 
the  men  who  still  sat  in  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States,  as  Senators  and  Eepresentatives  from  those 
Commonwealths. 

It  was  evident  from  the  tone  of  President  Buchanan's 
message  that  he  had  nerved  himself  to  do  something  for 

The  "star  ^1G  vin^ication  of  the  authority  of  the  Gov- 
of  the  west'-  eminent.  On  the  very  day  that  the  message 

affair.  i    •      n  N.  i    ^    A 

was  read  in  Congress,  it  was  revealed  to  the 
world  what  it  was.  He  had  most  naturally  resolved 
to  strengthen  Major  Anderson's  garrison  in  Fort  Sum 
ter  sufficiently  to  enable  it  to  hold  the  place  against 
attack.  He  had  sent  re-enforcements  and  supplies  to 
the  Major  from  New  York  on  the  steamer  "  Star  of 
the  West."  This  vessel  reached  Charleston  Harbor  on 
the  9th  (January),  and  attempted  to  approach  Fort 
Sumter.  It  was  fired  upon,  by  the  South  Carolinians, 
from  Fort  Moultrie  and  Morris  Island,  and  was  struck. 
It  then  put  back,  and  returned  to  New  York,  without 
having  reached  Fort  Sumter  at  all.  The  South  Caro 
linians  had  raised  the  hand  of  violence  against  the  Gov 
ernment  of  the  United  States,  and  the  whole  military 
power  of  the  United  States  ought  to  have  been  sent  at 
once  to  the  support  of  Fort  Sumter,  and  for  the  recapt 
ure  of  the  United  States  property  in  South  Carolina. 
The  firing  upon  the  "  Star  of  the  West"  was  really  the 
beginning  of  the  war  of  the  rebellion.  The  United 


SECESSION  107 

States  Government  had  just  us  much  right  to  send  troops 
to  Fort  Sumter,  as  to  keep  troops  in  Fort  Sumter.  The 
constitutional  right  to  do  both  was  perfect,  and  firing 
upon  United  States  soldiers  going  to  Fort  Sumter.,  un 
der  orders  from  the  President,  was  just  as  much  a  hos 
tile  act  as  tiring  upon  United  States  soldiers  in  Fort 
Sumter.  The  Administration  simply  chose  not  to  so 
regard  it.  President  Buchanan  was  resolved  to  avoid 
the  issue  of  arms,  if  he  possibly  could  do  so.  Congress 
was  not  prepared  for  it,  and  it  is  not  certain  that  the 
people  of  the  North  would  then  have  rallied  to  the 
President's  support.  And  so,  a  distinction  was  made  be 
tween  resistance  to  the  Government  on  its  way  to  Fort 
Sumter  and  resistance  to  the  Government  already  in 
Fort  Sumter,  in  order  to  avoid  accepting  the  gage  of 
battle  thrown  down  by  the  South  Carolinians.  It  does 
seem,  however,  that  a  determined  President,  in  com 
mand  of  ten  thousand  good  soldiers  might,  at  the  mo 
ment,  have  nipped  the  rebellion  in  the  bud.  The  legal 
right  to  act,  and  the  legitimate  occasion  for  acting,  were 
both  perfect.  It  was  the  physical  means,  and  the  dis 
position  to  use  them,  that  were  lacking. 

As  it  was,  the  ignominious  backdown  of  the  Adminis 
tration  encouraged  the  secessionists  and  humiliated  the 
North.  The  Secretary  of  the  Interior,  Mr.  The  effect  of 
Thompson,  of  Mississippi,  and  the  Secretary  Relieve11  Major 
of  the  Treasury,  Mr.  Thomas,  of  Maryland,  Anderson, 
now  resigned,  declaring  that  in  attempting  to  re-enforce 
Major  Anderson  the  President  had  broken  his  pledges, 
and  that  they  could  therefore  remain  no  longer  in  con 
nection  with  him.  The  appointment  of  General  John 
A.  Dix  of  New  York  to  the  secretaryship  of  the  Treas 
ury,  and  the  transfer  of  Mr.  Holt  to  the  War  Department 
now,  however,  placed  the  Administration  upon  much 
firmer  ground,  so  that,  after  all,  the  "  Star  of  the 


108  THE   CIVIL   WAE 

West  "affair  was  not  wholly  injurious.  The  Cabinet 
was,  at  last,  purged  of  the  secessionist  element  and  be 
came  solidly  and  sincerely  loyal  to  the  Union. 

Two  days  after  the  repulse  of  the  "  Star  of  the  West" 
from  Charleston  Harbor,  Governor  Pickens  demanded 
The  demand  of  Major  Anderson  the  surrender  of  Fort 
pfickSi0sVerfno°r  Sumter.  The  Major  refused,  but  suggested 
ofeForfrsum-  that>  if  tbe  Grovernor  would  refer  the  matter 
ter-  to  the  President,  he  would  send  one  of  his 

own  subordinates  to  bear  the  communication.  The 
Governor  immediately  deputed  his  Attorney-General, 
I.  W.  Hayne,  to  go  to  Washington  and  demand  the  sur 
render  of  Fort  Sumter.  When  Mr.  Hayne  arrived  in 
Washington,  the  Senators  from  Georgia,  Alabama,  Mis 
sissippi,  Louisiana,  Florida,  and  Texas  immediately  met 
him,  and  persuaded  him  not  to  make  this  demand  of 
the  President  until  their  "  States  "  could  form  a  con 
federation  with  each  other  and  with  South  Carolina. 
They  agreed  with  Mr.  Hayne  that,  in  consideration  of 
his  delay,  they  would  themselves  jointly  request  the 
President  to  give  an  assurance  that  the  garrison  in  Fort 
Sumter  would  not  be  re-enforced.  They  made  the  re 
quest,  and  the  President,  through  the  Secretary  of  War, 
immediately  declined  to  give  any  such  assurance,  but 
distinctly  declared  that,  if  Major  Anderson's  safety 
should  require  re-enforcements,  every  effort  would  be 
made  to  supply  them.  This  happened  on  the  22d  of 
January. 

Meanwhile    Congress   had   continued   its    efforts  for 

pacification.     The  House  Committee  had  reported  on 

the  13th.     It,  too,  had  been  unable  to  come 

The  contin-     .  .  m 

nance  of  the  to  any  unanimous  agreement.     Two  reports 

efforts  of  Con-  ,-.          »  ,     -,     .  .-,  ., 

grees  for  pad-   were  therefore  presented  from  the  commit 
tee.     The  chairman  of  the  committee,  Mr. 
Corwin,  presented  the  report  of  the  majority.     This  re- 


SECESSION  109 

port  denounced  the  acts  of  Northern  "  State"  Legislat 
ures  for  obstructing  the  execution  of  the  Fugitive  Slave 
law,  and  the  conduct  of  mobs  and  combinations  of  pri 
vate  persons  for  the  same  purpose,  as  contrary  to  the 
Constitution,  inconsistent  with  comity  and  good  neigh 
borhood  between  the  "  States/'  and  dangerous  to  the 
peace  of  the  Union  ;  and  recommended  the  repeal  of  all 
such  legislative  acts,  and  in  their  stead  the  passage  of 
laws  securing  the  rights  of  the  citizens  of  each  "  State  " 
in  every  other,  and  requiring  the  punishment  of  all 
persons  guilty  of  attempting  to  set  on  foot  the  invasion 
of  any  "State"  or  Territory,  or  aiding  or  abetting  \ 
therein.  This  report  also  declared  the  existence  of 
slavery  in  fifteen  "  States  "  of  the  Union,  and  affirmed 
that  no  authority  outside  of  the  "  State "  concerned 
could  deal  with  the  institution  in  that  "  State";  but 
pronounced  it  to  be  "  the  duty  of  the  Federal  Gov 
ernment  to  enforce  the  Federal  laws,  protect  the  Feder 
al  property,  and  preserve  the  Union  of  the  States,"  and 
denied  that  there  was  any  sufficient  cause,  coming  from 
any  quarter,  for  the  dissolution  of  the  Union. 

The  practical  propositions  of  the  report  were,  first, 
an  amendment  to  the  Constitution,  which  should  pro 
vide  against  the  initiation  of  any  future  amendment  in 
regard  to  slavery,  except  at  the  instance  of  a  "  State  " 
in  which  slavery  existed,  and  against  the  ratification  of 
any  such  amendment  when  thus  proposed,  except  by  the 
vote  of  every  "  State  "  of  the  Union  ;  second,  an  amend 
ment  to  the  Congressional  act  for  the  rendition  of  fugi 
tives  from  justice,  so  as  to  give  the  "State"  from 
which  the  fugitive  should  escape  full  jurisdiction  over 
the  case  and  secure  the  rendition  by  means  of  the  United 
States  courts  ;  and,  third,  the  immediate  admission  of 
New  Mexico  as  a  "  State"  into  the  Union  with  such  ter 
ritorial  dimensions  as  to  give  almost  all  the  domain  of 


110  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

the  Union  south  of  the  line  of  thirty-six  degrees  and 
thirty  minutes  to  slavery. 

Seven  of  the  Southern  members  of  the  committee 
joined  in  a  minority  report,  the  propositions  of  which 
were  substantially  the  Crittenden  scheme  presented  to 
the  Senate. 

Finally,  two  of  the  Northern  members,  Mr.  M.  W. 
Tappan  of  New  Hampshire  and  Mr.  C.  C.  Washburn 
of  Wisconsin,  made  another  minority  report,  which  con 
cluded  with  a  proposed  resolution,  reading  as  follows  : 
"  Eesolved,  that  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  are 
ample  for  the  preservation  of  the  Union,  and  the  pro 
tection  of  all  the  material  interests  of  our  country  ;  that 
it  needs  to  be  obeyed  rather  than  amended ;  and  that 
our  extrication  from  our  present  difficulties  is  to  be 
looked  for  in  efforts  to  preserve  and  protect  the  public 
property  and  enforce  the  laws,  rather  than  in  new  guar 
antees  for  particular  interests,  or  compromises,  or  con 
cessions  to  unreasonable  demands." 

Before,  however,  these  reports  were  debated  at  all  in 
the  House,  a  resolution  was  passed  in  the  Senate  which 
Mr  dark's  aPPeare(l  *°  Pu^  an  en<^-  to  all  attempts  at  any 
the°senate  in  comProm^se  in  which  it  should  be  necessary 
for  that  body  to  participate.  On  the  3d  day 
of  January,  Mr.  Crittenden  had  again  presented  in  the 
Senate  his  resolutions  of  December  18th,  which,  as  we 
have  seen,  were  offered  by  the  Southerners  in  the  com 
mittee  of  the  Senate  as  the  basis  of  a  compromise.  In 
the  midst  of  the  discussion  upon  them  in  the  Senate, 
Mr.  Clark,  of  New  Hampshire,  gave  notice  that  he 
should  move  a  substitute  for  them  which  read  :  "  Re 
solved,  that  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  are  ample 
for  the  preservation  of  the  Union,  and  the  protection  of 
all  the  material  interests  of  the  country ;  that  it  needs 
to  be  obeyed  rather  than  amended  ;  and  that  an  extrica- 


SECESSION  111 

tion  from  the  present  dangers  is  to  be  looked  for  in 
strenuous  efforts  to  preserve  the  peace,  protect  the  public 
property,  and  enforce  the  laws,  rather  than  in  new  guar 
antees  for  particular  interests,  compromises  for  particu 
lar  difficulties,  or  concessions  to  unreasonable  demands  ; 
that  all  attempts  to  dissolve  the  present  Union,  or  over 
throw  or  abandon  the  present  Constitution,  with  the 
hope  or  expectation  of  constructing  a  new  one,  are  dan 
gerous,  illusory  and  destructive  ;  that  in  the  opinion  of 
the  Senate  of  the  United  States,  no  such  reconstruction 
is  practicable,  and  therefore  to  the  maintenance  of  the 
existing  Union  and  Constitution  should  be  directed  the 
energies  of  all  the  departments  of  the  Government,  and 
the  efforts  of  all  good  citizens." 

On  the  15th  (January),  Mr.  Clark  moved  the  adoption 
of  this  substitute  for  Mr.  Crittenden's  propositions  ;  and 
on  the  16th  the  motion  was  actually  voted,  by  Pagga  f 
a  majority  of  twenty-five  against  twenty-  ^g0]Jt|0anrBk'8 
three,  through  the  abstention  of  six  Southern 
Senators,  viz.,  Benjamin  and  Slidell  of  Louisiana,  Hemp- 
hill  and  Wigfall  of  Texas,  Iverson  of  Georgia,  and  John 
son  of  Arkansas.  The  Senators  from  the  "  States  " 
which  had  passed  secession  ordinances  had  ceased  to  act, 
and  Mr.  Toombs  of  Georgia  was  not  present.  Had  he 
been,  he  would  no  doubt  have  acted  with  the  other  six. 
In  fact,  it  is  asserted  on  good  authority  that  it  was  witli 
his  knowledge  and  counsel  that  the  six  abstained  from 
voting,  though  in  their  seats,  in  order  to  be  able  to  say  to 
the  people  of  the  South  that  the  Senate  had  refused  any 
compromise  whatsoever.  It  is  certainly  true  that  Mr. 
Benjamin  telegraphed  to  the  people  of  Louisiana,  imme 
diately  after  this  vote,  the  fateful  words  :  "We  cannot 
get  any  compromise/'  Senator  Andrew  Johnson  de 
clared  that  he  sat  just  behind  Mr.  Benjamin  when  the 
vote  was  being  taken,  and  that  he  asked  Mr.  Benjamin 


112  THE   CIVIL    WATC 

why  he  would  not  vote,  and  that  Mr.  Benjamin  replied 
that  "he  would  control  his  own  action  without  consult 
ing  me  or  anybody  else."  Mr.  Johnson  then  and  there 
divined  his  purpose  and  retorted,  "vote  and  show  your 
self  an  honest  man/' 

On  the  18th,  Mr.  Cameron  moved  to  reconsider  the 
vote  upon  Mr.  Clark's  propositions,  and  the  Senate  passed 
Reconsider-  the  motion,  so  that  the  Crittenden  measures 
cia0rk'8?e8o?£  were  restored  to  the  calendar  of  the  Senate, 
turns.  gut  the  vote  of  the  16th  had  done  the  work 

for  the  secessionists.  The  Georgia  convention  passed 
its  secession  ordinance  on  the  19th,  and  the  Louisiana 
convention  did  likewise  on  the  25th,  making  thus  the 
original  six  that  formed  the  Southern  Confederacy. 

The  delegations  from  these  "  States  "  in  the  House  of 
Representatives  withdrew  from  that  body  as  the  passage 
withdrawal  of  the  secession  ordinance  in  their  respective 
States  "  was  officially  announced  to  them. 
Tney  took  tneir  *eave  generally  through  the 
congress.  form  of  cards,  signed  jointly  by  the  mem 
bers  of  each  delegation,  through  which  they  informed 
the  House  of  the  secession  of  their  "States"  from  the 
Union,  and  expressed  the  opinion  that  this  act  worked 
the  revocation  of  their  own  representative  functions. 
A  few  of  them  indulged  in  speeches,  reproaching  the 
North,  the  Government  and  the  Republicans,  and  bid 
ding  them  defiance. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Senators  from  Mississippi,  Ala 
bama,  Florida,  Georgia,  and  Louisiana  made  farewell  ad 
dresses,  each  for  himself.  Mr.  Toombs  of  Georgia  and 
Mr.  Brown  of  Mississippi  were  the  only  exceptions.  They 
allowed  themselves  to  be  represented  by  their  respective 
colleagues,  Mr.  Iverson  and  Mr.  Davis.  Between  the 
21st  of  January  and  the  4th  of  February,  the  Senators 
listened  to  the  words  of  their  departing  colleagues. 


SECESSION  113 

One  would  naturally  expect  to  find  in  these  speeches 
an  enumeration  of  the  grievances  imposed  upon  the 
"  seceding  States  "  by  the  Government,  from  The  fareweii 
whose  jurisdiction  they  now  declared  them-  S^southem 
selves  withdrawn,  but  nothing  of  the  kind  Senators- 
was  offered.  When  reference  was  made  to  the  tyranny 
of  the  Government  at  all,  it  was  tyranny  anticipated, 
not  tyranny  actually  existing.  To  that  moment  all  the 
departments  of  the  Government  had  accorded  everything 
which  the  slaveholders  had  demanded  for  the  security 
of  their  peculiar  institution.  It  was  impossible  for 
them  to  accuse  it  of  tyranny  in  regard  to  any  of  its 
measures  whatever.  These  Senators  were,  therefore, 
reduced  to  the  necessity  of  proclaiming,  as  their  only 
grievance  against  the  Government,  the  prospect  that  af 
ter  the  4th  of  the  following  March,  the  President  and  a 
majority  of  the  House  of  Representatives  in  Congress 
would  belong  to  a  party  which  had  declared  that  it  would 
resist  by  all  lawful  means  the  further  spread  of  slavery, 
because  it  thought  that  slavery  was  wrong. 

In  default  of  any  actual  grievances  against  the  Gov 
ernment  of  the  United  States,  these  men  were  obliged 
to  seek  some  elsewhere.  They  arraigned  the  Legislat 
ures  of  the  Northern  Commonwealths  for  their  per 
sonal  liberty  laws  in  defiance  of  the  fugitive  slave  pro 
vision  of  the  Constitution,  and  the  Fugitive  Slave  Act 
of  Congress,  and  at  last  they  presented  as  their  oppressor 
the  anti-slavery  spirit  of  the  North.  Against  this  some 
of  them  were  exceedingly  bitter. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  personal  liberty  laws  of 
some  of  the  Northern  Commonwealths,  while  intended 
only,  in  most  cases,  to  protect  their  own  col 
ored  citizens  against  kidnapping,  did  come  iiberty"rs?aws 
into  conflict  with  the  Fugitive  Slave  Act  of  intbe* 
Congress  ;  but  the  remedy  for  that  in  our  system  was  a 
VOL.  I.— 8 


114  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

decision  of  the  United  States  Courts  against  the  validity 
of  such  laws,  and  the  execution  of  the  Fugitive  Slave 
law  by  the  United  States  Government.  In  fact  that 
remedy  had  been  applied,  as  we  have  seen,  even  to  the 
extent  of  employing  the  military  power  in  the  enforce 
ment  of  that  law,  and  nobody  had  spoken  of  this  as  the 
coercion  of  a  "  sovereign  State."  The  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States  had  decided  eighteen  years  before, 
as  we  have  seen,  that  the  sole  responsibility  for  exe 
cuting  the  fugitive  slave  clause  in  the  Constitution 
rested  upon  the  United  States  Government,  upon  Con 
gress  to  provide  the  means  and  measures,  and  upon  the 
President  and  the  courts  to  enforce  them.  Even  though, 
therefore,  these  personal  liberty  laws  of  some  of  the 
Northern  Commonwealths  did  come  into  conflict  with 
the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United  States,  they 
could  be  regarded  as  violations  of  the  "Compact"  in 
no  other  sense  than  any  other  Commonwealth  law 
which  might  be  declared  to  be  in  this  situation,  and 
they  required  no  other  remedy  ;  while  as  to  the  griev 
ances  against  the  anti-slavery  spirit  of  the  North,  we 
can  only  say,  as  Lincoln  said  two  years  before  this  re 
markable  episode  took  place  in  the  Senate  chamber,  that 
they  meant  that  the  secessionists  would  not  be  satisfied, 
except  upon  the  condition  that  the  people  of  the  North 
should  think  and  feel  and  express  themselves  upon  the 
subject  of  slavery  as  they  themselves  did.  Congress 
and  the  President  and  the  Courts  had  interpreted  their 
rights  under  the  "Compact"  as  they  themselves  had 
dictated.  But  this  was  not  enough.  The  conscience  of 
the  North  must  be  forced,  so  as  to  make  it  certain  that 
the  departments  of  the  Government  never  would  in 
terpret  and  execute  the  "  Compact "  in  any  other  way. 
It  is  simply  marvellous  that  the  unnaturalness,  the  ab 
surdity,  and  the  monstrous  character  of  such  a  demand 


SECESSION  115 

did  not  appear  to  the  minds  of  these  able  men  of  the 
South.  If  any  of  them  saw  it  in  the  faintest  degree  in 
its  true  light,  they  did  not  give  the  slightest  evidence 
of  it.  They  all  spoke  with  an  air  of  sincerity,  boldness, 
and  patronizing  condescension,  which  is  produced  by  a 
consciousness  of  right  and  of  power,  mingled  with  an 
imperious  disposition.  Not  one  of  them  manifested  the 
faintest  suspicion  that  their  project  could  fail.  Not  one 
of  them  had  any  adequate  appreciation  of  the  energy  and 
determination  which  would  be  roused  in  the  North  in 
behalf  of  the  Union  by  the  attempt  to  destroy  it.  Sen 
ator  Iverson,  of  Georgia,  seemed  to  think  that  the  North 
would  be  paralyzed  by  his  declaration  that  it  would  cost 
the  North  one  hundred  thousand  men  and  one  hundred 
millions  of  dollars  to  make  conquest  of  the  South. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Republicans  were  so  honest  in 
their  assurances  that  they  meant  to  obey  the  Constitu 
tion  to  the  letter  in  regard  to  slavery  as  in  The  seces- 
regard  to  everything  else,  that  they  could 
not  believe  the  secessionists  were  sincere  in 
their  imputation  of  abolition  purposes  to  cans- 
them,  to  be  effected  by  any  and  every  means.  And  they 
were  incredulous  in  regard  to  the  threats  of  breaking  up 
the  Union  on  such  flimsy  pretexts.  Mr.  Slide!!  said  that, 
if  the  South  should  remain  in  the  Union  after  the  in 
auguration  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  the  slaves  would  revolt  in 
many  parts  of  the  South  against  their  masters  and  cause 
bloodshed.  He  said  they  had  been  taught  that  Lincoln's 
Administration  would  lend  them  the  hand  in  such  work. 
The  reply  of  the  Republicans  to  this  was  that  nobody 
but  their  own  masters  had  taught  them  to  expect  such 
things  from  the  incoming  Republican  Administration, 
and  for  that  the  Republicans  could  not  be  held  respon 
sible,  especially  when  they  had  constantly  disavowed 
any  such  purposes  and  had  incorporated  in  their  plat- 


116  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

form  of  1860  a  most  scathing  denunciation  of  the  John 
Brown  raid. 

In  fact  it  seemed  that  Mr.  Rhett  correctly  represented 
the  feelings  of  the  secessionists  when  he  affirmed  that  the 
secession  movement  had  been  in  preparation  for  thirty 
years,  and  had  at  last  only  culminated  on  the  occasion 
of  the  election  of  Lincoln  to  the  presidency. 

On  the  day  that  the  Louisiana  Senators  made  their 
adieus  to  the  Senate,  February  4th,  the  first  step  was 
The  forma-  taken  in  the  formation  of  the  Southern 
southemcon6  Confederacy.  The  conventions  in  the  six 
federacy.  «  States,"  which  had  passed  the  secession  or 
dinance,  had  also  elected  delegates  to  meet  in  a  general 
convention  at  Montgomery,  Alabama,  on  the  4th  of 
February  following,  for  the  purpose  of  forming  a  con 
federation  of  these  "  States,"  establishing  a  provisional 
government  for  the  confederation,  and  electing  a  pro 
visional  executive. 

The  Republican  and  Abolitionist  historians  have  in 
dulged  in  certain  criticisms  upon  the  forms  and  meth 
ods  employed  by  the  secessionists  in  passing  the  seces 
sion  ordinances  and  creating  the  new  confederacy,  The 
gist  of  these  criticisms  is  that  these  things  were  done  by 
"  State  "  conventions  instead  of  by  the  direct  act  of  the 
people,  as  our  system  of  democracy  would  have  required. 
The  criticism  is  not,  however,  well  founded.  The  Con 
stitution  of  the  United  States  was  framed  by  delegates 
elected  either  by  "  State  "  Legislatures  or  by  conventions 
within  the  "  States,"  and  ratified  by  conventions  within 
the  "States"  ;  and  its  provision  for  future  amendment 
speaks  only  of  Congress,  " State"  Legislatures,  and  con 
ventions  within  the  "  States,"  as  the  bodies  for  effecting 
changes  in  the  organic  law.  The  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  knows  nothing  of  a  direct  appeal  to  the 
people  in  any  of  these  cases.  The  secessionists,  there- 


SECESSION  117 

fore,  followed  onr  constitutional  precedents  in  passing 
their  secession  ordinances  and  establishing  their  new 
Confederacy  by  means  of  conventions  in  their  "  States." 
They  argued  that,  as  they  had  confided  powers  to  the 
United  States  Government  by  the  acts  of  conventions 
within  the  several  "States,"  they  could  withdraw  them 
in  the  same  manner — yea,  that  they  must  so  withdraw 
them,  if  they  withdrew  them  at  all ;  and  that,  as  they 
had  withdrawn  themselves  from  the  old  Confederation  of 
1781  to  form  the  Union  of  1787,  by  the  acts  of  conven 
tions  within  the  respective  "States,"  they  could  with 
draw  themselves  from  the  Union  of  1787  in  the  same 
manner — yea,  must  so  withdraw  themselves,  if  they 
withdrew  at  all.  The  demands  of  their  critics  that  these 
movements  should  have  been  submitted  to  the  direct 
suffrages  of  the  people  are  thus  seen  to  be  based,  not 
upon  the  precedents  and  analogies  of  our  constitutional 
law  and  practice,  but  upon  the  theories  of  an  advanced 
democracy.  If  the  secessionists  had  any  right  to  do 
what  they  did  do,  the  manner  in  which  they  accom 
plished  it  cannot  be  successfully  assailed. 

The  first  problem  with  which  the  delegates  from  these 
<(  State "  conventions  had  to  wrestle  was,  of  course, 
confederation.  It  required,  however,  only  The  pr0vi- 
three  days  to  solve  this  problem.  On  the  g^  S>nsu- 
8th  day 'of  the  month  (February)  they  or-  confederacy, 
dained  and  declared  the  union  of  the  six  "States" 
represented  in  the  convention  under  a  provisional  con 
stitution,  which  was  to  continue  in  force  for  one  year, 
unless  a  permanent  constitution  should  take  its  place 
before  the  expiration  of  that  period.  This  provisional 
constitution  was,  in  substance,  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  altered  in  a  few  points  to  fit  the  condi 
tions  of  a  provisory  organization,  to  make  express  those 
particular  interpretations  which  the  secessionists  had 


118  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

put  upon  the  old  instrument,  and  to  add  such  improve 
ments  as  the  experiences  of  these  men  under  the  work 
ing  of  the  old  system  had  suggested  to  them. 

They  naturally  declared  in  the  preamble  that  the 
provisory  constitution  was  formed  by  delegates  from 
sovereign  and  independent  "  States "  ;  and  they  con 
sistently  changed  the  language  of  the  provision  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  in  regard  to  the  tax 
ing  powers  of  the  Government  so  as  to  prohibit  the  en 
actment  of  a  protective  tariff,  and  also  the  language  of 
the  provision  concerning  the  rendition  of  fugitive  slaves 
so  as  to  impose  that  duty  upon  the  Governor  of  the 
" State"  in  which  the  fugitive  should  be  found. 

The  reasons  for  these  changes  and  modifications  lie  on 
the  surface,  and  need  no  further  examination.  We  find, 
however,  in  Section  7  of  Article  I.  of  this  provisory  in 
strument  some  divergencies  from  the  provisions  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  upon  the  same  sub 
ject,  for  which  the  reasons  are  not  apparent.  This  sec 
tion  of  the  constitution  of  the  new  Confederacy  provides 
that,  ' '  the  importation  of  African  negroes  from  any 
foreign  country,  other  than  the  slaveholding  States 
of  the  United  States,  is  hereby  forbidden  "  .  .  .  and 
"  that  Congress  shall  have  power  to  prohibit  the  intro 
duction  of  slaves  from  any  State  not  a  member  of  this 
Confederacy." 

Apparently,  the  charge  freely  indulged  in  at  the 
North,  that  the  "cotton  States"  were  planning  and  in 
triguing  to  reopen  the  African  slave-trade,  was  here  fully 
and  completely  refuted.  These  provisions  can,  however, 
be  interpreted  in  another  way,  a  less  generous  way  in 
deed,  but  perhaps  more  in  accordance  with  the  intentions 
of  their  framers — that  is,  as  an  inducement  to  the  other 
slaveholding  "States,"  which  furnished  the  "cotton 
States  "  with  slaves,  especially  to  Maryland  and  Virginia, 


SECESSION  119 

to  join  the  Confederacy  which  the  "  cotton  States"  were 
forming.  The  provisions  were  drawn,  whether  con 
sciously  or  not,  with  most  subtile  adaptability  to  the 
production  of  that  result.  Here  was  a  constitutional  pro 
vision  protecting  the  great  profits  of  the  slave-producing 
"  States"  in  the  domestic  slave-trade  against  foreign 
competition,  coupled  with  a  provision  giving  the  new 
Confederate  Congress  the  power  to  destroy  these  profits 
altogether  if  these  " States"  should  not  enter  the  Con 
federacy.  Once  within  the  Confederacy,  and  the  inde 
pendence  of  the  Confederacy  won,  that  clause  in  the 
Confederate  constitution  prohibiting  the  foreign  slave- 
trade  might  be  repealed.  Was  this  one  of  the  reasons 
for  making  the  process  of  amendment  easier  in  the  Con 
federate  constitution  than  it  was  in  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States  ?  One  would  think  that  the  "  State 
sovereignty  "  principle  would  have  required  it  to  be  made 
much  more  difficult. 

On  account  of  the  necessity  for  speedy  action,  the  con 
vention  made  itself  the  legislative  body  of  the  provi 
sional  government,  and  conferred  upon  itself  The  election 
in  this  capacity  the  power  to  elect  the  pro-  SenVo^lSe 
visional  President  and  Vice-President.  There  and'the  orjS 
was  not  much  question  in  the  provisional  confederate 
Congress  as  to  who  should  be  the  President.  Government. 
Mr.  Davis  stood  head  and  shoulders  above  all  the  others. 
Besides  being  the  prime  representative  of  the  doctrine 
of  "  State  sovereignty,"  and  the  clearest  mind  among 
them,  he  had  had  the  most  varied  experience  in  public 
life.  He,  as  we  know,  had  been  soldier,  legislator,  and 
high  executive  officer.  No  one  else  was  seriously  con 
sidered  except  Mr.  Toombs ;  and  he,  though  a  very  brill 
iant  man,  was  thought  of  more  on  account  of  the  claims 
of  his  "  State,"  as  the  "  Empire  State  "  of  the  Confeder 
acy,  than  because  of  his  own  fitness  for  office.  Of  the 


120  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

two,  Mr.  Davis  was  far  the  calmer,  more  conservative, 
more  prudent  and  judicious.  The  choice  was  the  best 
that  could  have  been  made,  although  the  downfall  of  the 
Confederacy  under  his  leadership  has  made  many  South 
erners  feel  that  it  was  a  mistake.  The  historian  knows, 
however,  that,  in  the  great  plan  of  history,  there  was 
not  the  slightest  chance  for  the  success  of  secession  in 
these  United  States,  and  sees,  from  the  point  of  view  of 
the  world's  history,  that  Mr.  Davis  might  have  done  bet 
ter,  if  only  he  had  not  done  so  well. 

Mr.  Davis  denied  ever  having  made  any  effort  to  se 
cure  the  presidency,  or  ever  having  entertained  any  de 
sire  for  it.  He  declared  that  he  preferred  the  military 
office,  which  had  already  been  conferred  upon  him  by 
Mississippi,  that  of  commanding  general  of  her  army. 
He  took  no  part  in  the  convention  at  Montgomery, 
and  was  at  "  Briarfield,"  his  plantation  home,  when 
he  was  elected  President.  He,  however,  accepted 
promptly  the  great  burden,  and  started  almost  imme 
diately  for  Montgomery  to  assume  the  functions  of 
the  office. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  selection  made  for  the  vice- 
presidency  was  more  deserving  of  criticism.  The  chances 
The  vice-  ^or  *ne  succession  of  the  Vice-President  to 
President.  the  first  office  by  an  accidental  termination 
of  the  life  of  the  President,  or  by  his  capture  in  war,  were 
much  greater  than  the  average  of  chances  in  such  cases. 
The  Vice-President  ought,  therefore,  to  have  been  a  man 
of  the  same  character,  equipment,  and  experience  as  the 
President.  Mr.  Alexander  H.  Stephens,  of  Georgia, 
the  man  finally  selected,  was  far  from  this.  Physically 
he  was  weak,  and  appeared  insignificant.  He  was  also 
inclined  to  pedantry  in  his  knowledge,  and,  therefore, 
little  fitted  for  executive  office.  Moreover,  he  was  an 
old-line  Whig,  and  altogether  half-hearted  in  his  seces- 


SECESSION  121 

sionism.  He  had  to  prod  himself  continually  to  keep  his 
courage  up.  The  reasons  for  his  selection  were  almost 
purely  political.  They  were  to  attach  the  old  Whigs  to 
the  secession  movement,  and  to  satisfy  the  claims  of 
Georgia  for  office. 

The  selection  of  the  members  of  the  Cabinet  was  also 
governed  too  largely  by  political  considerations.     One 
portfolio  was  given  to  each  "  State  "  forming 
the  Confederacy,  except  Mississippi,  which  confederate 

,    ,,  r -,  .  Cabinet. 

had  the  presidency,  and  one  was  given  to 
Texas,  whose  convention  had  passed  the  secession  ordi 
nance  on  the  1st  of  February,  but  on  account  of  the 
irregular  method  of  its  assembly,  and  for  other  less  hon 
orable  reasons,  had  submitted  the  ordinance  to  the  peo 
ple,  who  had  not  yet  voted  upon  it. 

In  anticipation  of  the  popular  ratification  of  the 
ordinance,  the  Texas  convention  had  voted  to  join  the 
Confederacy,  and  had  elected  delegates  to  xag  .oing 
the  Confederate  convention-congress.  Texas  the  confed- 
was,  therefore,  virtually  a  member  of  the 
Southern  Confederacy,  while  her  Representatives  and 
Senators  were  still  in  Congress  at  Washington,  doing 
what  they  could  to  embarrass  the  Government  of  the 
United  States,  and  revealing  to  the  Confederate  Gov 
ernment  at  Montgomery  everything  taking  place  at 
Washington.  The  way  in  which  the  Texan  secession 
ists  proceeded  was  most  dishonorable  and  reprehensible. 
They  insulted,  threatened,  and  bullied  their  grand  old 
Governor,  Sam  Houston,  the  father  of  their  country, 
and  when  he  would  not  yield  to  their  demand  to  call 
the  Legislature  together  in  extra  session,  they  called  it 
themselves,  without  any  regard  to  the  provision  of  the 
constitution  of  the  Commonwealth  vesting  that  power 
solely  in  the  Governor.  After  having  in  this  irregular 
manner  assembled  the  Legislature,  and  then,  through  it, 


122  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

the  convention,,  they  referred  the  secession  ordinance, 
passed  by  the  convention,  to  the  voters,  but,  as  we  have 
seen,  resolved  in  the  convention  to  join  the  Southern 
Confederacy,  and  elected  in  the  convention  delegates  to 
the  Confederate  convention-congress.  Finally,  after  the 
voters  had  ratified  the  ordinance,  the  Senators  and  Rep 
resentatives  from  the  Commonwealth  at  Washington 
still  remained  in  their  places,  until  the  convention  at 
Austin  could  pass  the  formal  act  declaring  the  "State" 
out  of  the  Union.  A  period  of  one  month  and  four  days 
thus  elapsed  between  the  first  passage  of  the  secession 
ordinance  and  the  final  act  of  the  convention,  during  a 
part  of  which  period  the  "  State  "  of  Texas  was  repre 
sented  both  at  Washington  and  Montgomery,  and  in 
both  places  by  secessionists,  those  at  Washington  keep 
ing  those  at  Montgomery  fully  informed  of  what  any 
honorable  man  would  have  regarded  himself  bound  by 
his  solemn  oath,  as  a  member  of  the  National  Legis 
lature,  to  have  kept  sacredly  locked  in  his  own  bosom 
against  the  enemies  of  the  United  States. 

But  to  return  to  the  composition  of  the  first  Confed 
erate  Cabinet.     The  principle  of  selection,  as  we  have 
The  compo-  seen,  was  to  give  each  "  State  "  one  place,  and 
cSfiiSt  X  tlien  let  tlie  delegates  from  the  "  State"  in 
sumed.  the  convention-congress  designate  the  man. 

The  first  Cabinet  composed  in  this  manner  consisted  of 
Mr.  Toombs  of  Georgia,  Secretary  of  State  ;  Mr.  Walker 
of  Alabama,  Secretary  of  War ;  Mr.  Memminger  of 
South  Carolina,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  ;  Mr.  Mallory 
of  Florida,  Secretary  of  the  Navy ;  Mr.  Benjamin  of 
Louisiana,  Attorney-General,  and  Mr.  Reagan  of  Texas, 
Postmaster-GeneraL  Of  these  only  two  were  men  of 
great  ability,  Toombs  and  Benjamin,  and  both  of  these 
had  grave  faults.  Toombs  was  too  impulsive  and  Ben 
jamin  was  too  much  given  to  intrigue. 


SECESSION  123 

On  the  18th  day  of  February,  Mr.  Davis  was  inaugu 
rated  and  the  machinery  of  the  new  Government  put 
into  operation.  The  inaugural  address  was  Theinau  u 
short,  and  hardly  equal  to  the  average  efforts  ration  of  Preu- 

.  T  .  ideut  Davis. 

of  its  author.  It  contained  no  statement 
of  grievances,  but  it  pronounced  the  doctrine  that  the 
secession  movement  was  an  illustration  of  "the  Ameri 
can  idea  that  governments  rest  on  the  consent  of  the 
governed,  and  that  it  is  the  right  of  the  people  to  alter 
or  abolish  them  at  will  whenever  they  become  destruc 
tive  of  the  ends  for  which  they  were  established."  He 
claimed  that  the  "seceding  States"  had  merely  asserted 
the  right  which  the  Declaration  of  Independence 
defined  as  inalienable,  and  that  each  of  them,  as 
sovereign,  was  the  final  judge  for  itself  of  the  time  and 
the  occasion  for  the  exercise  of  this  right.  He  drew 
from  these  premises  the  conclusion  that  the  act  of 
secession  was  not  revolutionary,  but  that  the  "  States" 
forming  the  new  Confederacy  had  simply  changed  "the 
agent  through  which  they  communicated  with  foreign 
nations,"  and  that  if  the  United  States  should  still  un 
dertake  to  assert  jurisdiction  over  the  "seceded  States" 
the  act  would  be  offensive  war.  He  expressed  the  hope, 
but  not  the  expectation,  that  they  would  be  allowed  to 
go  in  peace.  He  evidently  looked  for  war,  and  recom 
mended  the  creation  of  a  regular  army  and  navy  of  the 
Confederacy,  and  hinted  at  the  advantages  which  the 
legalization  of  privateering  might  produce.  At  this 
day,  the  address  impresses  one  as  being  weak  and  totally 
fallacious,  as  containing  a  theory  of  government  little 
removed  from  anarchy,  and  a  doctrine  in  reference  to 
the  offensive  and  defensive  entirely  reversed  from  truth 
and  fact. 

While  these  movements  were  in  progress  at  Mont 
gomery,  the  Union-savers  were  exerting  themselves  at 


124  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

Washington   both  within  and  without   Congress,,   and 
the  Union-destroyers  were  at  work  in  the  other  slave- 
holding  Commonwealths,   those   not  vet  in 

Cent  i  n  u  a  -  J 

tion  of  the  ef-  the  new  Confederacy,  upon  their  counter- 
forte  to  save      , 
the  Union    at    plan. 

On  the  self-same  day  that  the  Confederate 
convention  met  at  Montgomery,,  a  Union  Peace  confer 
ence  assembled  at  Washington  in  answer  to  a  call  issued 
by  the  Virginia  Legislature  on  the  19th  of  January  pre 
ceding.  All  the  non-slaveholding  Commonwealths,  ex 
cept  Michigan,  Wisconsin,  Minnesota,  California,  and 
Oregon,  and  all  of  the  slaveholding  Commonwealths 
which  had  not  passed  secession  ordinances,  except  Ar 
kansas  and  Texas,  were  represented.  That  is,  thirteen 
non-slaveholding,  and  seven  slaveholding,  Common 
wealths  participated  in  the  conference^  The  delegates 
chosen  by  the  Legislatures  or  Governors  of  these  respec 
tive  Commonwealths  were  all  men  of  the  highest  charac 
ter,  and  of  great  influence  in  all  conservative  circles. 
Such  men  as  Fessenden  and  Morrill  of  Maine,  Chitten- 
den  and  Harris  of  Vermont,  Forbes,  Crowninshield, 
Boutwell,  and  Allen  of  Massachusetts,  Hoppin  and  Ar 
nold  of  Rhode  Island,  Baldwin  and  Battelle  of  Connect 
icut,  Dudley  Field,  Curtis  Noyes,  Wadsworth,  Corning, 
Dodge,  King,  and  Wool  of  New  York,  Stockton,  Fre- 
linghuysen,  and  Price  of  New  Jersey,  Wilmot  and 
Franklin  of  Pennsylvania,  Chase,  Groesbeck,  and  Ewing 
of  Ohio,  Smith  and  Orth  of  Indiana,  Palmer  and  Stephen 
Logan  of  Illinois,  Harlan  and  Grimes  of  Iowa,  Rodney 
of  Delaware,  Howard  and  Reverdy  Johnson  of  Maryland, 
ex-President  Tyler,  Rives,  and  Seddon  of  Virginia,  Ruf- 
fin  of  North  Carolina,  Caruthers  and  Zollicoffer  of  Tenn 
essee,  Clay  and  Guthrie  of  Kentucky,  and  Doniphan  of 
Missouri,  were  sent  upon  this  great  mission  of  pacifica 
tion.  Certainly  if  there  were  not  intellect  and  character 


SECESSION  125 

enough  in  such  an  assembly  to  effect  a  compromise  of 
interests  between  the  warring  sections  of  the  country, 
and  invent  a  modus  vivendi,  it  was  to  be  feared  that  the 
Nation  did  not  possess  them. 

This  body,  under  the  chairmanship  of  the  venerable 
ex-President  of  the  United  States,  John  Tyler  of  Vir 
ginia,  wrestled  with  the  mighty  problem,  be-  ThePeace 
fore  it  from  the  4th  to  the  27th  of  February.  Convention 

„       J      and  its  work. 

They  were  able  to  agree  upon  a  series  of  rec 
ommendations,  which  were  offered  to  the  two  Houses  of 
Congress  on  the  first  and  second  days  of  March. 

These  recommendations  provided  :  that  slavery  should 
be  prohibited  in  all  the  existing  territory  of  the  United 
States  lying  above  the  latitude  of  thirty-six  degrees  and 
thirty  minutes  ;  that  the  existing  slave  status  in  the  ter 
ritory  south  of  that  line  should  not  be  changed  ;  that 
neither  Congress  nor  a  Territorial  Legislature  should 
forbid  or  hinder  the  taking  of  slaves  from  any  State  into 
the  existing  territory  of  the  Union  south  of  the  latitude 
thirty-six  degrees  and  thirty  minutes ;  that  neither 
Congress  nor  a  Territorial  Legislature  should  pass  any 
law  impairing  the  rights  arising  from  the  relation  of 
master  and  slave,  but  that  the  same  should  be  subject  to 
judicial  cognizance  in  the  courts  of  the  United  States, 
according  to  the  course  of  the  common  law ;  and  that 
any  Territory,  north  or  south  of  said  line,  should,  when 
its  population  equalled  that  required  for  a  Congressional 
district  within  the  "  States/'  be  admitted  into  the  Union 
as  a  "  State,"  with  or  without  slavery,  as  its  constitution 
might  provide,  on  an  equality  with  the  original  "  States": 

That  treaties  by  which  territory  should  be  annexed  to 
the  United  States,  except  for  naval  stations  and  depots, 
or  transit  routes,  must,  to  be  valid,  be  ratified  by  a  two- 
thirds  vote  of  the  Senate,  and  that  this  two-thirds  vote 
must  contain  the  votes  of  a  majority  of  the  Senators  from 


126  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

the  slaveholding  "States,"  and  also  of  a  majority  of 
those  from  the  non-slaveholding  "States"  : 

That  Congress  should  have  no  power  to  legislate  in 
regard  to  slavery  in  the  "  States,"  nor  in  those  places 
subject  to  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States, 
but  lying  within  the  boundaries  of  slaveholding  "  States," 
nor  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  without  the  consent  of 
Maryland  and  the  owners  of  the  slaves  within  the  Dis 
trict,  and  the  payment  of  damages  to  the  non-consenting 
owners  ;  that  Congress  should  have  no  power  to  prevent 
masters  from  bringing  their  slaves  into  the  District,  re 
taining  them  while  there,  and  taking  them  away  again ; 
that  Congress  should  have  no  power  to  prohibit  the  slave- 
trade  between  "  States "  and  Territories  recognizing 
slavery,  nor,  in  case  the  traffic  should  be  by  water,  pre 
vent  touching  at  points  in  non-slaveholding  "States" 
and  Territories;  and  that  Congress  should  have  no 
power  to  impose  a  higher  tax  on  slaves  than  on  land  : 

That  the  States  should  have  the  power  to  return, 
through  the  operation  of  their  own  governmental  instru 
mentalities,  fugitives  from  labor  to  the  persons  to  whom 
the  labor  was  due ;  and  that  Congress  should  pass  effi 
cient  laws  for  carrying  out  faithfully  the  constitutional 
prohibition  on  the  foreign  slave-trade. 

The  conference  recommended  that  all  of  these  pro 
posed  provisions  should  be  made  amendments  to  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States,  and  should  be  irre- 
pealable  and  unchangeable,  except  with  the  consent  of 
every  ee  State  "  in  the  Union.  The  conference  also  rec 
ommended  that  the  existing  provisions  of  the  Constitu 
tion  in  respect  to  fugitives  from  service  or  labor  and  in 
respect  to  the  counting  of  slaves  in  the  apportionment 
of  Congressional  representation  and  presidential  electors 
should  be  made  irrepealable  and  unamendable,  except 
with  the  consent  of  every  "  State." 


SECESSION  127 

The  conference  recommended,  finally,  that  the  Consti 
tution  should  be  so  amended  as  to  require  Congress  to 
provide  for  payment  out  of  the  Treasury  of  the  United 
States  for  escaped  slaves  whose  rendition  should  be  pre 
vented  by  mobs  or  riotous  assemblages,  and  to  provide  by 
law  for  securing  to  the  "  citizens  of  each  State  the  priv 
ileges  and  immunities  of  citizens  in  the  several  States." 

During  the  first  sittings  of  this  conference  its  mem 
bership  had  been  increased  by  representatives  from  the 
new  non-slaveholding  Commonwealth  of  Kansas,  the  act 
for  the  admission  of  which  was  signed  by  the  President 
on  the  29th  of  January  preceding  the  assembly  of  the 
conference.  This  made  fourteen  non-slaveholding  Com 
monwealths  that  were  represented  in  this  body  to  seven 
slaveholding  Commonwealths.  The  majority  of  the 
non-slaveholding  Commonwealths  voted  in  the  confer 
ence  against  all  of  these  recommendations,  except  only 
those  relating  to  the  prohibition  of  the  foreign  slave- 
trade  and  to  the  payment  by  the  Government  for  slaves 
whose  rendition  had  been  prevented  by  the  action  of 
mobs  or  riotous  assemblages.  Delaware,  Maryland,  Ken 
tucky,  and  Tennessee  voted  for  all  of  them.  North 
Carolina  voted  against  most  of  them.  Missouri  re 
frained  from  voting  on  about  half  of  them.  And  Vir 
ginia  finally  declared  her  dissatisfaction  with  the  series 
as  a  whole,  on  the  ground  that  it  did  not  offer  a  sufficient 
guarantee  for  all  of  her  rights. 

On  the  27th  of  February  the  resolutions  of  the  con 
ference  were  laid  before  the  Senate  by  the  Vice-Presi- 
dent,  Mr.  Breckenridge.  The  Senate  imme- 
diately  referred  them  to  a  committee  of  five 
persons,  Mr.  Crittenden,  Mr.  Bigler,  Mr.  the  Senate. 
Thomson,  Mr.  Seward,  and  Mr.  Trumbull,  with  instruc 
tions  to  report  on  the  next  morning.  On  the  28th,  Mr. 
Crittenden  reported  to  the  Senate  from  the  majority  of 


128  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

this  committee  a  resolution  that  the  propositions  of  the 
Peace  conference  should  be  recommended  by  Congress 
to  conventions  in  the  several  t s  States  "  for  ratification 
as  amendments  to  the  Constitution.  Mr.  Seward  and 
Mr.  Trumbull  offered  an  independent  resolution  that 
Congress  invite  the  "States"  to  apply  for  the  calling  of 
a  constitutional  convention  of  the  United  States  for  the 
initiation  of  such  amendments  to  the  Constitution  as 
would  meet  the  existing  emergencies.  The  resolution 
from  the  majority  was  made  a  special  order  for  the  next 
day,  and  when  it  was  brought  up  Senator  Douglas  asked 
that  the  resolutions  from  the  House  of  Representatives 
relative  to  amending  the  Constitution,  just  received  in 
the  Senate,  should  be  considered  along  with  it.  These 
resolutions  from  the  House  of  Representatives  were  the 
propositions  of  the  committee  of  thirty-three  of  that 
body,  already  recited,  which,  with  the  exception  of  the 
one  in  reference  to  the  immediate  admission  of  New 
Mexico  as  a  "  State,"  and  the  one  in  reference  to  the 
rendition  of  fugitives  from  justice,  the  House  had,  with 
little  change,  adopted,  on  the  27th  and  28th  of  Febru 
ary.  The  Senate  allowed  the  House  resolutions  to  be 
read,  but  laid  them  aside  for  the  moment  in  order  to 
give  its  whole  attention  to  the  propositions  of  the  Peace 
conference  and  the  resolution  of  its  own  committee  in 
reference  thereto.  Whereupon  Senator  Hunter,  of  Vir 
ginia,  immediately  announced  that  he  was  not  satisfied 
with  these  propositions  and  moved  to  substitute  Mr. 
Crittenden's  own  series  of  resolutions,  still  on  the  calen 
dar  of  the  Senate,  for  them.  Mr.  Hunter's  colleague, 
Mr.  Mason,  sustained  Mr.  Hunter  in  the  assertion  that 
the  propositions  of  the  Peace  conference  would  not  be 
satisfactory  to  Virginia.  With  this  it  became  entirely 
manifest  that  their  adoption  by  the  Senate  would  be 
useless. 


SECESSION  129 

While,  thus,  it  may  probably  be  truthfully  charged 
that  Virginia  rendered  the  work  of  the  Peace  conference 
nugatory,  and  blocked  the  work  of  pacifica- 

J  .  Failure    of 

tion  upon  that  line,  and  while  the  motives  the 

' 


n  .     •  -IT          t>  -i    •  tions    of    the 

in  the  minds  of  her  leaders  for  so  doing  may  peace  confer 
have  been  reprehensible,  still  the  historians 
and  publicists  of  this  day  are  not  disposed  to  find  much 
fault  with  the  result.  The  propositions  of  the  Peace 
conference  ought  to  have  failed,  because  they  meant,  in 
the  first  place,  the  perpetuation  of  slavery  as  a  perma 
nent  institution  of  the  country,  while  the  civilization  of 
the  world  was  and  is  working  toward  the  liberation  of 
all  mankind  ;  because  they  meant,  in  the  second  place, 
the  prevention  of  the  nationalization  of  our  people  by 
confederatizing  our  political  system,  while  the  civili 
zation  of  the  world  was  and  is  making  for  the  develop 
ment  of  national  states  ;  and  because  they  meant,  lastly, 
the  destruction  of  political  and  moral  progress  upon 
many  most  important  subjects,  by  withdrawing  these 
subjects  from  a  possible  method  of  constitutional  amend 
ment,  while  political  science  demands  that  the  real 
sovereign  power  in  any  political  system  shall  be  able 
to  change  the  constitution,  through  regular  forms  of 
amendment,  upon  every  subject.  In  a  word,  they  would 
have  turned  back  the  clock  of  the  world's  civilization  an 
entire  century.  They  undertook  to  arrest  the  plans  of 
Providence  in  the  evolution  of  the  world's  history. 

After  the  attitude  of  the  Virginia  Senators  had  caused 
the  Senate  to  lay  aside  the  propositions  of  the  Peace 
conference,  Mr.  Douglas  succeeded  in  induc 
ing;  the  body  to  take  up  the  resolutions  trans-  tempts  in  the 

P.     ,   „  ,  -,       TT  n        T        i     j!  mi        Senate  to  save 

mitted  from  the  House  the  day  before.     The  the  union  by 
chief  one  of  these  was  the  proposed  constitu 
tional  amendment  which  provided  that  no  future  amend 
ment  to  the  Constitution  should  ever  give  Congress  the 
VOL.  I.-9 


130  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

power  to  abolish,  or  interfere  with,  slavery  within  the 
"  States."  This  was  the  form  which  the  recommenda 
tion  of  the  committee  of  thirty-three,  that  110  future 
amendment  touching  slavery  should  be  initiated  except 
by  a  slave  (( State  "  or  considered  as  ratified  without  the 
approval  of  every  "  State,"  had  taken  on  in  its  passage 
through  the  House.  It  was  now  the  3d  of  March,  and 
it  seemed  that  the  adoption  of  these  House  resolutions 
by  the  Senate  was  the  only  thing  that  Congress  could  do 
for  the  pacification  of  the  country.  It  was  well  known 
that  they  did  not  satisfy  the  South.  The  Senators  from 
the  "border  States"  declared  that  they  were  next  to 
nothing.  Mr.  Crittenden  almost  alone,  under  the  per 
suasions  of  Mr.  Douglas,  felt  that  they  might  exercise 
some  influence.  These  two  patriotic  men  held  the  Sen 
ate  together  through  the  long  hours  of  the  night  of  the 
3d  of  March,  and  into  the  morning  hours  of  the  4th,  in 
deliberation  over  the  House  resolutions,  and,  almost  at 
the  last  moment  of  the  existence  of  that  Congress,  se 
cured  their  adoption  by  the  Senate.  The  last  hours  of 
the  Senate  were  passed  in  the  attempt  to  pass  the  Crit 
tenden  resolutions  also.  This  failed,  as  well  as  the 
attempt  to  pass  the  proposition  of  the  Peace  conference 
in  the  House. 

What  was  offered  to  the  South  by  Congress  was  a 
proposition  to  disable  the  Nation  from  ever  putting  into 
the  hands  of  Congress  the  power  to  touch  slavery  within 
the  Commonwealths.  From  any  point  of  view  enough, 
and  from  the  point  of  view  of  sound  political  science 
altogether  too  much. 

However  careful  and  desirous  the  impartial  historian 
may  be  to  present  the  position  of  the  secessionists  in  its 
most  favorable  light,  and  however  anxious  he  may  be  to 
prevent  the  failure  of  their  cause  from  prejudicing  his 
views  of  their  motives  and  their  reasoning,  still  he  will 


SECESSION  131 

find  it  most  difficult  to  understand  why,  in  every  sound 
mind  to-day,  the  Republican  leaders  are  not  to  be  con 
sidered  as  having  offered  everything  that 

J.         ,&  Republican 

could  have  been  expected  from  wise,  honest,  attitude  tow- 
and  sincere  men  for  the  pacification  of  the  t [on  pa£um- 
country,  and,  from  the  point  of  view  of  a 
sound  political  science,  more  than  they  ought  to  have 
done.  They  always  expressed  themselves  as  ready  to 
vote  for  the  calling  of  a  national  convention  to  consider 
all  grievances  from  whatever  section  coming,  and  thus 
give  time  for  passion  and  excitement  to  cool  down,  and 
for  misapprehensions  to  be  corrected.  They  had  not 
yet  taken  the  government  of  the  Union  into  their  hands, 
and,  therefore,  they  had  done  nothing  to  justify  seces 
sion,  rebellion,  or  revolution,  and  they  wanted  to  be 
calmly  heard  as  to  what  they  proposed  to  do.  The 
secessionists,  however,  treated  this  proposition  as  a 
mere  subterfuge.  It  is  difficult  to  believe  that  they 
were  moved  to  reject  it  from  the  conviction  that  it 
was  a  subterfuge.  It  seems,  rather,  as  if  they  wanted 
to  escape  a  plain  statement  of  reasons  and  policies, 
which  the  whole  people  might  weigh  and  consider  be 
fore  choosing  the  course  which  would  lead  to  disunion 
and  war. 

Again,  the  Republican  leaders  were  ready  to  secure 
slavery  in  the  "  States  "  where  it  was  by  an  unchangeable 
amendment  to  the  Constitution,  and  they  voted  for  the 
proposed  amendment  providing  that  no  future  amend 
ment  to  the  Constitution  should  ever  be  made,  which 
would  empower  Congress  to  interfere  with  slavery  in 
the  "  States,"  and  voted  for  it  in  such  numbers  as  to 
adopt  it,  by  the  requisite  two-thirds  majority,  and  that, 
too,  after  the  Senators  and  Representatives  from  six 
of  the  Southern  "  States  "  had  withdrawn  from  their 
seats. 


132  THE   CIVIL   WAK 

Still  further,  when  the  Crittenden  resolutions  were 
before  the  Senate,  Mr.  Anthony,  speaking  for  the  Re 
publicans,  on  the  16th  of  January,  oifered  to  allow  New 
Mexico  to  be  organized  at  once  as  a  new  slaveholding 
"  State, "  if  the  people  of  the  Territory  should  so  will  it. 
This  Territory  covered  all  the  territory  of  the  United 
States  south  of  the  latitude  of  thirty-six  degrees  and 
thirty  minutes,  except  the  Indian  Territory,  and  its 
northern  boundary  ran  up  at  some  points  to  the  latitude 
of  thirty-eight  degrees  and  a  little  higher.  The  Terri 
tory  did  not  contain  a  population  sufficient,  under  the 
existing  law  of  apportionment,  to  send  one  member  to  the 
House  of  Representatives  in  Congress,  but  the  Repub 
licans  were  willing  to  waive  this  requirement.  The  Re 
publicans  thought  this  virtual  offer  of  New  Mexico  a  fair 
equivalent  for  the  Crittenden  measure  dividing  all  the 
existing  Territories  of  the  United  States  between  the 
North  and  the  South  by  the  line  of  thirty-six  degrees  and 
thirty  minutes.  They  preferred  this  form,  because  they 
thought  to  escape  thereby  the  reproach  of  having  helped 
to  extend  slavery  by  Congressional  legislation,  a  thing 
which  they  could  not  do  without  destroying  the  raison 
d'etre  of  their  party.  But  the  Crittenden  proposition 
was  not  acceptable  to  the  secessionists,  unless  amended, 
as  proposed  by  Mr.  Powell,  so  as  to  cover  all  territory 
then  possessed,  or  thereafter  to  be  acquired,  by  the 
United  States.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the  designs 
on  Cuba  and  Mexico,  with  slavery  or  without  it,  as  their 
inhabitants  might  decide,  this  did  not  appear  to  the  seces 
sionists  an  equivalent  to  the  Crittenden-Powell  proposi 
tion.  The  Republicans,  however,  considered  such  an 
incentive  to  foreign  conquest  as  that  contained  in  Mr. 
Powell's  amendment  to  be  highly  immoral,  as  it  cer 
tainly  was. 

Still   further,    the   Republican   leaders    in   Congress 


SECESSION  133 

agreed,  during  the  month  of  February,  to  the  organiza 
tion  of  the  Territories  of  Colorado,  Nevada,  and  Dakota 
without  any  provision  in  the  bills  excluding  slavery. 
These  three  Territories  covered  almost  all  of  the  terri 
tory  of  the  United  States  north  of  the  latitude  of  thirty- 
six  degrees  a7id  thirty  minutes.  They  were  therefore 
open  to  slaveholders  with  their  slaves,  if  they  chose  to 
go  into  any  of  them ;  and  the  United  States  Supreme 
Court  had,  in  its  Dred  Scott  opinion,  positively  declared 
the  right  of  the  slaveholders  to  go  with  their  slaves  into 
any  Territory  of  the  Union. 

Lastly,  the  Republican  leaders  acknowledged  the  peo 
ple  of  the  North  to  be  obligated  by  the  Constitution  to 
return,  or  pay  for,  every  fugitive  slave  that  came  into 
their  hands,  and,  also,  acknowledged  the  duty  of  Con 
gress  to  pass  laws  to  punish  the  citizens  of  any  Com 
monwealth  for  going  into  any  other  for  the  purpose  of 
exciting,  or  attempting  to  excite,  insurrection  therein. 
They  were  not  willing,  as  individuals,  to  aid  in  the 
execution  of  the  Fugitive  Slave  law,  but  they  declared 
that  all  Commonwealth  laws  which  contravened  the 
pledge  in  the  Constitution  for  the  rendition  of  fugitive 
slaves  ought  to  be  repealed,  and  they  were  ready  to  em 
power  the  Treasury  of  the  United  States  to  pay  damages 
to  the  slaveowner,  whenever  the  officers  of  the  Govern 
ment  should  be  prevented  by  popular  violence  from  re 
turning  the  fugitive. 

To  the  historian,  who  regards  the  course  of  world 
events  from  the  vantage  ground  of  the  present,  and  to 
the  modern  political  scientist,  these  offered 

Criticism  of 

concessions  of  the  Republicans  appear  alto-  the   Repubii- 

. .  mi  TIT  can  attitude. 

gether   too   generous.      They   should   never 
have  been  willing  to  consent  to  the  extension  of  slavery 
over  one  foot  of  free  territory,  either  by  a  positive  act  of 
Congress,  or  an  act  omitting  the  restriction  on  slavery,  or 


134  THE   CIVIL   WAE 

by  an  act  encouraging  the  people  of  any  Territory  where 
slavery  already  nominally  and  legally  existed  to  make  it 
real  and  permanent.  And  they  never  should  have  been 
willing  to  withdraw  anything  from  the  amending  power 
in  the  Constitution.  This  meant  nothing  less  than  the 
confederating  of  the  political  system  of  the  United 
States,  and  the  prevention  of  political  progress  by  law 
ful  peaceable  means.  It  meant  a  return  to  the  system  of 
1781,  as  to  the  excepted  subjects.  It  meant  the  reversal, 
in  principle,  of  the  chief  advance  which  we  had  made  in 
the  development  of  our  constitutional  law  from  the  sys 
tem  of  1781  to  that  of  1787.  No  publicist  who  has  per 
ceived  the  movement  of  modern  political  history  toward 
the  development  of  national  states  can,  for  one  moment, 
approve  of  such  a  reactionary  course.  Instead  of  this, 
he  would  demand  that  existing  exceptions  from  the 
amending  power  be  expunged  from  the  Constitution, 
and  that  the  amending  power  itself  should  be  so  formu 
lated  as  only  to  guard  the  sovereign  power  of  the  Nation 
from  hasty  and  inconsiderate  action,  but  never  so  as  to 
thwart  its  deliberate  and  well-determined  purpose. 

When  now  we  consider  that  there  was  another  great 
party  at  the  North,  numbering  almost  as  many  adher 
ents  as  the  Republican  party  itself,  which  was  ready  to 
yield  to  almost  any  demand,  as  the  price  of  union,  that 
the  secessionists  might  make,  it  is  indeed  difficult  to  ex 
plain  the  irrationality,  as  well  as  the  passionate  precipi 
tancy,  of  the  secessionists,  except  upon  the  old  Greek 
maxim  that  "  whom  the  gods  would  destroy  they  first 
make  mad." 

We  know  now  that  the  spirit  of  civilization  was  work 
ing  for  much  more  advanced  results  than  the  Republicans 
themselves  consciously  intended.  Immediate  abolition 
of  slavery  in  the  Commonwealths,  and  thorough  nation 
alization  of  our  political  system,  were  consummations 


SECESSION  135 

far  beyond  their  hopes.  Their  hearts  had  to  be  fired  to 
these  results  by  the  madness  of  the  secessionists,  who, 
upon  the  basis  of  their  "  State  sovereignty"  theory, 
sought  to  destroy  the  Union  for  the  sake  of  perpetuat 
ing  and  extending  the  institution  of  African  slavery. 
Not  until  then  did  the  Eepublicans  see  that  both  slavery 
and  "  State  sovereignty  "  must  go,  and  in  their  places 
universal  freedom  and  national  sovereignty  must  be  en 
throned. 

This  then  was,  in  the  plan  of  universal  history,  the 
meaning  of  secession  :  The  hastening  of  emancipation 
and  nationalization.  The  United  States  were  lagging  in 
the  march  of  modern  civilization.  Slavery  and  "  State 
sovereignty  "  were  the  fetters  which  held  them  back, 
and  these  fetters  had  to  be  screwed  down  tight  in  order 
to  provoke  the  Nation  to  strike  them  off  at  one  fell  blow, 
and  free  itself,  and  assert  its  supremacy,  forevermore. 

While  the  Government  at  Washington  was  thus  wast 
ing  its  time  and  energies  in  fruitless  efforts  at  compro 
mise  and  conciliation,  the  Confederate  Gov- 

.  Confederate 

ernment  at  Montgomery  was  securing  and  preparations 

•  I        •  -  -T-I  »          for  war- 

preparing   the   sinews   ot  war.     .hvery  fort, 

arsenal,  navy  yard,  custom-house,  post-office,  and  mint 
within  the  boundaries  of  the  seven  "  States,"  which  had 
by  the  4th  of  March  passed  the  secession  ordinance,  had 
been  seized  by  the  troops  of  these  respective  "  States," 
except  only  Fort  Sumter  and  Fort  Pickens  and  the  forti 
fications  upon  Key  West  and  the  Dry  Tortugas.  Presi 
dent  Buchanan's  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  John  B.  Floyd, 
had  sent  large  shipment  of  arms  to  these  Southern  arse 
nals,  and  had  taken  care  to  place  the  larger  part  of  the 
regular  army  within  the  Southern  "States."  Conse 
quently  the  "  State  "  governments  of  the  Confederacy, 
and  the  Confederate  Government  found  themselves  fairly 
well  supplied  at  the  outset  with  implements  of  war  of 


136  THE    CIVIL    WAR 

the  latest  pattern  possessed  by  the  United  States  Gov 
ernment  ;  and  when,  during  the  latter  part  of  February, 
General  Twiggs,  in  command  of  about  half  of  the  United 
States  army,  surrendered  his  troops,  with  all  their  arms, 
munitions,  and  equipments  to  the  Texan  military  au 
thorities,  the  seven  "States"  of  the  Confederacy  had  in 
their  possession  fully  half  of  the  military  property  of  the 
United  States.  It  was  calculated  that  they  had  seized 
some  thirty  millions  of  dollars'  worth  of  the  property  of 
the  United  States. 

The  North  regarded  this  as  sheer  robbery.  The  se 
cessionists  said  that  they  had  only  taken  their  share, 
and  that  they  held  it  subject  to  future  disposition  by 
agreement  with  the  Government  of  the  United  States. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  their  doctrine,  that  the  Gov 
ernment  at  Washington  was  only  the  general  agent  em 
ployed  by  the  several  "States"  to  administer  the  joint 
affairs  and  property  of  a  confederacy  of  sovereigns,  they 
had,  perhaps,  sufficient  moral  justification  for  calling 
it  a  division  rather  than  a  robbery,  had  they  taken  only 
a  fair  share,  but  they  went  far  beyond  that.  From  the 
legal  point  of  view,  on  the  contrary,  they  had  not  the 
slightest  right  to  any  part  of  it.  From  the  legal  point 
of  view  these  seizures  were  pure  and  simple  robberies,  and 
could  be  cleared  of  the  criminal  character  only  by  the 
successful  maintenance  of  the  possession.  In  most  cases 
they  had  not  even  the  justification  of  secession,  since 
they  were  made  before  the  Commonwealths  in  which  the 
seized  property  was  located  or  deposited  had  passed  the 
secession  ordinance.  It  was  the  separate  "  State  "  gov 
ernments  rather  than  the  Confederate  Government  upon 
whom  the  immediate  responsibility  for  these  seizures 
rested,  but  the  chiefs  of  the  Confederate  Government, 
while  still  in  their  seats,  as  members  of  Congress  at 
Washington,  had  advised  their  "States"  to  do  these 


SECESSION  137 

things,  and  the  Confederate  Government  became  the 
subsequent  receiver  of  most  of  the  property  which  these 
"  State  "  governments  had  seized.  Throw  the  best  light 
upon  it  we  may,  it  is  still  a  dark  spot  for  the  Confeder 
ates  in  the  history  of  their  movement. 

The  Government  at  Montgomery  lost  no  time  in  work 
ing  up  its  military  preparations.  It  simply  adopted  the 
laws  of  the  United  States  en  bloc,  except  only  such  as 
were  inconsistent  with  the  constitution  of  the  Confed 
eracy,  and  continued  the  existing  United  States  officials 
in  office  as  Confederate  officials,  and  then  had  free  hand 
to  attend  to  its  finances  and  its  military  organization. 
Already  before  the  end  of  March,  it  could  have  met  the 
Eepublican  Administration  at  Washington  with  a  mili 
tary  power  greater  than  the  United  States  had  under 
command,  in  better  discipline,  and  possessed  with  a 
better  understood  and  more  resolute  purpose.  When 
Mr.  Lincoln  took  his  oath  upon  the  Constitution,  he 
found  himself  called  upon  to  meet  a  condition  instead 
of  a  theory. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  INAUGURATION  OF  LINCOLN  AND  THE  CON 
DITION  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT  HE  WAS  CALLED 
TO  ADMINISTER 

Laws  Give  no  Special  Protection  to  the  President-elect—Mr.  Lin 
coln's  Journey  to  Washington— Mr.  Lincoln  in  Washington  as 
President-elect— General  Scott's  Preparations  for  the  Safety  of 
the  Capital — The  Inaugural  Address — Review  of  the  Address — 
Criticism  of  a  Part  of  the  Address — Faint-heartedness  at  the 
North — Democratic  Attitude  at  the  North — Lack  of  Support  in 
the  Cabinet. 

THE   Government   of    the   United   States   does   not 

concern  itself  in  the  slightest  degree  about  the  personal 

Laws     ive  secur^J  °^  ^ie  President-elect  of  the  coun- 

DO  special  pro-  try.    It  leaves  him  to  find  his  own  way  to  the 

tection  to  the  .,    ,          ,    ,      ,,          ,  „   ,  .     .  . 

President-  capital  and  to  the  place  01  his  inauguration. 
Before  he  is  invested  with  the  powers  of  the 
office  to  which  he  has  been  chosen,,  he  must  take  care  of 
himself  like  any  private  citizen.  After  he  is  so  invested, 
he  may,  of  course,  take  care  of  himself  by  public  means. 
The  theory  of  this  is  that  the  people  will  do  no  harm  to 
him  whom  they  have  freely  chosen  to  rule  over  them. 
If  this  theory  is  sound  in  ordinary  times  and  under  ordi 
nary  conditions  in  elective  governments,  it  certainly  is 
not  so  when  passion  runs  to  an  extraordinary  height, 
and  when  large  numbers  of  men  declare  their  purpose 
to  resist  the  government  of  the  chosen  magistrate. 

Mr.  Lincoln  could  not  but  have  felt  that  he  took  his 
life  in  his  hand  when  he  set  out  upon  his  journey  from 

138 


THE   INAUGURATION    OF   LINCOLN  139 

Springfield  to  Washington.  He  was  obliged  to  pass 
through  country  where  the  inhabitants  were,  in  large 
numbers,  intensely  hostile  to  his  election,  arid  M  r  L  i  n. 
to  his  accession  to  power.  He  knew  well 
enough  that  Southern  men  had,  in  1856,  ton- 
threatened,  in  the  event  of  the  election  of  Fremont,  to 
proceed  in  force  to  AVashington,  and  prevent  Fremont's 
inauguration  by  any  means  necessary  to  the  result ;  and 
before  he  had  completed  much  more  than  the  half  of  his 
journey,  rumors  that  an  attempt  of  the  same  kind  would 
be  made  against  his  own  inauguration  reached  his  ears. 
When  he  arrived  in  Philadelphia,  he  was  met  by  the 
skilful  detective  Allan  Pinkerton,  who  told  him  that 
there  was  evidence  that  an  attack  upon  his  person  in 
Baltimore  had  been  arranged.  The  President  of  the 
Philadelphia,  Wilmington  and  Baltimore  Eailroad,  Mr. 
Felton,  had  suspected  that  violence  might  be  offered  to 
Mr.  Lincoln  in  passing  through  Baltimore,  because  of 
the  secession  spirit  which  prevailed  there,  and  because 
of  the  great  opportunity  which  the  slow  passage  of  the 
trains  through  the  city,  drawn,  as  they  then  were,  by 
horses,  would  offer.  He  had  put  Mr.  Pinkerton  upon 
the  scent,  and  both  he  and  Pinkerton  had  become  con 
vinced  that  there  was  great  danger  to  Mr.  Lincoln  in 
going  through  Baltimore  at  a  known  time.  They  tried 
to  dissuade  him  from  carrying  out  the  announced  plan 
of  his  journey  from  Harrisburg  to  Washington,  via  Bal 
timore,  on  the  23d  of  February  ;  but  he  decided  to  ad 
here  both  to  route  and  time.  A  few  hours  later  Mr. 
Frederick  Seward,  son  of  the  incoming  Secretary  of 
State,  arrived  in  Philadelphia,  and  sought  an  imme 
diate  audience  with  Mr.  Lincoln.  He  delivered  to  Mr. 
Lincoln  a  message  from  his  father,  and  one  from  Gen 
eral  Scott,  both  of  whom  were  in  Washington,  to  the 
effect  that  his  life  would  be  endangered  in  passing 


140  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

through  Baltimore  at  a  known  hour.  Mr.  Lincoln  was, 
however,  a  brave  man,  and  he  shrank  from  stealing  into 
the  capital  into  which  he  had  the  right  of  a  triumphal 
entry.  He  realized,  however,  that  for  the  sake  of  the 
country  he  was  in  duty  bound  not  to  run  any  unnecessary 
risks.  He  wanted  still  to  go  on,  with  an  escort,  but  no 
escort  was  provided  or  volunteered.  At  the  last  moment, 
he  yielded  to  the  persuasions  of  his  friends,  and  took 
the  night  train  of  the  22d  from  Philadelphia  instead 
of  the  day  train  of  the  23d  from  Harrisburg.  This 
brought  him  to  Washington  in  the  early  morning  of  the 
23d,  some  five  hours  before  he  was  expected  in  Balti 
more.  During  his  night  journey,  he  had  worn  a  travel 
ling-cap  instead  of  his  customary  "  beaver,"  and  was  at 
tended  only  by  his  friend  Colonel  Lamon.  These  were 
the  facts  upon  which  was  founded  the  story  that  Mr. 
Lincoln  had  sneaked  unannounced,  terror-stricken  and 
disguised,  into  the  city  which  was  the  seat  of  the  Gov 
ernment  that  he  had  been  chosen  to  administer. 

From  the  23d  of  February  to  the  4th  of  March,  he 
remained  in  his  hotel  as  quietly  as  it  is  possible  for  a 
Mr.  Lincoln  President-elect,  within  ten  days  of  his  inau- 
ton  a^apresf-  guration,  to  do.  The  most  important  event 
dent-elect.  Of  j^g  \[fe  during  this  period  was  a  visit  from 
the  members  of  the  Peace  conference.  The  Southerners 
especially  were  curious  to  see  the  strange  creature  from 
the  "  wild  and  woolly  West,"  and  divine,  if  they  could, 
his  governmental  policies.  They  found  a  homely  man, 
a  plain  man,  but  a  man  who  understood  himself  and  the 
crisis  which  he  had  been  called  upon  to  meet.  He  is  re 
ported  to  have  said  to  Mr.  William  C.  Rives,  of  Virginia  : 
"  My  course  is  as  plain  as  a  turnpike  road.  It  is  marked 
out  by  the  Constitution.  I  am  in  no  doubt  which  way 
to  go."  They  had  heard  nothing  with  that  kind  of  a 
ring  from  the  outgoing  President.  It  had  to  them  an 


THE   INAUGURATION    OF   LINCOLN  141 

ominous  sound.    It  gave  them  something  to  think  about, 
and  to  talk  about  with  their  friends  at  home. 

General  Scott  had  made  ample  preparations  for  the 
safety  of  the  capital  on  inauguration  day.  The  old  war 
rior  had  been  a  good  deal  angered  by  the  G  e  n  e  r  a ! 
rumors  which  had  come  to  him  of  intended  Scott's  prepa- 

.    ,  .    .  , ,  ,  .  »  , ,         ration  for  the 

violent  resistance  to  the  inauguration  of  the  eafety  of  the 
lawfully  elected  President,  and  he  proposed 
to  crush  any  such  movement  with  an  iron  hand.  He  had 
gotten  together  a  couple  of  batteries  of  artillery,  nearly 
a  thousand  men  of  the  regular  infantry  and  marines,  and 
a  good  strong  detachment  of  the  city  volunteers.  He 
planted  his  batteries  so  as  to  control  the  grounds  on  the 
east  front  of  the  capitol,  and  marched  his  infantry  in 
parallel  streets  with  the  presidential  procession  from 
Willard's  Hotel  to  the  Capitol.  If  any  violence  had 
been  intended,  this  display  of  military  power  and  vigor 
repressed  it.  The  inauguration  took  place  without  any 
unusual  incident,  and  Mr.  Lincoln  took  possession  of 
the  official  mansion  as  the  lawfully  elected  and  lawfully 
installed  President  of  the  United  States. 

The  inaugural  address  was  a  calm,  plain  statement 
of  the  President's  intention  to  preserve  the  Union,  and 
to  execute  the  laws  of  the  United  States  Theinaugu- 
throughout  the  whole  country.  It  was  not  ral  addre86- 
an  anti-slavery  address.  It  was  not  even  an  anti-slavery- 
extension  address.  Mr.  Lincoln  went  even  so  far  as  to 
say  in  it  that  he  would  have  no  objection  to  an  irrevo 
cable  amendment  to  the  Constitution  prohibiting  the 
United  States  Government  from  ever  interfering  with 
slavery  in  the  "  States."  And  he  repeated  the  assertion, 
which  he  had,  as  a  private  citizen,  already  made,  that  he 
had  no  purpose  of  interfering,  directly  or  indirectly, 
with  the  institution  of  slavery  in  the  "  States"  where  it 
existed,  and  that  he  did  not  believe  that  he  had  any 


142  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

lawful  right  to  do  so.  Moreover  he  said  nothing  about 
what  the  policy  of  his  administration  concerning  slavery 
in  the  Territories  would  be  ;  and  he  disclaimed  any  as 
sault  upon  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  in 
his  views  of  the  extent  of  its  authority  in  determining 
constitutional  questions. 

Why  Mr.  Lincoln,  whose  reputation,  and  whose  elec 
tion  to  the  presidency,  rested  upon  his  anti-slavery-ex- 
Review  of  tension  principles,  should  have  shifted  the 
the  address.  wnole  issue  to  the  question  of  saving  na 
tional  unity  and  preserving  the  Government  was  a  query 
in  the  minds  of  many  of  his  party  friends  at  the  mo 
ment,  and,  too,  of  many  of  their  successors.  A  broad 
view  of  the  subject  will,  however,  quickly  and  clearly 
reveal  the  reason.  The  situation  required  the  power 
and  universal  supremacy  of  the  Government  to  be  well 
settled  and  maintained  before  the  acts  of  the  Govern 
ment  could  be  of  any  general  value  as  laws  of  the  land  ; 
and  Mr.  Lincoln  always  went  for  one  thing  at  a  time 
and  the  big  things  first.  There  is  no  need  of  going  any 
further  than  this  in  explanation  of  the  tone  of  the  ad 
dress. 

It  was  certainly  a  very  wise  proclamation  of  policy. 
It  was  the  only  policy  upon  which  he  could  hope  to 
unite  the  North  and  divide  the  South,  which  was  his 
well-considered  purpose.  A  pronounced  anti-slavery 
policy,  or  even  anti-slavery-extension  policy,  would  have 
produced  the  directly  opposite  effect.  A  much  duller 
man  than  Mr.  Lincoln  could  not  have  failed  to  see  that. 
Mr.  Lincoln  knew  he  must  speak  strongly  and  in  no  un 
certain  language.  This  he  could  do  in  reference  to  the 
maintenance  of  the  Union  and  the  Government,  and 
reckon  upon  general  approval  at  the  North  and  some  ap 
proval  at  the  South.  He  affirmed  that  the  Union  was 
older  than  the  Constitution,  and  was  not,  therefore,  the 


THE   INAUGURATION    OF   LINCOLN  143 

product  of  the  Constitution,  but  was  an  historical  de 
velopment.  And  from  this  perfectly  sound  and  true 
premise,  he  drew  the  conclusion  that  "no  State  upon  its 
own  mere  motion"  could  "lawfully  get  out  of  the 
Union  ;  that  resolves  and  ordinances  to  that  effect " 
were  "legally  void;  and  that  acts  of  violence,  within 
any  State  or  States,  against  the  authority  of  the  United 
States  "were  "  insurrectionary  or  revolutionary  accord 
ing  to  circumstances/'  He  declared  that  the  Union  was, 
despite  the  secession  ordinances  passed  in  seven  of  the 
"States"  and  the  formation  of  the  Confederate  Govern 
ment  at  Montgomery,  still  unbroken,  and  that  he  should 
take  care  that  the  laws  of  the  Union  should  be  faithfully 
executed  in  all  the  "States."  And  he  announced  his 
determination  to  hold,  occupy,  and  possess  the  property 
and  places  belonging  to  the  United  States  Government, 
and  to  collect  the  duties  and  the  imposts  everywhere. 
Here  was  certainly  a  definite  policy,  and  one  in  the  sup 
port  of  which  all  but  the  secessionists  could  unite. 

The  secessionists  understood  well  enough  that  it  made 
the  issue  with  them  plain  and  direct,  and  that  they 
must  yield  or  fight.  They  seized,  however,  upon  some 
unfortunate  expressions  in  the  address,  and  twisted  them 
into  a  quasi  admission  of  the  correctness  of  their  seces 
sion  theory.  The  exact  words  of  Mr.  Lincoln  which 
were  subjected  to  this  interpretation  ran  as  follows  : 
"  Beyond  what  may  be  necessary  for  these  objects, "- 
that  is,  holding  the  property  and  places  belonging  to  the 
United  States  and  collecting  the  duties  and  imposts — 
"  there  will  be  no  invasion,  no  using  of  force  among  the 
people  anywhere.  Where  hostility  to  the  United  States 
in  any  interior  locality  shall  be  so  great  and  universal 
as  to  prevent  competent  resident  citizens  from  holding 
the  Federal  offices,  there  will  be  no  attempt  to  force 
obnoxious  strangers  among  the  people  for  that  object. 


144  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

While  the  strict  legal  right  may  exist  in  the  Govern 
ment  to  enforce  the  exercise  of  these  offices,  the  attempt 
to  do  so  would  be  so  irritating,  and  so  nearly  impractica 
ble  withal,  that  I  deem  it  better  to  forego  for  the  time 
the  uses  of  such  offices.  The  mails,  unless  repelled,  will 
continue  to  be  furnished  in  all  parts  of  the  Union.  So 
far  as  possible  the  people  everywhere  shall  have  that 
sense  of  perfect  security  which  is  most  favorable  to  calm 
thought  and  reflection.  The  course  here  indicated  will 
be  followed  unless  current  events  and  experience  shall 
show  a  modification  or  change  to  be  proper,  and  in 
every  case  and  exigency  my  best  discretion  will  be  ex 
ercised  according  to  circumstances  actually  existing, 
and  with  a  view  and  a  hope  of  a  peaceful  solution  of  the 
national  troubles  and  the  restoration  of  fraternal  sym 
pathies  and  affection." 

This  language  was  certainly  a  little  confusing  to  the 

minds  of  Union  men,  and  by  so  much  encouraging  to  the 

secessionists.      Mr.    Jefferson   Davis   subse- 

Criticism  of 

a  part  of  the  quently  cited  these  passages  of  the  address  as 
among  the  things  which  encouraged  the  hope 
at  the  South  that  the  North  would  allow  the  South  to  go 
in  peace.  Mr.  Lincoln  should  never  have  used  the  word 
invasion  to  describe  the  presence  of  the  National  Gov 
ernment  in  any  "  State  "  of  the  Union,  or  the  entrance, 
so  to  speak,  of  the  National  Government  into  any 
"State "of  the  Union.  The  National  Government  is 
as  much  at  home  in  any  "  State  "  organized  within  the 
boundaries  of  the  United  States  as  the  "  State"  govern 
ment,  and  the  idea  that  the  entrance  of  the  United 
States  soldiers  into  any  "State"  is  an  invasion  rests 
upon  the  most  radical  misconception  of  the  distinctions 
between  international  law  and  constitutional  law. 

Mr.  Lincoln  also  made  a  mistake  in  announcing  that 
he  would  not,  for  the  time  being,  fill  the  United  States 


THE   INAUGURATION    OF   LINCOLN  145 

offices,  and  cause  the  execution  of  the  United  States 
laws,  in  the  interior  of  hostile  communities.  This  en 
couraged  still  further  the  hope  and  belief  among  the 
masses  of  the  people  in  the  Southern  "States"  that 
peaceable  disunion  was  even  probable.  It  would  have 
been  far  better  for  them  to  have  clearly  understood  at 
this  critical  moment,  that  all  the  dangers  of  rebellion 
must  be  risked  by  them  in  their  attempt  to  break  up  the 
Government.  It  is  true  that  Mr.  Lincoln  put  in  a  sav 
ing  proviso,  of  which  they  ought  to  have  taken  more 
distinct  notice,  but  it  was  natural  that  they  should  mag 
nify  what  was  favorable  to  them  as  they  did. 

Taken  all  together  the  address  certainly  shows  that 
even  Mr.  Lincoln's  mind  was  not  entirely  clear  as  to  the 
national  character  of  our  political  system,  but  it  also 
shows  that  it  was  clearer  than  that  of  any  of  his  contem 
poraries.  The  whole  country,  North  and  South,  was 
more  or  less  tainted  with  the  doctrine  of  "  States- 
rights."  The  difference  between  almost  all  of  the  public 
men  of  the  day  was  a  difference  in  degree  more  than  a 
difference  of  kind.  It  is  wonderful  that  Mr.  Lincoln 
should  have  been,  in  the  midst  of  such  surroundings,  so 
clear  as  he  was. 

It  is  difficult  for  the  present  generation  to  realize  how 
confused  in  mind  and  purpose  and  how  faint-hearted  the 
men  of  the  North  were  at  the  moment  when 

_  _        T  .         ,  •  c  Faint-heart- 

Mr.   Lincoln  assumed  the  reins  of  govern-  ednesa  at  the 

ment.  All  through  the  winter  preceding  his 
inauguration  the  evidences  of  demoralization  in  the  Ee- 
publican  party  had  become  increasingly  manifest.  It 
seemed  as  if  the  party  had  become  frightened  at  its  own 
victory  and  at  the  consequences  entailed  by  it.  The 
municipal  elections  following  the  National  and  Common 
wealth  elections  showed  a  great  falling  off  from  its  ranks. 
Its  journalists  appeared  utterly  at  sea  without  compass  or 
VOL.  I.— 10 


146  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

rudder.  Mr.  Greeley  himself,  the  leader  among  them, 
seemed  never  to  that  moment  to  have  considered  what 
must  be  the  principle  of  his  party  in  regard  to  the  ques 
tion  of  sovereignty,  the  deepest  question  of  any  and  every 
political  system.  The  after-world  will  never  cease  to 
wonder  at  that  famous  editorial  of  his,  of  November  9, 
1860,  in  the  chief  organ  of  his  party,  his  own  Tribune, 
in  which  he  wrote  :  "We  hold,  with  Jefferson,  to  the 
inalienable  right  of  communities  to  alter  or  abolish 
forms  of  government  that  have  become  oppressive  or 
injurious ;  and,  if  the  cotton  States  shall  decide  that 
they  can  do  better  out  of  the  Union  than  in  it,  we 
insist  on  letting  them  go  in  peace.  The  right  to  secede 
may  be  a  revolutionary  right,  but  it  exists  nevertheless  ; 
and  we  do  not  see  how  one  party  can  have  a  right  to 
do  what  another  party  has  the  right  to  prevent.  We 
must  ever  resist  the  right  of  any  State  to  remain  in  the 
Union  and  nullify  or  defy  the  laws  thereof ;  to  with 
draw  from  the  Union  is  quite  another  matter.  And 
whenever  a  considerable  section  of  our  Union  shall 
deliberately  resolve  to  go  out,  we  shall  resist  all  coercive 
measures  designed  to  keep  her  in.  We  hope  never  to 
live  in  a  Republic  whereof  one  section  is  pinned  to  the 
residue  by  bayonets."  In  this  view  Greeley  frater 
nized  with  Davis  and  Stephens  instead  of  with  Lincoln. 
In  his  work  on  the  "  American  Conflict/'  published  three 
years  and  a  half  later,  he  endeavors  to  explain  that  his 
object  in  this  strangely  inconsistent  editorial  was  to  in 
duce  the  Southerners  to  go  into  National  convention  for 
the  settlement  of  all  grievances  and  differences.  Be  this 
as  it  may,  the  Southerners  cared  nothing  about  his  pur 
poses.  They  had  here  the  indorsement  of  their  seces 
sion  doctrine  by  the  leading  journalist  of  the  Republican 
party,  and  they  made  the  most  of  it.  Many  of  the  Re 
publican  journals  followed  the  lead  of  the  Tribune;  and 


THE   INAUGUPwATION    OF   LINCOLN  147 

it  is  needless  to  say  that  the  Democratic  newspapers  of 
the  North  vied  with  each  other  in  justifying  the  actions 
of  the  secessionists  and  throwing  the  whole  blame  for 
the  situation  upon  the  Republican  party.  It  is  true  that 
in  the  chagrin  of  defeat,  they  said  much  that  was  not 
really  meant.  But  the  secessionists  did  not  understand 
that,  or  would  not.  They  were  only  encouraged  there 
by  in  their  extravagant  estimate  of  the  injuries  they 
thought  they  were  suifering  at  the  hands  of  the  Repub 
lican  party,  and  in  their  hope  that  a  divided  North 
would  prevent  the  Republican  Administration  from  at 
tempting  to  exercise  its  jurisdiction  in  the  "  seceding 
States  "  by  force. 

Still  further,  the  people  themselves  held  meetings, 
in  which  many  Republicans  participated,  where  nothing 
but  conciliation  and  compromise  were  preached.  The 
existence  of  such  a  state  of  feeling  in  the  metropolitan 
city  of  New  York  is  nothing  surprising,  even  to  the  men 
of  this  generation.  It  rose,  however,  to  a  higher  degree 
than  we,  of  to-day,  can  well  understand.  The  secession  of 
the  city  itself  from  the  Commonwealth  of  New  York  was 
recommended  by  Mayor  Fernando  Wood  to  the  Common 
Council ;  and  Mr.  Daniel  E.  Sickles,  afterward  one  of 
the  bravest  of  the  Northern  soldiers  who  fought  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  Union  by  military  power,  declared, 
in  his  notorious  speech  of  December  10,  1860,  npon  the 
floor  of  Congress,  that,  in  the  event  of  secession  in  the 
South,  New  York  City  would  free  herself  from  the  hated 
Republican  "  State "  Government  of  New  York,  and 
throw  open  her  ports  to  the  free  commerce  of  the  world. 
Not  only  Democrats  spoke  thus,  in  New  York  and  for 
New  York,  but  old  Whigs  lent  their  voices  to  the  en 
couragement  of  disunion.  At  the  peace  meeting  of  the 
31st  of  January,  1861,  in  New  York  City,  Mr.  James  S. 
Thayer,  one  of  the  most  respected  and  influential  of  the 


148  THE   CIVIL   WAK 

old  line  Whigs,  said  :  "  If  the  incoming  Administration 
shall  attempt  to  carry  out  the  line  of  policy  that  has  been 
foreshadowed,"  i.e.,  the  policy  of  enforcing  the  laws  in 
"  States  "  which  had  declared  their  independence  of  the 
Union,  "  we  announce  that,  when  the  hand  of  Black 
Republicanism  turns  blood  red,  and  seeks  from  the  frag 
ments  of  the  Constitution  to  construct  a  scaffolding  for 
coercion,  another  name  for  execution,  we  will  reverse 
the  order  of  the  French  Revolution,  and  save  the  blood 
of  the  people  by  making  those  who  would  inaugurate  a 
reign  of  terror  the  first  victims  of  a  national  guillo 
tine." 

But  if  the  attitude  of  Democratic  New  York  at  that 
juncture  is  surprising,  what  is  to  be  thought  of  Repub 
lican  Philadelphia,  whose  Republican  Mayor  was  highly 
applauded,  at  a  peace  meeting,  for  saying  that  the  criti 
cisms  upon  Southern  slavery  indulged  in  at  the  North 
should  cease,  that  "  the  misplaced  teachings  of  the  pul 
pit,  the  unwise  rhapsodies  of  the  lecture-room,  the  ex» 
citing  appeals  of  the  press,  on  the  subject  of  slavery, 
must  be  frowned  down  by  a  just  and  law-abiding 
people." 

The  Abolitionist  wing  of  the  Republican  party  was 
never  noted  for  strong  Unionism,  and  it  was  only  to  be 
expected  that  the  attitude  of  its  members,  at  this  junc 
ture,  would  be  an  additional  embarrassment  to  the  Pres 
ident.  How  disloyal  they  were  can  be,  perhaps,  best 
illustrated  by  an  extract  from  Mr.  Wendell  Phillips's 
New  Bedford  address  of  April  9,  1861 :  <  Here  are/' 
he  said,  "  a  series  of  States,  girdling  the  Gulf,  who 
think  their  peculiar  institutions  require  that  they  should 
have  separate  government  They  have  a  right  to  decide 
that  question  without  appealing  to  you  or  me.  .  .  . 
Standing  with  the  principles  of  '76  behind  us  who  can 
deny  that  right.  .  .  .  Abraham  Lincoln  has  no 


THE   INAUGURATION   OF   LINCOLN  149 

right  to  a  soldier  in  Fort  Sumter."  The  Abolitionists 
seemed  to  have  no  conception  that  the  great  movement 
of  the  world's  history  which  lay  just  in  front  of  them  was 
the  solution  of  the  problem  of  national  sovereignty  as 
well  as  that  of  personal  liberty,  and  that  the  attainment 
of  abolition  was  possible  only  through  the  vindication  of 
the  sovereignty  of  the  Nation. 

Of  course  the  Breckenridge  Democrats  at  the  North 
gave  Mr.  Lincoln  no  support.     Nor  were  the  Douglas 
Democrats  much  more  to  be  relied  on  at  the 
moment.     Mr.  Douglas  himself  said  that  the   attitude  at  the 
United  States  Government  could  not  be  jus-  * 
tilled  in  holding  forts  in  the  "  seceding  States/7  much 
less  in  retaking  them,  unless  the  intention  was  to  reduce 
these    "  States "   to   subjection,   which,   at   that   time, 
seemed  to  him  not  to  be  seriously  considered. 

And  lastly,  Mr.  Lincoln  found,  at  first,  no  adequate 
support  in  his  own  Cabinet  of  advisers  for  the  policy  ex 
pressed  in  his  inaugural  address.  Mr.  Sew- 

L     -.  ,  .     ,    .    .  Lackofsup- 

ard  was  bent  upon  maintaining  peace,  at  port  in  the 
almost  any  sacrifice.  So  were  Cameron,  ablD 
Bates,  and  Smith.  Chase  had  "  States-rights  "  views 
that  were  troublesome.  Only  Welles  and  Blair  were  in 
nearer  sympathy  with  the  President.  It  was  Seward 
who  gave  the  President  the  greatest  embarrassment. 
He,  as  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  was 
the  person  to  whom  the  Confederate  Government,  in 
its  assumed  character  of  a  foreign  nation,  would  address 
itself;  and  much,  very  much,  almost  everything,  de 
pended  upon  his  discretion,  firmness,  and  loyalty  in 
meeting  such  approaches. 

This  was  the  situation  in  the  Government,  and  among 
the  people  of  the  North,  when  Mr.  Lincoln's  Adminis 
tration  was  called  upon  to  face  the  demands  of  the 
Southern  Confederacy  for  the  recognition  of  its  inde- 


150  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

pendence.  The  problem  was  one  of  so  great  difficulty, 
and  the  manner  in  which  it  was  treated  is  so  little  un 
derstood,  that  the  whole  subject  requires  to  be  dealt 
with  in  considerable  detail,  and  with  no  little  patience 
and  impartiality. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  ATTEMPT  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  CONFEDERACY 
TO  NEGOTIATE  WITH  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES 

The  Appearance  of  the  Confederate  Commissioners  in  Washington 
and  Their  Mission — Justices  Nelson  and  Campbell  at  the  State 
Department — The  Sumter  Situation — Justice  Campbell  and  the 
Confederate  Commissioners — The  Alleged  Pledge  of  Evacua 
tion — Mr.  Lincoln's  Plan  for  Relieving  Sumter — The  Embar 
rassment  of  Mr.  Seward — Rumors  of  the  Preparations  to  Relieve 
Sumter — President  Lincoln's  Notice  to  Governor  Pickens — 
Mr.  Davis's  View  of  the  Alleged  Pledges — The  Departure  of 
the  Expedition  from  New  York — The  Confederate  Commis 
sioners  and  the  Memorandum  of  Mr.  Seward — The  Demand 
for  the  Evacuation  of  Sumter. 

MR.  SEWARD  had  not  been  in  office  more  than  a  week 
when  he  was  confronted  with  the  question  of  the  atti 
tude  which  the  United  States  Government      Thea 
should  take  toward  the  Southern  Confeder-  ance  of  the 

, .  .,-.  ,     .  .  ,  , ,        Confed  e  r  a  t  e 

acy.  In  compliance  with  a  resolution  of  the  Commission- 
^»T  i  •  it  -I-M  ei>s  in  Wash- 

Confederate  Congress,  passed  in  the  middle  ington  and 

of  February,  the  Confederate  President  had  their  mi68ion' 
appointed  three  highly  respectable  citizens  of  the  Con 
federacy,  as  he  called  them,  Mr.  Martin  J.  Crawford  of 
Georgia,  Mr.  John  Forsyth  of  Alabama  and  Mr.  A.  B. 
Roman  of  Louisiana,  as  commissioners  from  the  Confed 
erate  Government  to  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  for  the  purpose  of  instituting  negotiations  with 
the  United  States  Government  for  "  the  settlement  of 
all  matters  between  the  States  forming  the  Confederacy 

151 


152  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

and  their  other  late  confederates  of  the  United  States, 
in  relation  to  the  public  property  and  the  public  debt  at 
the  time  of  their  withdrawal  from  them."  One  of  these 
gentlemen,  Mr.  Crawford,  had  arrived  in  Washington 
several  days  before  the  expiration  of  President  Buchan 
an's  term.  He  was  provided  with  a  letter  of  recommen 
dation  to  Mr.  Buchanan  from  Mr.  Jefferson  Davis.  Mr. 
Davis  did  not  attach  his  official  title  to  his  signature, 
from  which  we  may  fairly  conclude  that  the  letter  was 
meant  to  be  quasi-confidential.  Mr.  Davis  explained 
years  afterward  that  Mr.  Buchanan  had  intimated  to 
him,  through  Mr.  Hunter  of  Virginia,  "  that  he  would 
be  happy  to  receive  a  commissioner  from  the  Confeder 
ate  States,  and  would  refer  to  the  Senate  any  communi 
cation  that  might  be  made  through  such  a  commission." 
It  is  certainly  difficult  to  believe  that  President  Bu 
chanan  could  have  consciously  authorized  Mr.  Hunter 
to  make  such  a  statement  to  Mr.  Davis,  after  having  re 
fused  to  have  anything  to  do  with  the  South  Carolina 
commissioners,  and  after  the  castigation  applied  to  him 
by  Mr.  Davis,  in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States,  there 
for.  The  President  had,  as  we  have  seen,  become  stiffer 
in  his  Unionism  after  that  event,  rather  than  more  limp. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  attendant  circumstances  go  to 
prove  the  correctness  of  Mr.  Davis's  statement  of  Mr. 
Hunter's  communication  to  him.  It  is,  of  course, 
possible,  not  to  say  probable,  that  Mr.  Hunter,  in 
his  great  desire  for  a  peaceable  solution  of  the  mighty 
question  confronting  the  whole  country,  had  put  an  ex 
aggerated  interpretation  upon  what  Mr.  Buchanan  had 
said,  persuading  himself,  if  he  was  conscious  of  it  at  all, 
that  it  could  do  no  harm,  and  might  be  productive  of 
great  good.  Certain  it  is  that  President  Buchanan 
promptly  refused  to  see  Mr.  Crawford,  or  to  have  any 
thing  to  do  with  his  commission.  Mr.  Crawford  consid- 


ATTEMPT   OF   CONFEDERACY   TO   NEGOTIATE      153 

ered  this  attitude  of  President  Buchanan  to  be  a  violation 
of  a  promise,  and  attributed  it  to  the  fact  that  "  he  had 
become  fearfully  panic-stricken  "  between  the  date  of  ' '  his 
promise  "  and  the  arrival  of  the  commissioner.  Despite 
this  rebuff,  however,  Mr.  Crawford  waited  around  Wash 
ington,  taking  note  of  everything  he  saw,  for  the  arrival 
of  his  colleagues. 

About  a  week  after  the  inauguration  of  Mr.  Lincoln 
Mr.  Forsyth  appeared  ;  and  Crawford  and  Forsyth  im 
mediately  applied  verbally,  through  Senator  Hunter,  it 
is  supposed,  to  the  new  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Seward, 
for  an  unofficial  interview,  which  Mr.  Seward  promptly, 
but  respectfully,  declined  to  grant.  Whereupon  the  two 
commissioners  addressed  to  Mr.  Seward  a  written  request 
for  the  appointment  of  a  time  when  they  might  present 
their  credentials  to  the  President  of  the  United  States 
and  explain  to  him  the  object  of  their  mission.  The 
date  of  this  letter  was  March  12th,  and  the  contents  of 
it  explained  the  general  purposes  of  the  mission,  which 
were,  briefly,  to  officially  inform  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  of  the  withdrawal  of  seven  "  States  "  from 
the  United  States  and  the  formation  by  them  of  a  new 
Confederacy,  and  "  to  secure  a  speedy  adjustment  of  all 
questions  growing  out  of  the  political  separation,"  thus 
effected  "  de  facto  and  dejure" 

Mr.  Seward  wrote  his  reply  to  this  communication  on 
the  14th  day  of  March.  He  put  it  into  the  form  of  a 
memorandum,  unsigned  by  him,  and  placed  it  in  the 
State  Department  to  be  called  for  by  the  commissioners. 
The  Confederate  authorities  professed  to  find  Mr.  Sew- 
ard's  methods  in  this  transaction  inexplicable ;  but  if 
they  had  only  reflected  that  Mr.  Seward  was  cautiously 
seeking  to  meet  them  in  a  manner  which  could  not  in  any 
possible  way  be  tortured  into  an  official  recognition  of 
them  or  their  agents,  they  might  have  understood  him. 


154  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

Mr.  SewarcTs  memorandum  contained  a  full  resume 
of  the  contents  of  the  letter  of  the  so-called  commis 
sioners,  and  then  went  on  to  decline  to  fix  any  time  for 
receiving  these  gentlemen  calling  themselves  commission 
ers  of  the  "  Confederate  States/'  or  to  have  any  official 
intercourse  whatsoever  with  them,  on  the  ground  of  the 
nullity  of  the  whole  movement,  which  they  professed  to 
represent,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  Constitution 
and  the  political  system  of  the  United  States.  Mr.  Sew- 
ard  stated  in  his  memorandum  that  he  had  submitted 
his  views  as  expressed  therein  to  President  Lincoln,  and 
that  the  President  coincided  with  him  in  them,  and 
sanctioned  his  refusal  of  official  intercourse  with  Messrs. 
Forsyth  and  Crawford.  He  furthermore  called  the 
attention  of  the  so-called  commissioners  to  President 
Lincoln's  inaugural  address,  a  copy  of  which  was  en 
closed  with  the  memorandum. 

On  the  same  day  that  Mr.  Seward  filed  this  memo 
randum  in  the  State  Department,  there  to  be  copied,  and 

justices  tne  c°Py  ^°  ^e  furnished  to  Messrs.  Forsyth 
Nelson  and  and  Crawford,  upon  application,  Mr.  Justice 

Campbell     at  '      r  ' 

the  state  DC-  JN elsoii  oi  the  Supreme  Court  01  the  United 
States,  a  citizen  of  New  York,  presented  him 
self,  of  his  own  motion,  before  the  Secretary  of  State, 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  and  the  Attorney-Gen 
eral,  Messrs.  Seward,  Chase  and  Bates,  for  the  purpose 
of  influencing  them  by  argument  toward  a  pacific  pol 
icy,  and  of  stating  to  them  that,  from  a  careful  study  of 
the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United  States,  he  had 
reached  the  conclusion  that,  without  very  serious  viola 
tions  of  the  same,  coercion  could  not  be  successfully 
effected  by  the  Executive  Department  of  the  Govern 
ment. 

Returning  from  his  visit  to  the  State  Department,  we 
are  told  that  he  accidentally  met  one  of  his  colleagues 


ATTEMPT   OF   CONFEDERACY   TO   NEGOTIATE      155 

upon  the  Supreme  Bench,  Mr.  Justice  Campbell  of  Ala 
bama,  and  communicated  to  him  the  fact  and  the  pur 
pose  of  his  interview  with  the  Secretaries  and  the  gist 
of  the  conversation  with  them.  Mr.  Seward  had,  of 
course,  regarded  Justice  Nelson  as  a  friend  to  the 
Union,  and  had  conferred  with  him  very  frankly.  He 
told  him  that  the  Administration  was  face  to  face  with 
the  secessionist  Confederacy  upon  two  issues  ;  that  the 
first  was  the  question  of  holding  or  abandoning  Fort 
Sumter,  and  the  second  was  the  question  of  receiving 
the  Confederate  commissioners ;  and  that  the  second 
question,  if  pressed  at  the  moment,  would  embarrass 
the  Administration  in  dealing  with  the  first. 

The  situation  in  reference  to  Sumter  was  as  follows  : 
On  the  3d  of  March  the  Confederate  General  Beaure- 
gard  had  assumed  command  at  Charleston  The  Sumter 
and  had  virtually  invested  Fort  Sumter.  On  situa«011- 
the  4th  of  March  word  had  been  received  by  the  Presi 
dent  from  Major  Anderson  that  he  had  about  one 
month's  rations  in  the  Fort,  and  if  not  relieved  within 
that  time,  that  he  would  be  obliged  to  abandon  the  post  or 
starve.  Upon  the  receipt  of  this  message  the  President 
immediately  took  counsel  with  General  Scott,  and  was  ad 
vised  by  the  General  that  evacuation  was  almost  inevita 
ble,  and  that  at  least  four  months  would  be  necessary  to 
make  ready  an  expedition  to  relieve  the  garrison. 

Mr.  Lincoln  then  turned  to  his  Cabinet  and  put  the 
following  question  to  each  of  its  members  :  "Assuming 
it  to  be  possible  to  now  provision  Fort  Sumter,  under  all 
the  circumstances  is  it  wise  to  attempt  it  ?"  Chase  and 
Blair  replied  affirmatively,  but  the  other  five  thought  it 
would  be  unwise.  Seward  especially  so  expressed  him 
self.  This  occurred  on  the  15th  of  March,  the  very  day 
that  Mr.  Seward  filed  his  memorandum  in  answer  to  the 
letter  of  the  Confederate  commissioners  in  the  State 


156  THE   CIVIL    WAE 

Department,  and  the  very  day  of  Justice  Nelson's  visit 
to  Mr.  Seward.  The  Cabinet  meetmg  had  taken  place 
only  a  few  hours  before  Justice  Nelson's  visit,  and, 
therefore,  what  had  occurred  at  the  meeting  was  fresh 
in  Mr.  Seward's  mind.  It  is  true  that  Mr.  Lincoln  him 
self  had  never  expressed  any  other  purpose  than  the  one 
declared  in  his  inaugural  in  reference  to  Fort  Sumter, 
which  was  the  determination  to  hold  possession  of  all 
the  places  belonging  to  the  United  States,  and  that  he 
did  not,  at  the  meeting  on  the  15th  of  March,  commit 
himself,  in  the  slightest  degree,  to  any  other  course  or 
view.  But  Mr.  Seward  had  not  yet  learned  that  Mr. 
Lincoln  was  not  to  be  directed  by  his  Cabinet,  even 
when  the  majority  for  or  against  a  proposed  policy  was 
five  to  two,  with  Mr.  Seward  himself  among  the  five. 
Knowing  then  what  he  did,  at  the  moment  of  Justice 
Nelson's  visit,  Mr.  Seward  felt  quite  certain  that  the 
withdrawal  of  the  troops  from  Fort  Sumter  would  take 
place  within  a  fortnight.  He  very  probably  told  Justice 
Nelson  what  his  impressions  were  in  regard  to  the  im 
pending  evacuation,  and  pointed  out  to  him  how  the 
demands  of  the  Confederate  commissioners  for  official 
recognition,  at  that  very  juncture,  had  so  crowded  the 
Administration  as  to  force  it  to  take  a  stand,  which  might 
put  an  end  to  peace  efforts  altogether.  That  stand  was 
the  reply  to  the  letter  of  the  Confederate  commissioners, 
which  reply  was,  at  the  very  moment,  lying  in  the  State 
Department  awaiting  the  call  of  the  messenger  from  the 
commissioners  for  it. 

These  were  the  facts  and  the  impressions  which  Mr. 
Justice  Nelson  imparted  to  Mr.  Justice  Campbell  when 
they  accidentally  met  in  the  street  just  after  Justice 
Nelson's  interview  with  the  Secretaries.  On  the  spur 
of  the  moment  Justice  Nelson  suggested  that  Justice 
Campbell  might  be  of  service  in  the  cause  of  peace,  and 


ATTEMPT   OF   CONFEDERACY    TO   NEGOTIATE      157 

Justice  Campbell  immediately  expressed  his  willingness 
to  do  anything  within  his  power.  Whereupon  Justice 
Nelson  returned  to  the  State  Department,  accompanied 
by  Justice  Campbell,  and  sought  Mr.  Seward  again. 
Mr.  Seward  naturally  supposed  that  Justice  Campbell 
was  a  Union  man,  holding  as  he  did  one  of  the  highest 
offices  in  the  gift  of  the  United  States  Government,  and 
felt,  therefore,  no  hesitation  in  repeating  before  him 
what  he  had  already  said  to  Justice  Nelson.  As  a  mat 
ter  of  fact,  if  we  may  judge  from  the  course  of  subse 
quent  events,  Justice  Campbell's  heart  was,  at  that  mo 
ment,  with  the  secessionists,  and  he  was  anxious  to  induce 
Mr.  Seward  to  recognize  the  commissioners  from  the 
Confederate  Government  and  treat  with  them  as  the  dip 
lomatic  representatives  of  an  independent  nation.  He 
saw,  however,  that  what  Mr.  Seward  had  said  to  Justice 
Nelson  was  true,  namely,  that  the  hands  of  the  Adminis 
tration  were  full  with  the  Sumter  matter,  and  that  if  the 
commissioners  should  apply  for  the  answer  to  their  de 
mand,  that  answer  must  be  the  memorandum  which  Mr. 
Seward  had  just  filed  in  the  State  Department.  It  was 
also  plain  to  Justice  Campbell  that  any  pressure  brought 
upon  Mr.  Seward  by  the  commissioners  might  result  in 
a  change  of  Mr.  Seward's  attitude  on  the  question  of 
evacuating  Fort  Sumter. 

Justice  Campbell  then  took  it  upon  himself  to  see  the 
Confederate  commissioners,  and  persuade  them  to  delay 
sending  their  messenger  for  Mr.  Seward's  an-  j  u  8 1 }  c  e 
swer  to  their  letter.  In  the  interview  be-  Campbell  and 

,  .  ,    . ,  , .  ,        ,     the  Conf  eder- 

tween  him  and  them,  the  notion  was  evolved  ate  commis- 
that  the  evacuation  of  Fort  Sumter  would  be 
ordered  by  Mr.  Lincoln's  Administration,  provided  they 
would  not  ask  for  an  immediate  reply  to  their  communi 
cation  of  March  12th.  The  connection  between  the  two 
subjects  having  been  thus  established  in  their  minds, 


158  THE   CIVIL   WAE 

they  apparently  soon  began  to  think,  and  then  to  say, 
that  the  evacuation  of  Fort  Sumter  had  been  promised 
them,  pledged  them,  provided  they  would  delay  their 
demand  for  the  answer  to  their  letter  to  Mr.  Seward. 
Justice  Campbell  in  a  letter  to  Colonel  Munford,  pub 
lished  in  the  year  1874,  stated  that  he  said  to  Mr.  Sew 
ard,  in  the  interview  of  March  15th,  that  he  concurred 
with  him  in  the  view  that  the  Administration  could  not 
undertake  anything  more  at  the  moment  than  the  evac 
uation  of  Fort  Sumter,  and  that  he  would  see  the  com 
missioners  and  write  to  Mr.  Davis  himself  ;  that  he  asked 
Mr.  Seward  what  he  should  write  Mr.  Davis  in  regard 
to  Forts  Sumter  and  Pickens,  and  that  Mr.  Seward  au 
thorized  him  to  say  that  before  the  letter  could  reach  its 
destination  Mr.  Davis  would  learn  by  telegram  that  the 
order  for  the  evacuation  of  Sumter  had  been  given,  and 
that  no  change  would  be  made  in  the  status  of  Fort 
Pickens;  that  he  communicated  these  "assurances" 
given  by  Mr.  Seward  to  the  commissioners  and  to  Mr. 
Davis  ;  that  Mr.  Crawford  objected  to  the  delay  in  press 
ing  for  recognition,  and  finally  yielded  only  upon  the 
reduction  of  Mr.  Seward's  alleged  statements  to  writing 
and  the  personal  assurance  of  the  Justice  that,  as  writ 
ten  down  by  him,  they  were  correct  and  accurate  ;  and, 
finally,  that  he  (Justice  Campbell)  communicated  in 
writing  to  Mr.  Seward  the  fact  that  he  had  furnished 
Mr.  Crawford  with  a  written  document,  in  which  he  had 
expressed  entire  confidence  in  the  evacuation  of  Fort 
Sumter  within  ten  days,  and  in  the  preservation  of  the 
existing  status  by  the  United  States  Government  toward 
the  "  Southern  Confederate  States,"  and  had  advised 
against  the  commissioners  pressing  for  an  immediate 
reply  to  their  note  of  March  12th  to  Mr.  Seward  as  likely 
to  be  productive  of  evil  results. 

These  are  the  elements  out  of  which  the  Confederate 


ATTEMPT   OF   CONFEDERACY   TO    NEGOTIATE      159 

Government  constrncted  a  pledge  by  Mr.  Seward,  and 
through  Mr.  Seward  by  Mr.  Lincoln,  to  evacuate  Fort 
Sumter  within  ten  days,  provided  the  com-  The  alleged 
missioners  would  not  embarrass  Mr.  Lincoln's  ?vaecuftfon.°f 
Administration  by  pressing  for  an  answer  to  their  de 
mand  for  recognition. 

Five  days  subsequent  to  these  interviews  between  Mr. 
Seward  and  the  Justices,  and  between  the  Justices  and 
the  Confederate  commissioners,  the  commissioners,  we 
are  told  by  Mr.  Justice  Campbell,  telegraphed  to  General 
Beauregard  at  Charleston  to  know  if  Sumter  had  been 
evacuated,  or  if  anything  indicating  intention  to  evacu 
ate  had  occurred  ;  and  received  immediate  reply  that 
Major  Anderson  was  still  strengthening  his  defences. 
Justice  Campbell  tells  us,  further,  that  he,  accompanied 
by  Mr.  Justice  Nelson,  sought  Mr.  Seward  again,  and 
showed  him  the  despatch  from  Beauregard,  and  that  Mr. 
Seward  assured  him  that  the  delay  in  evacuating  Sumter 
was  accidental,  and  promised  that  any  change  "in  the 
resolution  in  reference  to  Sumter  or  Pickens"  would  be 
communicated  to  him.  These  statements  by  Mr.  Seward 
were  then  written  down  by  Justice  Campbell  and  the 
paper  was  sent  to  Mr.  Crawford,  and  Mr.  Seward  was 
informed  in  writing  by  Justice  Campbell  of  these  facts. 

The  Confederate  Government  regarded  this  episode 
as  completely  confirmatory  of  a  pledge  on  the  part  of 
Mr.  Lincoln's  Administration  to  evacuate  Fort  Sumter. 
The  actual  facts  did  not  warrant  the  conclusion,  either 
in  regard  to  the  making,  or  the  confirming,  of  a  pledge, 
but  they  could  easily  be  distorted  so  as  to  appear  to  do 
so,  and  it  was  not  unnatural  that,  in  that  time  of  anx 
iety  and  confusion,  this  happened  with  good  faith. 

Down  to  this  moment,  that  is,  March  20th,  the  Pres 
ident  had  communicated  his  thoughts,  much  less  his 
determination,  if  indeed  he  had  reached  any,  to  no  one 


160  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

except  Mr.  Blair,  who,  he  knew,  agreed  with  him  in 
opinion,  and  in  whom  he  had  perfect  faith.  The 
Mr.  Lin-  question  of  secession  did  not  fall  within  the 
reievin^sum-  Domain  of  any  particular  executive  depart- 
ter<  ment,  and  the  President  felt  himself  at  lib 

erty  to  confide  in  that  member  of  his  Cabinet  upon 
whose  sympathy  he  could  most  fully  count.  Through 
Mr.  Blair  he  came  into  communication  with  a  brave 
and  resourceful  man,  who  had  been  in  the  naval  ser 
vice  of  the  United  States,  Mr.  G.  V.  Fox.  Mr.  Fox 
was  a  brother-in-law  of  Mr.  Blair.  He  was  the  man 
who  had  proposed  to  Mr.  Buchanan,  during  the  pre 
ceding  February,  to  undertake  an  expedition  for  the 
relief  of  Sumter.  Mr.  Fox  laid  substantially  the  same 
plan  before  Mr.  Lincoln  a  day  or  two  before  the  first 
interview  between  Mr.  Seward  and  the  two  Justices  oc 
curred.  Mr.  Lincoln  now  acquainted  General  Scott 
with  his  communications  with  Mr.  Fox,  and  then  laid 
the  proposition  of  Mr.  Fox  before  the  Cabinet  for  con 
sideration.  General  Scott  discouraged  the  plan,  and 
only  two  members  of  the  Cabinet  favored  it,  Chase 
and  Blair.  The  President  then  sent  Fox  to  Sumter, 
and  Hurlbut  and  Lamon  to  Charleston,  to  examine  the 
condition  of  things  on  the  spot  before  making  his  de 
cision.  Fox  arrived  in  Charleston  on  the  21st  of  the 
month  (March),  and  immediately  applied  to  Governor 
Pickens  for  a  permit  to  visit  Fort  Sumter,  which  was 
granted,  according  to  the  Governor's  statement,  upon 
the  assurance  that  his  purposes  were  pacific.  Mr.  Fox 
and  President  Lincoln  undoubtedly  considered  a  proj 
ect  for  sending  provisions  to  the  hungry  men  in  Fort 
Sumter  as  containing  no  hostile  purpose.  Governor 
Pickens  also  stated,  in  his  message  to  the  South  Car 
olina  Legislature,  at  the  beginning  of  its  session  in 
November  of  1861,  that  Mr.  Lincoln's  other  emissary, 


ATTEMPT   OF   CONFEDERACY   TO   NEGOTIATE      161 

Colonel  Lamon,  appeared  in  Charleston  a  few  days  after 
Mr.  Fox,  and  told  the  Governor  that  he  had  come  "  to 
try  to  arrange  for  the  removal  of  the  troops "  from 
Su inter,  and  that  he  hoped  to  return  to  Charleston  in  a 
few  days  for  that  purpose. 

Colonel  Lamon  did  not,  however,  return  to  Charles 
ton,  and  at  the  end  of  the  month,  Governor  Pickens 
sent  an  inquiry  to  the  Confederate  commissioners  in 
Washington  in  regard  to  him  and  his  mission.  This 
despatch  from  Pickens  reached  Washington  on  the  30th. 
The  day  before  it  came,  Mr.  Lincoln  had  again  laid  the 
question  of  relieving  Fort  Sumter  before  his  Cabinet. 
This  time  Chase,  Blair  and  Welles  expressed  themselves 
in  favor  of  making  the  attempt,  and  Bates  wavered  in 
his  opposition  to  it.  The  President  had  still  kept  his 
own  counsel,  but  Mr.  Seward  now  saw  that  evacuation 
could  no  longer  be  counted  on,  although  he  still  gave  his 
voice  for  it.  When,  then,  Justice  Campbell  brought  Gov 
ernor  Pickens's  inquiry  of  the  Confederate  commission 
ers  to  Mr.  Seward,  as  he  did  so  soon  as  it  was  received  in 
Washington,  Mr.  Seward  had  been  disabused  of  the  idea 
that  the  evacuation  of  Fort  Sumter  was  certain,  or  even 
probable.  Mr.  Seward  immediately  made  known  to  the 
President  the  contents  of  Governor  Pickens's  despatch, 
and  Mr.  Lincoln  promptly  disavowed  Lamon's  authority 
to  promise  what  Pickens  claimed  he  did  in  the  despatch. 

On  the  1st  day  of  April  Mr.  Seward  saw  Justice 
Campbell  and  informed  him  what  the  President  had 
said  in  regard  to  Governor  Pickens's  telegram 

^  The  embar- 

of  inquiry.     Justice  Campbell  now  began  to  rassment  of 

,    ,  .  -i-iii  Mr.  Seward. 

reveal  his  sympathy  with  the  secessionists, 
and  Mr.  Seward  became  more  cautious  in  his  utterances. 
He  fell  back  now  on  the  President,  and  ceased  to  ad 
vance  opinions  of  his  own  in  regard  to  what  the  Admin 
istration  would  determine  to  do.  President  Lincoln 
VOL.  I. -11 


162  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

allowed  him  to  assure  the  commissioners,  through  Jus 
tice  Campbell,  "  that  the  Government  would  not  attempt 
to  supply  Fort  Surnter  without  giving  notice  to  Governor 
Pickens."  This  is  the  only  assurance  which  President 
Lincoln  ever  gave,  or  authorized  to  be  given,  and  it  is 
an  exaggeration  to  make  a  pledge  even  out  of  this. 

During  the  next  few  days  rumors  of  the  preparations 
to  relieve  the  beleaguered  and  hungry  troops  at  Surnter 

Rumors  of  began  to  float  about  Washington.  On  the 
tato'Sve  ?th  (April)  Justice  Campbell  addressed  an- 
sumter.  other  communication  to  Mr.  Seward,  asking 

if  his  assurances  still  held  ;  to  which  Mr.  Seward  re 
plied  :  "  Faith  as  to  Sumter  fully  kept.  Wait  and  see/' 
On  the  next  day,  Mr.  Crawford  sent  a  despatch  to  Gen 
eral  Beau  regard  at  Charleston,  which  ran  as  follows  : 
"  Accounts  uncertain  because  of  the  constant  vacillation 
of  the  Government.  We  were  reassured  yesterday  that 
the  status  of  Sumter  would  not  be  changed  without  pre 
vious  notice  to  Governor  Pickens,  but  we  have  no  faith 
in  them.  The  war  policy  prevails  in  the  Cabinet  at  this 
time."  It  would  appear  from  this  language  that  the 
only  pledges  or  assurances  which  the  Confederate  com 
missioners  considered  as  having  been  made  to  them  by 
the  United  States  Government  were  contained  in  Mr. 
Seward's  communication  to  them,  through  Justice  Camp 
bell,  on  April  1st,  viz.,  that  the  United  States  Govern 
ment  would  not  undertake  to  supply  Fort  Sumter 
without  giving  notice  to  Governor  Pickens. 

On  the  same  day  that  Beauregard  received  this  de 
spatch,  Mr.  Chew,  one  of  the  subordinates  of  the  State 

President  Department  at  Washington,  accompanied  by 
Lincoln's  Lieutenant  Talbot,  appeared  in  Charleston, 
emor  Pick-  and  sought  both  Governor  Pickens  and  Gen 
eral    Beauregard.     When   admitted    to   au 
dience,  Mr.  Chew  read  to  the  Governor  and  the  General 


ATTEMPT   OF    CONFEDERACY    TO    NEGOTIATE      163 

the  following  notice  :  "  I  am  directed  by  the  President 
of  the  United  States  to  notify  you  to  expect  an  attempt 
will  be  made  to  supply  Fort  Sumter  with  provisions  only ; 
and  that  if  such  an  attempt  be  not  resisted,  no  attempt  to 
throw  in  men,  arms,  or  ammunition  will  be  made,  without 
further  notice,  except  in  case  of  an  attack  upon  the 
Fort." 

In  commenting  upon  this  communication  to  Governor 
Pickens,  the  ex-President  of  the  Confederacy  wrote, 
twentv  vears  later  :  "  Thus  disappeared  the 

J    J  Mr.  Davis's 

last  vestige  of  the  plighted  faith  and  pacific  view  of  the 
pledges  of  the  Federal  Government."  There 
is  no  doubt  that  the  Government  at  Montgomery  held 
this  view  at  the  time.  Nevertheless  it  is  difficult  to 
understand  how  they  could  have  done  so.  The  Govern 
ment  of  the  United  States  gave  but  one  assurance,  name 
ly,  that  it  would  not  undertake  to  supply  Fort  Sumter 
without  giving  notice  to  Governor  Pickens,  and  this  it 
fulfilled  to  the  letter.  And  President  Lincoln  gave  this 
assurance,  not  for  the  purpose  of  delaying  any  answer 
to  the  Confederate  commissioners  on  the  question  of  rec 
ognizing  them,  but  for  the  purpose  of  delaying  an  at 
tack  upon  the  Fort  until  he  could  get  his  relief  expedi 
tion  in  readiness. 

The  transports  bearing  the  means  of  relief  to  the 
Sumter  garrison  left  port  on  April  7th,  and  if  not  hin 
dered  might  have  been  expected  to  arrive  in  The  depart- 
Charleston  Harbor  on  the  9th  or  10th.  There  S^ftSE 
was  no  war  vessel  with  them.  The  Secretary  New  York, 
of  the  Navy,  Mr.  Welles,  intended  to  send  the  war-ship 
Powhatan  from  New  York  with  them,  but  the  President 
ordered  the  Powhatan,  at  the  last  moment,  to  go  to  Pensa- 
cola  for  the  relief  of  Fort  Pickens.  The  President  issued 
this  order  through  Mr.  Seward  without  the  knowledge  of 
Mr.  Welles,  and  saw  his  mistake  too  late  to  rectify  it. 


164  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

When   the    Confederate   commissioners   at  Washing 
ton   learned   of   the   notice  to   Governor   Pickens  and 
TheConfed-   General  Beauregard,  they  sent  their  secretary 
to  the  State  Department  for  the  official  an- 


dhumTf°Mr"  swer  to  tneir  letter  of  March  12th.  So  soon 
seward.  as  they  received  and  read  the  memorandum 
of  the  Secretary  of  State,  they  immediately  addressed  a 
communication  to  him,  in  which  they  declared  that  they 
did  not,  in  their  letter  of  March  12th,  "  ask  the  Govern 
ment  of  the  United  States  to  recognize  the  independ 
ence  of  the  Confederate  States,"  but  that  "  they  only 
asked  audience  to  adjust  in  a  spirit  of  amity  and  peace, 
the  new  relations  springing  from  a  manifest  and  ac 
complished  revolution  in  the  Government  of  the  late 
Federal  Union/'  and  that  the  refusal  on  the  part  of 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  "  to  entertain 
these  overtures  for  a  peaceful  solution,  the  active  naval 
and  military  preparations  of  this  Government,  and  a 
formal  notice  to  the  commanding  General  in  the  harbor 
of  Charleston  that  the  President  intends  to  provision 
Fort  Sumter  by  forcible  means,  if  necessary,  are  viewed 
by  the  undersigned,  and  can  only  be  received  by  the 
world,  as  a  declaration  of  war  against  the  Confederate 
States."  They  then  declared  that  they,  in  behalf  of  the 
Confederate  Government,  accepted  the  gage  of  battle. 
They  closed  their  communication  with  an  explanation  of 
the  delay  in  demanding  the  reply  to  their  letter  of  March 
12th.  They  said  in  reference  to  this  that  their  secretary 
called  at  the  State  Department  for  the  answer  on  the 
13th  of  March,  and  was  informed  by  the  Assistant  Secre 
tary  of  State  that  Mr.  Seward  had  not  had  time  to  con 
sider  their  note  ;  that  he  was  asked  by  the  Assistant  Sec 
retary  for  the  addresses  of  Messrs.  Forsyth  and  Crawford, 
and  was  told  by  him  that  any  reply  which  might  be  made 
to  their  note  would  be  sent  to  their  lodgings  ;  that  they 


ATTEMPT   OF   CONFEDERACY   TO   NEGOTIATE      165 

consented  to  the  delay  of  twenty-three  days  in  receiving 
an  answer  "  not  of  their  own  volition  and  without  cause," 
but  because  of  the  assurances  of  Mr.  Seward,  communi 
cated  to  them  by  Justice  Campbell,  that  Fort  Sumter 
would  be  evacuated,  and  no  attempt  would  be  made  to 
provision  it  without  previous  notice  to  Governor  Pick- 
ens  ;  and  that  "  it  was  only  when  all  these  anxious  ef 
forts  for  peace  had  been  exhausted,  and  it  became  clear 
that  Mr.  Lincoln  had  determined  to  appeal  to  the  sword 
to  reduce  the  people  of  the  Confederate  States  to  the 
will  of  the  section  or  party  whose  President  he  "  was 
"  that "  they  "  resumed  the  official  negociations  tempo 
rarily  suspended,  and  sent  '  their '  secretary  for  a  reply 
to  '  their'  official  note  of  March  12th." 

Mr.  Seward  made  no  reply  to  the  propositions  and 
assumptions  of  this  document,  beyond  acknowledging 
its  reception.  And  the  commissioners  shook  from  off 
their  feet  the  dust  of  the  wicked  capital,  as  they  con 
sidered  it,  and  turned  their  faces  and  their  footsteps 
southward. 

Meanwhile  General  Beauregard  had  telegraphed  the 
Confederate  Secretary  of  War  at  Montgomery  word  of 
the  notice  from  President  Lincoln  to  Govern-  The  demand 
or  Pickens  of  the  intention  on  the  part  of  SLnbrf  Sum- 
the  United  States  Government  to  provision  ter< 
Fort  Sumter.  Beauregard's  despatch  was  dated  April 
8th.  The  reply  from  the  Confederate  Secretary  was  not 
made  until  the  10th.  The  Confederate  Government  is 
thus  seen  to  have  acted  with  deliberation.  The  reply 
was  an  order  to  General  Beauregard  to  demand  the  evac 
uation  of  Fort  Sumter,  and  to  reduce  it,  if  the  demand 
should  be  refused.  Beauregard  immediately  answered 
that  the  demand  for  surrender  would  be  made  at  noon 
of  the  next  day,  the  llth.  The  Confederate  AVar  Sec 
retary  replied  to  this  by  advising  an  earlier  hour,  but 


166  THE   CIVIL    WAK 

Beau  regard  telegraphed  him  that  he  had  special  reasons 
for  the  hour  designated. 

Accordingly,,  at  about  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of 
April  llth,  General  Beauregard  sent  two  of  his  aids,  Col 
onel  Chesnut  and  Captain  Lee,  to  Major  Anderson  with 
the  summons  for  evacuation.  Major  Anderson  imme 
diately  replied,  declining  compliance.  At  about  the 
same  time  that  Beauregard  received  Anderson's  answer, 
advices  reached  him  from  Montgomery  directing  him  not 
to  bombard  Sumter,  if  Anderson  would  fix  a  time  when 
he  would  evacuate,  and  agree  not  to  use  his  guns  against 
the  Confederate  forces  in  the  meantime,  unless  first  fired 
on  by  the  Confederates. 

In  accordance  with  these  instructions  Beauregard  sent 
a  second  demand  to  Anderson,  at  about  eleven  o'clock  in 
the  evening.  Anderson  replied  to  this  in  the  early  morn 
ing  of  the  12th,  and  offered  to  engage  to  evacuate  the 
Fort  at  noon  of  the  loth,  provided  he  should  not  receive 
prior  to  that  time  controlling  instructions  from  his  Gov 
ernment  or  additional  supplies,  and  provided  he  should 
be  furnished  with  necessary  and  proper  means  of  trans 
portation.  These  conditions  of  surrender  were  not  ac 
ceptable  to  the  Confederate  commander,  and  his  reply, 
dated  at  twenty  minutes  past  three  in  the  morning  of 
the  12th,  informed  Major  Anderson  that  fire  would  be 
opened  upon  the  Fort  by  the  Confederate  batteries  in 
one  hour  from  that  time. 

Accordingly  at  half-past  four  o'clock  in  the  morning 
of  the  12th  of  April,  the  Confederate  guns  began  to 
hurl  their  balls  against  the  Fort  covered  by  the  flag  of 
the  Union.  The  gates  of  Janus  were  flung  open,  and 
the  great  question  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  Nation  or  the 
sovereignty  of  the  "States"  was  appealed  from  the 
forum  to  the  battlefield. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  SUMTER  AND  THE  CALL  TO 

ARMS 

The  Offensive  and  the  Defensive  in  the  Sumter  Affair— Rebellion 
or  War — The  Surrender  of  Sumter — The  Union  Driven  to 
Take  Up  Arms— The  Call  for  Troops— The  Refusals  to  Obey 
the  President's  Call  for  Troops— Prompt  Action  of  the  Gov 
ernors  of  the  Northern  States — The  Attitude  of  Mr.  Douglas 
— The  Peril  of  the  Capital — Virginia  Convention  Passes  the 
Secession  Ordinance— Seizure  of  Harper's  Ferry  and  Gosport 
Navy  Yard— The  Sixth  Massachusetts  in  Baltimore— The  Ef 
fect  of  These  Events  on  the  Country — The  Attitude  of  John 
Bell  after  the  Fall  of  Sumter — Tennessee's  Treaty  with  the 
Confederacy — Tennessee's  Secession— The  Blockade  Procla 
mations — North  Carolina's  Secession — Secession  in  Arkansas  — 
Secession  in  Missouri  Attempted— Secession  in  Missouri  Foiled 
— Attempts  at  Secession  in  Kentucky— The  Attitude  of  the 
Government  and  of  the  People — The  President's  Policy  toward 
Kentucky — William  Nelson — Major  Anderson  Sent  to  Cincin 
nati — L.  H.  Rousseau — Manifestations  of  Magoffin's  Disloyal 
Purposes— The  Loyalty  of  the  Legislature — The  Unionists 
Elect  the  Congressional  Delegation — Northern  Anger  Aroused 
by  the  Situation  in  Maryland— Rumors  of  Attack  upon  the  Cap 
ital — General  Lee's  Conduct— The  Exodus  of  the  Secession 
ists  from  Washington — The  Occupation  of  Maryland — The 
Maryland  Legislature  at  Frederick — The  Isolation  of  Balti 
more — Triumph  of  Union  Cause  in  Maryland — The  Defence 
of  Washington. 

MR.  GREELEY  wrote  in  his  "  American  Conflict/' 
that  the  Confederacy  had  no  alternative  to  an  attack 
upon  Fort  Sumter  except  its  own  dissolution.  If  he 

167 


168  THE   CIVIL   WAE 

meant  by  this  that  the  Confederates  acted  defensively  in 
attacking  Sumter  he  was  still  laboring  under  that  bale- 
Th  off  en  ^  confusi°n  °f  niind  which  produced  the 
eive  and  the  strange  editorial  in  the  Tribune  of  Novem- 
tne  sumter  ber  9,  1860.  Such  a  proposition  could  only 
be  defended  upon  the  principle  that  the  Com 
monwealths  were  separately  and  completely  sovereign 
under  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States ;  that  the 
United  States  was  nothing  more  than  a  central  govern 
ment,  and  that  this  central  government  was  nothing 
more  than  a  joint  agent  of  these  separate  sovereigns, 
which  each  of  them  might  dispense  with  at  its  own 
pleasure  ;  and,  finally,  that  when  a  Commonwealth 
should  dispense  with  this  agency,  its  presence  there 
after  within  the  original  territorial  limits  of  the  Com 
monwealth,  even  in  the  places  subject  to  its  exclusive 
jurisdiction,  was  the  presence  of  a  foreign  invader.  This 
was  the  doctrine  of  the  secessionists,  but  it  found  no 
warrant  either  in  the  history  of  the  formation  of  the 
Constitution,  or  in  any  provision  contained  in  the  text 
of  it,  or  in  the  practice  of  the  Government  during  more 
than  seventy  years  of  existence  under  it.  It  was  simply 
a  revolutionary  claim  which  stamped  its  upholders  as 
rebels  until  they  should  succeed  in  establishing  it  by 
physical  force. 

There  can  be  no  question  in  the  mind  of  the  historian 
and  constitutional  lawyer  to-day  that  the  "States"  claim 
ing  to  have  seceded  from  the  Union  were  the  aggressors. 
The  South  Carolina  authorities  fired  the  first  shot  of  the 
conflict  when  they  opened  their  batteries  upon  the  Star 
of  the  West,  on  the  9th  of  January,  and  the  Confeder 
ate  agent  of  the  "States"  claiming  to  have  seceded 
fired  the  second  shot  in  Charleston  Harbor  on  the  morn 
ing  of  April  12th,  and  in  both  cases  the  shot  fired  was 
against  the  supremacy  of  that  law  and  authority  to 


THE   CAPTURE   OF   FORT   SUMTER  169 

which   those   who   did   the  deed   owed  obedience   and 
allegiance. 

The  more  puzzling  query  is  whether  the  result  of  these 
acts  was  rebellion  or  war.  It  certainly  was  not  a  war  be 
tween  independent  nations.  That  was  the  Rebellion  or 
deepest  issue  of  the  conflict,  and  the  outcome  war- 
proved  the  contrary.  Neither  was  it  in  a  strictly  cor 
rect  sense  civil  war.  It  was  not  a  struggle  between  two 
parties  for  the  possession  of  the  Government,  each  claim 
ing  to  be  legitimate  ;  nor  were  the  belligerent  parties 
composed  generally  of  adherents  resident  within  the 
same  localities.  It  was  really  the  attempt  of  a  section  to 
constitute  itself  a  separate  country,  a  separate  nation, 
a  separate  sovereignty.  And  the  first  step  in  such  a 
procedure  is,  and  must  be,  rebellion,  which,  if  success 
ful,  is  then  termed,  in  political  nomenclature,  revolu 
tion.  From  a  strictly  legal  point  of  view,  every  person 
engaged  in  it  makes  himself  subject  to  the  criminal  law 
of  the  Government  against  which  he  rebels,  but  when 
the  spirit  of  rebellion  becomes  so  general  throughout  a 
large  section  of  a  country  as  to  take  possession  of  the 
vast  majority  of  the  people  within  that  section,  and 
when  the  rebels  constitute  responsible  government  and 
regularly  organized  armies,  and  proceed  to  battle  for 
the  recognition  of  their  claims  according  to  the  meth 
ods  of  regular  war,  then  the  practice  of  the  world  is 
not  to  deal  with  them  as  traitors  under  the  criminal 
law,  but  as  belligerents  in  quasi-war.  That  is,  while 
the  government  against  which  the  rebellion  is  directed 
in  such  a  case  may,  in  strict  legality,  treat  every  rebel 
as  a  traitor  under  its  criminal  law,  international  prin 
ciple  and  good  public  policy  recommend  to  the  gov 
ernment,  in  such  a  situation,  a  quasi-international 
treatment  of  the  rebels,  if  not  of  the  question  of  the 
rebellion. 


170  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

We  arrive  at  truth  and  justice,  the  basis  of  law,  only 
through  the  medium  of  human  interpretation,  and  we 
determine,  in  democratic  countries,  the  correctness  of 
that  interpretation  by  the  power  of  conviction  which  it 
exerts  over  the  minds  of  great  numbers  of  the  people. 
When,  then,  there  is  anything  like  a  balance  of  numbers 
in  a  division  of  the  whole  country,  the  employment  of 
criminal  conceptions,  and  the  application  of  the  criminal 
law,  by  the  party  in  possession  of  the  original  govern 
ment  against  the  other  party  results,  usually,  in  barbar 
izing  both  parties.  There  are  conceivable  situations, 
indeed,  in  which  this  must  be  done  ;  when,  for  example, 
the  question  is  government  or  anarchy.  But  when  it 
is,  as  it  usually  is  in  these  cases,  a  question  of  one  gov 
ernment  or  another,  then  the  world-ethic  of  a  demo 
cratic  age  recommends  toleration  of  differences  so  far, 
at  least,  as  to  ascribe  a  rational  sincerity  to  all,  and  to 
treat  those  in  rebellion  more  as  belligerents  than  as 
traitors. 

This  is  not  an  entirely  logical  position,  from  the  point 
of  view  of  either  of  the  governments  concerned.  Both 
are  liable  to  confound  the  qualities  of  belligerency  with 
the  rights  of  independence.  And  while  one  will  deny 
belligerency  as  involving  a  recognition  of  independence, 
the  other  will  claim  independence  as  involved  in  a  rec 
ognition  of  belligerency.  But  if  we  regard  the  question 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  world's  progress  in  civil 
ization,  a  progress  in  which  so  much  has  been  accom 
plished  through  antagonism,  we  may  perceive  the  phi 
losophy,  if  not  the  logic,  of  the  proposition  and  the 
practice. 

Major  Anderson  and  his  little  band  of  loyal  soldiers 
defended  Fort  Sumter  for  thirty-four  hours  against  the 
shot  and  shell  of  the  Confederate  batteries,  and  when 
its  walls  were  beaten  down  upon  them,  and  the  barracks 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  SUMTEK      171 

set  on  fire  by  red-hot  shot,  surrendered  the  work  on  the 
condition  of  being  allowed  to  withdraw  in  possession  of 
their  individual  and  company  property,  and  The 
to  salute  the  flag  of  the  Union  in  depart- 
ing.  The  steamboat  Isabel  took  them  down  the  harbor, 
and  transferred  them  to  the  Baltic,  which  was  lying  in 
wait  for  them  outside  the  bar.  On  the  18th,  they  arrived 
at  the  port  of  New  York,  and  Major  Anderson  imme 
diately  made  his  official  announcement  of  the  surrender 
to  the  Secretary  of  War. 

If  the  Confederacy  had  no  alternative  to  the  attack 
upon  Fort  Sumter  but  its  own  dissolution,  the  Union 
had  now  no  alternative  to  its  dissolution  but  The  Union 
the  overthrow  of  the  Confederacy.  It  is  true  driven  to  take 
that  no  person  had  been  killed  on  either  side, 
except  by  the  bursting  of  a  gun  in  the  final  salute  to  the 
flag,  but  the  sovereignty  of  the  Union  had  been  forcibly 
expelled  from  territory  which  it  had  possessed  for 
decades,  and  over  which  it  still  claimed  the  rights  of 
property  and  dominion.  That  sovereignty  must  now  re 
possess  itself  of  this  territory  and  reassert  and  re-estab 
lish  the  supremacy  of  its  will,  or  else  it  must  accept  the 
proposition  that  "  discontented  individuals  too  few  in 
number  to  control  administration,  according  to  organic 
law/'  may,  under  any  pretence  they  may  desire,  break 
up  their  government  by  taking  shelter  under  a  claim 
of  sovereignty  in  the  localities  or  communities  in 
which  they  reside,  to  which  they  may  profess  to  owe 
a  paramount  allegiance.  Verily,  it  was  the  question 
whether  popular  government  should  perish  from  the 
earth. 

President  Lincoln  did  not  wait  for  Major  Anderson's 
official  report.  He  recognized  that  the  time  for  deliber 
ation  and  discussion  had  now  passed,  and  the  time  for 
action  had  arrived.  He  saw  clearly  that  he  must  now 


172  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

go  forward  with  a  firm  hand  and  a  determined  purpose, 
if  he  would  save  the  Nation  from  dissolution,  yea,  if  he 
would  even  save  its  capital  from  those  in  rebellion 
against  its  sovereignty. 

On  the  day  after  the  fall  of  Sumter  he  issued  the  call 
to  arms.  This  remarkable  proclamation  should  be  care- 
The  call  for  Mly  studied,  since  it  contained  Mr.  Lincoln's 
troops.  conception  of  the  situation  which  confronted 

him.  In  it  Mr.  Lincoln  first  declared  that  the  execu 
tion  of  the  laws  of  the  United  States  were,  and  for  some 
time  had  been,  "  obstructed  in  the  States  of  South  Caro 
lina,  Georgia,  Alabama,  Florida,  Mississippi,  Louisiana, 
and  Texas  by  combinations  too  powerful  to  be  suppressed 
by  the  ordinary  course  of  judicial  proceedings  or  by  the 
powers  vested  in  the  marshals  by  law/'  Mr.  Lincoln 
thus  distinctly  indicated  the  view,  at  the  outset,  that  he 
was  dealing,  not  with  nations  or  even  with  "  States," 
but  with  private  combinations  of  persons  in  rebellion 
against  the  sovereignty  of  the  United  States,  and  the 
constitutional  and  legal  authority  of  the  United  States 
Government ;  that  secession  was  an  utter  abortion  ;  and 
that  the  claim  of  the  rebels  in  South  Carolina,  Georgia, 
and  the  other  communities,  to  be  the  ll  States"  of  South 
Carolina,  Georgia,  and  the  like,  was  an  absolute  impos 
sibility  in  principle. 

Dealing,  according  to  this  conception,  with  a  domes 
tic  insurrection,  and  not  with  a  foreign  enemy,  Mr. 
Lincoln's  I^1100^  derived  his  duties  and  his  powers 
theory  of  the  from  those  clauses  of  the  Constitution  which 

situation.  .  ,  ,  .  ,          ,  , .         . 

imposed  upon  him  the  obligation  to  see  to 
the  faithful  execution  of  the  laws  of  the  United  States, 
and  conferred  upon  him  the  means  of  discharging  the 
trust.  There  was  no  difficulty,  from  his  point  of  view, 
in  finding  executive  power  to  use  the  existing  army 
and  navy  to  maintain  the  authority  of  the  Government 


THE   CAPTURE   OF    FORT   SUMTER  173 

against  insurgents,  but  it  was  not  so  easy  to  find  the 
executive  power  to  increase  the  forces,  and  without  this 
the  arm  of  flesh  would  not  be  strong  enough  to  deal 
successfully  with  the  situation.  The  Constitution  gave 
Congress  the  exclusive  power  to  create  armies  and  navies, 
and  to  provide  for  bringing  the  militia  of  the  "  States" 
into  the  service  of  the  United  States,  that  is,  for  bring 
ing  them  under  the  command  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States.  By  a  statute  of  sixty-five  years'  standing, 
however,  Congress  had  conferred  upon  the  President, 
under  its  power  to  provide  for  calling  the  militia  of  the 
"  States"  into  the  service  of  the  Union,  the  authority 
to  issue  the  call  himself  at  his  own  discretion,  and  the 
Supreme  Court  had  decided,  more  than  thirty  years  be 
fore,  not  only  that  this  statute  was  constitutional,  but 
that  any  militiaman  refusing  to  obey  the  command  of 
the  President  calling  him  into  the  service  of  the  United 
States  was  subject  to  the  process  of  a  United  States 
court-martial.  Here,  then,  was,  without  question,  an 
executive  power  to  increase  the  military  forces  under 
the  command  of  the  President  to  any  extent  which  the 
population  and  resources  of  the  country  would  bear, 
since  every  male  citizen  between  the  ages  of  eighteen 
and  forty-five  was,  at  that  moment,  by  another  con 
gressional  statute,  subject  to  militia  service.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  however,  the  general  organization  of  the 
militia  on  the  basis  of  this  law  requiring  universal 
military  service  had  fallen  into  desuetude.  So  far  as 
actual  organization  was  concerned,  the  militia  of  1861, 
in  the  United  States,  was  more  a  volunteer  system  than 
a  compulsory  service.  As  organized,  therefore,  at  that 
date,  its  strength  was  far  short  of  what  the  Congressional 
statute  provided  and  required. 

President   Lincoln   was,  of   course,  obliged   to   take 
things  as  he  found  them.     There  was  no  time  to  spare 


174  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

in  transactions  with  the  •'*  States/'  however  loyally  dis 
posed  they  might  be,  for  executing  the  Congressional 

Thenecessi  ^  ^or  ^e  universa^  organization  of  the  mil- 
tiesofthesitu-  itia.  The  President  must  address  himself, 
first  of  all,  to  the  existing  organizations.  He 
despatched  his  commands  to  the  Governors  of  all  the 
"States,"  except  those  in  which  the  insurrection  ex 
isted.  He  addressed  the  Governors  in  their  capacities 
as  the  highest  officers  of  the  militia  in  their  respective 
"States."  Good  political  science,  and  a  sound  construc 
tion  of  the  Constitution  itself,  made  them  his  military 
subordinates  in  the  matter  of  bringing  the  militia  into 
the  service  of  the  United  States,  if  no  farther,  and  a 
refusal  by  any  one  of  them  to  obey  his  call  ought  to 
have  been  considered  an  offence  of  the  highest  character, 
to  be  dealt  with  by  a  court-martial  of  the  United  States. 

The  President  stated  that  the  first  service  to  which 
the  seventy-five  thousand  militia  thus  called  into  the 
service  of  the  United  States  would  probably  be  assigned 
would  be  the  repossession  of  the  "forts,  places,  and 
property"  which  the  insurgents  had  seized.  He  did 
not  appear  from  this  to  be  especially  anxious  about  the 
safety  of  the  capital.  The  events  of  the  next  five 
days,  however,  made  it  manifest  that  the  first  duty  of 
the  new  army  must  be  the  defence  of  Washington. 

The  proclamation  contained,  further,  the  command  of 
the  President  to  the  insurgents  to  disperse  within  twenty 
days.  And  it  closed  with  the  summons  to  the  two 
Houses  of  Congress  to  meet  in  extraordinary  session  on 
the  4th  day  of  the  following  July.  Whatever  may  have 
been  the  President's  reasons  for  deferring  this  meeting 
for  so  long,  it  certainly  showed  strong  nerve  in  him  to 
be  willing  to  carry  the  great  responsibility  alone  for  such 
a  period. 

The  Governors  of  Virginia,  North  Carolina,  Kentucky, 


THE   CAPTURE   OF   FORT   SUMTER  175 

Tennessee,  Missouri,  and  Arkansas  flatly  and  insolently 
refused  to  obey  the  President's  call  for  troops  from  those 
Commonwealths,  and  the  Governors  of  Dela-  The  refusals 
ware  and  Maryland  did  not  obey  it.  No  ordi-  president's 
nance  of  secession  had  as  yet  been  passed  in  can  for  troops, 
any  of  these  Commonwealths,  and  no  one  of  them 
claimed  to  be  out  of  the  Union.  From  a  true  juristic 
point  of  view,  as  well  as  from  the  point  of  view  of  a 
sound  political  science,  these  men  made  themselves,  by 
their  military  insubordination,  subject  to  a  United  States 
court-martial.  They  ought  to  have  been  arrested,  tried, 
and  condemned  by  a  military  tribunal  for  one  of  the 
most  grievous  offences  known  to  public  jurisprudence. 
It  was  the  physical  power  to  carry  out  such  a  procedure 
that  was  lacking  ;  and  the  fear  of  the  effect  of  such  an 
unprecedented  course  upon  the  inhabitants  of  these 
Commonwealths  might  have  deterred  the  President 
from  using  it,  had  he  possessed  it.  At  this  day  such  an 
attitude  on  the  part  of  "  State "  Governors  would  be 
regarded  very  differently  from  what  it  was  then,  and 
might  be  dealt  with  very  differently. 

The  Governors  of  the  non-slaveholding  Common 
wealths,  on  the  other  hand,  all  answered  with  alacrity. 
All  of  these  Commonwealths  east  of  the 


8.C- 

Rocky  Mountains,  except  only  Rhode  Island,   tion  of  the 

-,   A  »  v  r       r  •         i    i  Governors  o  f 

had  Governors  ot  Mr.  Lincoln  s  own  party  ;  the  Northern 

States 

and  the  Democratic  Governor  of  Rhode  Isl 
and,  Mr.  William  Sprague,was  as  prompt  as  any  of  these. 
He  even  proposed  to  lay  aside  his  civil  functions  and  put 
himself  at  the  head  of  the  contingent  from  his  Common 
wealth.  And  the  great  leader  of  the  Northern  Democ 
racy,  Senator  Douglas,  called  immediately 

J '  ,  .  /        The  attitude 

upon  the  President,  and  assured  him  of  his  of  Mr.  Doug- 
loyal  sympathy  and  co-operation  in  the  im 
pending  conflict.     This  great  patriotic  act  of  Mr.  Doug- 


176  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

las  made  the  North  a  unit  substantially  in  the  support 
of  the  Administration.  The  divided  North,  upon  which 
the  secessionists  had  counted,  had  now  vanished  like  a 
will-o'-the-wisp  before  the  rising  sun.  The  North  viewed 
the  question  now  no  longer  as  slavery  against  freedom, 
but  as  national  existence,  as  the  maintenance  of  govern 
ment,  as  the  suppression  of  rebellion  against  lawful  au 
thority.  With  this  consolidation  of  the  public  opinion 
of  the  North  in  his  support,  Mr.  Lincoln  felt  that  the 
most  important  field  had  been  won.  For  this  he  had 
worked  and  waited  since  the  day  of  his  inauguration, 
and  he  viewed  the  realization  of  his  hopes  with  supreme 
satisfaction  and  sincere  thankfulness. 

The  other  chief  object  of  his  solicitude,  however,  the 

preservation  of  the  border  slaveholding  Commonwealths 

The  peril  of  against  the  passage  of  secession  ordinances, 

the  capital.       was  now  piace(j  jn  extreme  jeopardy,  and  with 

it  the  safety  of  the  capital  was  imperilled. 

We  have  seen  that  the  Governors  of  all  these  Common 
wealths  except  only  Delaware  and  Maryland,  had  refused 
obedience  to  the  President's  call  for  troops,  and  in  some 
cases  had  threatened  to  array  themselves  against  the 
military  power  and  authority  of  the  Government,  and 
that  the  Governors  of  Delaware  and  Maryland  did  not 
obey  the  call.  While  the  action  of  these  two  function 
aries  was  not  positively  hostile,  it  still  gave  the  President 
more  anxiety  than  the  more  pronounced  attitude  of  the 
others,  since  these  Commonwealths  lay  geographically 
between  the  capital  and  the  loyal  North.  General  Scott 
had  collected  a  few  companies  of  regulars,  and  seemed 
to  think  that  he  could  hold  out  against  any  attack  until 
the  arrival  of  re-inforcements,  provided  they  should  be 
promptly  forwarded. 

There  was  a  general  belief  in  Washington  that  a  well- 
matured  conspiracy  for  the  capture  and  destruction  of 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  FOUT  SUMTER      177 

the  city  existed,  and  the  alarm  over  the  situation  for  the 
first  few  days  after  the  capture  of  Sumter  was  genuine 
and  great.  If  the  Marylanders  would  furnish  no  troops 
for  the  relief  of  the  city,,  and  should  resist  the  passage 
of  troops  from  the  loyal  Commonwealths  through  their 
territory,  it  was  manifest  that  such  delay  might  be  thus 
caused  in  receiving  re-inforcements  at  Washington  as  to 
give  the  conspirators,  if  there  were  any,  a  fair  opportu 
nity  to  execute  their  purposes.  The  Confederate  Secre 
tary  of  War,  Mr.  L.  P.  Walker,  proclaimed  in  his  speech 
of  April  ]  2th  at  Montgomery,  that  the  Confederate  flag 
would  float  over  Washington  City  before  the  1st  of  May. 
And  the  secessionist  leaders  in  Virginia  considered  the 
capture  of  the  city  as  one  of  the  first  movements  which 
Virginia  should  undertake  after  deciding  to  join  the 
Confederacy.  It  was  now  conjectured  in  Washington 
that  the  plan  of  the  conspirators  was  to  have  the  Mary- 
landers  prevent  the  passage  of  troops  from  the 'North 
across  their  "  State  "  ;  gather  Virginia  troops  along  the 
Potomac  opposite  Washington ;  effect  the  secession  of 
Maryland  ;  then  have  Maryland  reclaim  possession  of 
the  District  of  Columbia  upon  the  same  principle  that 
South  Carolina  claimed  Fort  Sumter,  viz.,  by  virtue  of 
her  sovereign  right  to  resume  all  of  her  grants  to  the 
United  States  Government  at  her  own  pleasure  ;  and 
finally  enforce  the  claim,  if  the  United  States  Govern 
ment  should  refuse  to  surrender  the  District,  by  the  mil 
itary  forces  of  the  two  "  States." 

The  events  of  the  next  five  days  after  the  fall  of  Sum 
ter  seemed  to  justify  fully  these  conjectures.  On  the 
17th  the  convention  at  Richmond  passed  the 

,.  T  Virginia 

secession  ordinance  by  a  secret  vote.     Less  convention 
than  a  fortnight  before  it  had  rejected  the  cession  ordl- 
proposition  by  a  majority  of  two  to  one.     It  E 
now  resolved  to  submit  its  vote  approving  secession  to 
VOL.  L— 12 


178  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

the  people  for  ratification.  It  appointed,  however,  a 
distant  day  for  that  purpose,  the  23d  of  the  following 
month,  and  long  before  that  time  the  old  Common 
wealth  was  occupied  by  the  forces  of  the  Confederacy. 
The  popular  vote,  when  it  was  cast,  was  the  merest 
farce. 

The  day  following  the  passage  of  the  secession  ordi 

nance    by   the   convention,    the   Virginia    secessionists 

.  seized  Harper's  Ferry,  and  sent  their  General 

Seizure    of  .  J) 

Harper's  Fer-    laliaferro  to  capture  the  great  navy-yard  of 
the  United  States  at  Gosport  near  Norfolk. 


This  was  also  speedily  accomplished,  and 
therewith  the  Confederacy  obtained  possession  of  ships, 
cannon,  arms,  munitions,  and  military  and  naval  stores 
to  the  value  of  some  ten  millions  of  dollars. 

The  events  of  the  19th  were  even  more  exciting  and 

threatening.    Already  in  the  afternoon  of  the  16th  some 

The  sixth  four  or  five  hundred  Pennsylvania  troops  had 

setts8  in  Batti-  made  tneir  waJ  across  Maryland,  and  had 

reached  Washington  without  incident.  A 
few  more  arrived  on  the  18th.  On  the  19th  the  Sixth 
Massachusetts  regiment,  uniformed  and  armed,  under 
took  to  go  by  rail  to  Washington,  through  Baltimore. 
The  cars  containing  seven  of  the  companies  were  drawn 
by  horses  from  the  Northern  to  the  Southern  station  with 
safety.  The  mob  had  by  this  time,  however,  gathered 
in  force,  and  began  to  obstruct  the  tracks  in  the  streets, 
and  the  other  four  companies  were  compelled  to  march 
through  the  town.  The  mob  fell  upon  them  with  all 
kinds  of  missiles,  even  firing  pistols  at  them.  The 
Mayor  and  the  police  endeavored  to  disperse  the  rioters, 
but  were  unsuccessful.  The  soldiers  were  obliged  to 
take  care  of  themselves.  They  at  last  cleared  their  way 
with  bullets  and  fixed  bayonets.  Four  of  the  soldiers 
were  slain  outright,  a  dozen  or  more  of  the  rioters  were 


THE    CAPTURE   OP^   FORT   SUMTER  179 

killed,  and  a  considerable  number  of  them  wounded. 
The  regiment  reached  Washington  in  the  afternoon  of 
the  same  day,  and  with  the  eight  hundred  or  more  Penn- 
sylvanians,  some  city  volunteers,  and  General  Scott's 
five  or  six  companies  of  regulars,  placed  the  capital  out 
of  danger  of  a  surprise. 

The  events  of  the  week  from  the  twelfth  to  the  twen 
tieth  set  the  whole  country  in  commotion.  A  wave 
of  passionate  anger,  presaging  fearful  war, 
swept  over  the  North,  the  South,  and  the  these  events  on 
slaveholding  Commonwealths  which  had  not  tt 
yet  renounced  their  allegiance.  From  the  vantage  ground 
of  the  present,  we  can  easily  comprehend  the  deep  in. 
dignation  of  all  loyal  hearts.  The  flag  of  their  country 
had  been  shot  down  ;  the  authority  of  their  Government 
had  been  defied,  and  expelled  by  force  of  arms  from  a 
place  which  was  the  property  of  the  Union  ;  and  loyal 
soldiers  had  been  attacked,  maimed,  and  killed  upon  the 
soil  of  a  Commonwealth  where  they  had  every  kind  of 
right  to  be,  and  over  which  they  were  obliged  to  pass 
in  order  to  defend  the  capital  of  the  Union  against 
capture  and  destruction.  It  would  have  been,  indeed, 
a  base  and  cowardly  people  who  would  not  have  been 
stirred  to  wrathful  feeling  and  belligerent  deeds  by  such 
events. 

It  is  more  difficult  to  see  why  the  secessionists  should 
have  experienced  any  increased  resentment  toward  the 
Northern  people  and  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  on  account  of  them.  These  were  outrages  com 
mitted  by  themselves.  It  is  psychologically  true  that 
the  committers  of  outrages  usually  become  greatly  ex 
cited  against  their  victim  in  the  execution  of  their  work, 
but  the  rational  mind  can  see  no  reason  or  justice  in  it, 
though  it  may  discover  the  explanation  of  it.  And  it  is 
almost  impossible  to  comprehend  the  mental  processes  of 


180  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

the  professed  loyal  men,  in  the  slaveholding  Common 
wealths  that  had  not  before  these  events  passed  secession 
ordinances  renouncing  their  allegiance  to  the  Union, 
which  led  them  to  participate  sympathetically  in  the 
newly  excited  feelings  of  the  secessionists.  One  would 
think  now  that  those  events  ought  to  have  increased  their 
aversion  toward  the  destroyers  of  the  Union  and  have 
made  them  more  determined  in  their  loyal  attitude,  They 
did  do  so  in  Kentucky  and  Missouri  very  generally,  and 
in  some  notable  instances  in  Tennessee.  The  wonder  is 
that  they  did  not  do  so  in  all  cases.  And  the  wonder  of 
wonders  is  the  unaccountable  apostacy  of  John  Bell. 

Bell  was  the  acknowledged  leader-in-chief  of  the 
Unionists  of  the  South.  He  had  almost  evenly  divided 
The  attitude  the  popular  vote  of  the  slaveholdmg  Common- 
alter0?^  ?a!i  wea^ns  with  Breckenridge  in  the  election  of 
of  sumter.  I860.  He  made  his  campaign  upon  a  platform 
whose  only  principle  was  :  "The  Union,  the  Constitu 
tion,  and  the  enforcement  of  the  laws."  A  firm  and  de 
cided  stand  on  his  part  would  probably  have  rallied 
most  of  his  followers  in  the  slaveholding  Commonwealths 
that  had  not  then  passed  secession  ordinances  to  more 
determined  efforts  for  upholding  the  cause  of  the  Union 
in  their  midst.  At  least,  it  would  most  probably  have 
prevented  Tennessee  from  casting  her  lot  with  the  South 
ern  Confederacy.  It  was  the  grand  opportunity  of  his  life. 
Had  he  clung  to  the  principle  of  his  platform,  and  used 
his  influence  and  his  eloquence  to  inspire  his  friends  and 
followers  with  courage  and  patriotism,  he  would  not  now 
be  forgotten,  as  he  is,  but  would  be  enthroned  among 
the  heroes  of  our  national  history.  Instead  of  this 
he  crept  ignobly  into  the  secessionist  meeting  in  the 
Court  House  at  Nashville,  just  after  the  fall  of  Sumter, 
and  virtually  gave  in  his  adherence  to  secession,  while 
nominally  disapproving  it,  and  therewith  sealed  the  fate 


THE   CAPTURE   OF    FORT   SUMTEIi  181 

of  the  Union  cause  in  Tennessee  and  his  own  everlasting 
downfall.  It  was  a  sad  ending  of  a  noble  career.  He 
had  stood  firmly  against  the  repeal  of  the  Missouri  Com 
promise — that  is,  against  the  extension  of  slavery  into 
the  Territories  north  of  thirty-six  degrees  and  thirty 
minutes.  He  had  incessantly  proclaimed  that  all  differ 
ences  must  be  fought  out  and  settled  by  discussion  and 
vote  within  the  Union.  And  he  had  declared  the  Union, 
the  Constitution,  and  the  enforcement  of  the  laws  to  be 
the  fundamental  principle  of  his  political  creed.  But 
now  he  deserted  the  Administration  and  the  Union  at 
the  very  first  attempt  made  by  the  new  President,,  not 
even  to  enforce  the  laws  against  those  defying  them,  but 
only  to  protect  the  soldiers  in  the  military  posts  of  the 
Union  from  starvation  and  capture.  It  is  impossible  to 
describe  the  chagrin  and  dismay  which  overcame  the 
followers  of  this  grand  old  man  in  his  native  Common 
wealth  and  in  many  other  quarters,  when  they  learned 
that  he  had  surrendered  his  proud  leadership  in  Ten 
nessee,  and  had  himself  become  virtually  a  follower  of 
the  narrow-minded,  passionate  Governor  of  the  Com 
monwealth  who  was  bending  all  his  energies  to  commit 
Tennessee  to  secession.  They  lost  the  courage  to  resist 
the  social  persecution,  which  was  now  inaugurated  in 
Tennessee,  as  well  as  in  Virginia,  against  all  who  would 
not  declare  themselves  unreservedly  for  secession  ;  and  it 
soon  became  the  doctrine  of  the  Tennessee  secessionists 
that  those  who  would  not  join  hands  with  them  in  de 
stroying  the  Union  must  leave  the  "  State." 

The  theory  of  cowardice  is  hardly  a  satisfactory  one 
upon  which  to  account  for  the  strange  conduct  of  Mr. 
Bell.  He  was  conciliatory  in  his  habit  of  mind,  but  had 
not  been  considered  cowardly.  He  undoubtedly  reasoned 
that  a  neutral  position  on  the  part  of  the  slaveholding 
Commonwealths,  which  had  not  yet  declared  secession, 


182  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

would  avert  war,  and  give  opportunity  for  a  peaceable 
reconstruction  of  the  Union.  He  thought  that  success 
ful  war  against  the  Union  by  the  Confederacy  would  lead 
to  permanent  separation,  and  that  successful  war  by  the 
Union  against  the  Confederacy  would  lead  to  a  change 
of  the  Constitution,,  and  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the 
Commonwealths.  He  was  for  the  Union  under  the  exist 
ing  Constitution,  not  for  the  Union  under  any  constitu 
tion  which  the  necessities  of  war  might  require.  We 
can  see  how  he  thus  reconciled  his  conduct  with  the  first 
two  elements  in  his  platform-principle  :  "  The  Union, 
the  Constitution."  But  how  he  made  it  harmonize  with 
the  third  element — "  the  enforcement  of  the  laws  " — 
is  not  so  easy  to  comprehend,  that  is,  not  so  easy  from 
a  general  point  of  view.  If,  however,  we  reflect  that  to 
the  Southern  mind  in  1860,  this  phrase  meant  especial 
ly  the  enforcement  of  the  Fugitive  Slave  law,  and  the 
Kansas-Nebraska  Act  as  interpreted  in  the  Dred  Scott 
opinion,  we  may  help  ourselves  to  understand  how  Mr. 
Bell  explained  away,  to  his  own  satisfaction,  that  appar 
ently  loyal  and  patriotic  principle  for  which  he  stood  as 
a  presidential  candidate  in  1860.  We  must  do  him  the 
justice  of  believing  he  was  convinced  by  his  own  sophis 
tries.  We  must  also  do  the  Tennessee  secessionists  the 
justice  of  believing  that  they  thought  themselves  patriots 
in  now  establishing  a  reign  of  terror  over  Union  senti 
ment  in  Tennessee.  From  the  Governor  down  they  were 
men  of  narrow  mind  and  unlimited  passion.  Embol 
dened  by  the  apostacy  of  Bell  and  the  consequent  timidity 
of  those  whom  he  had  left  in  the  lurch,  they  now  tram 
pled  under  foot  every  dissent  from  their  own  views,  and 
every  man  who  dared  to  express  it. 

A  Confederate  agent  immediately  appeared  in  Nash 
ville,  and  the  Democratic  Legislature  authorized  Gov 
ernor  Harris  to  appoint  commissioners  to  negotiate  with 


THE   CAPTURE    OF   FORT   SUMTER  183 

him  a  military  alliance  between  Tennessee  and  the  Con 
federacy.   The  convention  agreed  upon  between  the  two 
parties  provided  for  the  transfer  of  the  com 
mand  of  the  military  forces  of  the  "  State"  treaty withthe 
to  the  Confederate  authorities,  and  for  the  C 
ultimate  transfer  of  all  the  munitions  of  war  in  the  pos 
session  of  the  "  State  "  to  the  Confederacy.    This  agree 
ment  was  secretly  ratified  by  the  Legislature  on  the  7th 
of  May. 

On  the  day  preceding  this  act,  the  Legislature  passed 
a  secession  ordinance,  appended  to  it  a  provision  adopt 
ing  the  constitution  of  the  Confederacy,  and  Tennessee 
submitted  both  to  a  popular  vote  to  be  taken  BecesBion- 
June  8th.  When  this  day  arrived,  the  "  State  "  had 
been  already  a  month  in  the  grasp  of  the  Confederacy, 
and  the  farce  at  the  polls  was  proclaimed  by  the  Gov 
ernor  to  have  been  an  overwhelming  ratification  of  the 
ordinance  and  of  the  Confederate  constitution.  A  few 
brave  men  among  the  Union  leaders,  such  as  Johnson, 
Etheridge,  Maynard,  Stokes,  and  Brownlow,  stuck  to 
their  principles  and  left  the  "  State,"  but  the  great 
majority  of  them  felt  compelled  to  seek  service  under 
the  Confederacy  in  order  to  prove  the  sincerity  of  their 
ignominious  conversion. 

The  secessionist  Governor  of  North  Carolina,  Ellis, 
also  seized  the  opportunity  offered  by  the  excitement 
over  the  fall  of  Sumter  to  dragoon  that  North  Caro. 
Common wealth  into  the  secession  movement.  lma  Beceseion- 
The  people  had  elected  a  large  Unionist  majority  to  a 
convention  on  the  30th  of  the  preceding  January,  and 
at  the  same  time  had  voted  against  holding  any  con 
vention.  Nevertheless  a  convention  of  the  disunionist 
minority  assembled  at  Ealeigh  on  the  22d  of  March,  and 
waited  for  the  course  of  events  to  open  a  way  for  the 
accomplishment  of  their  purpose.  It  was  probably 


184  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

with  their  approval,  and  perhaps  upon  their  advice, 
that  the  Governor  proceeded,  on  the  20th  of  April,  to 
seize  the  United  States  mint  at  Charlotte,  and,  on  the 
22d,  the  United  States  arsenal  at  Fayetteville.  He 
had  already  more  than  three  months  before  taken  pos 
session  of  the  United  States  forts  near  Beaufort  and 
Wilmington.  They  were  not,  at  the  time,  garrisoned, 
and  he  gave  it  ont  that  he  feared  their  occupation  by 
irresponsible  persons.  Ostensibly  he  had  held  them 
for  the  United  States  Government,  not  against  it.  No 
such  excuses,  however,  were  now  offered  for  the  seiz 
ures  of  the  mint  and  the  arsenal.  They  were  taken 
from  the  United  States  Government,  and  held  against 
that  Government.  The  "State"  had  not  as  yet  pre 
tended  to  have  seceded  from  the  Union.  Nothing 
therefore  distinguished  the  Governor  in  the  commission 
of  these  acts  from  a  common  robber,  except  that  they 
were  executed  by  virtue  of  the  abuse  of  his  public  pow 
ers,  and  for  what  he  considered  to  be  the  advantage  of 
the  community  over  which  he  governed.  On  the  26th 
he  proceeded  to  call  the  Legislature  for  the  purpose  of 
effecting  the  passage  of  a  secession  ordinance. 

President  Lincoln  accepted  these  movements  as  put 
ting  the  people  of  North  Carolina  in  an  attitude  of 
rebellion  to  the  Government  of  the  United 

The  Block 
ade  prociama-  States,  and,  on  the  27th,  he  issued  a  proc 
lamation,  supplementary  to  that  of  April 
19th  blockading  the  ports  of  the  seven  "States"  in 
which  conventions  had  passed  secession  ordinances,  and 
extended  this  inhibition  of  commerce  to  the  ports  of 
Virginia  and  North  Carolina. 

The  President's  proclamation  of  the  19th  had  been 
directly  evoked  by  an  order  of  the  Confederate  Govern 
ment  of  the  17th  proposing  to  use  these  ports  for  the 
fitting  out  and  commissioning  of  privateers  to  prey 


90* 


The  Bloc 


70' 


i  Coast. 


THE   CAPTURE   OF   FORT   SUMTER  185 

upon  the  commerce  of  the  United  States.  The  Con 
federates  represented  Mr.  Lincoln's  proclamation  as  in 
volving  a  recognition  of  belligerent  rights  and  of  in 
dependence.  Mr.  Seward,  on  the  other  hand,  instructed 
the  ministers  of  the  United  States  to  foreign  nations  to 
say  that  it  was  meant  simply  as  a  means  of  suppressing 
insurrection.  The  text  of  the  proclamation  supports 
this  interpretation.  It  declares  the  amenability  of 
persons  acting  under  the  letters  of  marque  of  the  Con 
federate  President  to  the  laws  of  the  United  States  in 
reference  to  the  crime  of  piracy. 

The  North  Carolina  Legislature  made  a  great  ado 
over  the  supplementary  proclamation  of  the  27th,  ex 
tending  the  blockade  to  the  ports  in  /that  North  caro- 
Common wealth.  It  immediately  issued  the  lina  secession, 
call  for  a  convention,  ordered  the  election  of  delegates 
to  the  convention  upon  the  13th  of  the  following 
month  (May),  and  fixed  the  date  of  its  assembly  for  the 
20th.  It  sent  a  representative  to  the  Confederate  Con 
gress,  and  the  lower  house  of  the  body  passed  a  reso 
lution  declaring  that  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  in  blockading  the  ports  of  North  Carolina,  had 
assigned  North  Carolina  to  the  position  of  a  foreign 
country,  and  had  declared  war  upon  her,  and  authoriz 
ing  the  Governor  "  to  use  all  the  powers  of  the  State, 
civil  and  military,"  to  protect  its  citizens  and  defend 
its  honor. 

The  view  which  the  leaders  in  North  Carolina  then 
imposed  upon  the  people  with  every  violence  of  speech 
and  act  was  that  Mr.  Lincoln  had  overturned  the  Con 
stitution  of  the  United  States,  assumed  a  military  dic 
tatorship,  expelled  them  from  the  Union  and  from  the 
protection  of  its  laws,  and  was  proceeding  to  destroy 
them  by  means  of  the  ravages  of  war  and  slave  insurrec 
tion.  The  Union  sentiment  was  thus  suppressed  and 


186  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

reduced  to  silence,  and  the  convention  accomplished  its 
mad  work  on  the  very  day  of  its  assembly,  and  with  per 
fect  unanimity. 

Arkansas  was  borne  along  even  more  swiftly  by  the 
force  of  this  insane  excitement.  The  convention  called 
secession  in  bj  ner  Legislature  to  consider  secession  had 
Arkansas.  assembled  in  the  early  days  of  March,  and 
after  having  listened  to  propositions  from  the  Confeder 
ate  President  had  voted  not  to  pass  a  secession  ordinance. 
It  had  resolved,  however,  to  submit  its  action  to  the  peo 
ple  at  the  polls  on  the  first  da}7"  of  the  following  August. 
It  had  then  adjourned  to  the  17th  of  August,  to  await 
the  decision  of  the  voters  upon  the  subject. 

Upon  the  fall  of  Sumter  and  the  call  for  troops  to 
suppress  the  rebellion,  the  convention  immediately  re 
assembled.  The  Union  sentiment  was  suppressed  by  the 
same  sophistries,  expressed  and  impressed  in  the  same 
violent  and  brutal  ways  as  obtained  in  Tennessee  and 
North  Carolina.  On  the  6th  of  May  the  convention 
passed  the  secession  ordinance,  with  only  a  single  voice 
and  vote  raised  against  it. 

It  was  the  well  laid,  and,  to  a  degree,  well  developed 
plan  of  the  secessionists  to  secure  the  passage  of  secession 
.  .  ordinances  in  Missouri  and  Kentucky  also  by 
Missouri  at-  the  help  of  the  Sumter  excitement.  The 
Governor  of  Missouri  and  a  majority  of  the 
Legislature  were  favorable  to  secession.  They  assisted 
in  the  development  of  the  movement  through  January 
and  February,  and,  when  they  thought  the  time  was 
ripe,  the  Legislature  issued,  on  January  16th,  its  call  for 
the  convention.  To  their  great  surprise  an  overwhelm 
ing  majority  of  the  delegates  chosen  were  Unionists.  In 
fact  when  the  convention  assembled,  on  the  28th  of  Feb 
ruary,  not  a  single  one  of  the  members  declared  for  se 
cession.  It  passed  a  resolution  against  secession,  elected 


THE   CAPTURE   OF    FORT   SUMTER  187 

delegates  to  the  "border  States  "  convention  proposed 
by  the  Legislature  of  Kentucky,  and,  on  March  22d 
adjourned  to  meet  again  in  the  following  December, 
unless  called  together  earlier  by  the  committee  chosen 
by  it  and  vested  by  it  with  this  power  in  any  emergency 
which  might  seem  to  its  members  to  require  immediate 
action. 

During  all  this  time  the  Governor,  Mr.  Jackson,  had 
been  devising  a  scheme  for  getting  hold  of  the  United 
States  arsenal  at  St.  Louis.  But  fortunately  for  the 
Union  cause  there  was  a  stanch  loyalist  in  St.  Louis  at 
this  time  who  more  than  equalled  the  Governor  in  the 
craft  of  politics,  as  well  as  in  intelligence,  courage,  and 
resoluteness.  This  was  Francis  Preston  Blair,  Jr.,  the 
brother  of  Montgomery  Blair,  Mr.  Lincoln's  Postmaster- 
General. 

As  far  back  as  January  the  Governor  began  an  attempt 
to  corrupt  the  commandant  of  the  arsenal.  This  was 
quickly  reported  in  Washington  with  the  result  that  the 
commandant  was  changed  and  the  garrison  at  the  arsenal 
re-enforced.  Then  the  secessionists  began  the  organiza 
tion  of  armed  clubs,  under  the  title  of  "Minute  Men," 
for  the  purpose  of  capturing  the  arsenal.  Blair  and  the 
Unionists  formed,  in  counter  movement,  a  committee  of 
safety  and  proceeded  to  organize  companies  of  "  Home 
Guards,"  for  the  defence  of  the  arsenal. 

Upon  the  incoming  of  the  new  Administration,  with 
his  brother  in  the  Cabinet,  Mr.  Blair  was  able  to  have  a 
most  capable  and  patriotic  man,  Captain  Na- 

•    IT  .     .     n  i    •       oj          Secession 

thaniel  Lvon,  appointed  commandant  in  bt.   in  Missouri 

T  i        'ii     T  •  ±*i        •>  J.T         foiled. 

Louis,  and  with  Lyon  in  authority  over  the 
military  of  the  United  States  in  the  city,  and  his  com 
mittee  of  safety,  and  his  influence  in  Washington,  Blair 
was  able  to  foil  the  Governor  and  the  Legislature  and 
their  secessionist  support  in  all  their  schemes  for  the 


188  THE    CIVIL    WAR 

capture  of  the  arsenal,  and  the  commitment  of  Missouri 
to  the  Confederate  cause. 

The  Unionists  had,  however,  a  very  serious  struggle 

to  maintain  their  ground  when  the  excitement  over  the 

The  etru     ^a^  °^  Sumter  an(l  the  call  for  troops  swept 

gie  between  over  the  land.    As  we  have  seen,  the  Govern- 

the    Unionists 

and  the  seces-  or  refused  the  call  in  terms  of  insult  to  the 
the8faii  oef  President,  as  well  as  disloyalty  to  the  Union. 
Blair  and  the  committee  of  safety  went  to 
work,  however,  enlisting  volunteers.  The  Governor,  on 
his  part,  began  the  establishment  of  a  "  State  "  camp  in 
the  suburbs  of  the  city  under  the  direction  of  his  "  State  " 
Brigadier-General  Frost.  His  purpose  from  the  first 
was,  undoubtedly,  the  seizure  of  the  arsenal.  During 
the  last  week  of  April  he  was  in  communication  with 
the  Confederate  President,  asking  for  arms  with  which 
to  attack  the  troops  of  the  United  States  in  the  arsenal. 
In  the  night  of  the  8th  of  May,  cannon,  muskets,  and 
ammunition  sent  by  order  of  the  Confederate  President 
actually  arrived  in  St.  Louis  by  steamer  from  New  Or 
leans.  Blair  and  the  committee  of  safety  allowed  them 
to  be  taken  without  opposition  to  Camp  Jackson,  in  or 
der  to  have  certain  proof  of  the  treasonable  designs  of 
the  Governor  and  his  General. 

Meanwhile  President  Lincoln  had  authorized  Blair 
and  his  committee  to  proclaim  martial  law  in  St.  Louis, 
if  they  deemed  it  necessary,  and  to  create  a  military  force 
of  not  more  than  ten  thousand  men  under  their  com 
mand,  to  act  with  Lyon  and  his  regulars  in  the  arsenal. 

The  day  following  the  arrival  of  the  arms,  Captain 
Lyon  went  out  to  Camp  Jackson  incognito.  He  saw 
the  arms  sent  by  the  Confederate  Government,  and  other 
most  convincing  proofs  of  the  disloyalty  of  the  Governor 
and  General  Frost.  On  the  next  day,  May  10th,  Lyon 
proceeded  with  his  forces  to  surround  the  camp,  and 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  SUMTER      189 

demand  its  surrender.  He  had  planned  his  attack  so 
well  and  so  quietly  that  success  was  certain.  Frost 
surrendered  without  the  firing  of  a  single  musket.  On 
the  way  back  to  the  arsenal,  however,  with  his  prisoners, 
Lyon  was  set  upon  by  a  secessionist  mob,  and  it  became 
necessary  to  allow  his  troops  to  fire  in  self -protection. 
Ten  or  fifteen  persons  were  killed,  and  quite  a  number 
wounded.  The  excitement  in  the  city  became  very 
intense.  Unfortunately  in  the  height  of  it,  General 
Harney,  the  commander  of  the  military  department  in 
which  St.  Louis  was  situated,  arrived  upon  the  scene. 

General  Harney  was  a  genuinely  loyal  man,  but  he 
was  one  of  those  mild,  conservative,  urbane  gentlemen, 
who  are  very  slow  to  suspect  deceit  and  treachery,  and 
very  prone  to  attribute  to  all  men  the  uprightness  of 
which  they  themselves  are  conscious  in  their  own  hearts. 
Harney  was  Lyon's  superior  in  command,  of  course,  and 
was  a  favorite  with  General  Scott,  the  Commander-in- 
chief  of  the  United  States  army.  He  immediately  man 
ifested  his  disposition  to  listen  to  the  representations 
of  Frost,  Price  and  others  of  the  opponents  of  Blair  and 
Lyon,  who  declared  that  they  had  no  disloyal  purposes 
in  assembling  the  militia  around  St.  Louis. 

Blair  and  Lyon  knew  that  Harney  was  being  deceived, 
and  when  he  began  to  speak  of  disbanding  the  "  Home 
Guards  "  which  the  President  had  authorized  Blair>  Lyon 
them  to  organize,  they  sent  a  deputation  to  and  Haruey- 
Washington  to  confer  with  the  President.  The  other 
side  also  sent  representatives.  Blair's  brother  in  the  Cab 
inet  espoused  the  cause  of  the  one  faction,  while  Bates, 
the  Attorney-General,  also  a  Missouri  man,  was  inclined 
to  favor  the  other.  Mr.  Lincoln,  with  his  unfailing  sagac 
ity,  saw  the  situation  as  it  was,  and  determined  to  sus 
tain  Blair  and  Lyon.  He  relieved  Harney,  raised  Lyon 
to  the  rank  of  a  brigadier-general,  and  put  him.  in  corn- 


190  THE   CIVIL   WAE 

mand  at  St.  Louis.  The  President  did  not  announce  his 
determinations  to  the  public  immediately,  but  sent  them 
in  confidence  to  Mr.  Blair,  and  wrote  him  to  allow  Harney 
to  remain  in  command  unless  or  until  it  should  become 
necessary  in  his  judgment  to  remove  him.  Mr.  Blair 
held  the  President's  order  from  the  18th  of  May  until 
the  30th,  during  which  period  it  became  entirely  mani 
fest  to  Blair  and  his  friends  that  Jackson,  Frost,  Price, 
and  the  Missouri  Legislature,  then  assembled  at  Jeffer 
son  City,  were  preparing  for  armed  rebellion,  and  that 
Harney  was  almost  oblivious  to  the  fact,  and  was  allow 
ing  the  moments  during  which  their  plans  might  be 
frustrated  to  slip  by  unimproved.  On  the  30th  of  May 
Blair  determined  to  delay  no  longer,  and  delivered  to 
Harney  the  President's  order  of  the  16th,  relieving  him 
and  putting  Lyon  in  command. 

Jackson  and  Price  now  sought  an  interview  with 
Blair  and  Lyon.  This  occurred  at  St.  Louis,  on  the  llth 
of  June.  Jackson  demanded  that  the  "  Home  Guards" 
should  be  disbanded,  and  that  no  more  United  States 
soldiers  should  be  placed  in  Missouri.  Lyon  on  the  other 
hand  demanded  the  dissolution  of  the  "  State  Guards  " 
and  the  abandonment  of  the  project  for  organizing  the 
military  dictatorship  of  the  Governor  over  the  Common 
wealth.  He  also  declared  that  the  United  States  Gov 
ernment  would  not  yield  its  constitutional  rights  to  march 
its  soldiers  into  or  through  the  Commonwealth,  and 
station  them  therein,  according  to  its  own  discretion. 
The  Governor  and  his  attendant,  General  Price,  pro 
nounced  the  attitude  assumed  by  Blair  and  Lyon  to  be 
a  declaration  of  war  upon  Missouri.  They  returned  in 
haste  to  Jefferson  City,  ordering  the  railroad  bridges  to 
be  burned  behind  them.  Arriving  there,  the  Governor 
published  the  results  of  the  interview  at  St.  Louis  and 
called  for  fifty  thousand  men  to  take  arms  in  the  ser- 


THE   CAPTURE   OF   FORT   SUMTER  191 

vice  of  the  ' f  State  "  against  the  United  States  Govern 
ment.  The  Governor  drew  a  distinction  between  the 
constitutional  requirements  of  the  Federal  Government, 
which  it  was  the  duty  of  the  citizens  of  Missouri  to 
obey,  and  "  the  unconstitutional  edicts  of  the  military 
despotism  "  enthroned  at  Washington,  which  they  were 
obligated  to  resist.  But  no  Unionist  was  deceived  by 
such  contradictions,  however  much  the  Governor  might 
deceive  himself  by  them.  Lyon  followed  them  with  a 
strong  force  by  steamer  up  the  Missouri  River,  and,  on 
the  15th  (June),  took  possession  of  the  capital  of  the 
Commonwealth.  Missouri  was  now  in  the  hands  of  the 
United  States  army. 

The  convention  which  had  adjourned,  as  we  have 
seen,  the  preceding  March,  after  having  appointed  a 
committee  with  power  to  call  its  members  together 
again  upon  an  emergency,  was  now  summoned  by  this 
committee.  It  assembled  on  the  22d  of  July  and  be 
fore  the  end  of  the  month  it  had  established  a  loyal 
Commonwealth  government  in  Missouri.  With  this  the 
position  of  Missouri  was  definitely  determined,  and  the 
danger  of  the  enactment  of  a  secession  ordinance  by 
any  body  of  men  entitled  to  claim  to  represent  the 
"  State  "  was  entirely  averted. 

It  was  the  attitude  of  Kentucky,  however,  which, 
next  to  that  of  Maryland,  gave  Mr.  Lincoln  the  greatest 
concern.  Besides  its  inestimable  value  from  Attem  tg  at 
political  and  strategic  points  of  view,  it  was  secession  in 

.  .    .  .  Kentucky. 

the  "  State  of  his  nativity,  and  his  strongly  The  attitude 
sentimental  nature  made  him  regard  its  soil  meit8  iSTof 
and  its  inhabitants  with  particular  affection. 
The  government  of  the  Commonwealth,  in  both  the 
legislative  and  executive  branches,  was  in  the  hands  of 
the  Breckenridge  Democrats  at  the  moment  of  the  at 
tack  upon  Sumter,  and  the  Governor,  Beriah  Magoffin, 


192  THE    CIVIL    WAR 

refused,  in  insulting  language,  President  Lincoln's  call 
upon  him  for  Kentucky's  quota  of  the  militia  to  sup 
press  insurrection  and  enforce  the  laws.  The  President 
had  faith,  however,  that  the  feeling  of  the  great  mass  of 
the  people  was  with  him,  and  he  determined  so  to  act  as 
to  give  time  and  opportunity  for  the  Union  sentiment 
to  develop  into  intelligent  opinion  and  settled  purpose. 
The  prevailing  notion  in  Kentucky,  at  the  moment, 
was  that  the  "  State "  should  remain  neutral  in  the 
impending  struggle,  and  refuse  to  allow  the  troops  of 
either  the  United  States  or  the  Confederate  States  to 
enter  its  limits.  Even  the  strongest  Unionists  did  not 
seem  to  perceive,  at  the  moment,  that  this  would  mean 
aid  to  the  Confederacy,  by  defending  the  secessionist 
"  States"  against  the  approach  of  the  authorities  of  the 
Union.  Even  John  J.  Crittenden  reasoned,  at  first, 
that,  if  Kentucky  and  the  other  "  border  States  "  should 
assume  this  attitude,  war  between  the  two  sections 
would  be  averted,  and  the  "Confederate  States,"  after  a 
few  years  of  trial  with  their  experiment,  would  return 
voluntarily  to  the  Union.  He  went  so  far,  at  first,  as  to 
approve  of  the  Governor's  refusal  of  the  militia  on  the 
President's  call,  although  he  took  pains  to  explain  his 
position,  and  that  of  those  who  thought  with  him,  to 
the  Government  at  Washington,  with  very  different 
reasons  from  those  advanced  by  the  Governor.  He 
wrote  to  General  Scott  that  while  Kentucky  regret 
ted  the  language  of  her  Governor's  answer  to  the  Pres 
ident,  she  ft  acquiesced  in  his  declining  to  furnish  the 
troops  called  for,  and  she  did  so,  not  because  she  loved 
the  Union  the  less,  but  she  feared  that  if  she  parted 
with  those  troops,  and  sent  them  to  serve  in  your  ranks, 
she  would  have  been  overwhelmed  by  the  secessionists 
at  home  and  severed  from  the  Union  ;  and  it  was  to 
preserve  substantially  and  ultimately  our  connection 


THE   CAPTURE    OF    FORT   SUMTER  193 

with  the  Union  that  induced  us  to  acquiesce  in  the  par 
tial  infraction  of  it  by  our  Governor's  refusal  of  the 
troops  required."  The  confusion  of  the  thought  in  this 
proposition  is  made  very  manifest  in  the  confusion  of 
the  grammar  in  which  it  is  expressed.  Still  it  held 
sway  over  the  minds  of  most,  and  of  many  of  the  best. 

The  President's  policy  toward  Kentucky  was,  if  not 
dictated,  very  largely  determined  by  these  views  of  the 
prominent  Unionists  in  the  Commonwealth.  The 
He  saw  that  he  must  so  shape  the  course  of  ^wini 
the  Administration  as  to  force  the  disloyal  tucky- 
men  in  Kentucky  to  show  their  hands.  When  they 
should  reveal  their  purpose,  which  the  President  fully 
understood,  of  making  Kentucky  a  bulwark  and  a  bat 
tle-ground  for  the  Confederates,  Mr.  Lincoln  had  full 
faith  that  the  Unionists  would  then,  themselves,  call  the 
armies  of  the  Union  to  their  rescue.  His  idea  was  sim 
ply  to  put  himself  in  a  position  to  answer  the  call, 
promptly  and  vigorously.  He  did  not,  of  course,  con 
sider  himself  under  any  legal  obligation  to  await  the 
call,  but  only  thought  best  to  do  so,  unless  it  should  be 
too  long  delayed.  Early  in  May,  he  selected  a  brilliant 
young  Kentuckian,  William  Nelson,  at  the  William 
moment  a  capable  naval  officer,  and,  giving  Nel80n- 
him  leave  of  absence  from  duty  in  the  navy,  sent  him  to 
Louisville,  with  the  understanding  that  he  should  un 
dertake  the  military  organization  of  the  Unionists  in 
central  Kentucky.  Arms  were  sent  to  him  for  distribu 
tion  among  them. 

The  President  also  sent  another  noted  Kentuckian, 
Major  Robert  Anderson,  the  late  commander  at  Fort 
Sumter,  the  best  known  military  character  M  An_ 
in  the  country,  at  the  moment,  to  Cincinnati,  aerson  atcin- 

J  ,  cmnati. 

with  the  authority  to  receive  volunteers  from 
Kentucky  and  Virginia  into  the  United  States  service. 
VOL.  I.— 13 


194  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

A  little  later  the  President  commissioned  the  brilliant 
young  Unionist  of  the  Kentucky  Senate,  L.  H.  Rous- 
L.  H.  ROUS-  seau,  to  raise  and  organize  a  brigade  of  Ken- 
tuckians  for  the  United  States  army.  Gen 
eral  Rousseau  established  his  camp,  "  Joe  Holt,"  across 
the  Ohio  River  on  Indiana  soil. 

While  these  movements  were  in  progress  the  Legislat 
ure  was  again  in  session,  upon  the  call  of  the  Governor, 
Manifests-  who  now  showed  his  disloyalty  with  distinct- 
goffln'°diBioyl  ness  to  a11  wno  would  see  it.  He  declared 
ai  purposes.  ^^  ^]ie  "[Inion  was  already  dissolved,  and 
that  the  Government  at  Washington  was  a  usurpation. 
He  again  recommended  the  arming  of  the  militia,  under 
the  "  State  Guard "  organization,  commanded  by  his 
military  man,  Simon  B.  Buckner,  and  the  calling  of 
the  "sovereign  convention"  of  the  "  State,"  the  body 
which  should  determine,  in  his  view,  the  attitude  which 
the  "State"  would  take  in  the  impending  conflict.  It 
was  charged  that  he  applied  to  the  Confederate  Govern 
ment  at  Montgomery  for  arms. 

The  Legislature,  however,  remained  loyal ;  repudiated 
his  pronunciamento  against  the  Washington  Govern 
ment  ;  refused  to  call  a  convention  ;  rejected 
of  the  Legis-  his  demand  for  three  millions  of  money  with 
which  to  purchase  arms,  accoutrements,  and 
ammunition  for  his  "  State  Guards"  ;  and  passed  a  law 
requiring  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  Union  from  every 
member  of  the  "  State  Guards,"  and  authorizing  the 
organization  of  the  loyal  "Home  Guards."  It  still  pro 
posed  to  use  these  only  in  defence  of  the  neutrality  of 
the  "  State,"  it  is  true  ;  but  these  measures  had  the  effect 
of  preventing  the  success  of  any  attempt  to  pass  a  seces 
sion  ordinance,  and  of  purging  the  "State  Guards"  or 
ganization,  and  of  organizing  the  militia  in  the  loyal 
"Home  Guards." 


THE   CAPTURE   OF    FORT   SUMTER  195 

The  month  of  May  passed  while  these  movements  were 
heing  accomplished.     The  "border  State"  Peace  con 
ference,  presided   over   by   Mr.    Crittenden,      The 
was  held.     The  Legislature  adjourned.     The  of  events  dur- 

,,..,!  ,-,        ing  May. 

secessionists  were  gathering  in  the  south 
western  portion  of  the  Commonwealth,  and  the  Union 
ists  were  getting  complete  control  in  the  other  portions. 
Still  no  United  States  troops  were  on  Kentucky  soil,  but 
many  Kentuckians  had  volunteered  their  services  to  the 
Union,  and  were  organizing  and  drilling  in  the  camps 
just  across  the  Ohio.  The  conservative  Unionists  were 
becoming  convinced  that  the  neutrality  of  Kentucky 
would  be  an  impossibility,  and  that  Kentucky  would  be 
obliged  to  fight  on  the  one  side  or  the  other. 

The  election  of  members  of  Congress  from  Kentucky 
for  the  special  session  of  that  body  called  by  the  Presi 
dent  to  meet  on  the  4th  of  July  was  now  at  Tne  union- 
hand.  All  felt  that  the  crisis  in  Kentucky's  gfngrSonal 
affairs  had  arrived.  The  Unionists  went  delegation, 
boldly  into  the  contest,  and,  after  a  three  weeks'  cam 
paign  of  a  most  exciting  character,  won  nine  of  the  ten 
seats.  Kentucky  might  still,  by  the  fortunes  of  war,  be 
made  a  temporary  battle-ground,  but  there  was  now  no 
further  danger  of  a  secession  ordinance,  or  of  the  dis 
loyal  ty  of  her  inhabitants.  If  any  of  them  should  choose 
to  throw  in  their  lots  with  the  Confederates,  they  would 
have  to  do  it  without  the  justification  or  excuse  of  "going 
with  their  State,"  that  is,  they  would  have  to  accept  the 
character  of  unmitigated  rebels  against  their  own  de 
facto  and  de  jure  "  State  "  government,  as  well  as  against 
the  National  Government.  Mr.  Lincoln  was  profoundly 
gratified  with  the  result,  and  now  felt  certain  that  the 
northern  boundary  of  the  Confederacy  could  not  be  fur 
ther  advanced.  He  could  now,  at  last,  clearly  estimate 
the  territorial  extent  of  the  rebellion. 


196  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

When  the  Massachusetts  regiment  left  Baltimore  in 
the  afternoon  of  April  19th,  the  city  was  virtually  in  the 

Thesitua  ^ianc^s  °^  ^ie  secessionist  mob.  At  about  four 
tion  in  Mary-  o'clock  they  held  a  mass-meeting  and  mani 
fested  such  strength  and  determination  that 
the  authorities,  both  of  the  city  and  the  Commonwealth, 
were  terrorized  into  obedience  to  them,  where  they  were 
not  already  in  sympathy  with  them.  Even  the  Governor, 
Mr.  Hicks,  though  loyal  to  the  Union  and  the  Govern 
ment,  gave  way  before  the  storm  of  disunion  so  far  as  to 
address  the  meeting,  and  to  say  :  "I  bow  in  submission 
to  the  people.  ...  I  will  suffer  my  right  arm  to  be 
torn  from  my  body  before  I  will  raise  it  to  strike  a  sister 
State/'  The  Mayor  had  gone  even  further,  and  had  in 
formed  the  crowd  that  an  understanding  had  been  con 
cluded  between  the  Maryland  authorities  and  the  presi 
dent  of  the  Philadelphia  and  Baltimore  Railroad  company 
to  the  effect  that  no  more  troops  would  be  brought  over 
the  line  without  the  consent  of  these  authorities. 

About  midnight  the  Mayor,  Mr.   Brown,  the  Police 

Marshal,  Mr.  Kane,  and  the  Police  commissioners  held 

a  conclave,  and  resolved  upon  the  destruction 

The  burning  .;  . 

of  the  railroad  oi  the  railroad  bridges  on  the  lines  between 
Baltimore  and  the  North.  Before  daylight 
three  bridges  on  the  Philadelphia  line  and  three  on  the 
Harrisburg  line  had  been  burned  by  their  emissaries. 
The  party  which  did  the  work  on  one  of  the  lines  was 
led  by  the  Police  Marshal  himself,  who  in  the  midst  of 
his  nefarious  work  sent  a  telegram  to  the  notorious 
secessionist  of  Frederick,  Bradley  T.  Johnson,  exhorting 
him  to  "send  expresses  over  the  mountains  and  valleys 
of  Maryland  and  Virginia  for  the  riflemen  to  come  with 
out  delay,"  and  declaring  that  "  further  hordes  will  be 
down  upon  us  to-morrow,"  and  that  "  we  will  fight  them, 
and  whip  them,  or  die." 


THE    CAPTURE    OF   FORT   SUMTKIi  197 

The  burning  of  these  bridges,  severing  the  National 
Capital  from  the  source  of  its  defence  against  capture, 
was  an  act  of  veritable  treason,  committed  by  the  mu 
nicipal  authorities  of  Baltimore,  and  not  simply  by  pri 
vate  persons.  These  authorities  claimed  that  Governor 
Hicks  joined  in  the  resolution.  Jle  denied  it.  If,  how 
ever,  lie  did,  then  the  Commonwealth  government  was 
involved  in  the  treason.  Exact  political  and  legal  logic 
would  have  required  the  immediate  seizure  of  the  city, 
and  all  other  necessary  points  by  the  troops  of  the  United 
States,  the  establishment  of  martial  law  over  them,  the 
arrest  of  all  persons  concerned  in  the  treasonable  act, 
and  the  trial  of  them  under  the  processes  of  the  crimi 
nal  law  of  the  United  States,  if  not  under  the  processes 
of  martial  law.  But  the  Government  at  Washington  did 
not  have,  at  the  moment,  the  necessary  physical  power 
to  assert  its  just  authority. 

On  the  day  following  the  rebellious  outbreak  in  Bal 
timore,  Governor  Hicks  telegraphed  to  the  Secretary  of 
War  that  the  secessionists  had  the  upper  hand  in  the 
city,  and  that  he  thought  it  prudent  to  decline,  for  the 
time  being,  the  President's  call  for  the  four  regiments 
of  Maryland  militia.  lie  had  no  more  power  to  do  that 
than  a  general  in  the  "regular  army  had  to  decline  the 
order  of  the  President  to  bring  his  detachment  to  Wash 
ington.  His  refusal  to  obey  the  President's  command 
in  regard  to  this  matter,  no  matter  how  mildly  and 
tentatively  expressed,  made  him  subject,  in  sound  ju 
risprudence,  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court-martial. 
The  demoralization,  the  perfect  bewilderment,  of 
thought  upon  this  subject,  as  well  as  upon  almost  every 
other  public  relation,  which  obtained  in  the  so-called 
"  border  States,"  as  well  as  in  the  "  States  "  that  had 
passed  secession  ordinances,  are  a  speaking  testimony 
of  the  growth  of  the  Confederate  theory  of  the  Consti- 


198  THE    CIVIL    WAR 

tution  during  the  forty  years  between  1820  and  I860. 
It  is  doubtful  if  Mr.  Lincoln  himself  and  his  chief  ad 
visers  realized  the  enormity  of  the  offence  which  these 
"  border  State  "  governors  had  committed  in  refusing 
to  obey  the  President's  order  to  send  forward  the  troops 
under  their  respective  commands,  and  in  assuming  to 
declare  their  respective  "  States  "  neutral  in  the  strug 
gle  of  the  Government  to  maintain  the  Union  and  en 
force  the  laws.  And  it  is  also  doubtful  if  he  and  they 
realized  the  character  and  extent  of  the  President's 
power  in  dealing  with  such  conduct.  The  widespread 
demoralization  in  thought  and  reasoning  had  not  left 
them  entirely  untouched.  The  President  did,  how 
ever,  upon  hearing  of  the  measures  taken  by  the  Mary 
land  authorities  to  prevent  the  passage  of  any  more 
troops  across  the  Commonwealth,  order  a  despatch  to  be 
sent  to  the  president  of  the  Philadelphia  and  Wilming 
ton  Railroad,  instructing  him  that  Governor  Hicks  had 
no  authority  to  forbid  the  soil  of  Maryland  to  troops 
coming  to  Washington  under  the  orders  of  the  Presi 
dent  of  the  United  States,  and  commanding  him  to 
send  them  on  prepared  to  fight  their  wray  through,  if 
necessary. 

On  the  same  day,  the  20th,  a  committee  of  Balti- 
moreans  appeared  in  Washington  bringing  a  request  to 
The  request  the  President  from  Hicks  and  Brown  that 
iiici°svetonthe  no  more  troops  should  be  led  through  Balti- 
m°re.  The  President  consulted  General 
Scott  and  tlien  rePlied  tliat  lie  would  make 
no  point  of  marching  the  soldiers  through 
Baltimore,  but  would  order  them  to  proceed  around 
the  city.  The  committee  apparently  assented  to  this 
proposition,  but  upon  the  return  of  its  members  to 
Baltimore,  they  were  repudiated  by  the  secessionists 
for  not  having  refused  their  consent  to  the  march  of  the 


THE   CAPTURE    OF    FOKT   SUMTER  199 

troops  through  any  part  of  Maryland.  The  secession 
ists  then  sent  two  new  men  to  Washington  to  make  fur 
ther  demands  of  the  President.  Mr.  Lincoln  preferred 
to  deal  with  the  highest  authorities,  and  sent  a  despatch 
to  Hicks  and  Brown  requesting  their  presence  at  the 
White  Plouse. 

In  the  meantime  the  loyal  and  capable  presidents  of 
the  Philadelphia  and  Wilmington  and  the  Pennsylvania 
Central  Railroads,  Felton  and  Thomson,  had  The  Prepi_ 
devised  a  route  by  rail  to  Perry  ville,  at  the  dent's  answer, 
head  of  the  Chesapeake  Bay,  thence  by  water  to  An 
napolis,  and  thence  by  rail  again  to  Washington  ;  and 
when  Brown  with  three  friends,  Hicks  having  excused 
himself,  arrived  in  Washington,  the  President  told  them 
that  the  troops  must  come  to  Washington  ;  that  they 
would  be  brought  either  by  the  Perryville-Annapolis 
route,  or  from  Harrisburg  and  marched  around  Balti 
more,  provided  no  obstacles  should  be  placed  in  their 
way,  but  that  if  any  should  be,  they  would  be  ordered 
to  select  their  own  route,  and  fight  their  way  through, 
if  necessary.  Brown  and  his  friends  were  thus  com 
pelled  to  assent  to  the  President's  proposition. 

This  interview  took  place  in  the  forenoon  of  the  21st, 
and  these  gentlemen  left  the  White  House  to  return  to 
Baltimore.     In  less  than  two  hours  they  were 
back  again  with  the  story  that  three  thousand   second  visit  to 

r,       -,  M1  ,,»,  the  President. 

troops  were  at  (Jockeysville,  some  ntteen 
miles  north  of  Baltimore,  on  the  railroad  to  Harrisburg, 
and  that  the  people  were  rising  to  attack  them.  The 
President  sent  an  order  to  these  troops  to  return  to 
Harrisburg,  despite  the  fact  of  their  sore  need  in  Wash 
ington. 

By  this  time  the  people  of  the  North  had  become 
thoroughly  angered  by  the  treasonable  threats  and  deeds 
of  the  Marylanders.  The  idea  that  the  loyal  soldiers 


200  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

should  be  forbidden  to  pass  over  any  route  in  going  to 

the  defence  of  the  capital  against  seizure  by  rebels  was  in- 

tolerable.    The  people  were  fast  approaching 

anger  aroused  the  resolution  to  £0  in  a  mass,  of  their  own 

by  the    situa-  ,.  ,  ,c  ,       ,       ' 

tion  in  Mary-   motion,  and  march  rough  shod  over  any  op 
position  which  might  be  placed  in  their  way. 
Already,  however,  on  the  19th  and  20th,  the  Eighth 
Massachusetts  regiment  under  Butler,  and  the  Seventh 
The  Ei  hth  -^ew  York  under  Lefferts,  both  crack  regi- 
Magsachusetts  ments  of  good  fighters,  led  by  brave  and  cap- 
seventh  New  able  commanders,  had  arrived  at  Philadelphia, 

York    on    the     ,-,     ,-,  j-i-j.ii-  j_      T»  -n 

way  to  Wash-  Butler  proceeded  with  his  men  to  Perryville, 
took  possession  of  the  ferry-boat  Maryland, 
and,  embarking  his  soldiers  upon  her,  steamed  down  the 
bay  to  Annapolis.  Lefferts  procured  the  steamer  Boston 
at  Philadelphia,  and  went  with  his  regiment  down  the 
Delaware  intending  to  proceed  to  Fortress  Monroe  and 
up  the  Potomac  to  Washington.  He  found,  however, 
that  the  ascent  of  the  Potomac  might  be  hazardous,  and 
steamed  up  the  Chesapeake  to  Annapolis.  He  arrived  in 
the  harbor  on  the  morning  of  the  22d,  and  found  But 
ler  and  his  men  there.  They  had  been  there  for  more 
than  twenty-four  hours,  but  had  not  attempted  to  land. 
Governor  Hicks  was  in  the  city,  and  he  and  the  Mayor 
were  endeavoring  to  dissuade  Butler  from  landing. 
Hicks  wrote  again  to  President  Lincoln  requesting  that 
no  more  troops  be  brought  through  Maryland,  and  that 
those  on  the  boats  in  the  harbor  of  Annapolis  be  ordered 
away.  The  President  received  this  letter  just  after  he 
had  learned  that  the  secessionists  in  Baltimore  had  taken 
possession  of  the  telegraph  offices  in  that  city,  and  had 
cut  Washington  off  from  telegraphic  communication  with 
the  North.  At  this  same  juncture  another  Baltimore 
committee  called  upon  him,  and  proposed  to  him  to 
solve  the  difficulties  by  acknowledging  the  independence 


THE   CAPTURE   OF    FORT   SUMTER  201 

of  the  Southern  Confederacy.  The  President's  indigna 
tion  was  roused  to  a  high  pitch.  He  refused  promptly 
Hicks's  requests,  and  told  the  committee  that  he  should 
bring  the  troops  through  Maryland,  and  that  if  they 
should  be  attacked  they  would  return  the  blow  with 
severity. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  22(1,  Butler  and  Lefferts 
disembarked  their  troops  at  Annapolis  without  resist 
ance.  They  remained  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  city 
during  the  next  day,  when  four  more  regiments  arrived 
in  the  harbor.  On  the  same  day  messengers  from  Gen 
eral  Scott  made  their  way  through  to  Annapolis.  They 
brought  orders  to  Butler  to  hold  possession  of  Annap 
olis,  but  to  send  most  of  the  troops  to  Washington. 

In  the  morning  of  the  24th,  the  Eighth  Massachusetts 
and  the  Seventh  New  York  regiments  started  for  Wash 
ington  by  way  of  Annapolis  Junction  on  the  Baltimore 
and  Washington  railroad  line.  The  railroad  from  An 
napolis  to  the  Junction  had  been  destroyed  by  the  seces 
sionists,  and  the  troops  marched  this  distance,  repairing 
the  road  as  they  went.  It  was  barely  twenty  miles,  but 
they  were  so  delayed  by  their  work  upon  the  road  that 
twenty-four  hours  of  time  were  consumed  in  the  move 
ment.  Upon  reaching  the  Junction  a  train  of  cars  was 
found  in  waiting.  Colonel  Lefferts  and  his  men  boarded 
it,  and  by  three  o'clock  that  afternoon  they  were  march 
ing  with  flying  colors  and  martial  music  up  Pennsylvania 
Avenue,  to  the  great  relief  of  the  President,  the  officials, 
the  scanty  garrison,  and  the  loyal  population  of  the  city. 

For  three  days  before  their  arrival  rumors  of  attack 
from  Virginia  had  been  rife.  General  Scott  had  re- 
porteb  to  the  President  that  two  thousand 

.  _  .     .  ,  Humors  of 

rebels  were  said  to  be  at  a  point  some  four  attack  upon 

miles  below  Mt.  Yernon,  that  two  thousand 

more  were  opposite  Fort  Washington,  and  that  still  two 


202  THE   CIVIL   WAE 

thousand  more  were  marching  from  Harper's  Ferry. 
It  was  believed  that  Washington  might  be  attacked  at 
any  moment  by  a  force  of  from  eight  to  twelve  thou 
sand  men.  The  General  thought  that  he  could  defend 
the  city  against  the  entrance  of  the  rebel  troops,  but  did 
not  feel  hopeful  of  his  ability  to  protect  it  against  bom 
bardment  from  the  heights  across  the  Potomac.  It  is 
difficult  to  say  what  might  have  been  the  result  of  a 
vigorous  advance  of  the  rebels  upon  the  city  at  any  time 
before  the  25th.  There  was  a  strong  party  in  Richmond 
in  favor  of  it.  The  commander-in-chief  of  the  insur 
gent  forcos  in  Virginia,  General  Lee,  on  the  contrary, 
issued  an  order,  dated  the  23d,  forbidding  an  attack  on 
Washington,  and  commanding  his  officers  to  act  on  the 
defensive,  and  to  collect  men  and  provisions  along  the 
line  of  the  Potomac.  Whether  he  did  this  from  the  be 
lief  that  such  an  attack  would  be  unsuccessful,  or  from 
the  point  of  view  that  the  South  must  act  upon  the  de 
fensive  in  self-justification,  is  not  positively  known.  It 
is  certainly  probable,  however,  that  the  latter  considera 
tion  had  much  weight  with  General  Lee,  at  the  moment. 
Only  five  days  before  the  issue  of  this  order  Lee  was 
the  Colonel  of  the  First  regiment  of  United  States 
General  Regular  Cavalry,  and  was  in  Washington 
Lee-s  conduct.  conferring  with  General  Scott.  Scott  had 
fixed  his  eye  upon  him  for  commander-in-chief  of  the 
Union  army  in  the  field,  and  the  President  virtually 
offered  him  the  position  on  the  18th.  The  person 
through  whom  the  President  made  the  offer  thought 
that  Lee  accepted  it.  Lee  said  subsequently  that  he 
declined  it.  He  went  over  to  Arlington,  his  home,  in 
the  morning  of  the  19th,  and,  on  the  20th,  wrote  to 
General  Scott  resigning  his  position  in  the  regular  army. 
In  this  letter  he  wrote  :  "  Save  in  defence  of  my  native 
State,  I  never  desire  again  to  draw  my  sword."  On  the 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  SUMTER       203 

22d,  he  was  chosen  by  the  secessionist  Governor  and 
convention  at  Richmond  command er-in-chief  of  the  Vir 
ginia  militia.  On  the  23d  he  assumed  command,  and 
issued  this  order  restraining  the  Virginians  from  attack 
ing  Washington  or  crossing  the  Potomac.  After  the 
arrival  of  the  troops  from  Annapolis,  on  the  25th,  an 
attack  upon  Washington  could  hardly  have  succeeded, 
and  in  a  few  days  more  it  was  out  of  the  question. 

The  secessionist  sympathizers  among  the  officials  and 
in  the  departments  at  Washington  now  gave  up  the  hope 
of  seeing  their  friends  in  possession  of  the  The  exodus 
city,  and  quickly  resigned  their  positions  and  ^0^s  7r°om~ 
went  southward.  Among  them  were  the  Washington, 
commandant  of  the  Washington  Navy  Yard,  Commo 
dore  Franklin  Buchanan,  and  Captain  John  B.  Magru- 
der  of  the  Regular  Artillery. 

The  route  from  the  North,  by  way  of  Perry ville  and 
Annapolis,  was  now  fully  open  and  in  the  firm  possession 
of  the  Union  troops.  Butler  was  assigned 

The  occupa- 

to  its  defence.  A  military  department  was  tion  of  Mary- 
now  created  by  order  of  the  President  cover 
ing  the  country  for  twenty  miles  upon  each  side  of  the 
railroad  line  from  Annapolis  to  Washington.  It  was 
called  the  Department  of  Annapolis,  and  Butler  was 
placed  in  command  of  it. 

At  the  same  time  troops  were  being  gathered  at  Phila 
delphia  and  Harrisburg  under  the  command  of  General 
Patterson  for  an  advance  upon  Harper's  Ferry  and  Bal 
timore.  General  Patterson  held  his  commission,  at  the 
moment,  from  the  Governor  of  Pennsylvania,  but  was 
soon  recognized  by  the  President  and  General  Scott  as 
being  in  command  of  the  Department  of  Pennsylvania, 
which  was  considered  as  comprehending,  besides  Penn 
sylvania,  all  of  Maryland  north  of  the  Department  of 
Annapolis. 


204  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

Governor  Hicks  had  called  the  Maryland  Legislature 
to  meet  at  Frederick,  instead  of  Annapolis,  because  of 

The  Mary-  the  presence  of  the  Union  troops  in  the  latter 
Ifrfa^Tret  Place-  The  body  convened  at  Frederick,  only 
erick.  about  twenty  miles  distant  from  the  rebel 

forces  at  Harper's  Ferry,  on  the  26th  (April).  Presi 
dent  Lincoln  decided  not  to  oppose  the  assembly  of  the 
members,  but  ordered  General  Scott  to  watch  their 
movements,  and  to  check  any  such  as  might  appear 
hostile  to  the  Union  by  any  means  he  should  consider 
proper  and  necessary. 

The  President  also  authorized  General  Scott  to  sus 
pend  the  privileges  of  the  writ  of  Habeas  Corpus  upon 

Thesuspen-  any  of  the  military  lines  opened,  at  the  mo- 
privileges'  of  merit,  or  subsequently,  between  Philadelphia 
and  Washington.     By  the  end  of  the  month, 


SoS'of  JSiti  the  Baltimoreans  found  themselves  isolated 
more.  from  the  rest  of  the  world,  and  surrounded 

by  Union  armies.  On  the  4th  of  May,  General  Butler 
moved  up  to  the  Relay  House  with  two  regiments  of 
soldiers,  and  severed  the  connection  between  Baltimore 
and  Harper's  Ferry.  The  Maryland  Unionists  regained 
courage  to  speak  and  to  act. 

Governor  Hicks  now  declared  his  attachment  to  the 

Union   cause,    and    dismissed    the   secessionist    militia 

gathered  in  Baltimore.     The  railroad  bridges 

Triumph  of    fc  . 

Union  cause  were  rebuilt  and  the  telegraphic  lines  re 
paired.  The  Legislature  broke  down  in  its 
attempt  to  introduce  measures  looking  toward  secession. 
On  the  9th,  troops  were  led  through  Baltimore  without 
interruption.  On  the  13th,  Butler  took  possession  of  the 
city,  and  entrenched  himself  permanently  on  Federal 
Hill.  With  this,  railroad  and  telegraphic  communica 
tion  between  Washington  and  the  North,  through  Balti 
more,  was  completely  restored.  On  the  14th  the  dis- 


THE   CAPTURE   OF    FORT   SUMTER  205 

heartened  Legislature  adjourned  sine  die,  and  Governor 
Hicks  now  issued  his  call  for  the  four  regiments  of 
militia  required  of  him  by  the  President  for  the  United 
States  service.  The  rebellion  in  Maryland  was  crushed, 
and  the  Commonwealth  was  brought  back  to  its  proper 
position  as  a  participant  in  the  struggle  for  the  preser 
vation  of  the  Union.  It  had  played  a  disgraceful  part, 
but  it  had  served  the  National  interests  by  rousing  the 
anger  of  the  North  to  the  fighting  point. 

During  the  remainder  of  the  month  troops  to  the 
number  of  about  fifty  thousand  poured  into  Washing 
ton,  and  were  organized  and  equipped  for 

The  defences 

action.  At  last  on  the  24th  (May),  they  of  washing- 
crossed  the  Potomac,  took  possession  of  Ar 
lington  and  Alexandria,  and  began  establishing  the 
chain  of  fortifications  reaching  in  semicircle  from  above 
Georgetown  to  the  mouth  of  Hunting  Creek,  which 
made  Washington  impregnable  from  the  south-west. 
It  was  agreed,  on  all  sides,  that  Washington  must  be 
made  safe  before  any  forward  movements  should  be 
undertaken.  All  felt  that  the  capture  of  Washington 
by  the  Confederate  forces  would  be  about  the  greatest 
disaster  which  could  befall  the  National  cause.  It 
would  dishearten  the  Unionists,  raise  the  courage  of 
the  Confederates  to  the  highest  pitch  of  enthusiasm, 
give  the  Confederacy  prestige  abroad,  and  transfer  the 
scene  of  the  contest  from  rebellious  to  loyal  soil.  To 
avoid  such  results  everything  else  must,  if  necessary, 
be  held  in  abeyance.  Consequently  the  first  real  ad 
vance  was  made  elsewhere,  and  the  first  real  blow  was 
struck  in  a  different  quarter. 


CHAPTER 

THE   THREE   MONTHS'   WAR 

Greorge  B.  McClellan — McClellan's  Operations  in  Western  Virginia 
— The  Wheeling  Convention — Attempt  of  the  Virginia  Au 
thorities  to  Suppress  the  Unionist  Movement  in  the  Western 
Counties — The  Delay  of  McClellan  in  Crossing  the  Ohio— 
McClellan's  Advance — The  Engagement  at  Philippi — Presi 
dent  Davis  at  Richmond,  now  Assumed  the  Direction  of  the 
Military  Movements  of  the  Confederates  in  Virginia — Reas 
sembly  of  the  Unionists  in  Convention  at  Wheeling — Virginia's 
Loyal  Legislature,  and  its  Election  of  United  States  Senators 
— Governor  Pierpont's  Call  for  Aid  to  Suppress  Rebellion  in 
Virginia — Laurel  Hill  and  Rich  Mountain — Carrick's  Ford— 
McClellan's  Movements  after  the  Battle  of  Rich  Mountain — 
The  Haste  for  Military  Movements  on  the  Part  of  the  North 
ern  People  —  The  Military  Situation  on  the  Potomac  —  Big 
Bethel  and  Vienna  Station— The  Council  of  War  of  the  29th 
of  June — Tke  Plan  of  the  Campaign— The  Advance  on  Ma 
nassas — Patterson's  Blunder — Johnston's  March  to  Manassas 
—  McDowell's  Movements  —  Change  of  McDowell's  Plan  of 
Battle— McDowell's  New  Plan  Revealed  to  the  Enemy— The 
Battle— The  Rout  of  the  Union  Army— The  Pursuit— The 
Results  of  the  Battle. 

ON  the  23d  of  April,  when  all  railroad  communica 
tion  between  Washington  and  the  West  had  been  sev- 
George  B.  ered,  the  Governor  of  Ohio,  Mr.  Dennison, 
McClellan.  appointed  George  B.  McClellan  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  Ohio  militia,  called  into  the  service  of 
the  United  States,  with  the  rank  of  Major-General. 

McClellan  had  been  a  captain  of  artillery  in  the  regu 
lar  army,  had  had  the  experience  of  the  Mexican  War, 

206 


THE  THREE  MONTHS'  WAR         207 

had  witnessed  the  movements  and  operations  of  the  Cri 
mean  War,  as  a  member  of  the  military  commission 
sent  to  Europe  for  the  purpose  of  gathering  military 
knowledge,  had  resigned  his  captaincy  in  1857,  and  was, 
at  the  moment,  president  of  the  Ohio  and  Mississippi 
Railroad  company,  with  residence  at  Cincinnati.  He 
was  well  born,  highly  educated,  only  thirty-five  years 
of  age,  brave,  capable  and  loyal.  Upon  receiving  his 
appointment  from  Governor  Dennison,  he  immediately 
resigned  his  railroad  presidency,  and  addressed  himself 
to  the  work  of  organizing  and  equipping  the  Ohio  troops. 
Camp  Dennison,  near  Columbus,  was  his  centre  of  oper 
ations,  but  he  gathered  troops  along  the  north  bank  of 
the  Ohio  River  from  Cincinnati  to  a  point  nearly  oppo 
site  Wheeling. 

Before  Governor  Dennison  had  appointed  him  to  the 
command  of  the  Ohio  troops,  prominent  citizens  of  Cin 
cinnati  had  requested  the  Washington  Government  to 
put  him  in  command  at  Cincinnati  with  authority 
to  raise  and  organize  an  army.  On  the  3d  of  May,  the 
President  appointed  him  Commander  of  the  Military 
Department  of  the  Ohio,  which  was  made  to  consist  of 
the  Commonwealths  of  Ohio,  Indiana,  and  Illinois. 
Finally,  on  the  14th  of  May,  the  President  made  him  a 
major-general  in  the  regular  army. 

McClellan's  first  work  after  the  organization  of  his 
forces  was  naturally  the  defence  of  the  Ohio  line,  and 
then  the  rendering  of  aid  to  the  Unionists  in 
Kentucky  and  Western  Virginia.  At  the 
moment  his  chief  forward  movement  must 
be  in  Western  Virginia.  This  part  of  Virginia  was  in 
habited  by  a  loyal  population,  and  contained  but  few 
slaveholders  or  slaves.  It  ran  up  like  a  wedge  between 
Ohio  and  Pennsylvania,  commanding  the  great  lines  of 
rail  and  telegraphic  communication  between  the  middle 


208  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

Atlantic  section  and  the  West,  and  lastly  it  had,  by  the 
action  of  the  secessionist  convention  at  Richmond,  been 
declared  out  of  the  Union.  The  occupation  of  this  por 
tion  of  Virginia  was  thus  immediately  seen  to  be  both  a 
military  and  a  political  necessity. 

The  West  Virginians  themselves  took  the  initiative  in 
inviting  the  movement.      So  soon  as  the  convention  at 

The  wheel  ^cnmon(i  passed  its  secret  secession  ordinance 
ing  conven-  on  the  17th  of  April,  most  of  the  members 
from  the  western  counties  went  immediately 
to  their  homes,  and  began  an  agitation  for  the  assembly 
of  a  convention  of  loyal  men  at  Wheeling.  They  suc 
ceeded  in  bringing  representatives  of  thirty-five  counties 
together  at  that  place  on  the  13th  of  May.  This  body 
immediately  opened  communication  with  President  Lin 
coln,  on  one  side,  and  General  McClellan,  on  the  other, 
and  received  assurances  of  assistance  from  both. 

Governor  Letcher  was  soon  made  aware  of  the  Union 
ist  movements  in  Western  Virginia   and   sent  Colonel 

Attempts  of  G.  A.  Porterfield  with  some  East  Virginia 
aueth^ri?iesnto  militia  to  Beverly,  a  spot  well  protected 
oTiTni^t  on  the  north-west  by  the  line  of  the  Rich 
Se western  an(^  Laurel  mountains,  to  organize  an  op- 
counties,  position  to  it.  The  secessionist  forces  soon 
advanced  northward  to  Grafton,  the  point  where  the 
Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  line  bifurcates,  one  branch 
running  to  Wheeling  and  the  other  to  Parkersburg. 

The  Wheeling  convention  adjourned  on  the  15th,  af 
ter  having  called  for  the  election  of  members  to  another 

The  delay  of  convention,  the  election  to  be  held  on  the 
SoSiengnth?  26th,  an(*  the  convention  to  assemble  on  the 
Ohia  llth  of  June.  The  vote  of  the  people  on 

the  secession  ordinance  passed  by  the  Richmond  con 
vention  was  to  be  taken,  as  we  have  seen,  on  the  23d  of 
May.  General  McClellan  desired  to  have  these  two 


The  West  Virginia  Battles. 


WAR  209 

elections  take  place  in  Western  Virginia  without  the 
presence  of  Union  soldiers  therein.  He  felt  sure  of  the 
results  in  both  cases,  and  he  did  not  wish  them  falsely 
attributed  to  the  presence  of  his  troops.  The  West 
Virginians  themselves,  who  had  volunteered  in  the  Un 
ion  service,  were  for  this  reason  organized  and  encamped 
in  Ohio  at  Camp  Carlile  opposite  Wheeling. 

On  the  evening  of  the  20th  McClellan  at  length 
issued  his  orders  to  Colonels  Kelly  and  Stedman  to 
cross  the  Ohio  and  occupy  Wheeling  and  Mccieiian-s 
Parkersburg.  These  orders  were  success-  advance- 
fully  executed  in  the  morning  of  the  27th.  On  the  30th 
they  advanced  to  Grafton,  Porterfield's  troops  having 
retired  to  Philippi,  about  fifteen  miles  to  the  southward. 
The  railroad  lines  from  Grafton  to  Wheeling  and  Par 
kersburg  were  quickly  put  in  order,  and  by  June  1st 
an  army  of  six  or  eight  thousand  men  was  collected  at 
Grafton  under  the  command  of  General  Morris. 

General  McClellan  now  ordered  Morris  to  press  on  to 
Philippi  and  surprise  Porterfield.  On  the  morning  of 
the  3d  of  June  the  attack  was  made,  and 

.  Tneengage- 

the  rebel  forces,  numbering  from  six  to  eight  pent  at  Phu- 
hundred   men   were   beaten    and   dispersed. 
Porterfield  with  a  few  followers  escaped  to  Beverly,  and 
then  continued  their  flight  to  Huttonsville,  where  they 
found  refuge  with  another  detachment  of  rebel  troops. 

The  President  of  the  Confederacy  had,  immediately 
after  the  adjournment  of  the  Confederate  Congress  in 
the  last  days  of  May,  repaired  to  Richmond,  president 
at  which  place  the  Confederate  Congress  had  SSndn'ow  as" 
voted  to  reassemble  on  the  20th  of  July,  eumed  the  di- 
Confederate  troops  had  already  been  sent  military  move- 
into  Virginia  and  were  gathered  at  Harper's  confederates 
Ferry,  under  the  command  of  General  Jo-  inVifginia- 
seph  E.  Johnston  ;  at  Manassas,  under  the  command  of 
VOL.  I— 14 


210  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

General  P.  G.  T.  Beauregard  ;  and  at  Yorktown,  under 
the  command  of  General  John  B.  Magruder.  President 
Davis  found  General  Lee  in  command  at  Richmond. 
He  immediately  sent  Generals  H.  A.  Wise  and  R.  S. 
Garnett  into  Western  Virginia  to  succor  Porterfield  and 
reorganize  the  secessionist  forces  there. 

While  they  were  engaged  in  this  work  at  Lewisburg 
and  Beverly   the   Unionist    convention   assembled,  ac- 
C01'ding  *°  appointment,  at  Wheeling.     Rep- 


of  the  Union-   resentatives  from  forty  counties  were  pres- 
vention  at  ent.     The  convention  restored  loyal  "State" 

Wheeling.  ,    .      ,T.      .    .      ,          ,      ,  .         -^ 

government  in  V  irgmia  by  electing  x  rancis 
H.  Pierpont  Governor,  and  constructing  a  legislature 
composed  of  the  existing  members  of  the  Virginia  Leg 
islature  who  would  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the 
United  States  and  of  such  other  persons  as  might  be 
chosen  in  the  places  of  such  of  the  existing  members  as 
would  not  do  so.  The  convention  adjourned,  on  the 
25th  of  June,  until  August,  and  the  newly  constructed 

Virginia's  Legislature  of  loyal  Virginia  met  almost  im- 
JSfShtt  mediately.  On  the  9th  of  July  it  elected 
united1  states  w-  T-  WilleJ  and  J-  S-  Carlile  United  States 
senators.  Senators,  in  the  places  of  J.  M.  Mason  and 
R.  M.  T.  Hunter  ;  and  Messrs.  Willey  and  Carlile  were 
on  the  13th  of  July  admitted  by  the  Senate  of  the 
United  States  to  seats  in  that  body  as  the  Senators  from 
Virginia. 

Already  on  the  21st  of  June,  Governor  Pierpont  had 
made  a  regular  demand  upon  the  President  for  a  force 

Governor  to  suppress  the  rebellion  in  Virginia.     This 
d°o88upn  was  well  enough,  but  such  juristic  punctil- 
in  r<vTr-  i°usness   was   unnecessary.      Thousands    of 
ginia.  United  States  troops  were  before  that  date 

in  Virginia,  and  many  more  were  on  the  way  thither. 
General  McClellan  arrived  in  person  at  Grafton  on  the 


THE  THREE  MONTHS'  WAR        211 

23d  of  Jane,  and  by  the  4th  of  July  he  had  assembled 
an  army  of  thirty  thousand  men  at  that  point.  To  meet 
this  force  the  Confederate  General  Garnett  had  concen 
trated  in  and  around  Beverly  from  six  to  ten  thousand 
men. 

Garnett  threw  forward,  in  the  last  days  of  June,  a 
detachment  to  the  pass  over  Laurel  Hill,  between  Bev 
erly  and  Philippi,  and  another  to  the  pass 

TV    i      TV/T          i.    •         i,  T>  j        Laurel    HiU 

over  Rich  Mountain,  between  Beverly  and  and  Rich 
Buckhannon ;  entrusting  the  command  of 
the  latter  to  Colonel  John  Pegram,  while  leading  the 
former  in  person.  He  also  left  troops  at  Beverly  to 
cover  his  rear.  The  passes  were  thus  held  by  not  more 
than  five  or  six  regiments,  and  the  larger  part  of  this 
force  was  at  Laurel  Hill. 

General  McClellan  now  sent  General  Morris  with  five 
regiments  to  attack  Garnett,  and  led  the  expedition 
against  Pegram  at  Rich  Mountain  in  person.  He  found 
Pegram  strongly  entrenched  on  the  western  face  of  the 
mountain,  and  decided  to  send  General  W.  S.  Rosecrans 
around  the  Confederate  forces  by  the  south,  with  the 
purpose  of  falling  upon  their  rear  and  cutting  them 
off  from  their  base  at  Beverly.  The  manoeuvre  was  not 
so  immediately  successful  as  was  hoped,  but  it  finally 
resulted  in  the  dislodgment  of  Pegram  and  the  surren 
der  of  his  troops.  The  battle  occurred  on  the  llth  of 
July,  and  the  surrender  on  the  12th. 

Meanwhile  General  Morris  was  advancing  upon  Gar 
nett  at  Laurel  Hill.  Upon  learning  of  the  disaster  to 
Pegram  at  Rich  Mountain,  Garnett  retreated  toward 
Beverly  ;  but  McClellan  was  too  fast  for  him,  and 
reached  Beverly  from  Rich  Mountain  before  he  had 
made  half  the  march  from  Laurel  Hill.  Garnett  was 
thus  compelled  to  flee  to  the  north-eastward.  Morris 
was  in  hot  pursuit  and  overtook  his  rear  guard  about 


212  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

noon  of  the  13th  of  July,  at  Carrick's  Ford  over  Cheat 

River,  some  twenty-five  miles  from  Laurel  Hill.     The 

carrick's  Union  troops  immediately  began  the  attack, 

dispersed  the  enemy  and  killed  General  Gar- 

nett  himself. 

In  these  several  engagements  the  Union  army  had 
lost  only  about  a  dozen  killed  and  forty  wounded,  while 
the  Confederates  lost  about  ten  times  as  many,  together 
with  about  one  thousand  taken  as  prisoners.  The  first 
stage  of  the  Western  Virginia  campaign  was  thus  en 
tirely  successful,  and  the  Confederate  forces  were  swept 
out  of  all  parts  of  Western  Virginia  north  of  the  Ka- 
nawha  Valley.  Viewed  from  the  standpoint  of  subse 
quent  events  these  battles  were  mere  skirmishes,  but  at 
the  time  they  were  regarded  as  great  victories,  and  the 
results  of  them  were  certainly  most  important  and  sub 
stantial.  They  gave  Western  Virginia  to  the  Union 
throughout  the  entire  course  of  the  great  struggle, 
made  it  possible  to  create  the  new  Commonwealth  of 
West  Virginia,  placed  the  direct  line  of  railway  from 
Washington  through  Virginia  to  the  West  in  the  hands 
of  the  Government  at  Washington,  and  turned  all  eyes 
upon  McClellan  as  the  coming  man  in  case  the  war 
should  continue. 

General  McClellan  himself  was  not  in  the  engagement 

at  Carrick's  Ford.     He  had,  on  the  day  of  the  affair, 

turned  his  face  southward.     His  purpose  was 

McCiellan's  A  .          ,.  . , ,     ~  i    -r     n     s* 

movements  to  form  a  junction  with  General  J.  D.  Cox, 
tie  of  Rich  "  whom  he  had  ordered  to  cross  the  Ohio  at 
Guyandotte  and  advance  up  the  Kanawha 
Valley.  With  this  movement  he  expected  to  drive  the 
Confederates  out  of  the  whole  of  Virginia  west  of  the 
Alleghanies.  He  had,  however,  already  developed  in  his 
own  mind  a  far  more  comprehensive  plan  than  this,  a 
plan  with  the  correctness  of  which  it  is  difficult  to  find 


THE  THREE  MONTHS'  WAK         213 

any  well-gronnded  fault.  It  was,  in  a  word,  after  his 
junction  with  Cox,  to  cross  the  mountains  to  Wytlieville 
on  the  railroad  running  from  Lynchburg  in  Virginia  to 
Knoxville  in  Tennessee,  deliver  East  Tennessee  and 
Northern  Georgia  from  the  secessionists,  and  attack 
Richmond  from  the  rear.  This  would  have  been  a 
masterful  stroke.  It  would  have  put  a  Union  army  of 
fifty  thousand  men  into  the  heart  of  the  South,  where 
it  would  have  been  protected  by  the  natural  fortresses 
of  the  mountains,  nourished  by  a  friendly  population, 
and  increased  to  double  its  strength  by  the  voluntary 
enlistment  of  the  hardy  inhabitants  of  this  loyal  region. 
The  objection  to  the  movement  would  have  been  that 
lie  would  be  getting  too  far  away  from  his  base.  But 
would  he  not  have  had  his  base  right  under  him  in 
this  loyal  region,  which  could  have  supplied  his  army 
easily  for  at  least  a  year,  at  that  time,  and  would  most 
gladly  have  done  so  ?  It  is  true  that  his  way  to  the 
Ohio  would  have  been  through  a  broken  country  and 
over  poor  roads,  but  it  would  have  been,  all  the  way, 
through  a  friendly  population.  If  the  authorities  at 
Washington  could  only  have  contented  themselves  with 
the  defence  of  the  city,  and  have  waited  for  the  con 
summation  of  the  developments  in  the  rear  as  planned 
by  McClellan,  it  does  seem  as  if  Richmond  might 
have  been  taken,  and  the  backbone  of  the  Confederacy 
broken,  in  the  summer  and  autumn  of  1861. 

The  authorities  at  Washington  were,  however,  not  so 
much  to  blame  for  the  haste  of  the  Manassas  campaign 
as  the  people  of  the  North.  The  people  The  haste 
were  indignant  at  the  bold  effrontery  with  LovemSson 
which  the  Government  of  their  choice  had  j^  Northern 
been  treated  and  defied,  and  were  restless  Pe°Ple- 
under  the  patience  of  the  Government  in  dealing  with  it. 
They  had  answered  the  call  of  the  Government  promptly 


214  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

and  generously,  and  had  offered  far  more  than  the  Gov 
ernment  had  asked.  Their  representatives  were  now  in 
Washington  in  Congress  assembled,  and  were  urging  the 
Administration  to  strike  a  speedy  and  decisive  blow. 
The  Confederate  Congress  was  to  meet  on  July  20th  at 
Richmond,  and  the  Confederate  President  with  his  Cab 
inet  wras  already  there,  directing  the  military  movements 
of  the  Confederate  forces  in  front  of  Washington  and 
elsewhere  in  Virginia.  The  meeting  of  that  Congress  in 
that  place  must  be  prevented,  and  Virginia,  which  had 
restored  its  loyal  "  State"  government,  must  be  rescued. 
"  On  to  Richmond  ! "  was  the  universal  cry,  and  the 
Government  was  obliged  to  yield  to  the  popular  clamor. 
The  military  reason  was  obliged  to  give  way  to  the  politi 
cal  reason.  There  was,  indeed,  a  military  reason  for  the 
advance,  but  it  was  not  tactical.  It  was  the  fact  that 
the  term  of  service  of  the  militia  called  April  15th  would 
soon  expire,  and  many  of  the  men  desired  to  return  to 
their  homes.  If  any  blow  was  to  be  struck  with  them, 
it  must  be  done  at  once. 

The  military  situation  in  the  beginning  of  July  on 
the  Potomac  and  the  lower  Chesapeake  was  briefly  as 
follows :  General  Patterson  had  marched 
situation '(MI  down  from  his  camp  at  Chambersburg  with 
iac'  an  army  of  twenty  thousand  men,  and  had 
threatened  the  Confederate  General  J.  E.  Johnston  at 
Harper's  Ferry.  Johnston's  force  did  not  equal  Patter 
son's  and  he,  recognizing  the  weakness  of  the  Harper's 
Ferry  position  on  the  north-east,  abandoned  the  place  and 
concentrated  his  army  at  Winchester,  some  twenty-five 
miles  to  the  south-west.  Whereupon  Patterson  crossed 
his  forces  over  to  the  Virginia  side,  and  fixed  his  head 
quarters  at  Martinsburg,  about  twenty  miles  north-west 
of  Harper's  Ferry.  The  two  armies  were,  in  a  direct 
line,  about  twenty-five  miles  apart. 


WAR  215 

The  army  at  Washington,  and  encamped  on  the  Vir 
ginia  side  of  the  river  from  Alexandria  to  the  bend  above 
Georgetown,  numbered  about  forty-five  thousand  men, 
under  the  command  of  General  Scott  and  his  chief  sub 
ordinate  in  the  field,  General  Irvin  McDowell.  It  was 
confronted  by  a  Confederate  army  of  about  fifteen  thou 
sand  men,  under  the  immediate  command  of  General 
Beauregard.  Beauregard's  base  of  operations  was  Ma- 
nassas  Junction,  a  place  some  thirty  miles  from  Wash 
ington,  where  the  railway  from  the  lower  Shenandoah 
Valley  joins  the  line  leading  from  Alexandria  to  Rich 
mond  and  to  Lynchburg.  The  two  Confederate  armies 
had  thus  the  advantage  of  what  is  termed  in  military 
language  the  interior  lines  of  communication. 

Finally,  General  Butler's  force  of  about  ten  thousand 
men,  which  had  occupied  York  peninsula  with  head 
quarters  at  Fortress  Monroe,  was  opposed  by  Magruder's 
army  of  about  the  same  strength. 

Two   slight   collisions  had  taken  place,  one  at  Big 
Bethel,  near  Yorktown,  on  June  10th,  and  the  other  at 
Vienna  Station,  some  fifteen  miles  west  from 
Washington,  on  the  17th,  in  both  of  which   and  Vienna 
the    Union    troops    were    worsted,    results  s 
which  greatly  increased  the  impatience' of  the  North. 

On  the  29th  of  June,  the  President  held  his  council 
of  war  upon  the  subject  of  the  advance  of  the  Union 
army  from  Washington  upon  Manassas. 
General  Scott  opposed  the  movement,  but  of  war°ofnthe 
expressed  the  opinion  that  the  Union  army 
could  vanquish  the  Confederates  in  a  battle.  His  ob 
jection  was  based  upon  the  consideration  that  a  victory 
upon  so  small  a  scale  would  not  amount  to  anything. 
The  politicians  in  the  council,  that  is,  the  President  and 
the  members  of  his  Cabinet,  felt  that  the  people  of  the 
North  could  not  be  satisfied  without  a  military  effort  on 


216  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

the  part  of  the  Government,  and  the  President  decided 
that  the  campaign  must  be  undertaken.  General  Scott 
had  foreseen  the  result,  and  had  caused  General  Mc 
Dowell  to  draw  up  the  plan  for  the  movement.  General 
Scott  now  presented  the  plan  to  the  council,  with  his 
approval  of  it  from  the  tactical  point  of  view. 

The  main  points  of  the  plan  were  that  General  Mc 
Dowell,  with  a  force  of  thirty  thousand  men  and  a  re- 
Thepianof  serve  of  ten  thousand,  should  attack  the 
the  campaign.  main  position  of  the  Confederates  at  Manas- 
sas,  and  turn  it  upon  the  south,  that  is,  upon  the  Con 
federate  right  flank,  while  Patterson  should  hold  John 
ston's  army  at  Winchester,  and  Butler  should  occupy 
the  attention  of  Magruder  before  Yorktown. 

Scott  and  McDowell  thus  calculated  that  Beauregard 
would  be  able  to  call  to  his  assistance  only  the  forces 
under  General  Holmes  around  Aquia  Creek.  McDowell 
thought  that  he  would  be  obliged  to  fight  not  over 
thirty-five  thousand  men.  He  estimated  Beauregard's 
army  then  at  Manassas  at  twenty-five  thousand.  In 
fact,  Beauregard  did  not  have  over  twenty-five  thou 
sand  after  calling  up  all  that  Holmes  could  furnish 
him. 

Butler  detained  the  forces  in  front  of  him  by  his 
feints  and  manoeuvres,  and  had  Patterson  done  his  duty, 
the  Confederates  under  Beauregard  might  have  been 
overwhelmed  by  McDowell's  army. 

Patterson  moved  forward  from  Martinsburg  to  Bun 
ker  Hill  on  the  loth  (July).  He  was  now  directly 
north  of  Winchester  and  only  nine  miles  away.  He  had 
a  fine  army  of  fifteen  thousand  men,  while  his  adversary 
had  not  more  than  fifteen  thousand,  if  so  many. 

On  the  16th  McDowell  marched  his  forces  out  of 
the  entrenchments  in  front  of  Washington,  and  headed 
them  for  Centreville,  which  place  was  to  be  his  base  of 


The  Manassas  Campaign. 


WAR  217 

operations.  The  Confederate  Commander  at  Manassas 
and  the  Confederate  President  at  Richmond  were  im 
mediately  informed  of  the  advance  by  kind  The  advance 
friends  in  or  about  Washington,  and,  on  the  ™  Manassas. 
17th,  Mr.  Davis  informed  Johnston,  at  Winchester,  that 
Beauregard  was  about  to  be  attacked,  and  ordered  him 
to  march  his  forces  to  Manassas  if  possible. 

At  the  very  moment  when  Johnston  received  this 
despatch,  Patterson  was  making  it  possible  for  him  to 
execute  safely  the  fateful  movement  ordered  Patterson's 
by  Mr.  Davis.  On  the  day  before  the  order  blundcr- 
arrived  in  Winchester,  General  C.  W.  Sandford  in  com 
mand  of  Patterson' s  left  wing,  which  was  composed  of 
some  eight  thousand  of  his  best  troops,  had  advanced 
from  Bunker  Hill  some  three  or  four  miles  in  a  south 
easterly  direction,  with  the  purpose  of  placing  this  force 
between  Winchester  and  the  Shenandoah  River.  Had 
this  movement  been  followed  up,  Johnston  would  have 
been  compelled  either  to  remain  in  Winchester,  or  to 
come  out  of  his  entrenchments  there  and  fight  Sandford 
in  the  open  field,  with  Patterson  upon  his  exposed  left 
flank.  In  either  case  Johnston  could  not  have  made  his 
march  to  Manassas. 

In  the  evening  of  the  16th  Sandford  had  his  troops 
in  line  for  the  advance  toward  the  south-east,  when  a 
little  after  midnight,  to  his  surprise  and  indignation, 
he  received  an  order  from  Patterson  to  move  toward 
Charlestown,  a  place  some  ten  or  fifteen  miles  due  east 
ward  from  his  position,  and  about  twenty-two  miles 
north-eastward  from  Winchester.  On  the  17th,  Patter 
son's  whole  army  abandoned  its  position  on  the  north 
and  north-east  of  Winchester,  and  virtually  retreated  to 
Charlestown.  Patterson  gave  out,  as  his  reason  for  this 
strange  movement,  that  he  had  received  reliable  infor 
mation  that  twenty  thousand  Confederate  troops  from 


218  THE   CIVIL    WAK 

Manassas  had  joined  Johnston,  and  that  Johnston  was 
about  to  fall  upon  him  with  an  army  of  forty  thousand 
men.  General  Sandford,  who  was  nearer  to  Winchester 
than  Patterson,  declared  that  he  had  received  no  such 
information,,  and  was  almost  in  a  mood  to  disobey 
Patterson's  order,  and  risk  a  battle  between  Winchester 
and  the  Shenandoah  without  any  support  from  Patter 
son,  and  upon  his  own  responsibility. 

Johnston  learned  of  Patterson's  unaccountable  blun 
der  on  the  18th  and  immediately  started  with  about  two- 
thirds  of  his  army,  some  eight  thousand  men, 
march  to  Ma-  for  Manassas.     He  marched  eastward,  forded 
the  Shenandoah,  passed  through  the  gap  in 
the  Blue  Ridge,  turned  southward  to  Piedmont  Station 
on  the  Manassas  railroad,  took  cars  there,  and  on  Satur 
day  morning,  the  20th,  effected  his  junction  with  Beaure- 
gard  at  Manassas. 

Meanwhile  McDowell's  army  had  reached  Centreville, 
driving  the  Confederate  pickets  before  them.  General 
McDowell's  Tyler,  in  command  of  the  first  division  of 
movements.  ^Q  army^  pursued  the  retreating  enemy  to 
Blackburn's  Ford  over  Bull  Run  Creek,  some  three 
miles  southward  from  Centreville,  and  became  engaged 
in  a  sharp  skirmish  in  which  the  Union  troops  were 
rather  worsted.  Tyler  withdrew  his  detachment,  instead 
of  supporting  it,  because  McDowell  had  commanded 
him  not  to  bring  on  a  battle  at  that  juncture.  The 
strong  resistance  which  the  Confederates  made  here  to 
the  farther  advance  of  the  Union  army  made  it  evident 
to  McDowell  that  they  had  taken  position  on  the  west 
bank  of  Bull  Run  from  the  railroad  bridge  at  Union 
Mills,  on  the  south,  to  the  Stone  Bridge,  over  which  the 
Centreville  and  Warrenton  turnpike  crossed  the  creek 
on  the  north,  a  distance  of  seven  or  eight  miles.  The 
creek  was  quite  a  formidable  obstacle  to  the  further  ad- 


THE  THREE  MONTHS'  WAR         219 

vance  of  the  Union  army,  since  it  was  not  generally 
fordable,  and  since  the  bridges  were  few  and  easily 
defendable,  and  the  west  bank  was  higher  than  the  east 
bank  and  covered  with  woods. 

As  we  have  seen,  McDowell  started  out  with  the  plan 
of  turning  the  Confederate  right,  but  by  a  personal  ex 
amination  of  the  roads  in  that  direction, 
made  on  the  18th,  he  decided  that  the  plan 
of  the  battle  must  be  changed,  and  that  he  plauc 
must  undertake  to  turn  the  enemy's  left.  lie  im 
mediately  gave  notice  of  this  change  to  his  division 
commanders,  Tyler,  Hunter,  Heintzelman,  Miles,  and 
Runyon,  and  had  he  been  able  to  make  his  attack  on 
the  morning  of  the  19th,  he  would  in  all  probability 
have  gained  a  decided  victory.  He  could  not,  however, 
find  an  unfortified  ford  or  bridge.  It  was  nearly  forty- 
eight  hours  before  his  engineers  found  the  Sudley  Ford 
only  three  or  four  miles  above  the  Stone  Bridge. 

Neither  Patterson  nor  McDowell  was  aware  of  John 
ston's  march  from  Winchester  to  Manassas,  and  of  the 
increase  thereby  of  the  Confederate  forces  on  the  west 
side  of  Bull  Run.  Consequently  McDowell  did  not  call 
for  any  of  Patterson's  troops  as  a  reserve  in  case  of 
necessity,  and  planned  his  battle  with  reference  to 
Beauregard's  army  only.  In  the  night  of  the  20th,  he 
assembled  his  division  commanders  again  and  gave 
them  their  instructions.  Tyler,  with  the  first  division, 
was  ordered  to  advance  to  Stone  Bridge,  and  make  a 
strong  demonstration  at  that  point,  while  Hunter  and 
Heintzelman,  with  the  second  and  third  divisions, 
should  march  to  Sudley  Ford,  cross  Bull  Run  there, 
come  down  on  the  west  side,  strike  the  Confederates  at 
Stone  Bridge  in  their  left  flank,  and  open  the  way  for 
Tyler  to  cross  the  bridge.  Miles,  with  the  fifth  divis 
ion,  was  commanded  to  remain  in  reserve  at  Centre- 


220  THE   CIVIL   WAE 

ville,  while  Runyon,  with  the  fourth,  should  guard  the 
communication  with  Washington. 

McDowell  ordered  the  movements  from  Centreville 
to  begin  in  the  darkness  of  the  night,  and  expected  the 
McDowell's  three  divisions  which  were  to  fight  the  battle 
SSIeft  the  to  be  at  the  Stone  Bri(-]ge  and  Sudley  Ford 
enemy.  kv  sjx  0>ciock  in  the  morning.  Tyler's  di 

vision  was  prompt  and  commenced  pressing  the  Con 
federates  around  the  bridge  at  about  that  hour.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  divisions  marching  to  Sudley  Ford 
were  so  slow  in  their  movements  that  they  did  not  reach 
their  objective  point  until  about  nine  o'clock.  This  de 
lay  not  only  occasioned  the  disadvantage  of  fighting  the 
battle  in  the  heat  of  the  July  day,  but  it  revealed  the 
plan  of  the  battle  to  the  Confederates.  Beau  regard  sat 
in  his  saddle  for  two  hours  on  a  hill  top  and  watched 
the  clouds  of  dust  moving  toward  Sudley  Ford.  He 
divined  at  once  that  Tyler's  attack  on  the  bridge  was 
only  a  feint,  and  he  hurried  his  regiments  northward  to 
meet  Hunter  and  Heintzelman  at  the  Ford.  Naturally 
Johnston's  men,  in  coming  from  Winchester,  had 
stopped  on  Beauregard's  left,  and  the  very  first  Con 
federate  troops  to  come  into  the  battle  on  the  side  next 
to  the  Ford  were  the  men  whom  Patterson  had  engaged 
to  hold  fast  at  Winchester. 

The  divisions  commanded  by  Hunter  and  Heintzel 
man  crossed  the  creek  successfully  soon  after  nine 
o'clock,  and  the  wearied  soldiers,  who  had 

The  battle.  .  .  ,  .    ' 

been  moving  since  three  o  clock  in  the  morn 
ing,  went  eagerly  into  the  battle.  They  soon  drove  the 
Confederates  back  across  the  Warrenton  turnpike,  and 
opened  the  way  for  Tyler's  division  across  the  Stone 
Bridge.  Two  of  Tyler's  brigades  rushed  across,  and 
about  eighteen  thousand  victorious  troops  were  now 
driving  the  Confederate  left  out  of  the  valley,  through 


WAR  221 

which  the  Warrenton  turnpike  ran  at  this  point,  across 
Young's  creek,  and  up  the  southern  ascent  from  the 
valley. 

Upon  the  crest  of  this  ascent,  called  Henry  Hill,  the 
fleeing  Confederates  succeeded,  at  last,  in  making  a  halt 
behind  General  T.  J.  Jackson's  fresh  brigade,  which 
stood,  as  they  said,  like  a  stone-wall,  to  cover  them.  Beau- 
regard  himself  hurried  to  this  point  and  took  command 
in  person.  He  soon  gathered  some  ten  thousand  men  and 
several  batteries  of  artillery  upon  this  very  advantageous 
position,  and  prepared  to  make  desperate  resistance 
against  the  Union  advance.  It  was  evident  that  the  fate 
of  the  day  was  to  be  decided  at  this  point.  For  an  hour 
and  a  half  the  battle  raged  with  great  determination  on 
both  sides.  The  scales  of  victory  which,  in  the  forenoon, 
had  dipped  so  decidedly  in  favor  of  the  Union  forces 
now  hung  nearly  even  in  the  balance,  inclining,  if  any 
thing,  to  the  advantage  of  the  Confederates.  One  bri 
gade  of  Tyler's  division  had  not  yet  engaged  in  the 
struggle  and  was  just  preparing  to  advance,  when  a 
large  column  of  Confederates  was  discovered  moving 
upon  the  right  flank  of  the  Union  forces.  It  was  the 
remainder  of  Johnston's  army  from  Winchester  led  by 
Kirby  Smith.  They  had  come  down  from  Piedmont 
Station  by  train,  and,  on  hearing  the  sounds  of  the  battle, 
had  jumped  from  the  cars,  and,  forming  quickly,  had 
rushed  upon  the  field  exactly  at  the  right  moment  and 
in  the  right  place  to  give  the  day  to  the  Confederates, 
and  carry  rout  and  panic  through  the  Union  ranks. 

The  Union  forces  now  knew,  for  the  first  time,  that 
they  had  Johnston's  army  upon  them,  and  seeing  no 
re-enforcements  approaching  with  which  to  The  rout  of 
meet  it,  they  gave  up  the  fight,  and  fled  in  t^e  Union 
confusion  and  dismay  from  the  field.  Down 
the  slope  of  Henry  Hill,  across  Young's  creek  to  the 


222  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

turnpike,  over  the  Stone  Bridge,  through  Centreville, 
back  to  the  Potomac,  they  poured,  a  disorganized,  terri 
fied  mob,  carrying  and  spreading  consternation  and 
fright  as  they  went. 

The  Confederates  followed  them  across  Bull  Run,  but 
did  not  attempt  to  enter  Centreville.     Two  fresh  divis 
ions  of  Union   troops  were   at   Centreville, 

The  pursuit. 

and  between  that  place  and  the  Potomac, 
and  the  Confederate  commanders  were  certainly  justi 
fied  in  thinking  that  the  retreating  forces  might  reform 
behind  these  and  return  to  the  battle.  They  did  not 
realize  the  extent  of  the  demoralization  which  had  so 
suddenly  seized  the  Union  army.  Their  own  army  was 
also  badly  crippled  and  exhausted,  and  in  no  condition 
to  pursue.  President  Davis,  who  arrived  on  the  field 
just  in  time  to  see  his  forces  victorious,  was  anxious  for 
an  advance,  but,  in  deference  to  Johnston  and  Beaure- 
gard,  left  the  decision  in  their  hands.  They  preferred 
to  rest  their  troops  through  the  night,  and  go  forward 
by  daylight,  especially  as  the  weather  of  the  night  fol 
lowing  the  battle  was  most  inclement.  On  the  next 
day  they  had  free  and  open  way  clear  back  to  the  forti 
fications  in  front  of  Washington.  The  Union  com 
manders  had  not  thought  of  renewing  the  struggle,  but 
had  marched  the  reserves  back  to  the  entrenchments 
from  which  they  had  gone  out  on  the  16th. 

It  had  been  a  sanguinary  battle.  Nearly  two  thou 
sand  men  were  killed  and  wounded  on  each  side.  The 
The  results  number  of  prisoners  taken  was  not  great, 
of  the  battle.  Ag  tjie  Confederates  were  victorious  they 
naturally  had  the  advantage  in  this  respect.  Beaure- 
gard  claimed  to  have  captured  between  fourteen  and 
sixteen  hundred  men,  many  of  whom,  however,  were 
wounded. 

General  McDowell  had  planned  the  battle  well,  and 


THE  THREE  MONTHS'  WAR        223 

up  to  the  moment  of  the  appearance  of  Smith's  division 
of  Johnston's  army  on  their  right  flank,  the  Union 
forces  had  fought  the  battle  well.  The  fates,  however, 
seemed  to  be  on  the  Confederate  side.  First,  Patterson 
let  Johnston  give  him  the  slip  ;  then  the  battle  was  de 
layed  at  least  one  day  by  the  stupidity  of  the  engineers 
in  not  finding  an  unfortified  crossing  ;  then  the  delay 
in  the  march  of  the  divisions  of  Hunter  and  Heintzel- 
man  from  Centreville  to  Sudley  Ford  revealed  to  Beau- 
regard  the  plan  of  attack  ;  and  lastly  the  appearance  of 
Kirby  Smith  and  his  division,  at  the  most  critical  mo 
ment  and  in  the  most  dangerous  quarter,  turned  a  hard- 
fought  victory  into  a  sudden  and  terrible  defeat.  In 
view  of  this  course  of  events,  it  is  certainly  not  surpris 
ing  that  religious  natures  among  the  Confederates  should 
have  concluded  that  Providence  was  smiling  upon  their 
cause,  nor  that  such  natures  on  the  other  side  should 
have  felt  that  the  wrath  of  the  Higher  Powers  was  be 
ing  poured  out  upon  them. 

It  must  be  said  further  that  the  Confederate  com 
manders  showed  themselves  skilful,  energetic,  and  cour 
ageous,  and  that  they  fought  a  good  battle  and  won  a 
great  victory.  The  movement  of  Johnston  from  Win 
chester  to  Manassas  was  excellent  strategy,  and  the  suc 
cessful  defence  of  Henry  Hill  by  Beauregard  and  Jack 
son  was  a  splendid  achievement.  The  master-hand  of 
them  all,  however,  was  the  Confederate  President,  who 
planned  the  combination  of  the  two  Confederate  armies, 
and  gave  the  order  for  the  execution  of  the  plan  at  ex 
actly  the  right  moment. 

The  immediate  effects  of  this  sudden  and  crushing 
defeat  of  the  Union  army  were  most  deleterious  to  the 
Union  cause.  McClellan  was  called  away  from  Western 
Virginia  to  Washington,  and  his  plan  for  seizing  the 
Knoxville  and  Lynchburg  railroad,  delivering  East  Ten- 


224  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

nessee,  and  approaching  Richmond  from  the  south-west, 
was  abandoned.  The  loyal  men  of  East  Tennessee,  West 
ern  North  Carolina  and  Northern  Georgia  were  thus  de 
prived  of  the  hope  of  assistance  in  their  movements  for 
resisting  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Confederacy  over  their 
section,  and  were  compelled  to  succumb  to  a  long  and 
galling  oppression.  Confederate  camps  were  established 
at  Cumberland  Gap,  Nashville,  and  Union  City,  and  prep 
arations  were  made  for  occupying  Kentucky  from  these 
points,  so  soon  as  the  disunionists  in  Kentucky  could 
mature  their  plans.  These  leaders  assembled  and  agreed 
upon  the  main  points  in  their  programme.  In  Missouri, 
Jackson  and  Price,  who  had  been  driven  by  Lyon  into 
the  south-western  portion  of  the  Commonwealth,  took 
new  courage,  and  began  the  organization  of  a  strong 
force  in  that  section  for  the  purpose  of  regaining  con 
trol  over  the  "  State  "  and  making  it  a  member  of  the 
Southern  Confederacy.  The  Foreign  Powers,  which 
had  been  led  by  the  anti-coercion  policy,  or  rather  the 
non-coercion  policy,  of  President  Buchanan  into  a  par 
tial  recognition  of  the  Confederacy,  but  had  begun  to 
see  more  clearly  after  hearing  Lincoln's  instructions  to 
his  diplomatic  agents  and  reading  his  message  to  Con 
gress,  were  again  thrown  into  doubt  and  bewilderment 
in  regard  to  the  position  which  they  should  assume  be 
tween  the  belligerents  ;  while  panic  reigned  in  Wash 
ington,  and  despair  rested  its  black  cloud  over  the  North. 
It  was  now  evident  to  all  that  a  long  and  terrible 
war  would  be  necessary  to  quell  the  giant  rebellion,  and 
that  the  Government  must  choose  between  such  a  war 
and  the  dissolution  of  the  Union.  Not  very  many  fa 
vored  the  latter  alternative.  More  were  wavering  and 
undecided.  The  Government,  however,  and  the  great 
mass  of  people  at  the  North,  soon  recovered  sufficiently 
to  express  the  determination  that  the  last  man  and  the 


THE  THREE  MONTHS'  WAR        225 

last  dollar  should  be  expended  in  the  defence  of  the 
Union  and  of  national  existence.  With  stern  resolve 
they  set  about  the  colossal  preparations  for  the  three 
years'  war  now  about  to  follow. 

The  Confederates,  upon  their  side,  never  seemed  to 
have  considered  at  all  that  the  victory  placed  them  in  a 
most  advantageous  position  to  offer  peace  for  a  Union 
reconstructed  upon  their  own  ideas,  with  half  of  the 
Territories  for  slavery,  and  guarantees  in  the  form  of 
unamendable  amendments,  which  would  secure  them 
forever,  in  so  far  as  law  could  do  it,  in  the  possession  of 
their  slave  property.  Their  exaltation  knew  no  bounds. 
Their  President  told  them  that  their  enemy  num 
bered  two  to  their  one  upon  the  field  of  Manassas,  and 
they  naturally  concluded  that  every  battle  in  which  the 
Unionists  would  dare  to  engage  could  have  only  the 
same  result.  They  resolved  to  persist,  or  rather  they 
did  not  think  of  discontinuing  to  persist,  in  their  work 
for  complete  and  permanent  separation.  Nothing,  in 
the  long  run,  proved  more  disastrous  to  them  than  this 
first  great  victory.  It  blinded  them  to  the  dangers 
which  lay  before  them.  It  maddened  them  for  their 
own  destruction. 
VOL.  I. —15 


CHAPTER  IX 

PREPARATIONS  FOR  THE  THREE  YEARS'  WAR 

Convictions  as  to  the  Length  of  the  War  after  Bull  Run— The  Call 
for  Volunteers  and  Enlistments  in  the  Regular  Army  and 
Navy— The  Powers  of  the  President  in  Raising  Armies  and 
Navies — Congressional  Acts  Enabling  the  President  to  Deal 
with  the  Rebellion— The  President  as  Military  Dictator— The 
Habeas  Corpus  Question — The  Merryman  Case — Mr.  Bates's 
Opinion  on  the  War  Powers  of  the  President — The  Raising, 
Organizing,  and  Equipping  of  the  Great  Military  Force  Author 
ized  by  Congress—  McClellan  at  Washington — Fremont  in  the 
West — Halleck  at  St.  Louis — Increase  and  Organization  of  the 
Navy— The  Production  of  the  Materials  of  War  at  the  North- 
Preparations  for  War  in  the  Confederacy — The  Centres  of 
Confederate  Military  Organization — The  Problems  Confronting 
the  Confederate  Leaders. 

THE  effect  of  the  Confederate  victory  at  Bull  Run,  as 

to  convictions  concerning  the  length  of   the  struggle, 

was  one  thing  at  the  South  and  the  directly 

Convictions  .,      ..  .     ! 

as  to  the  opposite  thing  at  the  JSorth.  In  the  oouth 
warafterBuii  the  mass  of  men  believed  that  one  Southern 
er  had  actually  whipped  five  Northerners, 
could  do  it  every  time,  and  that  the  Northern  cowards 
would  hardly  dare  to  try  another  bout.  In  a  word,  they 
thought  that  the  war  was  practically  over,  and  secession 
practically  established,  and  that,  therefore,  no  further 
preparations  on  their  part  were  necessary. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  people  of  the  North  were 
made  to  realize  the  magnitude  of  the  undertaking  in 
which  they  were  engaged,  and  which  they  must  prose- 

226 


PREPARATIONS  FOR  THE  THREE  YEARS'  WAR     227 

cute  to  n  successful  end.  While  deeply  humiliated  by 
the  disaster,  they  came  quickly  to  understand  that  it 
was  no  reflection  upon  the  valor  of  Northern  soldiers, 
since  the  combatants  were  nearly  evenly  matched,  as  to 
numbers,  in  the  last  hours  of  the  battle,  and  the  'Con 
federates  had  greatly  the  advantage  as  to  position,  and 
to  appreciate  the  fact  that  not  one-third  of  the  army 
under  the  command  of  General  Scott,  on  the  Virginia 
border,  had  participated  in  the  engagement.  While, 
therefore,  they  lost  no  courage,  they  were  forced  to  the 
conviction  that  the  struggle  was  to  be  protracted,  obsti 
nate  and  bloody,  and  they  immediately  set  about  making 
preparations  on  a  scale  sufficient  to  accomplish  the  result 
upon  which  they  were  more  firmly  resolved  than  ever. 
On  the  day  following  the  defeat,  the  House  of  Repre 
sentatives  voted  :  "  That  the  maintenance  of  the  Con 
stitution,  the  preservation  of  the  Union  and  the  enforce 
ment  of  the  laws  are  sacred  trusts  which  must  be 
executed  ;  that  no  disaster  shall  discourage  us  from  the 
ample  performance  of  this  most  sacred  duty  ;  and  that 
we  pledge  to  the  country  and  the  world  the  employment 
of  every  resource,  national  and  individual,  for  the  sup 
pression,  overthrow  and  punishment  of  rebels  in  arms." 
And  this  sentiment  was  quickly  and  distinctly  echoed 
back  from  every  city,  village,  hamlet  and  homestead  of 
the  North. 

The  President  had  already  in  his  message  of  July  4th 
asked  Congress  to  place  at  the  disposal  of  the  Govern 
ment  four  hundred  thousand  men  and  four  The  call  for 
hundred  millions  of  dollars.  At  the  same  Jn'd  ^enlist8- 
time  he  informed  Congress  of  his  call  of  May  £ent?  "J  the 

J     Kegular  Army 

4th  preceding  for  enlistments  in  the  regular  and  Navy- 
army  and  navy,  and  for  volunteers  to  serve  during  the 
war,  and  directed  the  attention  of  Congress  to  the  report 
of  his  Secretary  of  War  that  the  regular  army  contained 


228  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

at  that  date,  July  4th,  in  consequence  of  the  call  of  May 
4th,  forty-two  thousand  men,  and  the  volunteer  force 
one  hundred  and  eighty-eight  thousand  men,  and  also  to 
the  report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Xavy  that  the  navy 
contained,  in  consequence  of  the  increase  of  force  so 
provided,  eighty-two  vessels,  carrying  eleven  hundred 
guns,  and  manned  by  some  thirteen  thousand  men. 
Here  was  a  vast  military  force  already  at  hand.  It  had 
been  recruited  in  response  to  calls,  issued  May  4th 
preceding,  for  about  eighty  thousand  men — forty-two 
thousand  volunteers,  twenty-two  thousand  regulars,  and 
eighteen  thousand  seamen.  The  President  acknowledged, 
in  his  message,  doubts  as  to  his  constitutional  power  to 
make  these  calls,  and  said  they  "  were  ventured  upon 
under  what  appeared  to  be  a  popular  demand  and  a 
public  necessity."  He  took  the  ground,  however,  that 
while  he  might  have  usurped  the  powers  of  Congress,  he 
had  not  gone  beyond  that,  and  expressed  the  hope  that 
Congress  would  ratify  his  acts. 

There  is  no  question  that,  in  increasing  the  army  by 
any  other  means  than  a  call  for  militia,  and  in  increas 
ing  the   navy  by  any   means  whatever,  the 

The  powers  •-,,-,      j  j  i 

of  the  Presi-  President  had  assumed  powers  not  expressly 
armies  raaTI  conferred  upon  him  either  by  the  Constitu 
tion  or  the  laws.  It  is  certainly  a  fair  query, 
however,  whether  the  President  may  not,  in  accordance 
with  the  spirit  of  the  Constitution,  in  time  of  invasion 
or  rebellion,  and  when  Congress  is  not  in  session,  ask  his 
fellow-countrymen  to  come  to  the  armed  support  of  the 
Government  and  the  country.  It  is  certainly  good 
political  science  to  acknowledge  such  a  power  to  him, 
and  very  bad  political  science  not  to  do  so.  And  he 
certainly  would  be  a  bad  President  who  would  refuse  to 
assume  such  a  responsibility  under  exigencies  which,  in 
his  own  honest  opinion,  required  him  to  do  so.  A  Pres- 


229 

ident  who  would  let  the  Government  go  to  pieces  in  an 
armed  attack  upon  it,  either  by  foreign  or  domestic  foes, 
before  he  would  ask  the  people  to  assist  him  in  its  armed 
defence  and  in  the  maintenance  of  its  supremacy,  would 
be  a  pitiable  object,  would  be  a  President  far  more  mer 
iting  to  be  impeached  and  driven  from  office  than  the 
President  who  should  exceed  his  regular  constitutional 
powers  in  defending  the  country  and  maintaining  the 
enforcement  of  the  laws. 

It  might  be  a  dangerous  thing  to  vest  such  a  power  in 
the  President  by  the  express  terms  of  the  Constitution. 
It  might  prove  a  strong  temptation  to  ambitious  and 
imperious  natures  to  expand  unduly  and  unnecessarily 
the  executive  power  and  prerogative.  It  is  perhaps  best 
that  the  Constitution  should  recognize  the  power  as 
belonging  to  the  President  in  so  general  and  vague  a 
manner  as  to  make  him  feel  the  great  weight  of  the  re 
sponsibility  which  he  assumes  in  its  exercise,  and  thus 
secure  him  against  temptation  to  assume  it  lightly  ; 
but  the  constitution  which  permits  the  executive,  un 
der  no  exigencies,  to  call  the  people  to  his  aid  in  up 
holding  government  is  an  unscientific  and  an  unpracti- 
cable  instrument  of  public  law,  one  which  invites,  and 
even  requires,  infraction  in  the  most  critical  moments 
of  a  nation's  existence. 

The  Congress  which  assembled  on  the  4th  of  July, 
1861,  was  evidently  inclined  from  the  outset  to  inter 
pret  the  Constitution  from  its  whole  spirit  rather  than 
from  the  letter  of  express  provisions.  On  the  very  first 
day  of  the  session,  Mr.  Wilson  of  Massachusetts  gave 
notice  in  the  Senate  that  he  should  ask  leave  to  intro 
duce  a  bill  for  ratifying  the  President's  acts.  On  the 
next  day  he  proposed  to  the  Senate  a  joint  resolution 
which  provided  that  all  of  the  acts  of  the  President  in 
increasing  the  army  and  navy,  and  in  calling  the  militia 


230  THE    CIVIL   WAR 

and  volunteers  should  be  legal  and  valid,  "  with  the 
same  effect  as  if  they  had  been  issued  and  done  under 
the  previous  express  authority  and  direction  of  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States/'  This  precise  resolution, 
though  reported  back  to  the  Senate  favorably  and  with 
out  change  by  the  committee  to  which  it  was  referred, 
was  never  voted  on ;  but  by  separate  acts  Congress 
adopted  substantially  its  contents  and  put  the  Adminis 
tration  upon  the  war  footing. 

By  the  acts  of  July  22d  and  25th,  the  President 
was  authorized  to  call  for  and  accept  volunteers  to  the 
Cong  res-  number  of  five  hundred  thousand  men  for  a 
SSSlng'fhe  maximum  service  of  three  years,  or  for  the 
SSf  wIEh  the  Period  of  the  war,  to  fix  the  number  of  gen- 
rebellion.  era]  officers  necessary  to  command  this  vast 
force,  and  by  and  with  the  consent  of  the  Senate  to 
appoint  them,  and  to  arm  these  troops  according  to  his 
own  discretion.  By  the  Act  of  July  29th  he  was  author 
ized  to  increase  the  regular  army  by  nine  regiments  of 
infantry,  one  regiment  of  cavalry,  and  one  regiment  of 
artillery,  and  to  use  any  part  of  the  military  power, 
militia,  volunteers,  regulars,  and  marines,  for  suppress 
ing  rebellion  against  the  Government  of  the  United 
States,  and  removing  obstructions  to  its  operations 
which,  in  his  opinion,  could  not  be  dealt  with  by  the 
ordinary  course  of  judicial  proceedings.  By  the  act  of 
August  5th,  he  was  authorized  to  enlist,  through  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  and  for  the  period  of  the  war, 
any  number  of  seamen  and  other  persons  necessary  to 
place  the  entire  navy  in  a  state  of  utmost  efficiency  for 
active  service.  And  finally  by  the  Act  of  August  6th, 
all  the  acts,  proclamations,  and  orders  of  the  President 
relating  to  the  army,  navy,  militia,  and  volunteers,  is 
sued  after  March  4th  preceding,  were  approved  and  le 
galized. 


PREPARATIONS  FOR  THE  THREE  YEARS'  WAR     231 

In  the  second  place,  by  the  Act  of  July  13th,  Con 
gress  empowered  the  President  to  collect  the  customs  at 
the  ports  of  delivery  instead  of  the  regular  ports  of 
entry  ;  and,  if  he  should  find  it  impossible  to  enforce 
the  customs  laws  either  at  the  ports  of  entry  or  of  de 
livery,  to  cause  the  custom-houses  at  such  ports  to  be  re 
moved  to  other  places  in  the  respective  customs  districts 
of  these  ports,  or  to  be  established  on  shipboard  within 
these  ports  or  near  them  ;  and  if  he  could  not  enforce 
these  laws  in  either  of  these  ways  in  such  districts,  to 
close  the  ports  of  entry  therein,  and  blockade  such 
ports  against  the  entrance  of  any  foreign  vessels,  and 
make  capture  of  any  vessel  undertaking  to  enter. 

In  the  third  place,  by  the  Act  of  July  17th,  Congress 
authorized  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to  borrow  the 
sum  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  millions  of  dollars,  on  the 
credit  of  the  Government,  by  the  issue  of  bonds  and 
treasury  notes  in  such  proportion  as  the  Secretary  might 
find  beneficial  ;  and  by  the  Act  of  August  5th,  Congress 
increased  the  duties  on  imports,  levied  a  direct  annual 
tax  of  twenty  millions  of  dollars,  and  apportioned  it 
among  the  Commonwealths,  arid  an  annual  income 
tax  of  three  per  centum  upon  all  incomes  over  eight 
hundred  dollars,  increased  to  five  per  centum  in  case 
the  citizen  assessed  resided  abroad,  but  reduced  to  one 
and  one-half  per  centum,  in  all  cases,  upon  income  de 
rived  from  the  securities  of  the  United  States.  It  was 
calculated  that  these  provisions  would  place  very  nearly 
one  million  of  dollars  a  day  in  the  hands  of  the  Govern 
ment  for  the  suppression  of  the  rebellion  and  the  re- 
establishment  of  the  supremacy  of  the  laws  of  the 
United  States  ;  and  to  these  ends  Congress  appropriated 
the  vast  sums  to  be  thus  raised  to  the  equipment  and 
maintenance  of  the  army  and  navy. 

In  the  fourth  place,  by  the  Act  of  August  6th,  Con- 


232  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

gress  authorized  the  President  to  seize,  confiscate,  and 
condemn  any  property  employed,  or  intended  to  be  em 
ployed,  in  aiding  and  abetting  insurrection  against  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  or  resistance  to  the 
laws  of  the  United  States.  This  Act  also  declared  any 
slave  emancipated  who  should  be  employed  by  his  mas 
ter,  or  be  permitted  to  be  employed  by  his  master,  in 
any  service  hostile  to  the  Government  of  the  United 
States. 

Finally,  by  the  Act  of  July  13th,  already  referred  to, 
Congress  authorized  the  President  to  declare  the  exist 
ence  of  insurrection  in  all  parts  of  the  United  States 
where  he  could  not  execute  the  laws  by  the  ordinary 
processes,  and  to  forbid  commerce  and  intercourse  be 
tween  the  inhabitants  of  such  parts  and  the  rest  of  the 
United  States,  and  seize  and  confiscate  to  the  United 
States  all  property  employed  in  such  illicit  traffic  and 
commerce. 

With  these  several  enactments  Congress   placed  the 
Government  on  the  war  footing,  ratified  the  President's 
The   Prpi    assumP^on  of  war  powers,  and,  on  the  6th 


dent  as  mill-  Of  August,  adjourned,  leaving  the  President 

tary  dictator.  &        >.      J  '    .  f> 

practically  in  the  position  of  a  military  dic 
tator.  This  was  good  political  science,  and  good  public 
policy.  It  was  also  sound  constitutionally.  In  periods 
of  extreme  peril  to  the  political  life  of  a  nation,  individ 
ual  liberty,  federalism  in  government,  and  even  co-ordi 
nation  of  governmental  departments  must  give  way 
temporarily  to  the  principle  of  executive  dictatorship. 
It  is  a  desperate  remedy,  a  remedy  of  last  resort,  but  it 
is  one  which  every  complete  political  s}Tstem  must  con 
tain,  and  under  certain  proper  conditions  employ.  The 
two  most  modern  constitutions  of  federal  government, 
those  of  the  German  Empire  and  of  Brazil,  make  ex 
press  provision  for  it.  They  authorize  the  Executive  in 


PREPARATIONS  FOR  THE  THREE  YEARS5  WAR      233 

periods  of  extreme  public  danger  to  suspend  the  ordinary 
law  and  establish  martial  law.  There  is  no  question 
that  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  authorizes 
the  Congress  and  the  President,  acting  together,  to  do 
the  same  thing.  The  clauses  of  that  instrument  which 
vest  in  Congress  the  power  to  raise  armies,  provide  for 
calling  the  militia  into  the  service  of  the  United  States 
for  repelling  invasion  and  suppressing  insurrection,  and 
to  declare  war,  and  in  the  President  the  powers  of  a 
commander-in-chief,  certainly  contain  the  principle  of 
the  dictatorial  power  of  the  whole  Government,  if  not  of 
the  President  alone,  and  it  is  altogether  gratuitous  to 
concede  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  over 
stepped  its  constitutional  powers,  and  acted  on  the 
principle  that  necessity  knows  no  law,  in  preserving 
the  Union  by  force  against  dissolution.  It  overstepped 
its  ordinary  limitations,  but  it  had,  and  has,  the  consti 
tutional  right  to  do  that  in  periods  of  extraordinary 
danger. 

The  root  of  the  error  in  denying  this  right  lies  in 
the  claim  that  the  Constitution  made  the  Union.  The 
truth  is  that  the  Union  made  the  Constitution,  and 
that  the  physical  and  ethnical  conditions  of  our  terri 
tory  and  population  made  the  Union.  The  Union  was, 
and  is,  the  Nation,  and  men  did  not  make  the  Nation 
by  the  resolutions  of  a  convention.  Men  undertook  to 
interpret  the  requirements  of  the  Union  in  political 
and  legal  organization  and  to  give  them  objective  form 
and  authority,  but  behind  all  that  they  did,  or  could  or 
can  do,  was  and  is  the  Union,  the  Nation,  whose  pres 
ervation  is  the  supreme  principle  back  of  the  Con 
stitution,  and  the  supreme  law  within  the  Constitution. 
Any  other  view  of  these  relations  is  unspiritual,  is  pure 
ly  arbitrary  and  mechanical.  Any  other  view  leads, 
as  it  led  in  the  South,  to  the  loss  of  the  ideal  in  our 


234  THE  CIVIL   WAR 

politics  and  jurisprudence,  and  consequently  to  disso 
lution,  anarch}^  and  ultimate  barbarism. 

Congress  passed,  at  this  session,  no  formal  resolution 
in  regard  to  the  suspension  of  the  privileges  of  the  writ 

of  Habeas  Corpus  by  the  President's  com- 
corpus  que?  mand.  It  was  doubtful  whether  the  President 

needed  any  approval  of  his  action  in  this 
matter  by  Congress,  or  whether  a  disapproval  by  Con 
gress  would  have  been  of  any  consequence  from  the 
point  of  view  of  a  sound  interpretation  of  the  Constitu 
tion.  The  Constitution  simply  provides  that  "  the 
privilege  of  the  writ  of  Habeas  Corpus  shall  not  be  sus 
pended,  unless  when  in  cases  of  rebellion  or  invasion  the 
public  safety  may  require  it."  It  is  not  expressly  desig 
nated  by  whom  the  privilege  of  the  writ  may  be  in  these 
events  suspended.  The  provision  is  found  in  the  article 
of  the  Constitution  which  treats  of  the  powers  of  Con 
gress,  and  it  was  argued  that,  from  the  textual  connection, 
it  must  be  concluded  that  Congress  is  vested  with  the 
power.  But,  from  the  point  of  view  of  a  correct  politi 
cal  science,  it  is  easily  perceived  that  the  power  belongs 
more  properly  to  the  Executive,  at  least  when  it  is  to  be 
called  into  exercise  upon  or  near  the  theatre  of  hostile 
operations.  It  is  the  President  who  must  meet,  and 
conquer  or  suppress,  such  movements,  acting  in  his 
capacity  of  commander-in-chief  of  the  military  power. 
The  Congress  may  not  be  in  session  at  the  time  when 
these  exigencies  arise.  Everything  may  depend  upon 
the  President's  promptness  and  vigor.  There  is  no 
question  that  a  sound  public  jurisprudence  would  at 
tribute  such  a  power  to  him  under  such  circumstances  ; 
and  where  the  constitutional  provision  may  be  inter 
preted  in  more  than  one  way,  the  dictate  of  a  sound 
political  science  ought  to  determine  which  interpretation 
shall  prevail.  The  then  Chief  Justice  of  the  United 


PREPARATIONS  FOR  THE  THREE  YEARS'  WAR 

States,  Mr.  Timey,  took  the  view,  however,  that  Con 
gress  alone  had  the  power  to  suspend  the  privilege  of 
the  writ,  and  that  the  power  to  suspend  the  privilege  of 
the  writ  did  not  carry  with  it  the  power  to  make  arbi 
trary  arrest. 

He  gave  this  opinion  in  the  Merryman  case.  One 
John  Merryman,  accused  of  holding  a  rebel  commission 
and  recruiting  a  rebel  military  force  in  Mary-  The  Merry. 
land,  was  seized  under  a  military  order  and  mancase- 
incarcerated  in  Fort  McIIenry.  Merryman  applied, 
through  counsel,  to  Chief  Justice  Taney  for  a  writ  of 
Habeas  Corpus.  The  Chief  Justice  issued  it.  General 
Cadwalader,  the  commander  of  the  Fort,  declined  to 
respond  to  it,  on  the  ground  that  he  had  been  authorized 
by  the  President  to  suspend  the  privilege  of  the  writ, 
and  had  done  so.  The  Chief  Justice  then  issued  a  writ 
of  attachment  for  the  body  of  General  Cadwalader,  but 
the  United  States  marshal,  who  undertook  to  serve  it, 
was  stopped  by  the  sentinel  at  the  entrance  to  the  Fort, 
and  sent  away  with  no  answer.  The  Chief  Justice  then 
filed  the  opinion,  referred  to  above,  in  the  office  of  the 
clerk  of  the  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the 
district  of  Maryland,  and  directed  a  copy  of  the  same  to 
be  transmitted  to  the  President.  These  events  occurred 
during  the  latter  part  of  May.  The  President  did  not, 
however,  order  any  return  to  be  made  to  the  writ  of 
Habeas  Corpus,  nor  command  the  execution  of  the  writ 
of  attachment,  nor  did  he  command  the  release  of  Merry 
man.  He  submitted  the  question  of  his  powers  and  du 
ties  in  regard  to  these  things  to  his  Attorney-General, 
Mr.  Bates,  and,  on  the  oth  of  July,  Mr.  Mr  Bateg,8 
Bates  instructed  the  President  that  he  had  opinion  on  the 

War     powers 

the  constitutional  power   to  make    military  of  the  Presi- 

arrests,  and  suspend  the  privilege  of  the  writ 

of  Habeas  Corpus,  in  times  of  great  public  danger.     The 


236  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

President  followed  the  view  of  Mr.  Bates,  rather  than 
that  of  the  Chief  Justice,  and  the  Congress,  then  in  ses 
sion,  tacitly  acquiesced  in  the  President's  course  of  ac 
tion.  Mr.  Bates's  doctrine  was  and  is  sound  jurispru 
dence,  but  Mr.  Taney's  propositions  were,  and  still  are, 
the  law  of  the  land.  The  development  of  constitutional 
law  on  the  side  of  the  temporary  dictatorial  powers  of 
the  President  is  still  an  unsolved  problem  in  our  system. 
After  the  adjournment  of  Congress,  the  Washington 
Government,  the  Northern  Commonwealth  governments 

The  raising     ail(^  ^6  People  °f    the  North  Settled  down  to 

organizing   the   work    of    raisin?,    organizing,    arming, 

and  equipping  .        .  ,      ,.      P,.     .  .,., 

of   the  great  equipping  and   disciplining  a  military  and 

military  force  ,  J       ., 

authorized  by  naval  power  of  colossal  proportions  for  the 
purpose  of  suppressing  the  giant  rebellion 
against  the  Union  and  the  Government.  The  chief 
centres  of  activity,  if  we  may  speak  of  chief  centres 
when  every  city,  town,  and  hamlet  was  astir  with  mar 
tial  life  and  animated  with  a  stern  and  resolute  pur 
pose,  were  Washington,  Cincinnati,  Louisville,  Cairo, 
and  St.  Louis. 

In   the   latter  part   of  July   General  McClellan  was 
called  to  Washington,  and  given  command  of  the  new 

Mccieiian at  military  department  of  Washington  and 
Washington.  North-eastern  Virginia.  He  left  General  W. 
S.  Rosecrans  in  command  in  Western  Virginia.  General 
John  C.  Fremont  had  already  been  appointed  to  the 
command  of  the  military  district  of  the  West,  composed 

Fremont  in  °^  Kentucky,  Illinois,  Missouri  and  Kansas, 
the  west.  an(j  Arrived  in  person  at  his  head-quarters  in 
St.  Louis  at  about  the  same  time  that  McClellan  as 
sumed  command  in  Washington.  Subject  to  Fremont's 
orders,  General  Robert  Anderson  was  placed  in  com 
mand  at  Louisville,  General  Benjamin  M.  Prentiss  at 
Cairo,  and  General  Nathaniel  Lyon  at  Springfield,  Mis- 


237 

souri.     General  Anderson  was  superseded   by   General 
W.  T.  Sherman  early  in  October,  and  General  Sherman 
by  General  Don  Carlos  Buell  in  November.  General  Pren- 
tiss  was  superseded  by  General  U.  S.  Grant  early  in  Sep 
tember.     General  Fremont  was  superseded  by  General 
David  Hunter  early  in  November,  and  ten  days  later  Gen 
eral  Hunter  was  removed  from  command  in  St.  Louis  and 
General  Henry  W.  Halleck  was  appointed  in      Haiieck    at 
his  stead.      It  was  under  the  superior  direc-  st  Louls- 
tion  of  these  great  chieftains  that  the  vast  army  of  six 
hundred  thousand  volunteers  was  assembled,  organized,    ; 
and  disciplined  during  the  late  summer  and  autumn  of  '' 
1861. 

The  navy  was  organized  in  three  squadrons.  The 
North  Atlantic  Squadron,  which  was  authorized  to  oper 
ate  to  the  southern  line  of  North  Carolina,  increase 
was  placed  under  the  command  of  Captain 
L.  M.  Goldsborough.  The  South  Atlantic 
Squadron  was  placed  under  the  command  of  Captain  S. 
F.  Du  Pont.  And  the  Gulf  Squadron  was  entrusted  to 
the  command  of  Captain  W.  W.  McKean.  By  the  1st 
of  December  (1801),  the  navy  had  been  increased  to  two 
hundred  and  sixty-four  war-ships,  carrying  two  thousand 
five  hundred  and  fifty-seven  guns,  and  manned  by  over 
twenty  thousand  seamen. 

The  people  throughout  the  Northern  Commonwealths 
went  earnestly  and  vigorously  about  creating  the  materi 
als  of  war.  Their  genius  for,  and  their  ex- 

?  111,1  The  produc- 

penence  in,  manufacture  enabled  them  to  tion  of  the 
produce  clothing,  accoutrements,  arms,  am-  war  at  the 
munition,  etc.,  without  limit,  while  their  J 
great  grain  fields  and  prairies  furnished  food  without 
stint.  The  only  difficulty  felt  was  in  a  sufficiently  rapid 
manufacture  of  arms  at  the  outset.  At  the  outbreak  of 
the  war  there  was  only  one  Government  establishment  at 


238  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

the  North  for  the  construction  of  these  implements,  the 
armory  at  Springfield  in  Massachusetts.  This  plant 
could  at  that  time  produce  only  about  ten  thousand 
guns  annually.  There  were,  however,  so  many  private 
establishments  for  the  manufacture  of  weapons  of  all 
kinds  that  no  need  was  felt  for  relying  to  any  great  ex 
tent  upon  governmental  production.  The  arsenals  at 
the  North  had  been  somewhat  depleted  by  the  orders  of 
Mr.  Buchanan's  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Floyd,  and  the 
Washington  Government  found  it  necessary  to  send  to 
Europe  in  the  summer  of  1861  for  muskets.  A  few 
rather  poor  ones  were  purchased,  but  were  soon  thrown 
aside  for  the  better  models  invented  and  manufactured 
at  home.  Many  of  the  iron  and  steel  foundries  were 
changed  into  factories  for  the  making  of  the  heavy  ord 
nance,  and  the  new  naval  armaments  were  chiefly  cre 
ated  at  home. 

Among  the  Confederates  the  preparations  were  by  no 

means  so  earnest,  active,  and  productive.     As  has  been 

said,  they  generally  thought  that  the  struggle 

Preparations    ,      -.  ,  ?  .       ,,     *        -i     -i    i        ,-,     •         •    , 

for  war  in  the  had  been  virtually  ended  by  their  victory  at 
confederacy.  Bull  Run>  There  wag>  however,  at  least  one 

among  them  who  was  not  thus  deceived,  and  that  one 
was  Mr.  Davis  himself.  He  was  continually  saying  that 
the  contest  would  be  long  and  bloody,  and  was  contin 
ually  urging  his  Congress  and  the  people  of  the  South 
to  make  adequate  preparations  to  meet  it. 

Already  before  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  the  Confeder 
ate  Congress  had  authorized  the  raising  of  sixty-six 
millions  of  dollars  by  loans,  and  had  laid  an  export  tax 
of  one-eighth  of  a  cent  a  pound  upon  cotton  for  the 
purpose  of  securing  sufficient  specie  to  pay  the  interest 
on  the  debt  to  be  thus  created.  Before  the  end  of  the 
year  the  raising  of  about  one  hundred  and  twenty-five 
millions  more  by  loan  was  authorized.  According  to 


PREPARATIONS  FOR  THE  THREE  YEARS'  WAR     239 

the  statement  of  President  Davis  the  expenditures  of 
the  Confederate  Government  up  to  the  beginning  of 
February,  1862,  amounted  to  one  hundred  and  seventy 
millions  of  dollars.  These  loans  were  chiefly  in  the 
form  of  Treasury  notes,  convertible  into  twenty-year 
eight-per-cent.  bonds,  the  interest  upon  which  was  to  be 
paid  in  coin,  the  coin  to  be  procured  by  customs  duties 
and  internal  taxes. 

Down  to  the  date  of  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  the  Con 
federate  Congress  had  authorized  the  enlistment  of  one- 
year  men  only,  and  to  the  number  of  one  hundred  thou 
sand.  As  a  fact  there  were  more  than  two  hundred 
thousand  men  in  the  field  before  the  1st  of  August. 
By  the  Act  of  the  8th  of  August  that  Congress  author 
ized  the  enlistment  of  four  hundred  thousand  men  to 
serve  for  a  maximum  period  of  three  years,  and  also  au 
thorized,  a  little  later,  additional  volunteer  forces  for 
local  defence  and  special  service. 

The  centres  of  organization  around  which  these  forces 
were  being  gathered  in  the  late  summer  and  autumn  of 
1861  were  Yorktown  and  Centreville  in  East-  The  Centre8 
ern  Virginia,  Winchester  in  the  Shenandoah  Sa^derjre 
Valley,  Lewisburg  and  Valley  Mountain  in  ganization. 
Western  Virginia,  Knoxville,  Nashville,  and  Memphis, 
in  Tennessee,  Little  Rock  in  Arkansas,  and  the  section 
of  Missouri  lying  south-west  from  Springfield.  The 
military  chieftains  to  whom  the  work  of  organization  and 
discipline  was  entrusted  were  Generals  J.  E.  Johnston, 
P.  G.  T.  Beauregard,  T.  J.  Jackson,  R.  E.  Lee,  H. 
A.  Wise,  F.  K.  Zollicoffer,  G.  J.  Pillow,  S.  B.  Buckner, 
A.  S.  Johnston,  Leonidas  Polk,  Benjamin  McCulloch, 
and  Sterling  Price.  There  is  no  question  that  here  was 
a  great  array  of  military  talent,  as  subsequent  events 
fully  proved. 

The   immediate  problems   which   they   had   to   face 


240  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

were   certainly   more   difficult   than  those   confronting 

the   Union   Generals.     The  South  was  poor  in  manu- 

T  h  e    rob    ^ac^ures  an(^  *u  talent  for  invention.     It  was 

lems    con-  also   a  second-rate   food-producing   section. 

fronting     the     „          ,  .  ni        •,   ••  -,   ,   , 

confederate  bpeaking  generally,,  it  bought  both  food  and 
clothes,  tools  and  arms,  and  all  of  the  finer 
products  of  civilization  from  the  North  or  from  Europe, 
and  paid  for  them  in  cotton.  How  to  arm,  equip  and 
provision  the  first  large  armies  from  the  existing  store 
of  material  in  the  South  was  a  most  serious  problem  for 
the  Southern  statesmen  and  generals  ;  and,  then,  how  to 
change  the  agriculture  of  the  South  from  the  raising  of 
cotton  to  the  producing  of  food,  and  divert  part  of  the 
labor  of  the  South  from  agriculture  altogether  and  em 
ploy  it  in  the  development  of  manufactures  were  almost 
equally  difficult  undertakings. 

The  first  necessity  was,  of  course,  for  arms.  The 
Confederate  President  estimated  the  number  of  muskets 
and  rifles  in  the  arsenals  of  the  "States"  of  the  Con 
federacy  in  the  spring  of  1861,  at  about  one  hundred 
and  fifty  thousand.  Of  these,  according  to  his  statement, 
about  fifteen  thousand  were  Mississippi  rifles,  and  the 
rest  old  muskets,  recently  altered  from  flintlocks  to  per 
cussion  locks.  The  United  States  officials,  from  the 
President  down,  and  the  Unionist  historians,  have  main 
tained  that  the  number  of  small  arms  in  the  "  States  " 
that  claimed  to  have  seceded  from  the  Union  was,  at 
that  time,  much  greater  than  this,  owing  to  the  treason 
able  acts  of  Mr.  Buchanan's  Secretary  of  War,  Mr. 
Floyd,  in  sending  too  large  a  proportion  of  the  arms 
belonging  to  the  United  States  into  that  section.  It  is 
The  sending  probable  that  an  exaggerated  view  of  Mr. 
soutTby°M^  Lloyd's  doings  has  prevailed  at  the  North, 
Floyd.  ]3U^  after  making  allowance  for  that,  one 

cannot  help  feeling  that  Mr.  Davis's  estimate  was  con- 


PREPARATIONS  FOR  THE  THREE  YEARS'  WAR     241 

servative.  He  was  not  in  the  habit  of  overstating  things, 
and  he  knew  better  than  anyone  else  in  the  Confeder 
acy  that  the  Southern  people  would  be  very  apt  to 
estimate  their  wealth  in  military  equipment  much  too 
highly.  AVhatever  may  be  the  exact  truth  as  to  these 
points,  the  seizure  of  Harper's  Ferry,  and  the  Navy 
Yard  at  Norfolk  with  its  two  thousand  pieces  of  artil 
lery,  the  capture  of  arms  at  Bull  Run  and  Ball's  Bluff, 
and  in  Missouri,  and  the  purchases  in  Europe  in  1801, 
placed  the  Confederates  in  a  fair  condition  to  meet  the 
armies  of  the  United  States,  in  so  far  as  the  weapons  of 
war  were  concerned.  It  must  also  be  remembered  that 
the  people  of  the  South  owned  and  kept  arms  to  a  far 
greater  extent  than  the  people  of  the  North,  except  per 
haps  in  the  extreme  West.  In  1861,  it  would  have  been 
rather  difficult  to  find,  in  the  country  districts  of  the 
South,  a  man,  or  even  a  boy  of  sixteen,  who  did  not 
possess  a  rifle,  a  double-barrelled  shot  gun  and  a  pistol. 
There  was  much  greater  poverty  in  ammunition  than  in 
arms.  Mr.  Davis  estimated  the  amount  of  powder  on 
hand  on  the  1st  of  June,  18G1,  at  two  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  pounds,  about  one-fourth  of  what  he  thought 
would  be  necessary  for  a  single  year.  He  stated  further, 
that,  with  the  exception  of  two  little  private  mills  in 
East  Tennessee,  there  was  no  manufacture  of  the  article 
in  the  Confederacy.  He  also  estimated  the  number  of 
percussion  caps  to  be  had  at  about  two  hundred  and 
fifty  thousand,  and  claimed  that  there  was  almost  no 
lead  to  be  found.  Copper  for  the  manufacture  of  caps 
was,  he  stated,  just  beginning  to  be  obtained  in  East 
Tennessee,  and  there  were  a  few  lead  mines  in  Virginia, 
which  were  being  worked  in  an  indifferent  manner. 
There  was  no  saltpetre  and  but  little  nitre  in  store,  but 
some  four  or  five  hundred  tons  of  sulphur  were  found 
in  New  Orleans.  As  to  the  accoutrements  of  an  army, 
VOL.  I.— 1C 


242  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

such  as  uniforms,  blankets,  knapsacks,  bridles,  saddles, 
harness,  wagons,  etc.,  the  Confederate  President  figured 
these  at  zero. 

During  the  late  summer  and  autumn  of  1861,  the 
Confederates  went  earnestly  about  the  manufacture  of 
Beginning  the  implements  of  war.  Powder  mills  were 
STrmffnVhe  established  in  Virginia,  North  Carolina, 
confederacy.  gouth  Carolina,  Georgia,  and  Louisiana. 
Eight  arsenals  and  four  depots  were  supplied  with 
machinery  for  the  manufacture  of  arms,  munitions, 
and  equipments.  Several  good  chemical  laboratories 
were  put  into  operation.  Foundries  for  the  casting 
of  artillery  were  established  at  Richmond,  Nashville, 
and  New  Orleans.  And  cloth  factories,  tanneries,  etc., 
were  springing  into  existence  in  many  places.  The 
blockade  runners  were  also  at  work  almost  uninterrupt 
edly  between  Wilmington,  North  Carolina,  and  Ber 
muda,  bringing  in  a  vast  quantity  of  war  material.  By 
the  end  of  the  year  1861,  the  Confederates  had  between 
two  and  three  hundred  thousand  men  in  their  armies, 
and  were  fairly  armed  and  equipped,  in  most  places,  for 
battle.  They  were,  moreover,  in  good  spirits  and  were 
confident  of  success.  A  majority  of  the  engagements 
following  their  signal  victory  at  Bull  Eun  had  resulted, 
as  we  shall  see,  favorably  to  them,  and  they  generally 
felt  that  the  ultimate  triumph  of  their  cause  was  not 
far  off. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE    MILITARY    MOVEMENTS   IN    THE   LATE  SUMMER 
AND  AUTUMN  OF  1861 

The  Military  Movements  in  Missouri— The  Battle  of  Wilson's 
Creek — The  Secessionists  in  Missouri  Encouraged  to  New 
Efforts— The  Securing  of  Cairo— Fremont's  Line  of  Fortifica 
tions  through  Missouri — Martial  Law  Proclaimed  in  Missouri  — 
Lincoln's  Disavowal  of  Part  of  Fremont's  Proclamation — The 
Union  Defeat  at  Lexington — Price's  Retreat— Secession  in 
Missouri — Fremont's  Advance  to  Springfield — The  Situation  in 
Kentucky  and  the  Affair  at  Belmont — Belmont  a  Confederate 
Victory — Hunter  Abandons  Fremont's  Plan  of  a  Campaign  in 
Arkansas — Halleck  at  St.  Louis — The  Military  Movements  in 
Western  Virginia  after  the  Battles  of  Laurel  Hill  and  Rich 
Mountain  — Carnif ex  Ferry — Cheat  Mountain — Buffalo  Plill — 
Close  of  the  Campaign  of  18G1  in  Western  Virginia — The  Capt 
ure  of  Romney — The  Military  Movements  in  Eastern  Virginia 
after  Bull  Run — The  North  Demands  a  New  Advance — The 
Disaster  at  Ball's  Bluff— The  Effect  of  the  Disaster  on  the 
Army  and  Navy  and  the  People,  and  the  Sacrifice  of  Stone  — 
McClellan  Made  Commander-in-Chief  of  all  the  Armies  of  the 
United  States — Naval  Operations  during  the  Summer  and 
Autumn  of  1861  The  Confederate  Privateers— The  Legal 
Status  of  the  Confederate  Privateersman — The  Blockade — The 
Hatteras  Expedition — Fort  Pickens — Ship  Island — The  Capture 
of  Port  Royal — The  Trent  Affair — Bird's  eye  View  of  the  Situ 
ation  at  the  Close  of  1861. 

AFTER  the  affair  at  Booneville,  in  Missouri,,  on  the 
18th  of  June,  General  Price  had  retired  hastily  with  his 
forces  toward  the  Southwest,  gathering  re- 

f.  The  military 

emits   as   he  went,   and  expecting  to  meet  movements  in 
Confederate  reinforcements  as  he  neared  the  B 
Arkansas  line.    On  the  3d  of  July  Lyon  had,  with  a  force 

243 


244  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

of  some  three  thousand  men,  begun  pursuit.  He  had 
before  this  sent  two  regiments  of  infantry  and  a  battery 
of  artillery,  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Franz  Sigel, 
to  Kolla,  and  on  the  23ci  of  June  this  force  had  entered 
and  taken  possession  of  Springfield,  the  most  important 
town  in  Southwestern  Missouri.  Sigel  had  immediately 
conceived  the  plan  of  intercepting  Price  on  his  retreat 
from  Booneville  to  Arkansas.  On  the  28th  he  had 
advanced  to  Sarcoxie,  and  had  found  that  Price  had 
already  passed  by  with  a  part  of  his  men,  but  that  two 
detachments  were  still  to  the  north  of  him.  These  he 
sought,  and,  on  the  8th  of  July,  found,  some  eight  or 
ten  miles  north  of  Carthage  ;  and  on  the  next  day  he 
attacked  them,  although  they  more  than  doubled  his 
force  numerically,  with  the  result  that  he  was  defeated 
and  compelled  to  retire  to  Springfield.  Meanwhile 
Lyon  was  advancing  to  his  aid  by  forced  marches.  The 
junction  of  their  forces  was  effected  at  Springfield  on 
the  13th  of  July. 

Lyon's  total  strength,  after  the  junction  with  Sigel, 
was  only  about  six  thousand  men,  while  Price,  reinforced 
by  McCulloch  with  a  regular  Confederate  division,  as 
sembled  at  Cassville  a  force  of  about  twelve  thousand 
men  and  fifteen  guns. 

On  the  1st  of  August,  this  army  of  Confederates  and 
Missourians,  under  the  command  of  McCulloch  and 
Price,  began  the  advance  on  Springfield.  On  that  day 
the  two  armies  were  only  thirty  miles  apart,  and  Lyon 
felt  that  it  would  be  most  hazardous  for  him  to  under 
take  the  long  retreat  to  the  railroad  terminus  at  Rolla, 
nearly  one  hundred  miles  away,  since  one-half  of  his 
enemy's  force  was  mounted  and  could  easily  overtake 
him.  He  moreover  feared  the  moral  effect  of  a  retreat 
without  a  struggle  upon  the  population  of  Southern 
Missouri.  He,  therefore,  resolved  to  risk  a  battle,  and 


THE   MILITARY    MOVEMENTS    OF    1861          245 

he  put  liis  army  in  motion  toward  Cassville  on  the  same 
day  that  McCulloch  and  Price  began  their  advance  in 
the  opposite  direction.  On  the  second  day  of  his  march 
he  encountered  Rains's  detachment  at  Dug  Springs  and 
drove  it  back  upon  McCulloch's  division  at  Cave 
Springs.  The  Confederates,  believing  Lyon  to  be  much 
stronger  than  he  really  was,  moved  toward  the  north 
west  in  order  to  effect  a  junction  with  another  column 
coming  from  Sarcoxie,  and  Lyon  returned  to  Springfield 
with  the  hope  of  finding  there  reinforcements  from 
Holla.  In  this  he  was  disappointed,  and  he  soon  learned 
that  his  enemy,  in  full  force,  had  resumed  the  advance 
upon  Springfield. 

Lyon  now  saw  that  his  only  chance  of  victory,  and 
perhaps  of  safety,  was  in  surprising  his  adversaries,  and 

in  inflicting  such  losses  upon  them  as  to  dis- 

1 1     4.1  A  i  f  i  •  The    battle 

able   them,  at  least,  from  making  pursuit,    of  Wilson's 

On  the  evening  of  the  9th  of  August,  he  set  Creek' 
out  again  from  Springfield  to  fall  upon  his  enemy  en 
camped,  at  the  moment,  on  the  west  bank  of  Wilson's 
Creek,  ten  miles  to  the  south-west  of  Springfield.  His 
plan  of  battle  was  to  send  Sigel,  with  about  a  thousand 
men  and  a  battery  of  artillery,  around  the  Confederate 
right,  with  the  order  to  assault  their  right  flank,  while 
he,  with  the  rest  of  his  force,  about  four  thousand  men, 
should  attack  in  front.  Both  movements  appear  to  have 
been  well  executed  in  the  beginning.  At  daybreak,  on 
the  10th,  the  Confederates  were  surprised,  at  about  the 
same  moment,  in  front  and  on  the  right  flank,  and 
the  battle  seemed  to  be  turning  in  favor  of  the  Union 
army.  The  demoralization  of  SigePs  troops,  however, 
when  they  found  themselves  within  the  camps  of  the 
Confederates,  the  treacherous  use  of  the  United  States 
colors  by  the  Confederates,  and  at  last  the  fall  of  Gen 
eral  Lyon,  reversed  the  order  of  victory,  and  gave  the 


246  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

triumph  in  the  bloody  battle  of  Wilson's  Creek  to  the 
Confederates.  About  one-fourth  of  the  Union  army 
had  been  slain,  wounded,  or  captured.  The  Confeder 
ates  lost  an  even  greater  number,  though  not  so  great  a 
proportion  of  their  force.  Lyon's  death  was  a  most 
serious  disaster  to  the  Union  army.  Colonel  Sturgis, 
however,  upon  whom  the  chief  command  now  devolved, 
brought  the  army  back  to  Holla  in  a  successful  retreat. 
The  Confederates  had  been  so  badly  crippled  by  the 
battle  that  they  did  not  undertake  any  serious  pursuit. 

As  the  news  of  the  defeat  and  death  of  Lyon  spread 

through  Missouri,  the  secessionists  were  greatly  encour- 

The  seces    a&e<^  an(*  PrePare(l  themselves  anew  to  join 


n   the  standard  of  the  Confederacy,  whenever 

Missouri    en-     .,  .,          .         i  T        «.  rm 

couraged  to  the  opportunity  should  oner.  The  check, 
however,  which  the  Confederates  and  Missou- 
rians  had  received  at  Wilson's  Creek,  and  the  misunder 
standings  between  McCulloch  and  Price,  the  one  holding 
commission  from  the  Confederacy,  and  the  other  from 
the  routed  government  of  Missouri,  caused  McCulloch 
to  retire  with  his  troops  into  Arkansas.  Whereupon 
Price,  thus  left  in  full  command  of  all  the  troops  in  Mis 
souri  operating  against  the  United  States,  began  to  move 
northwestward  instead  of  pursuing  the  retreating  Fede 
rals  to  Holla.  On  the  3d  of  September,  he  encountered 
a  body  of  Kansans  under  General  Lane,  at  Dry  wood 
Creek,  near  the  boundary  between  Kansas  and  Missouri, 
and  drove  them  back  into  Kansas,  taking  possession  of 
Fort  Scott. 

Meanwhile  Fremont  had  appeared  in  St.  Louis,  as  we 

have  seen,  and  was  gathering,  equipping,  and  disciplin- 

The  secur-   ing  a  large  force  for  the  rescue  of  Missouri 

ing  of  Cairo.      ftnd    the  holding    of    CairQ  in    Hlinojs   at    the 

junction  of  the  Ohio  River  with  the  Mississippi,  a  place, 
therefore,  of    great  strategic   importance.      Fremont's 


THE   MILITARY    MOVEMENTS   OF    18(U          247 

opinion  was  that  the  holding  of  Cairo  and  of  the  river 
communication  between  St.  Louis  and  Cairo  were  matters 
of  much  greater  moment  than  sending  aid  to  Lyon  at 
Springfield.  He  had  therefore  left  Lyon  to  shift  for 
himself,,  as  we  have  seen,  and  had  sent  reinforcements 
to  Ironton,  Cape  Gerardeau,  and  Cairo,  going  himself, 
the  1st  of  August,  to  Cairo.  He  found  that  he  had  not 
acted  any  too  promptly.  The  Confederate  General  Pillow 
had  already  appeared  in  New  Madrid,  not  many  miles 
below,  with  a  force  estimated  by  Fremont  at  twenty 
thousand  men.  Having  secured  Cairo,  Fremont  had  re 
turned,  on  the  4th  of  August,  to  St.  Louis,  in  order  to 
see  what  could  be  done  for  Lyon.  Before  he  could  re 
lieve  Lyon,  however,  the  battle  of  Wilson's  Creek  was 
fought  and  lost,  and  Springfield  had  to  be  temporarily 
abandoned. 

The  news  of  the  disaster  reached  St.  Louis  on  the 
13th.  Fremont  immediately  resolved  to  es- 

Fromont's 

tablish  a  belt  of  fortifications  reaching  from   line  of  for- 

,,       ,.-.      .      .        .      .,  ,      ti  fie  at  ions 

Cape  Gerardeau  on  the  Mississippi,  through  through  Mis- 
Ironton  and  Holla,  to  Jefferson  City  on  the 
Missouri,  and  set  to  work  in  good  earnest  upon  the  ex 
ecution  of  his  plan. 

Besides  being  thus  pressed  by  the  enemy,  Fremont 
was  harassed  by  difficulties  with  the  new  loyal  "  State  " 
government  lust  established  by  the  conven- 

I-  L  r  a:  rt-L  mi      n  Martial  law 

tion  at  Jefferson  City.  The  Governor  chosen  proclaimed  in 
by  the  convention,  Mr.  Gamble,  was  a  Demo 
crat,  and  disposed  to  be  quite  conservative.  Fremont, 
on  the  contrary,  was  a  radical  Republican,  if  not  an  out 
right  Abolitionist.  It  was  not  unnatural,  under  the 
circumstances,  that  he  should  come  quickly  to  the  con 
clusion  that  he  could  save  Missouri  to  the  Union  only 
by  the  assumption  of  dictatorial  power.  On  the  31st  of 
August,  he  issued  his  noted  order  proclaiming  martial 


248  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

law  throughout  the  "  State  "  of  Missouri  ;  designating 
the  line  of  military  occupation  as  extending  from  Leaven- 
worth  on  the  west,  through  Jefferson  City,  Rolla,  and 
Ironton,  to  Cape  Gerardeau  on  the  Mississippi ;  com 
manding  all  persons  taken  with  arms  in  their  hands 
within  this  line  to  be  tried  by  court-martial,  and,  if 
found  guilty,  to  be  shot ;  pronouncing  the  property  of 
all  persons  in  the  "  State"  who  should  be  convicted  of 
having  taken  up  arms  against  the  United  States,  or  of 
having  taken  active  part  with  the  enemies  of  the  United 
States  in  the  field,  confiscated  to  the  public  use ;  and 
declaring  the  slaves  of  such  persons,  if  any,  to  be  free 
men. 

It  was  a  drastic  measure.     It  created  great  excitement. 

In  fact,  it  overshot  the  mark  in  one  respect  at  least,  viz., 

Lincoln's   ^n  Declaring  the  emancipation  of  the  slaves 

disavowal   of  of  all  persons  in  rebellion  against  the  United 

part    of    Fre-     „,  A  i  111 

mont'eprocia-  States.  As  we  have  seen,  Congress  had,  by 
the  Act  of  August  6th,  ordained  the  emanci 
pation  of  such  slaves  only  as  were  employed,  by  com 
mand  or  permission  of  their  owners,  or  the  lawful  agents 
of  their  owners,  in  any  kind  of  military  or  naval  service 
against  the  United  States.  President  Lincoln  himself 
was  not  prepared,  at  that  moment,  to  go  any  further 
than  this,  if  indeed  he  had  the  power  to  do  so.  He, 
therefore,  promptly  disavowed  this  part  of  Fremont's 
order,  and  the  misunderstandings  between  Fremont  and 
the  Washington  Government  were  thus  begun,  which 
terminated  two  months  later  in  the  removal  of  Fremont 
from  the  command  of  the  military  department  of  the 
West. 

Fremont  now  sent  Colonel  Mulligan  with  a  force  of 
three  thousand  men  and  a  battery  of  artillery  to  occupy 
and  fortify  Lexington,  a  place  about  one  hundred  and 
twenty-five  miles  up  the  Missouri  River  from  Jefferson 


Pineville    ^/MCassvWe 

•-^V^ 

VBentonviile^ 

Q\ 

«\        A| 


\.J 


The  Field  of  Operations  in  Missouri  and  Northern  Arkansas. 


THE   MILITARY   MOVEMENTS    OF    1861  249 

City.  Mulligan  reached  the  place  on  September  9th, 
and  immediately  began  fortifying  College  Hill.  So  soon 
as  Price  learned  of  this  movement  he  deter- 

.-_-..  .  .  _         The    Union 

mined  to  attack  Mulligan  before  he  could  defeat  at  Lex- 
be  reinforced.  He  appeared  before  Lex 
ington  on  the  12th,  with  a  large  force  which  was  soon 
increased  to  about  twenty  thousand  men.  General  Fre 
mont  at  St.  Louis  and  General  J.  C.  Davis  at  Jefferson 
City  were  deceived  by  the  manoeuvres  of  the  enemy  into 
the  belief  that  Jefferson  City  was  the  point  to  be  at 
tacked.  They,  therefore,  failed  to  undertake  the  relief 
of  Mulligan  at  Lexington  until  it  was  too  late.  Price 
began  the  assault  on  the  18th,  and  pressed  forward  so 
vigorously  that  Mulligan  was  compelled  to  surrender  on 
the  20th. 

So  soon  as  Fremont  learned  of  the  disaster  at  Lexing 
ton,  he  started  in  pursuit  of  Price  with  an  army  of 
about  twenty  thousand  men.  The  old  Mis-  prices  re- 
sourian  was  too  wary  to  be  caught,  however,  treat> 
and  on  the  same  day  that  Fremont  set  out  from  St. 
Louis,  he  began  his  retreat  southward.  He  reached 
Neosho  and  formed  a  junction  with  McCulloch,  who 
had  entered  Missouri  again  with  a  strong  Confederate 
division. 

He  also  found  Governor  Jackson  here,  with  a  num 
ber  of  the  secessionist  members  of  the  old      secessions 
"State"  Legislature.     This  rump  assembly  Miesouri- 
went  through  the  farce,  at  last,  of  voting  Missouri  out 
of  the  Union. 

Fremont's  army  pursued  slowly,  and  reached  Spring 
field  on  the  27th  of  October.     He  established  his  head 
quarters  here,  while  Price  occupied  Cassville. 
His  plan  was  to  push  the  war  into  Arkansas,    advance  to 
His  chief  solicitude  in  regard  to  making  this 
movement  sprang  from  the  consideration  that  the  Con- 


250  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

federate  General  Polk  might  send  a  force  across  from 
the  Mississippi  Kiver,  and  strike  him  in  the  left  flank. 
He,  therefore,  ordered  General  Grant,  who  had  super 
seded  General  Curtis  at  Cairo,  to  make  a  demonstration 
from  Cairo  sufficiently  strong  to  hold  Folk's  forces  on 
the  Mississippi. 

The  people  of  Kentucky  had  elected  in  August  a 
strong  Unionist  Legislature  and  were  gradually  abandon- 

The  situa    ™&  ^le  ^ea  °^  neu^ral^J  in  the  conflict  and 
tionin  Keu-   preparing  to  fall  into  line  against  the  Con- 

tucky  and  the    £      ^  mi  •       •    -     •      ,  i       n 

affair  at  Bei-  lederacy.  The  secessionists  in  the  Common 
wealth  had  observed  this  change  of  temper 
and  undertook  to  anticipate  the  occupation  of  Kentucky 
by  Union  troops.  On  the  3d  of  September,  General 
Polk  crossed  the  Kentucky  line  from  West  Tennessee 
and  took  possession  of  Hickman,  and  on  the  4th  he 
occupied  Columbus.  Just  above  this  place  is  a  high 
bluff  commanding  the  Mississippi  River  and  the  Mis 
souri  shore  opposite.  Polk  proceeded  to  occupy  this 
bluff,  and  boastfully  called  it  "  the  Gibraltar  of  the 
West/5 

So  soon  as  General  Grant,  at  Cairo,  learned  of  Polk's 
advance,  he  sent  detachments  of  Federal  troops  across 
the  Ohio  to  Paducah  and  Smithfield,  at  the  mouths  of 
the  Tennessee  and  the  Cumberland.  With  these  move 
ments,  the  farce  of  Kentucky's  neutrality  was  played  to 
the  end.  It  was  now  evident  that  her  soil  must  furnish 
the  first  battle-grounds  between  the  Ohio  and  the  Ten 
nessee  lines. 

At  about  the  same  moment  when  Polk  entered  Ken 
tucky,  the  Legislature  of  the  Commonwealth  assembled, 
and  the  Senate  sent  a  committee  to  Western  Kentucky 
to  investigate  the  violation  of  Kentucky's  neutrality  by 
both  parties,  and  make  report  thereof.  This  committee 
repaired  to  Columbus  immediately,  and,  on  the  9th  of 


THE   MILITARY    MOVEMENTS   OF    1861          '2o 

September,  requested  Polk  to  withdraw  his  forces  from 
Kentucky.  Polk  answered  at  once,  and  offered  to  com 
ply  with  the  request,  provided  the  "  State  "  would  agree 
to  the  simultaneous  withdrawal  of  the  Federal  troops, 
and  would  engage  to  keep  them  out.  He  proposed  to 
give  the  like  guarantee  for  the  Confederate  Government 
in  respect  to  the  Confederate  troops. 

When  Folk's  answer  was  communicated  to  the  Legis 
lature,  both  Houses  of  that  body  immediately  passed  a 
series  of  resolutions,  declaring  that  Kentucky's  peace  and 
neutrality  had  been  wantonly  violated,  her  soil  invaded, 
and  the  rights  of  her  people  grossly  infringed  by  the 
so-called  Southern  Confederate  forces  ;  requesting  the 
Governor  to  call  out  the  military  forces  of  the  Common 
wealth  to  expel  the  invaders ;  invoking  the  United 
States  Government  to  come  to  their  aid  and  protection  ; 
calling  upon  General  Anderson  to  enter  upon  the  active 
discharge  of  his  military  duties  in  Kentucky  ;  and  ap 
pealing  to  the  people  of  Kentucky  to  stand  firm  in  their 
patriotism  and  in  their  devotion  to  the  Union,  and  to 
assist  in  the  expulsion  of  the  lawless  invaders  of  their 
soil.  The  Governor  vetoed  these  resolutions,  but  they 
were  passed  over  his  act  by  overwhelming  majorities. 
The  relations  of  Kentucky  were  now  entirely  distinct. 
The  Confederacy  must  reckon  with  her  as  an  enemy. 

The  Confederate  General  Zollicoffer,  who  had  been 
collecting  troops  on  the  line  between  East  Tennessee 
and  Western  Kentucky,  now  crossed  the 

.  J'  ~  TheConfed- 

hne    and    occupied    Cumberland    Gap.     On  crates  at  cum- 
the  19th  of  September,  he  advanced  to  Bar- 
boursville,    and    dispersed    a    regiment    of    Kentucky 
Unionists. 

On  the  20th,  General  Anderson  established  his  head 
quarters  at  Louisville  and  began  the  organization  of  the 
Federal  forces  in  Northern  Kentucky.  The  Legislature 


252  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

issued  a  call  for  forty  thousand  volunteers,  and  passed 
an  Act  making  every  Kentuckian  who  had  voluntarily 

joined  the  rebel  forces  invading  the  Common- 
General  An-   J  .  .         .  .   fe 

at    wealth  incapable  oi  inheriting  any  property 

* 


Louisville.  T7-  -,  ,          ,          ,        ,  , 

in  Kentucky?  unless  he  should  return  to  his 
allegiance  to  the  United  States  within  sixty  days.  The 
prompt  action  of  the  Legislature,  and  the  arrest  of  one 
of  the  most  outspoken  of  the  secessionists,  ex-Governor 
Morehead,  and  his  confinement  in  Fort  Lafayette,  drove 
the  disunionist  leaders,  such  as  John  C.  Breckenridge, 
William  Preston,  Humphrey  Marshall,  and  John  Mor 
gan,  into  the  Confederate  ranks  in  Tennessee. 

At  last  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  appointed 

September    10th    Confederate    commander-in-chief    in 

Tennessee,  Missouri,  and  Arkansas,  ordered 

eton  at  Bowl-   General  S.  B.  Buckner  to  advance  from  Mid 

dle  Tennessee  into   Kentucky,  and   occupy 

Bowling  Green  on  the  south  bank  of  the  Barren  River. 

This  movement  was  consummated  in  early  October,  and 

General  Johnston  himself  established  his  head-quarters 

at  Bowling  Green  in  the  last  days  of  the  month. 

General  W.  T.  Sherman  had  meanwhile  superseded 
General  Anderson  at  Louisville,  and  was  demanding  of 
the  Washington  Government  two  hundred  thousand 
troops  for  the  rescue  of  Kentucky  from  the  Confederate 
occupation.  All  Northern  Kentucky  was  in  great  ex 
citement  and  apprehension,  and  the  Legislature  at 
Frankfort  felt  keenly  that  its  own  safety  was  imperilled. 

Such  was  the  situation  in  Kentucky  when  General 
Fremont  ordered  General  Grant  to  threaten  Columbus 
in  order  to  prevent  Polk  from  sending  a  column  to  the 
aid  of  McCulloch  and  Price. 

Grant  prepared  an  expedition  during  the  first  days  of 
November,  and  although  Fremont  was  superseded  by 
Hunter  before  the  preparations  were  completed,  pro- 


THE   MILITARY    MOVEMENTS   OF    1861          253 

ceecled  to  carry  out  the  instructions  of  Fremont.  He 
ordered  General  C.  F.  Smith  to  threaten  Columbus  with 
a  land  force  from  Paducah,  while  he,,  with  about  four 
thousand  men,  dropped  down  the  Mississippi  in  trans 
ports  to  a  landing  on  the  Kentucky  shore  some  five 
miles  above  Columbus,  and  the  next  morning,  the  morn 
ing  of  the  7th  of  November,  crossed  over  to  Hunter's 
Landing  on  the  Missouri  shore.  Grant's  purpose,  as  thus 
revealed,  was  to  attack  a  small  Confederate  garrison  at 
Belmont,  a  hamlet  directly  across  the  river  from  Co 
lumbus. 

Polk  was  immediately  informed  of  the  debarking  of 
the  Federal  troops  at  Hunter's.  He  rightly  concluded 
that  the  threat  from  Paducah  was  a  mere  feint,  and 
promptly  sent  General  Pillow  across  to  Belmont  with 
three  regiments  of  troops.  They  arrived  at  Belmont  in 
time  to  meet  the  Federal  advance  in  front  of  the  works. 
The  Federals  had,  however,  gained  such  a  momentum 
of  victory  that  they  drove  right  on  over  the  fortifications 
into  the  camps  of  the  Confederates  and  scattered  the 
enemy  in  every  direction.  Thinking  the  triumph  com 
plete  the  Federal  regiments  now  virtually  disbanded 
to  plunder  the  camps  and  hold  high  revel  over  their 
success.  General  Polk  was  by  this  time  relieved  of  any 
anxiety  about  the  approach  of  General  Smith  from  Pa 
ducah,  and  he  sent  General  Cheatham  across  to  Belmont 
with  three  more  regiments,  and  then  followed  himself 
with  two  or  three  more.  These  all  landed  above  Bel 
mont,  where  Pillow's  scattered  troops  had  begun  to 
collect. 

Grant  now  found  himself  threatened  by  a  force  double 
his  own,  and  in  imminent  danger  of  being  cut  off  from 
his  transports  at  Hunter's  Landing.  He  succeeded,  how 
ever,  in  reforming  his  men,  and  in  cutting  his  way  suc 
cessfully  through  to  the  boats.  He  embarked  his  troops 


254  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

under  the  fire  of  the  Confederates,  and  steamed  back  to 
Cairo  in  the  evening  after  the  battle. 

The  Federal  loss  in  the  battle  was  between  five  and 
six  hundred,,  killed,  wounded,  and  captured.     The  Con 
federate  commander  stated  officially  the  Con- 

Belmont     a     „    _ 

Confederate  federate  loss  at  six  hundred  and  forty-one 
men.  Belmont  was  certainly  a  Confederate 
victory.  It  was  claimed  as  such  at  the  South,  and  rec 
ognized  as  such  at  the  North,  in  wrhich  section  the  event 
created  great  depression  of  spirits.  Still  Grant  had  ac 
complished  the  purpose  for  which  he  had  set  out.  It 
was  now  practically  certain  that  Polk  would  not  dare  to 
weaken  his  force  at  Columbus  in  order  to  aid  Price  and 
McCulloch. 

It  was,  however,  also  true  that  Price  and  McCulloch 
no  longer  needed  his  aid.     Hunter  did  not  share  Fre 
mont's  sanguine  views  of  the  results  of  a  cam- 
Hunter  aban-         .  1,1,111 
dons   Fre-  paign  in  Arkansas.     He  found  that  he  had 

mont'splan  of  -i-/v       i,        •  i     •   j  •          -i  • 

acampaignin  great  dimculty  m  subsisting  his  troops  at 
Springfield,  and  he  imagined  that  he  did  not 
possess  the  confidence  of  his  soldiers.  He  determined 
to  fall  back  upon  Holla,  where  he  could  re-provision  the 
army  through  railway  communication  with  St.  Louis. 
While  Grant  was  fighting  the  battle  at  Belmont,  Hun 
ter  was  executing  this  movement,  and  Price  was  advanc 
ing  to  Springfield,  which  now  became  his  head-quarters. 
He  occupied  the  valley  of  the  Osage  for  the  purpose  of 
gaining  both  recruits  and  supplies  for  his  army  in  that 
fertile  and  more  populous  district. 

McClellan  had  now,  by  the  executive  order  of   No 
vember  1st,  succeeded  General  Scott  in  the  chief  com- 
Haiieck  at  mand  of  all  the  armies  of  the  Union.     By 
his  advice,  General  Henry  W.  Halleck  was 
sent,  about  the  middle  of  November,  to  St.  Louis  to 
take  command  of  the  department  of  the  West.     While 


THE   MILITARY    MOVEMENTS   OF    1801  255 

Halleck  was  something  of  a  martinet,  he  had  a  good 
military  education,  and  had  formed  a  more  adequate 
conception  of  the  magnitude  of  the  work  before  him 
than  had  any  of  his  predecessors  at  St.  Louis.  lie  did 
not,  therefore,  deem  it  wise  to  carry  on  a  petty  war  with 
Price,  but  rather  to  prepare  himself  for  great  move 
ments,  making  it  a  point,  however,  to  prevent  Price 
from  receiving  recruits  from  Northern  and  Middle  Mis 
souri.  He  was  entirely  successful  in  the  latter  purpose, 
and  this  of  itself  forced  Price  to  retire  again  to  Spring 
field,  where,  with  an  army  of  some  ten  thousand  men, 
he  now  established  winter  quarters,  holding  thus  about 
one-half  of  that  part  of  Missouri  which  lies  south  of  the 
Missouri  River. 

As  we  have  seen,  the  successes  of  McClellan  at  Laurel 
Hill  and  Rich  Mountain,  had  caused  the  Confederate 
General  Wise  to  fall  back  to  Lewisburg  in  The  military 
the  valley  of  the  Greenbrier  River,  in  order 
to  protect  his  right  flank  against  the  possi- 
ble  advance  of  McClellan  southward.  After 
Bull  Run,  and  the  call  of  McClellan  to  Wash-  ton. 
ington,  the  Confederate  President  resolved  to  make  an 
other  attempt  to  occupy  Western  Virginia.  He  sent 
General  John  B.  Floyd  to  reinforce  Wise  and  assume 
command  in  the  Kanawha  Valley,  and  General  Robert 
E.  Lee  to  take  command  of  the  remnants  of  Garnett's 
forces  at  Valley  Mountain,  and  to  exercise  superior  di 
rection  of  the  campaign  in  all  of  Western  Virginia. 

Lee  soon  saw  that  he  must  give  up  operating  so  far  to 
the  north  as  Valley  Mountain,  in  order  to  maintain  com 
munication  with  Floyd  and  Wise,  on  the  head  waters  of 
the  Kanawha.  He,  therefore,  moved  southward,  and 
took  position  in  the  upper  part  of  the  Greenbrier  Valley 
in  front  of  the  defiles  of  Cheat  Mountain.  General  Rose- 
crans,  who  had  succeeded  McClellan  in  command  of  the 


256  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

Federal  forces,  had  retired  with  the  main  body  of  his 
troops  to  Clarksburg  on  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Rail 
road,  leaving  the  single  brigade  of  General  J.  J.  Rey 
nolds  to  guard  the  passes  of  Cheat  and  Greenbrier 
Mountains. 

Floyd  began  the  offensive  movement.  His  forces 
greatly  outnumbered  those  of  General  Cox  in  front  of 
him,  and  he  easily  compelled  the  Federals  to  fall  back 
upon  New  River,  the  south  branch  of  theKanawha.  He 
then  left  General  Wise  with  a  sufficient  force  to  hold 
Cox's  little  army  in  check,  and  marched  northwestward 
to  Carnifex  Ferry  on  the  Gauley  River,  with  the  purpose 
of  intercepting  any  reinforcements  coming  from  Rose- 
crans  at  Clarksburg.  After  crossing  the  river  success 
fully,  he  surprised  the  Seventh  Ohio  regiment  at  Cross 
Lanes,  a  few  miles  from  the  Ferry,  and  scattered  it,  after 
inflicting  great  loss  upon  it.  This  little  battle  took 
place  on  the  morning  of  the  26th  of  August,  and  after 
his  success,  Floyd  proceeded  to  fortify  the  heights  about 
Carnifex  Ferry  in  order  to  be  able  to  resist  any  force 
coming  from  the  North. 

So  soon  as  Rosecrans  learned  of  Floyd's  movements, 
he  set  out  from  Clarksburg  with  about  ten  thousand 
Carnifex  men>  anc^  *n  about  a  week,  he  appeared  be- 
Feny.  fore  Floyd's  intrenchments.  This  was  the 

10th  of  September.  Rosecrans  immediately  ordered 
Benham's  brigade  to  assault  the  works.  The  Federals 
were  repulsed  with  considerable  loss,  and  before  Mc- 
Cook's  brigade  could  come  to  their  assistance,  darkness 
intervened,  and  the  battle  was  suspended.  During  the 
night,  Floyd,  who  had  only  about  two  thousand  men, 
and  had  asked  aid  from  Wise  in  vain,  slipped  away.  He 
retired  to  SewelPs  Mountain  and  took  up  a  strong  posi 
tion  there.  Rosecrans  did  not,  however,  follow.  His 
troops  were  tired  out  by  the  hundred  miles  march  from 


THE   MILITARY    MOVEMENTS    OF    1861  257 

Clarksburg,  arid  their  exertions  in  the  battle.  He  had 
driven  the  Confederates  back  into  the  mountains,  and 
cleared  the  Kanawha  Valley,  and  seemed  to  feel  that  he 
had  accomplished  all  that  was  practicable  or  necessary 
at  the  moment. 

So  soon  as  General  Lee  learned  of  Rosecrans's  march  to 
the  Kanawha  Valley,  he  resolved  to  capture  the  passes 
into  the  middle  section  of  Western  Virginia  cheat  Moun- 
lield  by  the  single  brigade  of  General  Eey-  tam- 
nolds.  On  the  llth  of  September,  he  advanced  north 
ward  from  Huntersville  with  nearly  ten  thousand  men. 
From  the  12th  to  the  15th,  he  manoeuvred  about  Rey 
nolds  with  very  great  exertions  to  his  troops,  and  with 
no  results.  On  the  15th,  he  made  a  feeble  attack  upon 
Cheat  Mountain,  which  was  vigorously  and  successfully 
repelled.  Lee  now  drew  his  forces  back  into  the  valley 
of  the  Greenbrier,  leaving  General  XL  R.  Jackson  with 
a  single  brigade  to  guard  the  passes  through  the  Alle- 
ghanies  into  Eastern  Virginia  against  Reynolds.  Jack 
son  intrenched  himself  on  Buffalo  Hill,  from  Greenbrier 
which  he  could  command,  with  his  artillery,  Rlver- 
the  main  road  eastward  over  the  Alleghanies.  Reynolds, 
having  been  reinforced,  attempted  to  dislodge  him  by  an 
assault  upon  his  works,  October  3d,  but  failed. 

General  Lee  had,  meanwhile,  proceeded  southward, 
and  had  joined  Floyd  arid  Wise,  assuming  command  of 
the  entire  force  of  about  twenty  thousand  men.  He  did 
not,  however,  attempt  to  meet  Rosecrans,  although  his 
army  was  much  superior  in  point  of  numbers  to  the 
Federal  force.  He  sent  a  small  detachment  across  New 
River  to  Chapmanville,  where,  on  the  25th  of  Septem 
ber,  they  were  surprised  and  routed  by  a  small  body  of 
Federals. 

In  addition  to  these  discouragements  in  the  field,  Gen 
eral  Lee  had  to  deal  with  the  quarrel  between  Floyd  and 
VOL.  I.-17 


258  THE    CIVIL    WAR 

Wise,  which  was  presently  appealed  to  Richmond,  with 
the  result  that  Wise  was  withdrawn  from  his  command. 

close  of  the  Lee  himself  was  recalled  a  little  later,  and 
Sp£gwestf  sent  to  South  Carolina,  and  a  part  of  the 
eru  Virginia,  army  about  Lewisburg  was  marched  into  the 
ShenandoahA7alley,  to  reinforce  General  Stonewall  Jack  - 
son  at  Winchester.  Floyd  made  one  more  effort  to  re 
gain  the  Kanawha  Valley,  but  accomplished  nothing 
more  serious  than  inflicting  annoyance  upon  the  Federal 
supply  trains.  He  was  finally  driven  back  into  the 
mountains  about  the  middle  of  November.  And  the 
expulsion  of  the  Confederates  from  Huntersville,  in  the 
Greenbrier  Valley,  a  month  later,  closed  the  campaign 
in  Western  Virginia,  and  left  this  section  in  the  hands 
of  the  Federals. 

General  Stonewall  Jackson  inaugurated  a  little  cam 
paign  further  to  the  northeast,  with  the  purpose  of  re- 

The  capture  capturing  Romney,  occupied  by  the  Federal 
of  Romney.  General  Kelley  for  the  protection  of  the  Bal 
timore  and  Ohio  Railroad  line.  It  was  for  the  purpose 
of  this  movement  that  Loring's  brigade  had  been  sent 
from  Floyd  to  Jackson,  as  we  have  seen.  Jackson  suc 
ceeded  in  retaking  Romney,  but  the  troops  with  which 
he  garrisoned  the  place,  coming  as  they  did  from  a  more 
southern  climate,  found  the  winter  in  the  mountains  too 
rigorous  for  them,  and  were  finally  allowed  to  abandon 
the  post  and  return  to  Winchester. 

In  Eastern  Virginia  the  military  movements  during 

the  late  summer  and  autumn  were  even  less  active  than 

in    Missouri,  Kentucky,  and   Western  Vir- 

movementsin  ginia,  and  resulted  more  unsatisfactorily  to 

Eastern  Vir-    *  '  ,    j     • 

ginia   after  the  federal  cause   than  those   executed   in 
these  quarters.      Of  course   the  discourage 
ment  of  the  defeat  at  Bull  Run  was  more  keenly  felt 
around  Washington  than  elsewhere,  and  the  necessity 


THE   MILITARY    MOVEMENTS    OF   1861          259 

for  thorough  preparation  before  making  another  trial 
was  more  distinctly  realized.  The  Administration  and 
the  people  of  the  North  accepted  promptly  the  situation, 
and  with  practical  unanimity  settled  down  to  the  work 
of  organizing,  equipping,,  and  drilling  a  vast  army.  They 
gave  their  new  General,  McClellan,  carte  blanche  in  almost 
every  respect.  It  is  true  that  McClellan  complained 
of  obstacles  being  thrown  in  his  way,  but  it  is  now  well 
known  that  McClellan  magnified  difficulties  and  under 
estimated  advantages.  The  months  of  August  and  Sep 
tember  and  the  half  of  October  were  passed  in  organizing, 
equipping,  and  drilling  the  new  army,  and  in  fortifying 
Washington  upon  all  sides. 

By  the  middle  of  October  McClellan's  army  numbered 
over  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men,  with  two  hun 
dred  pieces  of  artillery.  Deducting  one-half  of  this  num 
ber  for  the  garrisons  at  Washington,  Baltimore,  and 
Annapolis,  and  on  the  upper  and  lower  Potomac,  and 
for  the  disabled  and  absent,  McClellan  had  a  force  of 
at  least  seventy-five  thousand  men  and  one  hundred  and 
fifty  pieces  of  artillery  with  which  to  begin  active  opera 
tions,  while  his  enemy  had  not  fifty  thousand  with  which 
to  meet  him. 

During  the  first  days  of  October  the  Union  army,  in 
eleven  divisions,  lay  along  both  sides  of  the  Potomac 
from  above  Georgetown  to  below  Alexandria.  They  were 
commanded  by  Generals  Banks,  Stone,  McCall,  Smith, 
Fitz  John  Porter,  McDowell,  Blenker,  Franklin,  Heintz- 
elman,  Keyes,  and  Hooker.  The  Confederates  were 
stretched  along  from  Leesburg  to  Aquia  Creek.  Evans's 
division  was  at  Leesburg.  The  main  army,  under  John 
ston,  was  at  and  around  Centreville.  Their  right  occu 
pied  Aquia  Creek,  under  the  command  of  General  Holmes. 
And  Magruder,  with  a  small  force,  still  faced  Butler  on 
York  peninsula. 


260  THE   CIVIL   TTAK 

The  Confederate  outposts  opposite  Washington,,  on 
Munson's  Hill,  were  in  plain  view  from  the  city  during 
August.  The  growth  of  the  Federal  army,  so  to  speak, 
on  the  west  side  of  the  river  during  September  and  Oc 
tober,  caused  the  withdrawal  of  the  Confederates  from 
these  advanced  points.  A  few  petty  skirmishes  had  taken 
place,  in  which  both  sides  usually  retired  unpursued. 

The  Confederates  had  planted  batteries  along  the  west 
bank  of  the  lower  Potomac,  and  had  virtually  cut  Wash- 
situation  op-   iRgton  off  from  commerce  by  water  with  the 
posite  wash-   Xorth  and  the  outside  world.      The  people 
down  the  PO-  of  the  Xorth  blamed  the  authorities  for  allow 
ing  this  to  be  effected,  but  it  was  soon  un 
derstood  that  the  only  way  in  which  this  could  be  suc 
cessfully  dealt  with  was  the  driving  of  the  Confederate 
army  at   Centreville  and  Aquia   Creek   back  into  the 
interior. 

The  temper  of  the  Northern  people  began  by  October 
to  change  again,  and  a  decided  impatience  for  another 
The  North  advance  became  manifest.     The  weather  was 
aenj?ew  TJ  magnificent,  the  army  was  well  organized, 
vance.  equipped,  and  drilled,  and  in  fine  spirits,  and 

the  condition  on  the  lower  Potomac  was  insufferable. 
McClellan,  though  still  exaggerating  in  his  own  mind 
and  in  his  representations  the  strength  of  the  enemy, 
was  made  to  feel  that  he  must  begin  operations.  On  the 
19th  of  October,  he  ordered  a  general  reconnoissance  along 
his  front  in  the  direction  of  Centreville.  General  McCall, 
who  commanded  the  extreme  right  of  the  army  on  the 
west  bank  of  the  river,  marched  his  division  through 
Dranesville  to  within  fifteen  miles  of  Leesbnrg  without 
discovering  any  signs  of  the  enemy.  He  returned  to 
Dranesville  under  order  from  McClellan,  who  feared  that 
Johnston  might  sally  forth  from  Centreville  and  strike 
the  division  in  its  exposed  left  flank. 


5 


Field  of  Operations  in  Virginia. 


THE   MILITARY   MOVEMENTS    OF    1861  261 

On  the  next  day,  McClellan's  Assistant  Adjutant-Gen 
eral,  A.  V.  Colburn,  sent  the  following  despatch  to  Gen 
eral  Stone  at  Poolesville  on  the  Maryland  The  disaster 
side  of  the  river  above  Georgetown:  "Gen-  at Ball's Bluf£- 
eral  McClellan  desires  me  to  inform  you  that  General 
McCall  occupied  Dranesville  yesterday  and  is  still  there. 
Will  send  out  heavy  reconnoissances  to-day  in  all  direc 
tions  from  that  point.  The  General  desires  that  you 
keep  a  good  lookout  upon  Leesburg,  to  see  if  this  move 
ment  has  the  effect  to  drive  them  away.  Perhaps  a 
slight  demonstration  on  your  part  would  have  the  effect 
to  move  them."  General  Stone  very  naturally  concluded 
from  the  language  of  this  order  that  he  was  commanded 
to  send  a  detachment  of  his  troops  across  the  river  in 
the  direction  of  Leesburg.  Leesburg  was  some  miles 
back  from  the  river,  and  was  concealed  from  Poolesville 
by  a  high  point  on  the  Virginia  bank,  called  Ball's  Bluif, 
and  by  heavy  intervening  forests.  There  was,  conse 
quently,  no  way  for  Stone  to  keep  any  lookout  upon 
Leesburg,  except  by  sending  troops  across  the  river,  and 
he  certainly  could  make  no  demonstration  against  the 
enemy  there  without  crossing  the  river.  In  a  word,  Mc- 
Clellan's  order  was  too  vague  and  left  too  much  to  Stone's 
discretion. 

In  execution  of  McClelland  instructions,  General 
Stone  ordered  Colonel  Devens  of  the  Fifteenth  Massa 
chusetts  regiment  to  take  his  regiment  over  to  Harri 
son's  Island  which  lies  about  midway,  in  the  river,  be 
tween  Poolesville  Landing  and  Ball's  Bluff,  and  to  send 
a  scouting  party  over  to  the  Virginia  shore  to  look  for 
the  Confederates.  Colonel  Devens  promptly  executed 
these  orders,  and  at  about  nine  o'clock  in  the  evening 
received  a  report  from  Captain  Philbrick,  the  leader  of 
the  scouting  party,  that  he  had  discovered,  a  short  dis 
tance  back  from  Ball's  Bluff,  a  camp  of  Confederates 


262  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

which  did  not  seem  to  be  guarded  at  all.  Devens  im 
mediately  transmitted  this  information  to  General  Stone. 
An  hour  or  so  later  he  received  a  written  order  from 
Stone  to  cross  over,  at  once,,  from  the  island  to  Ball's 
Bluff  with  five  companies  of  his  regiment  and  surprise 
the  camp  discovered  by  Philbrick.  Stone,  at  the  same 
time,  ordered  Colonel  Lee  of  the  Twentieth  Massachu 
setts  to  occupy  Harrison's  Island  with  four  companies 
of  his  regiment,  and  to  throw  one  company  over  to  Ball's 
Bluff  and  hold  it  there  after  Devens's  advance,  as  a  cover 
for  his  return.  The  exact  order  to  Devens  was  to  attack 
the  Confederate  camp  at  daybreak,  rout  the  enemy, 
pursue  them  as  far  as  he  deemed  prudent,  destroy  the 
camp  if  possible  and  return  to  Harrison's  Island,  unless 
he  should  discover  a  position  on  the  Virginia  side  near 
the  river,  which  he  could  surely  hold  against  large  odds 
until  reinforced,  in  which  case  he  should  occupy  such 
position  and  report. 

Despite  the  facts  that  the  waters  were  high  and  swift, 
and  that  Devens  had  but  three  little  boats  at  his  com 
mand,  not  enough  to  carry  over  a  single  company  at  a 
time,  the  brave  Massachusetts  Colonel  had  his  five  com 
panies  upon  the  top  of  Ball's  Bluff  before  daylight  in 
readiness  to  advance.  He  marched  forward  toward 
Leesburg,  but  found  no  camp  and  no  enemy.  Phil- 
brick's  discovery  was  evidently  nothing  but  the  lights 
and  shadows  produced  by  a  brilliant  October  moon. 
Devens  advanced  to  within  a  mile  of  Leesburg  before  he 
saw  any  signs  of  his  enemy.  It  was  about  seven  o'clock 
in  the  morning  of  the  21st,  when  he  got  his  first  sight  of 
them.  He  immediately  sent  back  word  to  General  Stone, 
and  fell  back  to  the  open  space  of  some  ten  acres  on  the 
top  of  Ball's  Bluff.  He  reached  there  about  nine  o'clock 
without  incident.  He  had  now  about  six  hundred  and 
fifty  men,  in  a  greatly  exposed  position,  surrounded  as  it 


THE   MILITARY   MOVEMENTS    OF    1861          263 

was  by  woods  on  all  sides  except  the  river  side,  and  the 
Confederates  were  advancing  upon  him,  under  the  protec 
tion  of  the  forest,  in  numbers  unknown  to  him.  lie 
ought,  in  accordance  with  General  Stone's  directions,  to 
have  recrossed  immediately  to  Harrison's  Island.  Instead 
of  this,  he  remained  quietly  on  Ball's  Bluff  waiting  for 
reinforcements.  About  noon  the  Confederates  began  to 
fire  upon  his  exposed  troops  from  the  woods,  which  were 
within  musket  shot  all  around. 

Meanwhile  General  Stone  had  gone  down  in  person 
to  Edward's  Ferry,  a  crossing  of  the  Potomac  some  two 
miles  or  more  below  the  lower  extremity  of  Harrison's 
Island,  and  had  ordered  General  Gorman  to  throw  a 
small  force  across  the  river  at  that  point.  He  also  sent 
an  order  to  Colonel  E.  D.  Baker  of  the  California  regi 
ment,  in  command  at  the  moment  of  a  brigade,  to  either 
throw  the  California  regiment  across  the  river,  or  call 
back  the  troops  of  Devens  and  Lee,  as  he  might  deem 
the  wiser  movement.  The  order  also  authorized  him  to 
assume  the  chief  command  on  reaching  the  Virginia 
side.  On  receiving  these  directions,  Baker,  who  was  at 
Conrad's  Ferry,  a  crossing  at  the  upper  extremity  of 
Harrison's  Island,  immediately  crossed  over  with  his 
entire  brigade,  composed  of  the  California  regiment,  the 
New  York  Tammany  regiment,  and  the  remaining  com 
panies  of  the  regiments  of  Lee  and  Devens.  He  arrived 
at  Ball's  Bluff  about  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  when 
Devens  was  being  sorely  pressed.  Baker  was  a  brave, 
impulsive  man,  filled  with  glowing  patriotism,  but 
void  of  prudence.  He  determined  at  once,  without  re 
gard  to  the  unfavorable  character  of  the  situation,  to 
fight.  He  was  the  ranking  officer  on  the  scene,  and 
also  had  Stone's  order  to  assume  the  superior  command. 
This  he  did  immediately,  and  formed  his  line  of  battle,  the 
Fifteenth  Massachusetts  with  two  little  pieces  of  artillery 


264  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

on  the  right,  the  Twentieth  Massachusetts  with  a  small 
rifled  cannon  in  the  centre,  and  the  California  regiment 
on  the  left,  with  the  New  York  regiment  in  reserve. 
He  had  not  quite  two  thousand  men.  By  this  time  the 
Confederate  General  Evans  had  brought  up  his  entire 
brigade,  consisting  of  four  full  regiments,  numbering 
about  three  thousand  men.  Protected  by  the  woods, 
the  Confederates  could  simply  shoot  the  Federals  down, 
without  exposing  themselves.  They  picked  off  the  offi 
cers,  and  the  troops  were  thus  soon  thrown  into  inex 
tricable  confusion.  At  about  four  o'clock,  Baker  fell 
pierced  through  the  head  by  a  musket  ball.  Cogswell, 
the  Colonel  of  the  New  York  regiment,  succeeded  to 
the  chief  command,  and  tried  to  execute  a  movement 
for  cutting  his  way  out  by  his  left  flank  toward  Ed 
ward's  Ferry,  where  he  thought  he  might  find  reinforce 
ments.  But  the  Confederate  Commander  had  antici 
pated  this,  and  had  blocked  the  way.  It  became  now 
simply  a  matter  of  sauve  qui  pent.  The  Federals  fled 
in  every  direction  they  could  find  open.  Many  jumped, 
or  were  pitched,  over  the  Bluff.  A  few  reached  the 
little  boats,  which  were  soon  overcrowded  and  sank. 
More  crept  along  the  shore  under  the  cover  of  the  now 
falling  night,  and  straggled  up  to  Conrad's  Ferry,  or 
down  to  Edward's  Ferry.  The  slaughter  was  appall 
ing.  About  a  thousand  men  of  the  little  force  of  less 
than  two  thousand  were  killed,  wounded,  or  captured. 
The  Confederate  loss  was  reported  by  Evans  at  less 
than  two  hundred.  Gorman,  Stone,  and  even  McClellan 
hastened  to  the  scene  of  action.  They  arrived,  how 
ever,  too  late.  The  work  was  over,  and  the  Confeder 
ates  had  safely  retired. 

The  whole  army  was  dispirited  and  the  whole  North 
humiliated  by  the  disaster,  which  everybody  could  see 
had  resulted  from  the  blunders  of  the  commanders. 


THE   MILITARY   MOVEMENTS    OF   1861          265 

The  public  opinion  seemed  to  demand  a  sacrifice,  or 
more  vulgarly  speaking,  a  scapegoat.  Who  should  it 
be  ?  Baker  was  dead.  Devens  was  not  high 

°  The   effect 

enough  in  rank  to  satisfy.     It  was  obliged  to  of  the  disaster 

be  Stone  or  McClellan.     And  so  Stone,  who  and  the  pe6- 

certainly  seems  to  have  been  the  least  cul-  sacrifice  of 

pable  of  the  four,  was  arrested  by  order  of 

the  Secretary  of  War,  confined  secretly  in  Fort  Lafayette 

for  six  months,  and  then  released  without  trial  or  ex 

planation. 

McClellan,  on  the  other  hand,  was,  ten  days  later,  ap 
pointed  coinmander-in-chief  of  all  the  armies  of  the 
Union,  and  now  claimed  further  indulgence  Mccieiian 
in  military  inactivity  in  order  to  plan  an  ad-  mandeCr°in- 


vance  for  all  the  armies  at  the  same  time.    A  of1  the 


little  unintentional  brush  at  Dranesville,  on  United  states. 
the  20th  of  December,  between  Ord's  brigade  and  J.  E. 
B.  Stuart's  Confederate  brigade,  in  which  the  Federals 
won  the  field,  was  all  that  happened  of  any  importance 
to  disturb  the  quiet  of  the  Potomac  during  the  remain 
der  of  the  year. 

The  operations  of  the  United  States  navy  during  this 
period  were,  on  the  other  hand,  quite  uniformly  suc 
cessful.  At  the  beginning  of  May  the  navy 

J  J        Naval  oper- 

was  as  much  disorganized  as  ttie  army.    Many  ations  during 

en          i  •  f  nn  i   ,     tne    summer 

oi  the  ships  were  tar  away.  Ihose  caught  and  autumn 
in  the  Southern  ports  had  been  seized  by  the 
Confederates.  And  over  two  hundred  of  the  officers 
had  left  the  service  to  join  their  fortunes  with  those  of 
the  Confederacy.  President  Davis  had,  as  we  have  seen, 
issued  his  proclamation  authorizing  privateering.  And 
such  ships  as  the  Confederates  could  lay  their  hands  upon 
were  fitted  out  to  prey  upon  the  commerce  of  the  United 
States.  On  the  other  side,  President  Lincoln  had  de 
clared  a  general  blockade  of  the  Southern  ports.  The 


266  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

newly  organized  navy  had  thus  several  serious  problems 

before  it,  any  one  of  which  would  tax  its  powers  to  the 

utmost.    It  met  them  all,  however,  most  successfully.    At 

the  outset,  the  Confederate  privateers  made 

TheConfed-  . 

erate  priva-  many  seizures  oi  .Northern  merchantmen  in 
the  Southern  ports,  or  in  the  waters  near 
them.  But  before  the  end  of  the  year  the  Federal  navy 
had  captured  most  of  the  vessels  fit  for  privateering 
owned  by  or  in  the  Confederacy,  and  the  Confederates 
were  not  in  a  condition  to  create  any  more.  Except  for 
the  ships  secured  later  in  Great  Britain,  the  Confeder 
ates  AVOU Id  have  scarcely  been  able  to  threaten  the 
commerce  of  the  United  States  seriously  again. 

One  very  important  legal  point  was  brought  to  issue 
by  the  capture  of  one  of  these  privateers,  the  Savannah, 
The  legal  as  sne  was  called.  President  Lincoln  had  de- 
coTf  eterlte  clared,  in  his  proclamation  of  April  19th,  that 
privateersmen.  anv  attempt  to  molest  the  commerce  of  the 
United  States,  under  claim  of  authority  from  the  Con 
federacy,  would  be  treated  as  piracy.  The  Savannah 
was  captured  on  the  3d  of  June  by  the  United  States  war 
ship  Perry,  and  the  crew  were  taken  to  New  York  City 
for  trial.  The  question  at  issue  greatly  embarrassed 
the  United  States  Government.  This  Government  had 
declined  to  sign  an  agreement  at  the  Congress  of  Paris 
in  1856  with  the  Powers  of  Europe  for  making  priva 
teering  piracy  by  international  consent.  Consequently, 
it  was  forced  back  to  the  question  whether  it  would 
recognize  the  Confederates  as  belligerents  or  would  deal 
with  them  as  criminals,  as  traitors.  If  the  Government 
should  view  them  not  only  as  rebels,  but  as  traitors, 
criminals,  then  it  must  assume  the  same  attitude  toward 
the  persons  engaged  in  rebellion  on  land  as  on  sea — that 
is,  all  persons  taken  in  arms  against  the  United  States 
must  be  made  subject  to  the  ordinary  criminal  law  of  the 


THE   MILITARY   MOVEMENTS   OF    18G1          267 

country,  and  could  not  be  dealt  with  as  prisoners  under 
the  laws  and  usages  of  war.  How  the  matter  would 
have  been  determined  had  no  considerations  except  those 
of  juristic  logic  have  been  involved  in  it,  is  difficult  to 
say.  The  capture  of  Federal  prisoners  in  the  battle  of 
Bull  Run  was  what  settled  the  question.  Mr.  Davis  put 
Colonel  Corcoran  and  a  score  of  other  officers  in  chains, 
and  informed  the  United  States  Government  that  he 
would  deal  with  them  in  the  same  manner  as  the  Wash 
ington  authorities  should  deal  with  the  crew  of  the 
/Savannah.  The  proceedings  against  the  "  pirates  "  were 
immediately  suspended,  and  the  "pirates"  themselves 
were  finally  exchanged  as  prisoners  of  war.  The  principle 
involved  in  this  precedent  was  that  during  the  appeal  of 
the  questions  between  the  United  States  and  the  Con 
federacy  to  the  trial  of  arms,  the  Confederate  combatants 
must  be  regarded  and  treated  as  belligerents.  If  they 
should  succeed  in  this  trial,  of  course  this  temporary 
status  would  be  vindicated  as  permanent.  But  if  they 
should  fail — fail  without  having  secured  any  terms  from 
the  United  States — then  they  would  be  finally  at  the 
mercy  of  the  Government  against  which  they  had  re 
belled  for  anything  more  than  the  ordinary  privileges  of 
the  accused  in  criminal  procedure. 

The  United  States  navy  was  also  successful  in  estab 
lishing  the  blockade  before  the  end  of  the  year.  The 
attempt  to  blockade  a  coast  more  than  three  The  Block. 
thousand  miles  long  with  its  numerous  bays,  ade> 
inlets  and  harbors  seemed,  in  the  beginning,  a  hercu 
lean  task.  But  it  was  done  with  promptness  and  vigor. 
There  was  considerable  blockade-running  between  the 
Bermudas  and  the  North  Carolina  coast,  and  between  the 
Bahamas  and  the  Florida  coast,  but  it  never  reached  pro 
portions  to  relieve  to  any  considerable  degree  the  wants  of 
the  Confederates.  Several  attempts  were  made  during  the 


268  THE   CIVIL   WAK 

last  half  of  the  year  to  break  the  blockade  at  particular 
points,,  but  they  were  unsuccessful.  The  first  and  most 
promising  one  occurred  in  the  mouths  of  the  Mississippi 
River.  The  New  Orleans  authorities  had  commissioned 
a  Captain  Hollins,  formerly  of  the  United  States  navy,, 
to  change  a  steamboat  into  an  ironclad  ram,  which  they 
named  the  Manassas,  and  with  that  and  some  five  ships 
to  drive  the  blockading  squadron  out  of  the  river.  He 
did  drive  some  of  the  United  States  vessels  aground,  and 
proclaimed  a  victory,  but  these  were  all  safely  gotten  off, 
and  the  blockade  was  restored,  as  stringent  as  before, 
within  twenty-four  hours.  The  other  attempts  were 
even  less  worthy  of  notice. 

It  occurred  early  to  the  authorities  at  Washington 
that  the  navy  might  be  used  for  another  purpose,  one 
TheHatteras  more  positive  and  offensive  than  protecting 
expedition.  commerce  and  maintaining  the  blockade, 
viz.,  for  the  purpose  of  lodging  troops  at  certain  points 
in  the  Confederacy,  and  establishing  coast  garrisons, 
which  would  serve  as  bases  of  operations  against  the 
vital  interior  points  of  the  insurgent  country,  and  as 
rallying-places  for  the  Union  men  of  these  sections. 
After  a  good  deal  of  thought  and  consultation,  it  was 
determined  to  effect  a  lodgement  at  Cape  llatteras  on  the 
North  Carolina  coast  and  at  Port  Royal  about  half  way 
between  Charleston  and  Savannah. 

The  expedition  for  the  occupation  of  Hatteras  was 
prepared  during  the  month  of  August,  and  set  out  from 
Newport  News  on  the  2Gth.  It  consisted  of  six  war  ves 
sels  under  the  command  of  Commodore  Stringham,  and 
several  transports  containing  a  land  force  of  about  one 
thousand  men  commanded  by  General  Butler.  The 
fleet  arrived  off  Hatteras  on  the  following  day,  and  on 
the  morning  of  the  28th  began  the  attack  on  the  forts, 
Clark  and  Hatteras.  These  forts  mounted  some  fifteen 


THE   MILITARY    MOVEMENTS    OF    18G1          269 

guns  and  were  held  by  nearly  a  thousand  men,  under 
the  command  of  Commodore  Barren,  a  former  United 
States  naval  officer.  The  attack  was  successful,  and,  on 
the  29th,  Barren  surrendered  forts  and  garrison.  Rec 
ognizing  the  strategic  importance  of  the  place,  the  Fed 
eral  commanders  decided  to  occupy  it  permanently. 
They  left  a  small  garrison  in  the  forts,  which  was  soon 
increased,  and  Ilatteras  furnished  the  solid  base  for  the 
subsequent  naval  operations  along  that  part  of  the  coast. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  Fort  Pickens,  which  guards 
the  east  side  of  the  entrance  to  Pensacola  Bay,  had  been 
held  by  its  Federal  garrison,  while  Fort  Me-  Fort  rick. 
Rae,  which  is  on  the  west  side,  had  been  seized  ens- 
by  the  Confederates.  On  the  9th  of  October,  the  Con 
federates  threatened  Fort  Pickens  by  landing  troops 
from  Pensacola  on  Santa  Rosa  Island  to  attack  some 
Federal  troops  in  the  rear  of  the  fort,  but  the  move 
ment  resulted  in  no  attempt  upon  the  fort.  On  the 
22d  of  November  the  garrison  of  Fort  Pickens,  aided 
by  the  war-ship  Richmond)  undertook  to  bombard  Fort 
McRae,  but  effected  nothing.  The  status  quo  was  pre 
served  during  the  remainder  of  the  year. 

Further  westward,  however,  the  Federal  nayy  took 
possession  of  Ship  Island  on  the  Mississippi  coast,  and 
established  here  a  base  for  naval  operations 
against  Mississippi.     Before  the  end  of  the 
year,  a  permanent  garrison  of  nearly  two  thousand  men, 
under  the  command  of  General  John  W.  Phelps,  was 
settled  here. 

But  the  naval  movement  of  greatest  brilliancy  and  suc 
cess  during  the  year  1861  was  the  expedition  against 
Port  Royal,  and  the  occupation  of  the  coasts  The  capture 
and  islands  of  this  most  important  bay.  The  of  Port  R°yaL 
expedition  was  prepared  during  the  month  of  October. 
It  consisted  of  about  twenty  war  vessels,  under  the  com- 


270  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

mand  of  Commodore  Samuel  F.  Da  Pont,  and  an  army 
division  of  some  ten  to  fifteen  thousand  men,  under  the 
command  of  General  T.  W.  Sherman,  embarked  011 
about  thirty  transports.  This  large  force  started  from 
Fortress  Monroe  on  the  25th  of  October.  Its  destina 
tion  was  known  only  to  the  President  and  his  Cabinet, 
and  to  Du  Pont  and  Sherman.  The  passage  was  stormy, 
and  a  few  of  the  transports  were  lost  and  others  dis 
abled.  In  the  night  of  November  3d,  the  Commodore's 
flag-ship  arrived  off  Hilton  Head  at  the  entrance  to  Port 
Royal.  He  found  two  forts.  Fort  Walker  on  Hilton  Head, 
and  Fort  Beauregard  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  inlet. 
They  were  together  defended  by  about  fifty  guns  and  two 
thousand  soldiers.  There  was  also  a  little  fleet  within  the 
bay,  commanded  by  Commodore  Tatnall,  formerly  of  the 
United  States  navy.  The  soldiers  in  the  forts  were  under 
the  immediate  command  of  General  T.  F.  Dayton. 

Du  Pont  began  the  attack  in  the  forenoon  of  Novem 
ber  7th,  and  within  six  hours  he  had  captured  the  forts, 
and  was  landing  Sherman's  army.  Tatnall  burned  his 
vessels,  and  the  Confederate  soldiers  fled  in  all  directions 
open  to  them.  The  war  was  thus  early  carried  into 
South  Carolina.  Before  the  end  of  the  year  the  Federal 
fleet  and  army  had  possession  of  the  waters  of  the  South 
Carolina  coast  from  North  Edisto  Bay  to  Warsaw  Bay, 
and  of  all  the  principal  islands  in  these  waters.  They 
also  had  possession  of  Tybee  Island  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Savannah  Eiver.  The  Stars  and  Stripes  had  been  again 
raised  in  both  South  Carolina  and  Georgia,  raised  never 
again  to  be  lowered. 

The  Washington  Government  also  managed,  at  this 
time,  most  successfully,  a  very  serious  incident  in  foreign 
The  Trent  relations.  President  Davis  had  com  mis- 
affair,  sioned  James  M.  Mason  and  John  Slidell  as 
diplomatic  representatives  of  the  Confederacy  to  Great 


THE   MILITARY   MOVEMENTS    OF    18G1  271 

Britain  and  France.  These  two  men,  bearing  despatches 
from  the  Confederate  Government  to  the  Governments  of 
Great  Britain  and  France,  and  accompanied  by  their 
families  and  secretaries,  slipped  out  of  Charleston  Har 
bor  in  the  night  of  October  12th  on  the  steamer  Theo 
dora,  and  landed  safely  in  Cuba.  On  the  7th  of  the 
following  month  they  left  Havana  on  the  British 
steamer  Trent,  destined  for  St.  Thomas,  whence  they 
intended  to  proceed  to  England.  Captain  Charles 
Wilkes  of  the  United  States  war-ship  San  Jacinto 
happened  to  be  with  his  vessel  in  Cuban  waters  looking 
for  the  Confederate  privateer  Sumter.  While  in  the 
port  of  Havana  he  learned  of  the  presence  of  Mason 
and  Slidell  in  the  city,  and  of  their  destination. 
Wilkes  had  read  a  good  deal  of  international  law  in 
British  texts  and  decisions,  and  he  concluded  that  he 
had  the  belligerent  right  to  visit  any  neutral  vessel  on 
the  high  seas  in  search  of  contraband  of  war,  and  to 
seize  the  persons  and  papers  of  diplomatic  representa 
tives  of  governments  at  war  with  his  Government. 
There  is  not  much  doubt  that  the  British  principles, 
practices  and  decisions  did  seem  to  warrant  this  conclu 
sion.  Wilkes  waylaid  the  Trent  in  the  Bahama  Channel 
the  day  after  her  departure  from  Havana,  and,  upon 
the  refusal  of  her  commander  to  heave  to,  fired  a  shot 
across  her  bow.  She  yielded  to  force  and  stopped.  She 
was  boarded  by  Lieutenant  Fairfax  and  a  detachment 
of  marines  from  the  San  Jacinto,  who  forcibly  removed 
Mason  and  Slidell  and  their  secretaries  from  the  Trent 
to  the  San  Jacinto,  and  brought  them  to  Fortress  Mon 
roe,  whence  they  were  taken,  by  order  of  the  Govern 
ment,  to  Boston  Harbor  and  confined  in  Fort  Warren. 
The  despatches  carried  by  these  gentlemen  were  not 
secured,  and  their  families,  spurning  the  proffered  hos 
pitality  of  Captain  Wilkes,  proceeded  to  England. 


272  THE   CIVIL   WAK 

The  news  of  the  event  of  the  8th  of  November  in  the 
Bahama  Channel  reached  the  Government  at  Washing 
ton  on  the  16th,  and  the  Government  at  London  on  the 
30th.  At  first  the  conduct  of  Captain  Wilkes  seemed 
to  be  universally  approved  in  the  United  States. 
The  people  applauded  it  with  enthusiasm  everywhere. 
The  House  of  Representatives  passed  a  vote  of  thanks. 
Even  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Mr.  Welles,  declared 
officially  that  "  the  prompt  and  decisive  action  of  Cap 
tain  AVilkes  on  this  occasion,  merited  and  received  the 
emphatic  approval  of  the  Department." 

In  Great  Britain  the  event  was  viewed  both  by  the  Gov 
ernment  and  the  people  as  an  insult  to  their  flag,  and  re 
lease  of  the  prisoners  with  suitable  apology  or  war  seemed 
to  be  the  only  alternatives  which  occurred  to  anyone  as 
proper  demands  to  be  made  of  the  Washington  Govern 
ment.  But  there  were  two  cool  heads  in  Washington, 
the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  they  had 
a  prudent  envoy  in  London,  Mr.  Charles  Francis  Adams. 
Moreover  the  British  Ambassador  to  the  United  States, 
Lord  Lyons,  was  wise  and  just  and  friendly  in  his  feel 
ings  toward  the  Government  to  which  he  was  accredited. 

Mr.  Seward  had  put  Mr.  Adams  in  a  position  to  meet 
any  embarrassments,  by  despatching  him,  on  the  day 
that  the  news  of  the  affair  in  the  Bahama  Channel 
reached  London,  the  information  that  Captain  Wilkes 
had  acted  without  authority  from  Washington,  and  that 
the  Government  was  ready  to  discuss  the  matter  with 
the  British  Government. 

The  British  Government  made  a  good  deal  of  bluster 
before  the  despatch  was  communicated  to  it ;  and  was 
so  embarrassed  by  its  own  haste  after  receiving  the  com 
munication  from  Mr.  Adams  that  it  delayed  making  the 
same  known  to  the  public  for  some  days.  During  this 
time  the  arsenals  rang  with  the  noise  of  warlike  prepa- 


TI7E   MILITARY    MOVEMENTS    OF    1801  273 

rations,  and  troops  were  sent  on  shipboard  destined  for 
Canada.  The  law  officers  of  the  crown  were  appealed 
to,  and  they  advised  the  Ministry  that  the  act  of  Wilkes 
was  illegal,  since  he  did  not  take  the  Trent  into  port 
and  subject  his  capture  to  the  jurisdiction  of  a  regular 
prize  court  of  the  United  States.  The  infraction  of  in 
ternational  law  made  by  Wilkes  consisted,  according  to 
their  view,  in  taking  the  persons  of  the  envoys  out  of 
the  British  vessel  without  a  preceding  trial  and  judg 
ment  by  a  regular  prize  court  of  the  United  States  au 
thorizing  the  same.  The  opinion  of  the  British  jurists 
was  certainly  sound  and  lawyerlike.  It  made  the  ques 
tion  of  procedure  precede,  as  it  should,  the  argument 
upon  the  merits. 

Whether  they  so  intended  or  not,  their  opinion,  and 
the  demand  of  the  British  Government  based  on  it, 
opened  to  the  United  States  Government  the  way  of  es 
cape  from  danger  and  embarrassment  without  loss  of 
dignity.  Mr.  Seward  saw  at  once  his  opportunity  and 
advised  the  President  to  yield  on  the  point  of  procedure 
and  release  the  prisoners,  which  the  President  promptly 
did. 

Mr.  Seward  took  advantage  of  this  occasion  to  assert, 
that,  in  demanding  the  release  of  Mason  and  Slidell,  the 
British  Government  had  placed  itself  upon  principles  in 
regard  to  the  right  of  visitation  and  search,  and  in  re 
gard  to  what  constitutes  contraband  of  war,  always  be 
fore  this  denied  by  Great  Britain,  while  long  approved 
by  the  United  States  and  most  of  the  states  of  Conti 
nental  Europe.  Mr.  Sumner  took  the  same  ground  in 
his  famous  speech  upon  the  subject  made  in  the  Senate 
on  the  9th  of  January,  1802. 

The  contention  in  both  cases  appears,  however,  a  little 
strained,  to  say  the  least.  As  we  have  seen,  the  British 
Government  rested  its  whole  case  on  the  question  of 
VOL.  L— 18 


274  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

procedure.  It  declared  simply  that  the  forcible  removal 
of  the  envoys  from  the  Trent  was  illegal  because  it  had 
not  been  preceded  by  a  trial  in  a  regular  prize  court  of 
the  United  States,  and  by  a  judgment  from  such  a  court 
decreeing  their  removal.  Both  Mr.  Seward  and  Mr. 
Sumner  were  a  little  over  anxious  to  appear  as  victors  in 
this  diplomatic  bout  with  Great  Britain. 

The  Confederates  were  greatly  disappointed  and 
chagrined  at  the  result.  They  had  been  gleeful  in  their 
joy  at  the  prospect  of  the  United  States  having  a  war 
with  the  most  powerful  state  of  Europe  in  addition  to 
the  internecine  struggle.  They  now  denounced  as  cow 
ardice  the  prompt  backing  down  of  the  Washington 
Government  before  "  the  roar  of  the  British  lyon,"  and 
scolded  Great  Britain  for  not  carrying  out  her  threats, 
although  her  demands  had  been  accorded.  The  amica 
ble  arrangement  of  this  matter  removed  all  danger  of  any 
serious  complications  between  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain,  and  solved  thus  early  one  of  the  main 
problems  with  which  the  Washington  Government  was 
confronted  from  the  first. 

If  we  cast  a  comprehensive  glance  over  the  situation 
at  the  close  of  the  year  1861,  we  shall  indeed  find  some 
Bird's -eye  justification  for  President  Lincoln's  state- 
uaetTonfahtethe  ment  in  his  message  of  December  3d  to  Con- 
cioseofisei.  gress^  that  the  cause  of  the  Union  was  "'ad 
vancing  steadily  and  certainly  southward,"  but  we  cannot 
repress  the  feeling  that  this  was  fully  as  cheerful  a  view 
of  the  state  of  things  as  the  facts  warranted.  The  Con 
federates  had,  at  last,  established  their  line  of  defence 
from  Yorktown  in  the  east  along  the  southern  Potomac 
to  Aquia  Creek,  thence  to  Centreville,  Leesburg  and 
Winchester,  thence  along  the  Alleghanies  south-west 
ward  to  the  headwaters  of  the  Great  Kanawha,  thence 
to  the  upper  Cumberland  Valley,  thence  westward  to 


THE   MILITARY    MOVEMENTS    OF    1861          275 

Bowling  Green,  Russellville  and  Columbus,  and  thence 
to  Springfield  and  the  Kansas  border.  Every  slave- 
holding  Commonwealth,  except  Delaware  and  Maryland, 
was  thus  wholly  or  partly  within  their  jurisdiction.  It 
was  a  vast  territory,  and  in  it  a  great  power  was  now  fairly 
organized  and  equipped  for  resistance.  The  authorities 
at  Washington  and  the  people  of  the  North  could  now 
no  longer  deceive  themselves  with  the  idea  of  a  speedy 
termination  of  the  struggle.  Neither  could  they  prom 
ise  themselves  any  more  that  success  at  a  single  point 
upon  this  extended  line  would  be  decisive.  They  saw 
that  a  powerful  and  united  effort  along  the  whole  line 
must  be  made  in  order  to  effect  anything  worth  the  ex 
ertion  and  the  cost.  We  pass  now,  therefore,  from  the 
consideration  of  the  petit  war  to  that  of  the  grand  war 
of  the  rebellion. 


CHAPTER   XI 

MILL   SPRINGS,  FORT   HENRY,  DONELSON,  SHILOH, 
PEA   RIDGE,    AND   ISLAND    NO.   10 

The  President's  Military  Order  of  January  27th,  1862 — Anticipation 
of  the  President's  Order  by  the  Western  Armies — Attempts  to 
Relieve  East  Tennessee — Zollicoffer's  Move  to  Mill  Springs — 
The  Battle  of  Mill  Springs,  or,  More  Correctly,  of  Logan's 
Cross  Roads — Grant's  Manoeuvres  from  Cairo  and  Paducah — 
Fort  Henry — Fort  Donelson — The  Battle — The  Surrender — 
The  Results  of  the  Victory — Halleck,  Buell,  and  Grant— Fail 
ure  of  the  Attempts  to  Prevent  the  Concentration  of  the  Con 
federates  at  Corinth — Concentration  of  the  Federals  at  Pitts- 
burg  Landing — The  Advance  of  Buell — The  Extension  of 
Halleck's  Authority — Nelson's  Forced  March  from  Columbia  to 
Savannah — Johnston's  Preparations  for  Battle — The  Advance 
of  the  Confederates  to  Shiloh— The  Federal  Position— The  Plan 
of  Attack— The  Battle— The  Death  of  Johnston— Webster's 
Battery— The  Arrival  of  Nelson— Suspension  of  the  Struggle— 
The  Two  Armies  on  the  7th— The  Renewal  of  the  Battle— 
The  Piercing  of  the  Confederate  Centre— The  Defeat  of  the 
Confederates  and  their  Retreat— The  Losses— The  Pea  Ridge 
Campaign — Retreat  of  Price — Curtls's  Pursuit — The  Position 
at  Pea  Ridge — The  Flanking  Movements  of  the  Confederates — 
The  Battle  of  Pea  Ridge— The  Second  Day's  Battle,  and  the 
Defeat  of  the  Confederates — The  Losses — The  Indian  Brigade 
—The  Capture  of  Island  No.  10— The  Attack  on  New  Madrid- 
Preparations  against  Island  No.  10 — The  Capture  of  the  Island 
and  the  Confederate  Army — The  Beginning  of  Pope's  Popular 
ity — The  Advance  on  Corinth — The  Retreat  of  the  Confeder 
ates  from  Corinth — The  Fall  of  Memphis. 

BY  the  beginning  of   1862,  the  Northern   patience 
with  the  work  of  preparation  again  manifested  signs  of 

276 


MILL   SPRINGS  277 

exhaustion.  The  President  was  made  to  feel  that  the 
temper  of  the  people  required  another  early  effort  to 
advance.  He  had  himself  become  restless  . 

under  General  McClelland  procrastinations,  dent's  mjiita- 
At  last  he  took  matters  into  his  own  hands,  January  27th, 
and,  on  the  27th  of  January,  issued  that, 
from  a  military  point  of  view,  strange  order  for  a  forward 
movement  on  the  part  of  all  the  armies  of  the  United 
States,  to  be  executed  on  the  selfsame  day,  the  22d  of 
February  following.  More  than  once  Mr.  Lincoln 
sought  to  make  use  of  the  mystical  influence  of  the  im 
pressive  events  in  our  national  history  to  inspire  the 
people  and  the  soldiers  with  patriotic  ardor.  This  mil 
itary  proclamation  is  intelligible  from  this  point  of  view, 
but  from  no  other. 

The  two  comprehensive  objects  of  the  intended  move 
ment  were  the  capture  of  Richmond  and  the  opening 
of  the  Mississippi.  Undoubtedly  it  was  good  military 
judgment  so  to  manoeuvre  the  armies  as  to  prevent  the 
Confederates  in  the  West  from  reinforcing  those  in  the 
East,  and  vice  versa,  but  it  is  hardly  to  be  supposed  that 
a  general  advance  upon  the  selfsame  day  from  points  a 
thousand  miles  apart  would  best  effect  these  purposes, 
or  would  even  be  a  possibility. 

The  Western  armies  did  not,  however,  wait  for  the 
coming  of  Washington's  birthday  to  enter 

Anticipation 

upon  the  campaign.    Already,  in  tact,  berore  of  the  presi- 

•    A        T»        -T       ,,  -i  i     dent's  order 

the  issue  ot  the  President  s  order,  they  had   by  the  west- 

i  ,  •  ern  armies. 

begun  operations. 

As  we  have  seen,  the  Union  forces  in  Middle  and 
East  Kentucky  had  early  regarded  East  Tennessee  as 
their   objective   point.      The   strong  Union 
sentiment  of  the  people  of  East  Tennessee  relieve  East 
was  well  known  in  Kentucky  and  throughout 
the  North.     Its  occupation  by  the  Union  armies  would 


THE    CIVIL    WAR 

rescue  a  loyal  people  from  the  tyranny  of  the  Confeder 
acy,  would  secure  the  resources  of  this  section  for  the 
Union  cause,  and  would  sever  one  of  the  main  lines  of 
connection  between  Virginia  and  the  western  parts  of 
the  Confederacy.  During  the  autumn  of  1861,  two  at 
tempts  were  made  to  advance  in  the  direction  of  East 
Tennessee  ;  one  by  General  Schcepf  from  the  Federal 
base  at  Wild  Cat  Camp  in  Garrard  County,  and  the  oth 
er  by  General  William  Nelson  from  Lexington,  up  the 
Licking  River  through  Prestonburg  and  Piketon,  and 
then  across  the  Cumberland  Mountains  into  the  valley 
of  Clinch  River.  Schoepf's  movement  was  stopped  by  a 
rumor  that  the  Confederates  were  advancing  from  Bowl 
ing  Green  upon  his  right  flank,  and  Nelson  was  checked 
by  the  Confederates  under  Colonel  Williams  in  a  little 
battle  between  Prestonburg  and  Piketon,  and,  although 
he  advanced  afterwards  to  Piketon,  he  was  convinced 
that  the  way  across  the  mountains  was  barred  to  him  by 
Williams  and  his  forces  at  Pound  Gap. 

Nelson  withdrew  his  forces  from  Piketon,  whereupon 
the  Confederates,  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Hum 
phrey  Marshall,  advanced  again  into  Kentucky.  General 
Buell  now  sent  Colonel  James  A.  Garfield,  with  the 
eighteenth  brigade  of  his  army,  to  drive  Marshall  back. 
Marshall  retreated  before  Garfield's  advance  to  Preston - 
burg,  and  in  the  morning  of  the  10th  of  January,  1862, 
made  a  stand  at  Middle  Creek,  a  little  to  the  west  of 
Prestonburg.  In  the  engagement  which  followed  both 
parties  claimed  the  victory.  Both  parties,  however, 
withdrew  from  the  position,  the  Confederates  retiring  to 
Pound  Gap  and  the  Federals  to  Paintsville.  The  Con 
federates  thus  abandoned  extreme  East  Kentucky,  and 
the  Federals  left  East  Tennessee,  for  the  moment,  in 
the  grasp  of  the  Confederacy.  It  was  evident  now  to 
them  that  they  could  not  penetrate  East  Tennessee 


MILL   SPRINGS  279 

through  the  mountains  of  Sonth-eastern  Kentucky,  and 
that  they  must  choose  their  line  of  advance  further  west 
ward. 

The  Confederates  saw  this  also,  and  in  order  both  to 
meet  the  possibility  of  an  attempt  of  the  Federals  to  ad 
vance  towards  East  Tennessee  by  the  Kings- 

,       ,,  ,  Zollicoffer'B 

ton  route  further  westward,  and  to  put  them-  move  to  Mm 
selves  in  a  better  position  to  invade  Middle 
Kentucky,  Zollicoffer  abandoned  Barboursville  and 
moved  his  troops  westward  to  Mill  Springs  and  Beach 
Grove,  the  former  on  the  south  side  and  the  latter  on 
the  north  side  of  the  Cumberland  River,  directly  oppo 
site  to  each  other.  The  Confederates  now  began  to  for 
tify  these  two  positions. 

General  Buell  saw  at  once  the  necessity  for  dislodg 
ing  Zollicoffer  from  this  new  base  of  operations,  and  in 
the  last  days  of  December,  he  ordered  General  Schcepf 
to  take  a  position  at  Somerset,  a  place  about  eighteen 
miles  to  the  north-east  of  Mill  Springs,  and  there  await 
the  advance  of  General  George  H.  Thomas  from  Colum 
bia,  a  place  thirty-five  miles  north-west  from  Mill 
Springs,  who  had  been  ordered  to  form  a  junction  with 
Schoepf,  and  then  attack  the  Confederates  on  the  Cum 
berland.  The  Confederate  Commander,  now  General 
George  B.  Crittenden,  soon  learned  of  the  movement, 
and  saw  at  once  that  he  could  save  himself  only  by  pre 
venting  the  junction  of  Thomas  and  Schoepf.  The  two 
Union  armies  were  to  come  together  at  a  place  called 
Logan's  Cross  Roads,  the  place  where  the  road  from 
Somerset  to  Mill  Springs  joined  the  road  from  Colum 
bia  to  Mill  Springs,  and  about  ten  miles  northward 
from  Mill  Springs.  Crittenden's  plan  was  to  occupy 
this  place  before  either  Thomas  or  Schoepf  could  arrive, 
and  beat  the  Union  armies  singly.  It  was  a  correct 
conception,  but  Crittenden  was  too  slow  in  executing  it. 


280  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

The  union  of  Thomas  and  Schcepf  had  been  accom 
plished  for  some  hours  before  the  Confederates  arrived 
in  front  of  the  Federal  outposts. 

The  Confederates  had,  however,  no  choice  of  alterna 
tives.  They  must  attack.  They  endeavored  to  help 
The  battle  of  themselves  by  a  surprise  attack.  In  the 
r-  early  morning  of  the  19th  of  January,  they 
m'led  themselves  impetuously  upon  the 
Roads.  Federal  troops.  The  Federals  were  at  first 

thrown  into  confusion,  and  the  Confederates  charged 
forward  with  shouts  of  victory.  But  Thomas  drew 
them  by  his  masterly  manoeuvres  into  a  position  where  he 
turned  their  left  flank,  and,  in  the  moment  of  their  con 
fusion  while  attempting  to  change  front,  threw  a  large 
fresh  regiment  upon  them  in  bayonet  charge,  which 
routed  them  completely.  The  victory  of  the  Federals 
was  decisive,  but  the  darkness  intervened  before  the 
works  at  Beach  Grove  were  reached.  On  the  morning 
of  the  20th,  the  Federals  entered  the  fortifications,  only 
to  find  that  the  Confederates  had  fled  across  the  river  to 
Mill  Springs,  and  were  already  in  full  retreat  towards 
Nashville. 

Some  five  thousand  Confederates  and  eight  or  ten 
thousand  Federals  had  taken  part  in  the  engagement. 
The  Confederate  loss  was  about  five  hundred  men, 
among  them  General  Zollicoffer.  The  Federal  loss,  on 
the  other  hand,  was  only  about  half  as  great.  The 
Federals  also  made  capture  of  a  large  amount  of  arms, 
ammunition  and  commissary  stores,  and  of  a  consider 
able  number  of  animals  and  wagons.  The  Confederates 
had,  undoubtedly,  suffered  a  most  serious  disaster.  It 
was  the  beginning  of  the  chapter  of  disasters  which 
overtook  their  armies  to  the  west  of  the  Alleghanies 
during  the  late  winter  and  spring  of  1862. 

At  the  beginning  of  Thomas's  movement  against  Mill 


FORT  HENRY  281 

Springs,,  Buell  requested  McClellan  to  order  General 
Grant,  at  Cairo,  to  threaten  Columbus,  Fort  Henry 
and  Fort  Donelson,  in  order  to  prevent  the  Grant's  ma- 
Confederates  at  Bowling  Green  from  sending  S7anV  p™ 
aid  to  Crittenden  at  Mill  Springs,  and  to  ducah- 
prevent  Bowling  Green  from  being  reinforced  from  the 
first-named  points. 

In  obedience  to  an  order  from  McClellan,  transmitted 
through  Halleck,  Grant  sent  General  J.  A.  McClernand 
from  Cairo  with  a  force  of  some  six  thousand  men  to 
menace  Columbus,  and  General  C.  F.  Smith,  from  Pa- 
ducah,  with  a  smaller  force,  to  occupy  the  attention  of 
the  Confederates  about  Fort  Henry.  Both  of  these 
movements  were  successfully  executed  between  the  10th 
and  25th  of  January.  No  reinforcements  were  sent  from 
these  points  to  Bowling  Green,  and  the  Confederates  at 
Bowling  Green,  being  threatened  on  their  front  by  Gen 
eral  BuelFs  main  army,  could  do  nothing  for  Critten 
den  at  Mill  Springs. 

These  reconnoissances  were  destined,  however,  to  lead 
to  far  more  important  results.  General  Smith  found  a 
fort  on  the  west  side  of  the  Tennessee  River,  just  across 
from  Fort  Henry,  which,  on  account  of  its  elevation 
above  the  latter,  really  commanded  it.  General  Smith 
reported  to  General  Grant  that  it  was,  in  his  opinion, 
practicable  to  seize  this  point,  called  Fort  Heiman,  and 
from  it  to  reduce  Fort  Henry. 

General  Grant  had  already  formed  the  view  that  the  true 
lines  of  operation  for  the  Union  forces  in  the  West  were 
up  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland  Rivers, 
thus  turning  both  Columbus  and   Bowling 
Green,  and  forcing  the  evacuation  of  Kentucky.     After 
receiving  Smith's  report,  he  went  to  Halleck,  at  St. 
Louis,  with  the  plan.     Halleck,  at  first,  rebuffed  him, 
but  with  the  help  of  Flag-Officer  Andrew  H.  Foote,  who 


282  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

had  gathered  a  little  fleet  of  iron-clad  boats,  called 
gun-boats,  at  Cairo,  he  at  last  prevailed  on  Halleck  to 
allow  him  and  Foote  to  undertake  the  campaign.  Hal- 
leek's  order  of  January  30th  was  simply  to  make  prepa 
rations  to  take"  and  hold  Fort  Henry,  and  his  written 
instructions  only  added  the  direction  to  occupy  the 
road  from  Fort  Henry  to  Fort  Donelson  on  the  Cum 
berland,  so  as  to  prevent  reinforcement  from  Donelson 
to  Henry,  or  escape  from  Henry  to  Donelson.  Grant's 
army  arrived  on  transports  within  striking  distance  of 
Fort  Henry  in  the  evening  of  February  5th.  He  or 
dered  McClernand  to  disembark  on  the  east  side  of  the 
river  and  occupy  the  roads  leading  from  Henry  to  Don 
elson,  C.  F.  Smith  to  disembark  on  the  west  bank  and 
assault  Fort  Heiman,  and  Officer  Foote  to  bombard  the 
Forts  in  front.  The  execution  of  these  movements  was 
to  take  place  at  eleven  o'clock  in  the  forenoon  of  the  next 
day,  the  6th.  The  Confederate  Commander,  General 
Lloyd  Tilghman,  had,  however,  very  cleverly  divined 
the  plan,  and,  during  the  night,  he  effected  the  evacua 
tion  of  Fort  Heiman,  and  the  escape  of  the  garrison  of 
Fort  Henry  by  the  upper  road  to  Fort  Donelson.  He 
remained  himself  at  Fort  Henry,  with  some  eighty  ar 
tillerists,  in  order  to  occupy  the  attention  of  the  Fed 
erals  until  his  little  army  of  three  thousand  men  could 
escape. 

The  advance  of  the  Federals  began  as  ordered.  At  a 
little  past  noon  the  battle  between  the  little  band  in  the 
Fort  and  Foote's  seven  gun -boats  was  opened.  It  lasted 
an  hour  and  a  quarter,  when  the  Confederates  surren 
dered.  When  Smith  arrived  at  Fort  Heiman,  he  found  it 
deserted,  while  McClernand  failed  to  intercept  the  march 
of  the  garrison  to  Fort  Donelson.  The  loss  in  killed 
and  wounded  was  inconsiderable,  and  the  prisoners  capt 
ured  in  Fort  Henry  numbered  only  about  sixty,  among 


FORT    DONELSOX  283 

them  General  Tilghmun.  But  one  of  the  great  water 
courses  leading  into  the  heart  of  the  Confederacy  was 
now  opened,  and  the  first  stage  of  the  campaign  for  the 
rescue  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  from  the  power  of 
the  Confederacy  was  successfully  accomplished. 

In  his  despatch  to  General  Halleck  announcing  the 
capture  of  Fort  Henry,  Grant  declared  that  he  would 
take  and  destroy  Fort  Donelson  on  the  8th.  In  this 
prediction  he  was  too  sanguine.  He  does  not  seem  to 
have  taken  sufficient  account  of  the  time  it  would  require 
to  send  the  gun-boats  down  the  Tennessee  and  up  the 
Cumberland,  nor  of  the  difficulties  of  the  march  across 
from  Henry  in  the  torrents  of  rain  which  were  falling, 
nor  of  the  strength  and  extent  of  the  fortifications  at 
Donelson. 

On  the  day  following  the  capture  of  Henry,  however, 
Grant  with  his  staff  and  few  companies  of  cavalry  rode 
to  within  a  mile  of  the  outer  works  around  Fort  ponei. 
Fort  Donelson  and  made  a  satisfactory  recon-  60n- 
noissance  of  the  position.  He  found  the  fortifications 
to  consist  of  a  strong  Fort  on  the  bank  of  the  river 
mounting  a  goodly  number  of  heavy  guns  to  defend  the 
approach  by  the  river,  and  a  line  of  rifle  pits  running 
up  the  stream,  and  about  a  mile  away  from  it,  to  a 
slough  of  the  river  which  lay  almost  at  right  angles  with 
the  main  current.  A  deep  creek,  called  Hickman  Creek, 
ran  around  the  base  of  the  Fort,  on  the  down-stream  side 
of  it,  and  formed  a  strong  barrier  against  an  attack  by  a 
land  force  moving  up  the  river.  Grant  also  found  that 
there  was  a  range  of  hills  outside  of  the  ridge  occupied 
by  the  rifle  pits,  which  were  higher  than  any  of  the  points 
of  the  fortifications,  and  that  a  deep  ravine  running  at 
right  angles  with  the  line  of  rifle  pits  cut  this  line  into 
two  parts  near  the  centre.  At  a  glance  he  saw  that  he 
could  command  the  Confederate  works  by  artillery  upon 


284  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

these  higher  points,  and  could  pierce  the  line  of  fortifi 
cations  through  the  ravine. 

By  the  12th  Grant  and  Foote  were  fairly  prepared  to 
begin  operations.  Foote  steamed  up  the  Cumberland 
with  the  gun-boats,  and  along  with  him,  on  transports, 
went  Colonel  Thayer's  brigade  of  infantry  ;  while  Grant, 
with  an  army  of  about  fifteen  thousand  men,  set  out  on 
the  march  across  the  neck  of  land  between  Fort  Henry 
and  Fort  Donelson,  about  a  dozen  miles  in  width.  The 
army  was  in  two  divisions,  under  the  command  of  Mc- 
Clernand  and  Smith,  while  Lew  Wallace  was  left  behind 
with  some  two  thousand  men  to  hold  Forts  Henry  and 
He  i  man. 

The  Confederates  had,  during  the  six  days  since  the 
capture  of  Fort  Henry,  been  receiving  reinforcements. 
After  the  disaster  at  Mill  Springs,  the  Confederate  com 
mander  at  Bowling  Green,  General  A.  S.  Johnston,  had 
decided  to  retire  behind  the  Cumberland,  in  order  to 
avoid  being  flanked  by  Thomas  on  his  right.  He  was 
evacuating  Bowling  Green  when  Grant  was  starting  from 
Fort  Henry  to  attack  Donelson,  and  he  sent  Generals 
Pillow,  Buckner,  and  Floyd  with  ten  to  twelve  thousand 
of  his  best  troops  to  Donelson,  having  resolved  to  fight 
his  battle  for  the  possession  of  Nashville  and  the  south 
bank  of  the  Cumberland  at  Donelson. 

About  noon  of  the  12th  the  head  of  McClernand's  col 
umn  encountered  the  Confederate  pickets.  Grant  now 
put  his  forces  into  position,  the  division  under 
McClernand  forming  the  right  wing,  while 
Smith's  division  formed  the  left  wing,  resting  on  the 
heights  nearly  opposite  the  fort.  Only  one  of  the  iron 
clads  had  arrived,  the  Carondelet,  commanded  by  Cap 
tain  Walke.  He  immediately  fired  a  few  shots  at  the 
lower  guns  of  the  fort,  but  made  no  impression. 

On  the  next  day,  the  loth,  the  Federal  lines  were 


FORT   DO  NELSON  285 

drawn  closer,  and  about  one  o'clock  in  the  afternoon 
General  McClernand  ordered  Colonel  Morrison's  brigade, 
supported  by  Haynie's  regiment,  to  take  advantage  of 
some  confusion  in  the  Confederate  line  caused  by  the 
good  artillery  fire  from  the  Federal  batteries  on  the 
heights  behind  them,  and  assault  a  redan  in  the  middle 
of  that  line  which  was  causing  the  Federals  a  good  deal 
of  annoyance.  It  was  a  rash  and  presumptuous  thing  on 
the  part  of  McClernand,  and  he  forfeited  Grant's  respect 
for  his  judgment  thereby.  Nevertheless,  the  brave  II- 
linoisans  almost  succeeded,  and  probably  would  have 
succeeded  had  not  their  gallant  leader,  Colonel  Morrison, 
been  stricken  down  at  the  most  critical  moment.  Mor 
rison  was  borne  bleeding  from  the  field,  and  Haynie 
gave  the  order  to  withdraw.  The  victory  of  the  Con 
federates  in  the  battle  of  the  13th  gave  them  great  en 
couragement,  and  was  in  some  degree  dispiriting  to  the 
Federals. 

In  the  night  of  the  13th  Foote  arrived  before  the  Fort 
with  five  gun-boats,  and  the  transports  bringing  Thay- 
er's  big  brigade  of  six  full  regiments.  General  Lew 
Wallace  arrived  also  in  the  early  morning  of  the  14th, 
with  the  troops  that  had  been  left  at  Fort  Henry.  With 
these  large  reinforcements,  Grant's  army  now  outnum 
bered  that  of  the  Confederates,  without  the  gun-boats, 
and  the  courage  of  the  men  was  completely  restored. 

Grant  now  formed  a  third  division,  composed  chiefly 
of  the  newly  arrived  troops,  put  Lew  Wallace  in  com 
mand  of  it,  and  caused  it  to  take  position  in  the  centre  of 
his  line,  between  Smith  and  McClernand.  His  plan  of 
battle  for  the  14th  was  to  have  the  army  so  threaten  the 
outer  works  as  to  hold  the  Confederate  forces  in  them, 
while  the  gun-boats  should  attack  the  batteries  on  the 
river,  pass  above  them,  establish  communication  with 
McClernand's  right,  and  then  take  everything  in  reverse. 


286  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

The  gun-boats  began  the  attack  about  three  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon.  They  advanced  to  within  about  a  thou- 
Attack  of  sand  feet  of  the  lower  batteries,  pouring  a 
the  gun-boats.  Well-directed  fire  into  the  Fort,  when  the 
wheel  of  the  flag-ship,  the  St.  Louis,  was  struck  and 
torn  away  and  Foote  was  severely  wounded.  At  about 
the  same  moment  another  shot  from  the  batteries  car 
ried  away  the  tiller-ropes  of  the  Louisville.  These  two 
boats  became  immediately  unmanageable,  and  drifted 
down  stream,  followed  by  the  others,  all  more  or  less 
battered.  The  nagging  zeal  of  the  Confederates  was 
roused  again  by  the  victory  of  the  14th.  Still  the  Fed 
eral  reinforcements  continued  to  arrive,  and  the  Federal 
line  kept  approaching  the  river  above  the  fortifications, 
threatening  to  bar  the  wray  of  retreat  toward  Nashville. 

The  Confederates  were  informed  of  these  facts  by  their 
scouts,  and  in  the  evening  of  the  14th  their  commanders 
met  in  council  to  discuss  the  situation.  Despite  the  tri 
umph  of  the  batteries  over  the  gun-boats,  it  appeared  to 
them  very  serious.  They  at  last  resolved  to  assail  the 
Federal  right,  at  dawn  the  next  morning,  with  a  division 
of  their  troops  commanded  by  Pillow,  turn  it,  and  drive 
it  back  upon  the  centre,  and  then  hurl  the  Confederate 
right  wing,  led  by  Buckner,  upon  the  exposed  flank  of 
the  Federals,  and  thns  open  the  way  for  the  Confederate 
army  to  pass  out  and  march  by  way  of  Charlotte  toward 
Nashville.  Orders  were  sent  in  all  directions  to  make 
the  necessary  preparations.  The  weather  had  become 
intensely  cold,  and  the  shivering  Confederates  spent 
most  of  the  dreary  night  putting  themselves  in  readiness 
for  the  deadly  conflict,,  and  the  dangerous  retreat  which 
was,  according  to  the  plan,  to  follow  it. 

General  Grant  did  not  anticipate  any  such  movement 
on  the  part  of  his  enemy.  He  had  been  summoned  by 
the  wounded  Foote  to  a  conference  on  board  the  St. 


FORT   DONP^LSON  287 

Louis,  which  was  lying  disabled  some  five  miles  below 
the  Fort.  lie  set  out  from  his  head-quarters,  just  behind 
Smith's  division,  in  the  early  morning  of  the  15th,  to 
answer  Footers  call,  all  unconscious  of  the  fact  that  the 
Confederates  were,  at  the  very  moment,  moving  in  great 
force  upon  the  extreme  right  of  his  line.  He  had  sent 
word  to  his  division  commanders  to  hold  their  positions, 
but  not  to  bring  on  an  engagement  until  ordered  by  him. 
Returning  from  his  visit  to  Foote,  he  was  met  by  one  of 
his  staff  coming  at  full  gallop,  and  informed  that  the 
Confederates  had  turned  McClernand's  right  and  were 
driving  the  entire  right  wing  back  upon  the  centre.  He 
rode  rapidly  forward  to  the  scene  of  battle,  and  his  mas 
ter  mind  divined  at  once  the  plan  of  the  Con-  Grant's  div- 
federates  to  escape.  He  immediately  ordered  ination- 
McClernand's  broken  regiments  back  into  line  across  the 
path  which  the  Confederates  were  trying  to  open,  and 
rightly  supposing  that  the  mass  of  Buckner's  troops  had 
gone  out  from  the  trenches  in  front  of  the  Federal  left 
wing  to  join  in  the  attempt  of  the  army  to  cut  its  way 
out,  and  that  only  a  few  remained  to  hold  the  Federals 
at  bay  long  enough  to  secure  the  retreat,  he  commanded 
General  Smith  to  assault  and  carry  these  works.  Smith's 
troops  carried  out  this  order  with  great  promptness  and 
success,  and  quickly  gained  a  lodgement  in  the  Confeder 
ate  rifle  pits  near  the  Fort  itself.  The  Confederates  now 
came  rushing  back  to  regain  their  works,  but  Smith  held 
them  at  bay,  while  the  Federal  right  and  centre  regained 
their  positions  of  the  preceding  day.  There  was  no 
place  within  the  Confederate  position  which  Smith's 
artillery  did  not  command  ;  and  when  the  sun  went 
down,  darkness  drew  its  protecting  wing  over  a  beaten 
and  demoralized  army  of  Confederates,  who  had  now  to 
meet  the  alternatives  of  slaughter  or  surrender. 

At  midnight  their  chiefs,  Floyd,  Pillow,  and  Buckner, 


288  THE    CIVIL   WAR 

were  gathered  in  council  in  a  little  house  in  the  hamlet 
of  Dover,  on  the  bank  of  the  slough  of  the  Cumber- 

The  surren-  ^an^  which  hemmed  the  Confederates  in  on 
the  side  looking  up  the  river.  Floyd  was 
bent  upon  making  his  own  escape.  He  feared  it  might 
go  hard  with  him  if  taken.  Pillow  was  a  man  who  never 
knew  when  he  was  down,  and  was  naturally  rather  in 
favor  of  further  resistance.  But  Buckner,  a  better  sol 
dier  and  a  better  man  in  every  way  than  either  of  the 
others,  saw  the  futility  of  any  more  fighting,  and  felt  the 
cruelty  to  the  men  of  exposing  them  to  any  more  hard 
ships  and  suffering.  He  advocated  surrender.  Floyd 
and  Pillow  at  last  assented,  with  the  understanding  that 
Buckner  should  assume  command  and  they  should  at 
tempt  to  escape.  It  was  now  near  the  dawn  of  the  16th. 
There  were  two  little  boats  at  the  Dover  landing.  Floyd 
and  Pillow  boarded  these  with  as  many  soldiers  as  could 
get  on,  chiefly  the  Virginians  of  Floyd's  brigade,  and 
steamed  for  Nashville.  Forrest,  with  his  cavalry,  swam 
the  slough  and  rode  away  along  the  south  bank  of  the 
river.  At  the  same  time,  Buckner  ordered  the  white 
flag  to  be  raised,  and  sent  a  messenger  to  Grant  to  open 
parley.  Grant  replied  that  he  should  require  immediate 
unconditional  surrender,  and  that  he  should  begin  the 
attack  at  once  if  this  demand  were  not  accepted.  Buck 
ner  felt  obliged  to  yield,  though  he  did  so  with  very  bad 
grace,  and  in  a  rather  undignified  manner. 

It  was  a  magnificent  Federal  victory.     The  Confed 
erates  lost  nearly  two  thousand  men  killed  and  wounded, 

The  results  an<^-  from  twelve  to  fifteen  thousand  taken 
of  the  victory.  prisoners,  together  with  the  entire  equipment 
of  their  army.  But  it  was  not  a  cheaply  purchased  vic 
tory  to  the  Federals.  They  lost  between  twenty-five 
hundred  and  three  thousand  men  killed  and  wounded. 
The  slaughter  and  the  suffering  had  been  frightful  on 


FORT    DONKLSON  289 

both  sides.  The  strategic  results  of  the  victory  were  the 
evacuation  of  Middle  Tennessee  and  of  the  fortress  on 
the  Mississippi  at  Columbus  by  the  Confederates,  and 
their  retreat  to  Corinth  and  Chattanooga.  So  soon  as 
General  Johnston  learned  of  the  disaster  at  Donelson  he 
marched  the  remnants  of  his  army,,  which  had  retreated 
from  Bowling  Green  to  the  north  bank  of  the  Cumber 
land,  right  on  through  Nashville  to  Murfreesborough, 
at  which  point  he  was  joined  by  Crittenden/s  troops 
coming  from  Mill  Springs  through  Carthage  and  Leba 
non,  and,  after  remaining  a  few  days  in  Murfreesborough, 
moved  his  whole  force  southward  to  the  Memphis  and 
Charleston  railroad  line,  and  sent  them  over  this  road  to 
Corinth,  in  Mississippi,  in  order  to  form  at  that  point  a 
junction  with  Beauregard,  who  had  been  transferred 
from  Virginia  to  take  command  of  the  defences  of  the 
Mississippi  Valley.  During  the  same  period  the  Con 
federates  withdrew  from  Columbus,  the  "  Gibraltar  of  the 
"West."  About  one-half  of  them,  commanded  by  Polk, 
the  Bishop-General,  went  direct  to  Corinth,  while  the 
other  half,  led  by  Beauregard  himself,  retired  to  Island 
Xo.  10 — an  island  in  the  Mississippi  some  forty-five 
miles  below  Columbus,  at  the  upper  extremity  of  New 
Madrid  bend — a  place  where  the  great  river  makes  a  turn 
so  sudden  and  complete  as  to  run  for  a  few  miles  in  a 
direction  exactly  contrary  to  its  general  course. 

The  reaping  of  the  results  of  the  victory  to  the  fullest 
extent  was  now,  however,  hindered  by  questions  of  au 
thority  and  precedence.    Halleck  was  Grant's 
superior,  but  he  was   not  Buell's   superior.   Bueii  and 
The  connection  between  Halleck  and  Buell 
was  McClellan.     McClellan  had,  on  the  15th  of  Febru 
ary,  ordered  Buell  to  advance  on  Nashville,  and  had  in 
formed  Halleck  of  this  order.     Before  receiving  this  in 
formation,  Halleck  had  telegraphed  McClellan  that,  in 
VOL.  I.— 19 


290  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

his  opinion,,  a  direct  move  by  Buellfrom  Bowling  Green 
on  Nashville  would  be  bad  strategy,  and  that  the  mass  of 
B u ell's  troops  should  be  sent  to  him  to  help  him  take 
Fort  Donelson,  and  then  operate  up  the  Tennessee 
River  in  the  rear  of  the  Confederates,  forcing  them  thus 
to  evacuate  Tennessee.  And  upon  receiving  Halleck's 
despatch,  McClellan  replied  that  Buell  must  move  in 
force  on  Nashville  as  rapidly  as  circumstances  would  per 
mit,  but  that  if  Grant  must  have  help,  three  of  Buell's 
brigades  and  some  artillery  would  be  sent  to  him  on  the 
next  day.  McClellan  thus  evidently  ruled  that  the  oper 
ations  against  Nashville  belonged  in  Buell's  department. 
Grant  sent  C.  F.  Smith's  division  up  the  Cumberland 
to  Clarksville,  a  place  about  one-third  of  the  way  from 
Donelson  to  Nashville,  and  kept  them  there  awaiting 
orders  from  Halleck  or  McClellan  to  advance  toward 
Nashville,  while,  in  accordance  with  McClellan's  order, 
Buell  sent  General  William  Nelson's  division  to  Fort 
Donelson  to  reinforce  Grant,  and  marched  with  the  rest  of 
his  army  direct  upon  Nashville.  His  advance  arrived  at 
Edgefield,  just  across  the  river  from  Nashville,  on  the  23d 
of  February,  and  Nelson  arrived  at  Donelson  on  the  same 
day.  Having  no  use  for  Nelson's  troops  at  the  moment, 
Grant  ordered  Nelson  to  proceed  with  his  men  on  trans 
ports,  under  convoy  of  a  gun-boat,  up  the  river  to  Nash 
ville,  and  upon  arrival,  to  put  himself  in  communication 
with  Buell,  provided  Buell  was  there  or  was  not  far  away, 
but  in  case  Buell  was  not  within  two  days'  inarch  of  the 
place  to  return  to  a  point  below  the  city  and  wait  for  his 
arrival.  When  Nelson  approached  Nashville,  he  found 
Nelson  and  Buell's  forces  encamped  on  the  north  side  of 
v ? n  e* ^ifd  the  river  with  no  means  of  crossing,  the  Con- 
Edgefleia.  federates  having  destroyed  the  bridges  and 
the  river  craft.  He  at  once  landed  his  troops,  without 
any  orders  from  Buell  or  understanding  with  him,  on 


FORT   DONELSON  291 

the  south  bank  of  the  river  and  took  possession  of  the 
city.  Nelson  was  at  the  moment  nominally  under 
Grant's  orders,  although  Grant  had  not  instructed  him 
to  occupy  Nashville,  as  we  have  seen.  Buell  seems  to 
have  been  disturbed,  if  not  terrified,  by  the  situation. 
He  had  formed  the  opinion  that  the  Confederates  were 
gathering  in  great  force  some  ten  miles  below  Nashville 
and  were  on  the  point  of  attacking  Nelson  and  repos 
sessing  themselves  of  the  city.  On  the  25th,  he  sent  a 
message  to  General  C.  F.  Smith  at  Clarksville,  urging 
him  to  bring  his  division  as  quickly  as  possible  to  Nash 
ville,  and  informing  him  of  the  almost  desperate  situa 
tion  of  the  Federal  army  at  Nashville  and  Edgefield,  as 
he  viewed  it.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  entire  Confeder 
ate  army  was  at  Murfreesborough  in  a  most  demoralized 
and  disheartened  condition,  and  did  not  number  all  told 
over  seventeen  thousand  men. 

Grant  had  written  to  head-quarters  in  St.  Louis  several 
days  before,  announcing  his  own  intention  of  going  in 
person  to  Nashville  unless  restrained  by  an  Grant  in 
order  from  General  Halleck  to  the  contrary  Nashville. 
in  the  returning  mail.  Receiving  no  such  order,  he  pro 
ceeded  to  Nashville  on  the  27th.  When  he  arrived  at 
Clarksville,  he  found  Smith's  division  embarking  to  go 
to  Nashville  in  answer  to  Buell's  request.  Smith  showed 
Grant  Buell's  message  of  the  25th,  remarking  that  he 
considered  Buell  altogether  over-anxious.  Grant  ordered 
him,  however,  to  join  Buell.  When  Grant  saw  Buell  in 
Nashville,  he  told  him  that  the  Confederates  were  get 
ting  away  as  fast  as  possible,  and  that  there  was  no  dan 
ger  of  an  attack  upon  the  Federal  forces  at  Nashville, 
but  Buell  asserted  that  fighting  was  at  that  moment  go 
ing  on  not  a  dozen  miles  away,  and  that  Nashville  was 
in  imminent  danger.  Grant  returned  to  Donelson  that 
evening,  leaving  the  over-cautious  Buell  in  almost  as 


292  THE   CIVIL    AVAR 

nervous  a  condition  as  were  the  Confederates  themselves 
thirty  miles  to  the  south-east. 

Grant  and  Buell  together  had  a  force  of  at  least  sixty 
thousand  men  well  armed,  equipped,  and  disciplined,  and 
all  flushed  with  victory.  It  is  true  that  Grant's  army  had 
fought  a  great  battle,  and  BuelFs  army  had  made  a  long 
march.  But  the  battle  was  now  ten  days  past,  and  mod 
erate  marching  is  much  better  for  the  health  and  spirit 
of  troops  than  entire  rest.  Opposed  to  them  was  the 
mere  caricature  of  an  army  at  Murfreesborough,  ready  to 
take  to  its  heels  at  the  appearance  of  a  few  good  regi 
ments.  There  is  no  doubt  that  General  Grant  was  en 
tirely  correct  in  claiming,  as  he  did  in  his  "  Memoirs," 
that  if  all  the  Federal  troops  west  of  the  Alleghanies  had 
then  been  under  the  command  of  a  single  good  general 
in  the  field,  they  could  have  been  marched,  directly  after 
the  fall  of  Donelson,  to  Chattanooga,  Corinth,  Memphis, 
and  Vicksburg,  and  have  dealt  the  Confederacy  its  death 
blow  in  the  West.  But  the  over-cautious  Buell,  acting 
under  the  orders  of  the  still  more  cautious  McClellan, 
and  Grant  held  back  by  Halleck,  who  was  altogether 
over-anxious  about  the  danger  which  he  fancied  threat 
ened  Cairo  from  Columbus,  could  not  proceed  in  unison 
to  the  completion  of  the  great  work  which  lay  just  before 
them.  It  is  true  that  McClellan  was  at  the  time  Hal- 
leck's  superior  as  well  as  BuelPs,  but  he  was  far  away, 
and  the  time  for  prompt  action  was  employed  by  him  in 
controversy  with  Halleck  as  to  whether  Murfreesborough 
or  Columbus  should  be  the  next  point  of  attack,  while 
during  the  very  moments  when  the  wires  between  Wash 
ington  and  St.  Louis  were  occupied  with  these  messages 
the  Confederates  were  evacuating  both  of  these  places, 
and  hastening  to  concentrate  upon  Corinth,  in  Missis 
sippi,  for  the  defence  of  the  Memphis  and  Chattanooga 
line. 


SHILOII  293 

Communication  between  Halleck  and  Grant  was  inter 
rupted  for  about  a  week  after  the  23d  of  February,  and 
the  first  order  which  Grant  received  from  Haiieck  and 
his  immediate  superior  after  that  time  came  Grant- 
to  his  hand  on  March  2d.  It  commanded  him  to  march 
his  forces  from  Doiielsou  back  to  Fort  Henry,,  leaving  a 
small  garrison  at  Donelson.  This  order  was  executed 
on  the  4th.  On  the  day  after  his  arrival  at  Fort  Henry 
he  received  another  order  from  Halleck,  directing  him 
to  send  the  bulk  of  his  troops,  under  the  command  of 
C.  F.  Smith,  on  an  expedition  up  the  Tennessee  to  East- 
port,  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  the  Memphis  and 
Charleston  railroad  bridges  near  that  point,  but  to  re 
main  himself  at  Fort  Henry.  Grant  did  not  for  the  mo 
ment  understand  why  he  should  be  superseded  by  Smitli 
in  the  command  of  this  expedition.  The  reason  was  re 
vealed  to  him  the  next  day  in  a  communication  from 
Halleck,  in  which  Halleck  wrote  :  "  Your  going  to  Nash 
ville  without  authority,  and  when  your  presence  with 
your  troops  was  of  the  utmost  importance,  was  a  matter 
of  very  serious  complaint  at  Washington,  so  much  so 
that  I  was  advised  to  arrest  you  on  your  return."  Hal 
leck  did  not,  however,  inform  Grant  that  he  himself, 
and  he  alone,  was  the  person  who  made  the  complaint. 
Grant  felt  deeply  injured  by  Halleck's  censure,  and  asked 
to  be  relieved  from  any  further  duty  under  him.  Ilal 
leck  had  supposed  that  the  interruption  of  communica 
tions  between  Grant  and  himself  was  owing  to  Grant's 
negligence,  and  that  Grant's  visit  to  Nashville  was  for 
the  purpose  of  a  grand  spree  in  celebration  of  his  victory. 
He  now  investigated  these  things,  and  found  there  was 
no  truth  in  his  suspicions.  He  wrote  to  Grant  on  the 
13th,  refusing  to  relieve  him  of  his  command,  and  sent 
a  communication  to  Washington  two  days  later  exoner 
ating  him. 


294  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

In  accordance  with   Halleck's  order,  General  Smith 

started  from  Fort  Henry  on  the  9th  of  March  with  about 

Failure    of   twenty-five  thousand  men  on  transports,  and 

the  attempt  to   steamed  up  the  river  to  Savannah.     He  here 

prevent  the  1-1,1  •  ,  •  c    i  • 

concentration  disembarked  the  mam  portion  of  his  troops, 
federates  at  but  sent  General  W.  T.  Sherman  with  his  di 
vision  farther  up  the  river  to  Eastport,  with 
instructions  to  land  there,  and  destroy  the  Memphis 
and  Charleston  Railroad  near  luka,  in  order  to  prevent 
Johnston's  army  from  concentrating  with  the  forces 
gathering  at  Corinth  and  in  the  vicinity.  On  account 
of  the  high  water  covering  the  bottoms,  Sherman  was  not 
able  to  reach  the  railroad.  He  returned  down  the  river 
to  Pittsburg  Landing,  a  place  on  the  west  bank  of  the 
river,  some  ten  miles  above  Savannah,  which  latter  place 
is  situated  on  the  east  bank.  Here,  by  order  of  General 
Smith,  Sherman  debarked  his  men  and  set  up  his  tents. 
At  the  same  time  Smith  sent  Hurlbut's  division  across 
from  Savannah  to  join  Sherman,  and  Lew  Wallace's  di 
vision  across  to  Crump's  Landing,  about  five  miles  above 
Pittsburg  Landing.  This  was  the  disposition  of  the 
troops  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Tennessee  when  Grant 
arrived  at  Savannah  on  the  17th  of  March,  and  took 
command  of  the  movements. 

By  this  time  the  Confederates  had  gathered  in  con 
siderable  force  at  Corinth.     The  Confederate  President 
concentra    ^iac^  or^erec^   General   Braxton  Bragg  to  go 
tion  of  the  from  Pensacola  with  a  fine  division  of  troops 

Fe  derals  at     ,  ,         rrn  ,          .       ., 

p  i  1 1  sb  u  rg  to  Beauregard.  These  had  arrived,  as  well  as 
Polk's  men  from  Columbus,  and  A.  S.  John 
ston's  army  was  being  rapidly  transported  from  Decatur 
over  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad.  Grant  saw, 
at  once,  that  the  forces  on  the  west  bank  of  the  river 
must  be  immediately  reinforced  or  withdrawn.  He  de 
cided  for  the  former  alternative,  and  on  the  18th  ordered 


SHILOH  295 

all  the  troops  at  Savannah,,  except  McClernand's  divis 
ion,  to  go  over  to  Pittsburg  Landing. 

On  account  of  the  illness  of  their  commander,,  General 
Smith,  these  were  formed  into  a  division  under  the  com 
mand  of  General  W.  II.  L.  Wallace.  Another  division 
was  formed  of  the  new  troops  arriving  with  and  after 
Grant,  and  placed  under  the  command  of  General 
B.  M.  Prentiss.  By  the  20th,  Grant  had  an  army  of 
about  forty  thousand  men  at  Savannah,  Crump's  Land 
ing,  and  Pittsburg  Landing,  and  the  Confederates  had 
about  as  many  in  and  around  Corinth,  only  twenty-five 
or  thirty  miles  away. 

During  all  this  time  Buell  had  not  been  able  to  satisfy 
his  mind  whether  Johnston  was  going  to  join  Beau  re 
gard  at  Corinth  or  would  receive  reinforce 
ments  at  Chattanooga  from  Virginia  and  re-  vanCCe  &of 
turn  to  attack  Nashville.    He  had,  therefore, 
divided  his  army,  sending  a  large  division  of  some  ten 
thousand  men  or  more,  under  General  0.  M.  Mitchell 
to  Murfreesborough,  and  marching  slowly  with  the  main 
body,  some  forty  thousand,  toward  Savannah,  by  way 
of  Columbia. 

On  the  llth  of  March,  President  Lincoln  issued  his 
War  Order,  No.  3,  according  to  which  McClellan's  au 
thority  was  confined  to  the  Department  of  The  exten- 
the  Potomac,  while  the  entire  territory  west  fe?k'B°author- 
of  the  longitude  of  Knoxville,  Tennessee,  ltJ- 
was  placed  under  the  superior  command  of  Halleck,  and 
the  district  between  the  departments  of  Halleck  and 
McClellan  was  assigned  to  Fremont  under  the  name  of 
the  Mountain  Department.  The  connection  between  the 
three  was  now  the  War  Department  at  Washington,  that 
is,  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Stanton. 

So  soon  as  Halleck  was  placed  in  superior  command 
over  Buell,  he  ordered  Buell  to  move  his  forces  as  rapidly 


296  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

as  possible  to  the  support  of  Grant.  He  repeated  the 
order  a  few  days  later  with  peremptoriness.  Still  Buell 
was  lingering  at  Columbia,  only  fifty  miles  away  from 
Nashville,  as  late  as  the  30th,  while  Savannah  was  more 
than  seventy-five  miles  farther  on.  Upon  that  day  he 
received  another  despatch  from  llalleck,  urging  him 
to  go  on  to  Savannah  and  to  dismiss  all  fear  from  his 
mind  in  regard  to  Johnston's  moving  on  Nashville  from 
Decatur. 

BuelFs  advance,  General  William  Nelson's  division, 

had  now  been  for  twenty  days  at  Columbia.     The  rea- 

,     son  for  the  delay  given  by  Buell  was  the  high 

forced  march  water  in  Duck  Eiver,  the  bridges  over  which 

bia  to  Savan-  had  been  burned  by  the  Confederates.     The 

impatient  and  impetuous  Nelson  was  so  irri 
tated  by  the  delay  that  he  rode  up  and  down  the  bank 
of  the  river  himself,  plunging  his  horse  in  here  and  there 
until  he  found  a  place  over  which  he  determined  to  ford 
his  division,  and  wait  no  longer  for  the  completion  of 
the  bridges.  It  was  thus  that  Nelson  put  his  division  a 
number  of  hours  in  advance  of  the  main  body  of  BuelPs 
army,  and  arrived  at  Savannah  in  time  to  reach  the  scene 
of  the  great  battle  before  the  end  of  the  first  day. 

Johnston  had  arrived  in  Corinth  on  the  23d,  and  on 
the  29th  he  assumed  the  chief  command  of  all  the  forces 

in  and  about  Corinth,  and  issued  his  orders 
preparations  dividing  the  entire  force  into  three  corps  and 

a  reserve,  and  designating  Polk,  Bragg,  Har- 
dee,  and  Crittenden  as  their  respective  commanders. 
Crittenden  was  arrested  a  few  days  later  on  charge  of 
misconduct  in  the  Mill  Springs  campaign,  and  the  com 
mand  of  the  reserve  was  transferred  to  J.  C.  Brecken- 
ridge.  Johnston  also  made  Beauregard  his  second  in 
general  command,  and  Bragg  his  chief  of  staff. 

With  the  exception  of  Bragg's  troop?,  from  Pensacola, 


SHILOH  297 

the  Confederates  were  in  a  bad  state  of  demoralization, 
and  were  greatly  lacking  in  supplies  and  means  of  trans 
portation.  Bragg's  judgment  was  that  no  offensive  op 
erations  could  be  undertaken,  but  Johnston,  smarting 
under  the  denunciations  which  had  been  hurled  at  him 
for  yielding  Tennessee  without  giving  battle  at  Mur- 
freesborough,  and  grieving  deeply  at  the  displeasure  of 
his  friend,  President  Davis — although  this  displeasure 
had  been  very  mildly,  and  only  impliedly,  expressed — 
determined  to  attack  the  Federals  gathering  at  Pittsburg 
Landing,  and  to  do  it  before  Buell's  army  could  reach 
the  scene  of  conflict.  It  may  have  been  good  tactics, 
but  there  was  a  large  element  of  desperation  in  it.  Some 
of  the  Southern  historians  are  inclined  to  ascribe  the 
movement  to  Beauregard.  Beauregard  was  probably  in 
favor  of  it,  while  Bragg  was  opposed  to  it.  But  John 
ston  was  commander-in-chief,  and  his  will  was  decisive. 
There  is  no  doubt  that,  on  the  1st  of  April  and  there 
after,  the  Federal  commanders  regarded  an  advance  of 
the  Confederates  from  Corinth  as  so  unmili-  The  Feder. 
tary  as  to  be  without  the  range  of  probabili-  piredU?o?rthc 
ties.  The  fact  that  they  had  taken  no  pre-  attack- 
cautions  to  meet  an  attack  is  convincing  on  this  point. 
They  had  not  caused  a  single  intrenchment  to  be  thrown 
up,  and  they  had  placed  their  raw  troops  farthest  for 
ward  on  the  roads  from  Pittsburg  Landing  to  Corinth. 
The  divisions  of  Sherman  and  Prentiss  were  in  the  front, 
while  those  of  McClernand  and  Smith  were  encamped 
nearer  the  river,  and  Lew  Wallace's  troops  were  five  or  six 
miles  to  the  north.  These  three  divisions  were  the  vet 
erans  of  the  Donelson  campaign,  and  if  an  attack  by  the 
Confederates  had  been  expected,  some  of  these  would  in 
all  probability  have  been  so  placed  as  to  assist  in  receiv 
ing  the  first  shock.  In  fact,  General  Grant  acknowl 
edges  in  his  "Memoirs"  that  he  had  "no  idea  the  enemy 


298  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

would  leave  strong  intrenchments  to  take  the  initiative 
when  he  knew  he  would  be  attacked  where  he  was  if  he 
remained." 

In  the  evening  of  the  2d  of  April,  information  reached 

Johnston  at  Corinth,  that  BuelFs   forces  were  on  the 

The    ad-   march   from   Columbia   to   Savannah.      He 

confederates  must  strike  at  once;  if  at  all«  He  hastened 
to  shiioh.  to  issue  ins  address  to  the  army,  informing 
the  commanders  and  the  men  of  the  plan  of  attacking  the 
Federals  at  Pittsburg  Landing.  His  troops  now  num 
bered  about  forty  thousand,  organized,  as  we  have  seen, 
into  three  corps  and  a  reserve.  On  the  morning  of  the 
4th  the  movement  began.  The  cavalry  were  in  the  ad 
vance.  Hardee's  corps  followed,  then  Bragg's,  then 
Folk's,  and  lastly  the  reserve  led  by  Breckenridge.  John 
ston  expected  to  march  his  whole  army  from  Corinth  to 
the  Federal  outposts  in  a  single  day,  and  to  begin  his 
attack  on  the  morning  of  the  5th.  But  the  roads  were 
so  narrow,  and  in  such  an  execrable  condition  that  he 
was  not  able  to  reach  the  spot  where  his  columns  were  to 
be  deployed  in  line  of  battle  until  the  afternoon  of  the 
5th.  It  was  then  determined  to  defer  the  attack  until 
the  morning  of  the  6th. 

The  Federal  forces  were  encamped  upon  the  wooded 
plateau  bounded  on  the  north  by  Owl  and  Snake  Creeks, 
The  Federal  an(^  on  tne  south  by  Lick  Creek,  two  water- 
position,  courses  of  considerable  depth  at  that  season, 
running  in  a  general  parallel  direction,  some  three  miles 
apart,  toward  the  Tennessee  River.  This  plateau  was 
intersected  by  three  roads,  one  running  from  Pittsburg 
Landing  to  Corinth,  one  from  Hamburg  Landing  to 
Corinth,  and  one  from  Hamburg  Landing  to  Purdy,  a 
county  town  in  Tennessee  north  of  Corinth.  There  was 
also  a  road  leading  from  Pittsburg  Landing  to  Crump's 
Landing,  which  bowed  westward  and  crossed  Snake 


SHILOH  299 

Creek  about  a  mile  from  its  mouth  in  the  Tennessee. 
This  road  connected  Lew  Wallace's  division  with  the 
rest  of  the  army. 

The  advanced  line  of  the  army  on  the  morning  of  the 
6th  of  April  was  composed  of  the  divisions  of  Sherman 
and  Prentiss,  all  raw  troops.  Sherman's  first  brigade 
was  on  the  extreme  right  of  the  line  and  touched  Owl 
Creek  at  the  bridge  over  which  the  road  to  Purdy  passed. 
His  fourth  brigade  came  next  to  the  first,  and  the  third 
next  to  the  fourth.  These  two  brigades  connected  at 
Shiloh  church,  on  the  road  from  Pittsburg  Landing  to 
Corinth,  some  two  and  a  half  miles  from  the  Landing. 
Sherman's  second  brigade  was  placed  on  the  extreme 
left,  and  touched  Lick  Creek  at  the  point  where  the 
road  from  Hamburg  Landing  to  Purdy  crossed  it.  Be 
tween  Sherman's  second  and  third  brigades,  Prentiss's 
division  was  located,  but  it  did  not  quite  fill  up  the  gap 
between  them.  About  half  a  mile  to  the  rear  of  Sher 
man's  third  brigade  was  McClernand's  division,  and 
about  the  same  distance  in  the  rear  of  Prentiss  was 
Hurlbut's  division.  Finally  W.  H.  L.  Wallace's  division 
was  in  reserve  in  the  rear  of  both  McClernand  and  Hurl- 
but. 

The  Federals  had  a  good  position.  Their  flanks  were 
protected  by  the  waters  and  marshes  of  the  creeks,  and 
the  topography  of  the  plateau  furnished  good  points  of 
defence.  The  Confederates  were  forced  to  attack  directly 
in  front,  and  to  depend  upon  human  power,  valor,  and 
endurance  for  success. 

Johnston's  plan  was  to  turn  the  Federal  left,  by  per 
sistently  advancing  his  own  right,  and  thus  drive  the 
Federals  into  the  marshes  of  Snake  Creek,  The  plan  of 
between  the  bridge  over  Snake  Creek  and  the  attack- 
Tennessee  River.  Once  huddled  into  this  miry  corner, 
and  thrown  into  confusion,  there  could  be  but  one  re- 


300  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

suit.  The  Confederate  generals  explained  this  plan  to 
their  subordinates,  and  went  into  the  battle  with  the 
colonel  of  every  regiment  fully  cognizant  of  it. 

Before  it  was  fairly  light  in  the  morning  of  the  6th, 
they  came  storming  forward  in  three  lines  of  battle, 
Hardee's  corps  in  the  advance,  followed  by 
Bragg's  and  then  by  Folk's,  with  Brecken- 
ridge's  in  reserve.  The  Federals  were  not  prepared  to 
meet  the  sudden  and  impetuous  attack.  They  were 
fairly  surprised.  The  soldiers  of  Sherman  and  Frentiss 
were,  of  course,  the  first  to  feel  the  shock.  For  raw 
troops  they  did  as  well  as  could  have  been  expected. 
Their  commanders  behaved  like  heroes.  Sherman  de 
veloped,  at  one  stroke,  that  genius  for  strategy  and  com 
mand  which  made  him,  in  the  opinion  of  many,  the 
greatest  soldier  produced  by  the  war.  He  seemed  to  be 
omnipresent.  His  towering  form  and  ringing  words  im 
parted  strength  and  courage  wherever  he  passed,  and 
his  quick  perception  and  sound  judgment  enabled  him 
to  place  his  battalions  just  where  they  could  do  most 
efficient  work.  Horse  after  horse  was  shot  under  him, 
and  twice  he  was  struck.  But  begrimed  and  bleeding 
and  suffering,  his  uniform  riddled  with  balls,  his  hat 
even  pierced,  he  never  lost  for  one  moment  his  courage, 
coolness,  or  judgment.  If  any  one  man  saved  the  Fed 
eral  army  from  irreparable  disaster  in  the  forenoon  of 
the  Gth,  it  was  certainly  Sherman. 

But  no  amount  of  personal  bravery  and  military  tact  on 
the  part  of  one  man,  or  a  thousand  men,  could  stem  the 
tide  of  the  furious  onset.  The  Confederates  poured  into 
the  intervals  on  the  right  and  left  of  Prentiss's  division, 
turning  the  positions  of  both  Prentiss  and  Sherman  by 
the  left,  at  the  same  time,  and  almost  surrounding  Pren 
tiss.  The  Federals  yielded  their  ground,  however,  slowly. 
McClernand,  Hurlbut,  and  W.  H.  L.  Wallace  brought 


SHILOII  301 

up  their  divisions  in  support,  and  the  battle  raged  with 
great  fury  along  the  entire  line.  By  this  time  Grant  had 
arrived  on  the  field.  He  came  up  from  Savannah,  and 
in  passing  Crump's  Landing  ordered  Lew  Wallace  to  put 
his  division  in  readiness  to  march,  and  await  further 
orders.  On  arriving  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  and  finding 
the  real  battle  in  progress  there,  he  sent  a  messenger  to 
Wallace  with  an  order  for  him  to  march  his  division  to 
Sherman's  right.  Grant  then  went  on  to  the  field,  and 
rode  from  regiment  to  regiment  trying  to  preserve  some 
concert  of  action  among  the  troops  of  his  considerably 
shattered  and  demoralized  army.  Again  and  again  he 
and  his  generals  rallied  the  men,  but  the  Confederates 
still  pressed  victoriously  forward.  McClernand's  division 
formed  no  less  than  six  lines  of  battle  in  retiring,  and  at 
last,  with  the  remnants  of  Sherman's  troops,  took  posi 
tion  in  front  of  the  bridge  across  Snake  Creek,  resolved 
to  defend  it  at  all  hazards,  since  it  was  here  that  Lew  Wal 
lace,  who  had  not  yet  come  up,  was  expected  to  appear, 
and  since  it  was  over  this  bridge  and  road  alone  that  the 
army  could  save  itself  from  capture  in  case  of  ultimate 
defeat. 

On  receiving  Grant's  order  to  march  to  Sherman's 
right,  Wallace  struck  out  for  a  point  on  Owl  Creek 
above  its  junction  with  Snake  Creek,  and  about  three 
miles  from  the  Tennessee  River,  supposing  that  Sher 
man's  right  was  about  in  that  position,  and  not  knowing 
that  Sherman  had  fallen  back.  About  noon  Grant  sent 
one  of  his  aids  to  look  for  Wallace,  and  two  hours  later 
lie  sent  two  more  of  them.  About  four  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon  they  found  Wallace,  and  the  aid  first  sent 
out,  leading  the  division  back  from  its  perilous  wander 
ings  to  the  bridge  across  Snake  Creek,  to  which  point  he 
ought  to  have  marched  directly  from  Crump's  Landing. 
Had  he  done  so  he  could  have  been  on  the  battle-field  by 


302  THE    CIVIL    WAR 

noon,  as  Grant  intended.  But  as  it  was,  he  arrived  too 
late  to  be  of  any  service  on  the  first  day  of  the  great 
conflict. 

Meanwhile  the  Confederates  had  made  a  desperate  at 
tempt  to  turn  the  Federal  left  entirely  and  drive  the 

The  death  of  shattered  army  into  the  marshes  of  Snake 
Johnston.  Creek.  Johnston  himself  led  the  charge. 
The  movement  seemed  to  be  on  the  point  of  success,, 
when  Johnston  fell  mortally  wounded,  and  expired  amid 
the  shouts  of  victory.  The  Confederates  passed  onward. 
W.  H.  L.Wallace's  division  was  scattered,  the  commander 
himself  being  killed.  Prentiss  was  surrounded,  and  part 
of  his  division  with  himself  captured.  Still  Sherman 
and  McClernand  held  the  bridge  over  Snake  Creek,  and 
were  resolved  to  sacrifice  the  last  man  in  its  defence. 
Thousands  of  the  Federals  had  fled  from  the  field  and 
were  huddled  under  the  bank  of  the  river.  Bragg  now 
determined  to  carry  the  last  position  on  the  Federal  left, 
and  drive  the  remnants  of  the  divisions  of  Hurlbut, 
Wallace,  and  Prentiss  into  the  river.  The  almost  ex 
hausted  Confederates  rallied  at  the  sound  of  his  voice, 
and  made  themselves  ready  for  the  final  charge. 

But  at  this  critical  moment,  when  victory  seemed  the 
certain  reward  of  one  more  grand  effort,  bitter  disap- 

Webster's  pointment  was  being  prepared  for  them.  The 
battery.  siege  guns,  which  had  been  landed  a  few  days 

before,  were  lying  on  the  heights  just  above  the  Landing. 
It  was  up  and  over  these  heights  from  the  other  side 
that  Bragg's  line  must  come.  Colonel  J.  D.  Webster,  of 
Grant's  staff,  perceived,  at  this  moment,  the  extreme 
danger  to  the  Federal  army,  and  the  advantage  which 
might  be  gained  from  a  proper  employment  of  this  heavy 
artillery  lying  uselessly  around.  He  hastily  collected  a 
few  gunners  and  threw  this  heavy  ordnance  into  battery, 
and,  with  a  slight  infantry  support,  likewise  hastily 


SHILOH  303 

gathered  from  broken  regiments,  prepared  to  receive 
Bragg's  line,  now  pressing  up  out  of  the  ravine  in  front 
of  the  position.  A  well-directed  fire  from  the  artillery 
sent  the  Confederates  reeling  backward,  but  the  brave 
and  resolute  General  rallied  them  again,  and  they  turned 
and  rushed  up  the  slope  before  the  Federal  gunners 
conld  reload  their  pieces.  The  weak  infantry  support 
deserted,  terror-stricken,  the  artillerists,  and  the  capture 
of  the  guns,  and  with  them  a  large  part  of  the  army, 
seemed  the  work  of  only  five  minutes  more  of  resolute 
advance. 

But  before  the  half  of  that  little  period  had  expired 
the  intrepid  Nelson,,  always  in  the  advance  of  BuelFs 
army,  came  driving  up  from  the  Landing  at  The  arrival 
the  head  of  the  first  brigade  of  his  division,  of  Nelson- 
and  received  Bragg's  line  within  three  hundred  feet  of 
the  battery.  Instantly  deploying  right  and  left  with 
the  precision  of  trained  soldiers,  they  poured  such  a  vol 
ley  at  short  range  into  the  Confederate  ranks  as  shat 
tered  them  into  fragments  and  drove  them  headlong 
down  into  the  ravine.  The  shells  from  the  gun-boats 
had  also  contributed  in  effecting  the  defence,  but  were 
of  more  service  during  the  retreat  of  the  Confederates 
than  during  their  advance.  The  repulse  of  Bragg  by 
Webster's  hastily  constructed  battery,  supported  at  the 
critical  moment  by  Nelson's  infantry,  and  the  mainten 
ance  of  the  position  on  the  extreme  right  in  front  of 
Snake  Creek  bridge  by  Sherman  and  McClernand  had 
saved  the  army  from  disaster. 

Night  was  rapidly  approaching,  and  Beauregard,  now 
in  chief  command  of  the  Confederates,  called  his  ex 
hausted  soldiers  back  to  the  camps  occu- 

1  .  .  Suspension 

pied  by  the  Federals  the  night  before,  in  of  the  strug- 
order  to  give  them  rest  and  refreshment  and  § 
reorganize  them  for  the  renewal  of  the  contest  on  the 


304  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

morrow.  He  did  not  know  that  General  Buell  was  him 
self  already  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  and  that  three  divis 
ions  of  his  army  were  nearing  the  battle-field.  Least  of 
all  did  he  know  that  it  was  a  brigade  of  Buell's  army 
which  finally  effected  the  repulse  of  Bragg. 

During  the  night  the  remainder  of  Nelson's  division 

crossed  over  from  the  opposite  bank  of  the  Tennessee, 

and  the  divisions  of  Crittenden  and  McCook 

The  two  ar-  n  .  .  _ 

mies  on  the  arrived  at  that  point.  In  the  early  morning 
hours  of  the  7th  these  two  divisions  also 
effected  the  crossing,  and  before  the  Confederates  were 
ready  to  renew  the  conflict  twenty  thousand  men  of 
Buell's  army,  fresh  and  eager  for  battle,  had  formed 
themselves  in  front  of  the  position  successfully  held  at 
the  close  of  the  previous  day.  Kelson  was  on  the  ex 
treme  left,  next  came  Crittenden,  and  then  McCook.  On 
the  right  of  McCook  came  the  divisions  of  Grant's  army, 
now  reduced  to  three — first  McClernand's,  then  Sher 
man's,  and  on  the  extreme  right  the  troops  commanded 
by  Lew  Wallace.  The  whole  Union  army  was  thus,  on 
the  7th,  drawn  up  for  battle  in  two  wings,  the  right 
wing  commanded  by  Grant,  and  the  left  by  Buell.  It 
numbered  scarcely  less  than  fifty  thousand,  about  one- 
half  of  whom  were  fresh  troops. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Confederates  had  brought 
their  last  man  into  action  on  the  6th.  They  had  lost 
by  the  casualties  of  the  battle  at  least  ten  thousand  men, 
and,  advancing  as  they  did  by  the  lines  of  entire  corps, 
the  regiments,  brigades,  and  divisions  of  the  different 
corps  had  become  inextricably  mingled.  Moreover,  the 
spoils  of  the  Federal  camps  had  added  greatly  to  their 
demoralization.  Their  officers  spent  the  whole  of  the 
night  in  the  vain  attempt  to  reorganize  their  commands  ; 
and  the  shells  from  the  gun-boats  kept  the  soldiers  from 
obtaining  the  rest  necessary  for  further  exertion.  In  a 


SHILOH  305 

word,  the  Confederate  army  resumed  its  positions,  on 
the  morning  of  the  7th,  decimated,  fatigued,  and  consid 
erably  disorganized. 

The  Federal  commanders  felt  assured  of  victory.  The 
Confederate  chiefs,  unaware  of  the  presence  of  BuelPs 
troops,  also  counted  upon  certain  success.  The  Feder 
als  had  in  store  for  the  Confederates,  on  the  7th,  as  great 
a  surprise  as  the  Confederates  had  dealt  out  to  them  on 
the  morning  of  the  Oth. 

Before  daylight  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  was  in  motion. 
To  the  brave  and  restless  Nelson  was  confided  the  duty 
of  opening  the  battle.  He  soon  found  the  The  renewal 
Confederates  in  strong  force  directly  in  front  of  the  battle, 
of  him,  for  they  still  adhered  to  their  plan  of  battle  of 
the  day  before  of  turning  the  Federal  left.  The  Con 
federate  commanders  now  quickly  discovered  that  they 
had  a  division  of  fresh  troops  to  overcome  before  they 
could  accomplish  this  purpose.  They  drew  reinforce 
ments  from  their  own  centre  and  left  in  order  to 
strengthen  their  right  in  the  work  required  of  that  part 
of  their  army.  They  thus  gave  Nelson  a  severe  battle 
for  several  hours,  driving  him  back  at  different  points. 

By  this  time,  however,  the  Federal  commanders  had 
discovered  that  the  Confederate  centre,  resting  on,  or 
near,  the  main  road  to  Corinth,  in  the  deep 
forest  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  east  of  Shiloh  of  thVconfecE 
Church,  had  been  weakened  to  support  their  cratecentre 
right  in  front  of  Nelson.  McCook  was  therefore  or 
dered  to  break  the  Confederate  line  at  this  point.  Beau- 
regard  commanded  here  in  person,  and  the  first  attempt 
was  repulsed.  Then  Rousseau's  entire  brigade,  consist 
ing  of  three  battalions  of  regulars  and  three  regiments 
of  volunteers,  was  hurled  upon  it.  General  Sherman 
says,  in  his  report,  that  he  saw,  from  his  position  far 
ther  toward  the  Federal  right,  this  superb  brigade  ad- 
VOL.  I.— 20 


306  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

vancing,  and  deploying,  and  entering  "this  dreaded 
woods,"  and  feeling  entirely  confident  of  its  success, 
ordered  his  own  division  to  keep  abreast  of  it  in  the 
movement. 

It  was  now  a  little  after  two  o'clock,  and  the  Confed 
erates  knew  that  the  crisis  of  the  battle  was  at  hand. 
The  defeat  Led  by  Beauregard  in  person,  they  struggled 
erahtee^°?ndd  manfully  and  obstinately,  but  in  vain.  The 
their  retreat,  whole  Federal  line  was  now  advancing  sure 
ly,  steadily,  and  in  perfect  order.  Calling  Breckenridge 
to  him,  Beauregard  acknowledged  defeat,  and  imposed 
upon  the  brave  Kentuckian  the  duty  of  covering  the 
retreat,  charging  him  not  to  allow  the  retreat  to  be 
turned  into  a  rout. 

Most  faithfully  did  Breckenridge  execute  his  trust. 
The  Confederates  gave  way  at  all  points,  but  slowly  and 
in  comparative  order.  The  Federals,  exhausted  by  their 
tremendous  efforts,  advanced  only  about  one  mile  far 
ther,  and  then  rested  for  the  remainder  of  the  day,  in 
possession  of  the  battle-field,  and  but  little  more.  On 
the  following  day  Sherman  tried  a  little  pursuit,  and 
had  one  of  his  regiments  badly  cut  up  by  a  cavalry 
charge.  After  this  the  Confederates  returned  to  Cor 
inth  unmolested. 

The  Federals  had  won  the  battle,  but  at  a  terrible 
cost.  The  killed,  according  to  their  official  report,  num 
bered  1,754.  the  wounded  8,408,  and  the  capt- 

The  losses.  ,  ,         .      .          n  nntf        mi       ^       »    T 

ured  and  missing  2,885.  The  Confederates 
acknowledged  a  loss  almost  as  great,  except  in  captured 
and  missing.  It  would  be  substantially  correct  to  say  that 
the  Confederates  returned  to  Corinth  about  twenty-five 
thousand  strong.  In  less  than  a  week  from  their  return 
they  were  reinforced  by  Van  Dorn  and  Price,  coming 
from  Arkansas  after  their  defeat  at  Pea  Ridge,  which 
will  now  be  related,  and  could  again  muster  an  army  of 


PP:A  RIDGE  307 

forty  thousand  men.  It  is  not  surprising  then  that  the 
authorities  at  Washington  regarded  the  Federal  victory  as 
rather  barren,  and  demanded  of  Hal  leek  to  be  informed 
whether  "  the  neglect  or  misconduct  of  General  Grant 
or  any  other  officer  contributed  to  the  sad  casualties"  of 
the  battle  of  the  6th. 

West  of  the  Mississippi,  in  Missouri  and  Arkansas,  the 
Federals  had  been  equally  successful  in  the  spring  cam 
paign  of  1862.     On  the  26th  of  January,  the      The  p 
Federal  army,  commanded  by  General  S.  li.   Ridge  cam- 
Curtis  and   about  twelve  thousand   strong,   I 
began  to  move  from  Holla  against  Price,  who  was  in 
trenched  at  Springfield  with  about  ten  thousand  men. 

To  the  surprise  of  Curtis,  Price  evacuated  his  fortifi 
cations  at  the  approach  of  the  Federals,  retired  into 
Arkansas,  and  took  refuge  in  the  defiles  of  Ketreat  Of 
the  Boston  Mountains,  some  fifty  miles  south  Price- 
of  the  Missouri  line.  Here  he  was  joined  by  reinforce 
ments  under  McCulloch,  Mclntosh  and  Pike,  and  on  the 
3d  of  March  General  Earl  Van  Dorn  took  command  of 
the  entire  force,  and  prepared  to  return  and  face  Curtis. 
Van  Dorn  estimated  his  strength  at  sixteen  thousand 
men.  The  Federal  General  reported  him  as  having 
almost  double  that  number. 

Curtis  had  pursued  Price  as  far  as  Fayetteville,  a  town 
in  Arkansas  some  thirty  miles  south  of  the  Missouri 
line.  His  army  had  been  reduced  to  less  cm-tie's  pur- 
than  eleven  thousand  men  during  the  march  8Uit- 
from  Rolla.  When  he  learned  of  the  increased  force 
under  Van  Dorn,  and  of  its  return  movement,  he  was 
convinced  that  he  must  not  await  an  attack  at  Fayette 
ville,  but  must  retire  into  the  Ozark  hills,  a  few  miles  to 
the  north-west,  where  he  could  find  a  defensive  position 
which  would  offset,  in  some  degree,  the  superior  force  of 
the  Confederates. 


308  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

These  hills  are  cut  from  east  to  west  by  three  deep 

ravines,  nearly  equidistant  from  one  another.     The  most 

southerly  one  is  called  Cross  Hollows,  the 

The  p  o  s  i  - 

tion^at  Pea  middle  one  Sugar  Creek  Valley,  and  the 
northerly  one  Cross  Timber  Hollows.  These 
valleys  are  traversed  almost  at  right  angles  by  the  post 
road  from  Fayetteville  to  Springfield.  The  point  where 
it  intersects  Cross  Hollows  is  called  the  village  of  Cross 
Hollows,  that  where  it  intersects  Sugar  Creek  Valley 
is  called  Mottsville,  and  that  where  it  intersects  Cross 
Timber  Hollows  is  called  Elkhorn  Tavern.  There  is 
also  a  road  leading  from  Bentonville  to  Springfield  along 
the  western  slope  of  these  hills,  and  at  a  point  in  this 
road  opposite  Sugar  Creek  Valley  a  road  branches  oif  to 
the  east,  runs  up  Sugar  Creek  Valley  to  a  place  called 
Leetown,  which  is  located  about  a  mile  and  a  half  west 
of  Mottsville,  and  then  crosses  the  ridge  between  Sugar 
Creek  Valley  and  Cross  Timber  Hollows,  and  finally  runs 
eastward  up  Cross  Timber  Hollows  to  Elkhorn  Tavern. 
General  Curtis  selected  for  his  position  the  ridge  be 
tween  Sugar  Creek  Valley  and  Cross  Timber  Hollows, 
so  as  to  cover  both  the  post  road  from  Fayetteville  to 
Springfield  and  the  road  from  Bentonville  to  Elkhorn 
Tavern  via  Leetown.  In  the  afternoon  of  the  6th  of 
March  Curtis's  entire  army  took  this  position,  after  his 
rear  guard  under  Sigel  had  succeeded  in  cutting  its  way 
through  the  swarms  of  Confederates  around  Bentonville. 
The  little  army  was  organized  into  four  divisions,  com 
manded  by  Generals  Sigel  and  Asboth  and  Colonels  Jeff 
C.  Davis  and  Carr.  The  line  of  battle  faced  southward, 
of  course.  The  divisions  of  Sigel  and  Asboth  formed  the 
right,  reaching  out  a  little  to  the  west  of  Leetown ;  the 
division  commanded  by  Colonel  Davis  formed  the  cen 
tre  ;  and  the  division  led  by  Carr,  reaching  out  a  little 
to  the  east  of  Mottsvillo,  formed  the  left. 


PEA    RIDGE  309 

It  does  not  seem  to  have  occurred  to  General  Curtis 
that  the  Confederates  might  pass  up  the  road  from  Ben- 
tonville  to  Springfield  beyond  the  point  where  The  flank- 
tile  road  branches  off  to  Leetown,  and  come  J^ent^of  vthe 
up  through  Cross  Timber  Hollows,  where  confederates, 
there  was  no  road  at  all,  into  his  rear.  But  that  was 
exactly  what  they  did  do.  They  executed  this  move 
ment  during  the  night  of  the  6th,  and  on  the  morning 
of  the  7th  Curtis  found  them  pushing  up  this  ravine  to 
Elkhorn  Tavern  and  threatening  to  cut  his  connection 
with  Springfield.  He  immediately  ordered  his  whole  line 
to  change  face  from  front  to  rear,  making  now  Carrs 
division  his  right,  and  the  divisions  of  Asboth  and  Sigel 
his  left,  with  Davis,  of  course,  still  in  the  centre.  It  was 
in  this  perilous  position  that  he  fought  the  battle  of  the 
7th  of  March. 

His  plan  was  not  to  wait  for  the  Confederates  to  at 
tack,  but  to  strike  the  centre  of  the  Confederate  line, 
while  the  line  was  being  formed,  pierce  it,  The  battle 
drive  one  part  of  it  eastward,  and  the  other  of  Pea  mdge- 
westward,  and  then  when  each  part  had  its  flank  ex 
posed,  throw  his  right  upon  one  part,  and  his  left  upon 
the  other.  With  this  purpose  in  view,  he  formed  an 
assaulting  column  from  Davis's  division,  and  placed  it 
under  the  command  of  the  valiant  Colonel  Peter  Oster- 
haus.  He  then  ordered  Osterhaus  to  advance  to  the  at 
tack,  and  went  himself  to  his  right  in  order  to  hold  it  firm 
while  Osterhaus  should  break  the  Confederate  centre. 
Osterhaus  pressed  forward  impetuously  and,  at  first,  suc 
cessfully,  but  the  Confederates  soon  moved  strong  rein 
forcements  from  their  right  and  repulsed  him.  Curtis 
now  ordered  Davis  to  support  Osterhaus  with  the  re 
mainder  of  his  division.  The  Confederates  felt,  at  this 
moment,  certain  of  victory.  They  had  pressed  the  Fed 
eral  right  slowly  back,  and  had  now  full  possession  of 


310  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

Elkhorn  Tavern  and  the  road  to  Springfield.  When 
Osterhaus  yielded,  they  rushed  forward  with  great  im 
petuosity.  But  Davis's  fresh  troops  brought  them  to  a 
halt.  The  Confederates  were  led  at  this  point  by  Mc- 
Culloch  and  Mclntosh,  who  performed  feats  of  most 
extreme  daring  in  order  to  encourage  their  men.  The 
battle  was  waged  here  most  hotly,  and  it  seemed  as  if  the 
Confederates  were  on  the  point  of  success,  when  botli 
McCulloch  and  Mclntosh  were  struck  down.  There  was 
no  one  among  their  survivors  who  could  rally  and  lead 
forward  the  soldiers  accustomed  only  to  their  voices  and 
their  chieftaincy.  The  Federal  centre  was  now  relieved 
of  the  pressure  upon  it,  but  the  right  was  continually 
losing  ground.  Van  Dorn  himself  was  directing  the 
movement  of  the  Confederates  against  the  Federal  right, 
and  he  had  brought  many  of  the  troops  from  his  own 
right  to  his  left,  to  accomplish  his  purpose.  Curtis  now 
learned  that  there  were  practically  no  Confederates  in 
front  of  his  left,  and  he  ordered  Asboth  to  lead  his  di 
vision  to  the  support  of  Carr  on  the  right,  and  Sigel  to 
go  to  the  support  of  Davis.  Both  of  these  movements 
were  successfully  accomplished,  and  the  Federal  right 
was  thereby  enabled  to  hold  its  ground.  It  had  how 
ever  been  forced  back  about  a  mile  from  the  position 
held  by  it  at  the  beginning  of  the  day. 

Night  now  intervened,  and  the  Federal  commander 
found  himself  in  a  very  precarious  situation.  The 
Confederates  were  between  him  and  Springfield,  and  the 
alternatives  for  the  morrow  were  victory  or  surrender. 
In  the  darkness  he  formed  his  new  line  of  battle,  the 
third  since  the  beginning  of  the  conflict.  He  now  knew 
that  the  Confederates  were  massing  opposite  Carr's 
division.  He,  therefore,  placed  Asboth  on  Carr's  right, 
and  ordered  Davis  and  Sigel  to  move  up  nearer  to  Carres 
left,  while  Osterhaus  remained  about  Leetown  to  pre- 


PEA    RIDGE  311 

vent  the  Confederates  from  flanking  the  new  Federal 
left.  Carr's  division  was  now  almost  the  centre  of  the 
new  Federal  line.  The  Federal  General  knew  well  the 
ground  over  which  he  must  fight,  since  it  had  been  his 
own  position  of  the  day  before. 

The  attack  on  the  morning  of  the  8th  was  begun  by 
Davis.  The  Confederates  returned  his  fire  with  terrible 
effect  from  their  new  lines  and  batteries.  The  eecond 
The  Federal  right  centre  was  again  sorely  day's  battle. 

. .    .  ^     J     and  the  defeat 

pressed,  and  was  retiring  slowly,  when  Cur-  of  theconfed- 
tis  suddenly  threw  forward  his  extreme  right, 
planting  his  cannon  on  eminences  which  commanded  the 
left  flank  of  the  Confederates.  At  the  same  time  Sigel 
appeared  on  their  right  flank,  advancing  with  irresist 
ible  force.  The  Confederates  were  caught  in  a  cul  de 
sac,  and  were  raked  by  the  crossfires  of  the  Federals 
from  both  the  right  and  the  left.  They  broke  and  fled 
in  all  directions.  The  main  body  of  them  went  north 
ward  on  the  road  from  the  Elkhorn  Tavern  toward 
Springfield  until  they  passed  out  of  the  gorge  in  the 
hills,  and  then  made  for  Huntsville  in  a  south-easterly 
direction.  Sigel  followed  them  for  a  short  distance,  but 
they  melted  away  before  him  in  the  defiles,  and  the  Fed 
eral  soldiers  were  too  much  overcome  with  fatigue  and 
hunger  to  pursue  them  further  at  the  moment. 

Curtis  had  saved  his  army  from  surrender,  and  Mis 
souri  from  another  invasion,  but  at  a  terrible  cost.     He 
reported  a  loss  of  nearly  fifteen  hundred,  and 
estimated  the  Confederate  loss  at  a  higher, 
though  not  definite,  figure.     Van  Dorn  reported  his  loss 
at  eight  hundred,  and  estimated  the  Federal  loss  at  two 
thousand.     It  is  rather  difficult  to  understand  how  he 
could  have  known  much  about  the  Federal  loss.     He 
also  reported  that  he  went  into  the  battle  with  only 
fourteen  thousand  men,  while  he  estimated  the  Federal 


312  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

force  at  about  twenty  thousand.  Van  Dorn's  commu 
nication  was  addressed  from  Jacksonsport,,  some  two 
hundred  miles  south-eastward  from  the  battle-field,,  and 
was  dated  the  27th  of  March.  It  was  addressed  to  Gen 
eral  Braxton  Bragg  at  Corinth.  It  was  evident  that  he 
was  moving  to  join  the  Confederate  army  gathering  at 
Corinth.  Price  with  the  Missourians  followed  him  a 
little  later,  and  Curtis  pursued  Price  across  the  entire 
"  State  "  of  Arkansas,  reaching  finally  the  town  of  Hel 
ena  on  the  Mississippi  Eiver. 

There  are  some  facts  about  this  battle  of  Pea  Ridge 
that  are  very  painful  for  the  historian  to  record,  and  for 
The  Indian  the  civilized  world  to  learn.  They  relate  to 
brigade.  ^he  employment  of  Indians  by  the  Confeder 
ates,  and  the  exercise  of  their  savage  methods  of  war 
fare  in  this  battle.  General  Curtis  reported  that  they 
tomahawked  and  scalped  his  men,  and  made  bitter  com 
plaint  of  the  utter  demoralization  which  such  practices 
were  bound  to  produce. 

It  is  from  some  points  of  view  to  be  regretted  that  the 
questions  involved  in  the  great  conflict  were  not  fought 
out  by  Americans  of  the  white  race  on  both  sides.  But 
after  the  employment  of  Indians  by  the  Confederates,  it 
certainly  did  not  become  them  to  object  to  the  employ 
ment  of  negroes  by  the  Federals.  Negroes  were  more 
or  less  barbarians,  but  they  were  not  savages,  and  their 
conduct,  on  the  whole,  was  that  of  a  civilized  soldiery. 
It  was  especially  exasperating  to  the  Northern  people 
that  the  man  who  organized  and  commanded  this  Indian 
brigade  was  a  Bostonian  by  birth,  and  a  Harvardian  by 
education,  Albert  Pike,  and  it  was  some  relief  to  the  con 
science  of  the  Confederates  that  such  was  the  case.  The 
Indian  soldiers  were  not,  however,  of  much  service  to 
the  Confederates.  The  roar  of  heavy  artillery  fright 
ened  them  so  much  that  they  could  not  be  held  in  any 


ISLAND   NO.    10  313 

regular  order,  and  after  the  battle  the  "brigade  was  not 
again  effectively  reorganized. 

At  the  very  moment  when  Grant  and  Bnell  were  win 
ning  the  costly  victory  around  Shiloh  Church, 


a  ture 

events  were  taking  place  a  hundred  and  fifty  of  island  NO. 
miles  to  the  north-west  on  the  line  of  the 
Mississippi  of  a  far  more  satisfactory  character  to  the 
Federal  arms. 

After  the  victory  at  Donelson  and  the  evacuation  of 
Columbus,  Halleck  had  ordered  General  John  Pope  to 
proceed  to  Cairo,  and  organize  an  expedition  against  the 
Confederate  forces  at  New  Madrid  and  Island  No.  10, 
to  which  places,  as  we  have  seen,  about  one-half  of  the 
Confederates  from  Columbus  had  retired.  On  the  21st 
of  February,  Pope  went  from  Cairo  up  the  Mississippi  to 
Commerce  on  the  Missouri  bank,  having  decided  that 
it  was  best  to  assemble  his  land  force  for  the  attack  on 
New  Madrid  there,  and  march  them  from  that  point. 
By  the  end  of  the  month  he  had  collected  an  army  of 
twenty  thousand  men,  and  had  set  his  column  in  motion 
for  the  march  through  the  dismal  Mingo  swamp  which 
lies  between  Commerce  and  New  Madrid,  fifty  miles 
apart.  In  five  days  it  was  accomplished,  and  on  the  3d  of 
March  the  entire  force  deployed  in  front  of  New  Ma 
drid.  Pope  found  the  place  fortified  and  defended  by 
twenty-one  heavy  guns  and  five  regiments  of  infantry. 
He  also  found  six  gun-boats,  carrying  from  thirty  to 
forty  guns,  lying  along  the  shore,  and  as  the  water  of 
the  river  was  almost  on  a  level  with  the  bank,  these 
guns  commanded  the  flat  terrain  back  from  the  river  to 
a  considerable  distance.  The  Confederate  force  in  the 
fortifications  was  directed  by  General  J.  P.  McCown  and 
the  fleet  of  gun-boats  by  Flag-Officer  George  Hollins. 
Pope  decided  immediately  to  delay  the  attack  until 
he  could  bring  down  some  siege  artillery  from  Cairo. 


314  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

While  waiting  for  these  guns  he  occupied  Point  Pleas 
ant,  a  point  twelve  miles  down-stream  from  New  Ma 
drid,  cutting  off  thus  water  communication  with  New 
Madrid  and  Island  No.  10  from  below.  The  Con 
federate  gun-boats  made  several  attempts  to  silence  the 
Federal  battery  at  Point  Pleasant,  and  drive  the  Fed 
erals  away.  The  Federals,  however,  not  only  stood 
their  ground,  but  advanced  their  artillery  nearer  to  the 
river  and  made  it  impossible  for  transports  to  pass. 

While  the  attention  of  the  Confederates  was  occupied 
with  this  movement  in  their  rear,  the  siege  guns  sent 
The  attack  ^rom  Cairo  arrived  before  New  Madrid.  They 
onNewivia-  were  placed  in  position  during  the  night  of 
the  12th  of  March,  and  fire  was  opened  from 
them  on  the  fortifications  and  the  gun-boats  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  13th.  The  cannonade  continued  during  the 
entire  day.  Several  of  the  gun-boats  were  disabled  and 
the  earthworks  were  badly  damaged.  Night  came  on 
before  Pope  was  ready  to  assault  the  intrenchments 
with  infantry,  and  with  it  a  terrible  storm  of  rain  and 
electricity.  When  morning  dawned,  it  was  found  that 
the  Confederates  had  abandoned  New  Madrid,  leaving 
all  their  heavy  artillery,  thousands  of  small  arms,  a  vast 
magazine  of  ammunition,  and  a  large  quantity  of  stores 
of  every  description.  The  men  had  been  transported 
across  the  river,  and  ordered  to  make  their  way  to  Isl 
and  No.  10,  and  the  gun-boats  had  withdrawn  to  a  point 
below  Point  Pleasant.  Pope's  entire  loss  in  this  brill 
iant  movement  did  not  exceed  sixty  men.  He  estimated 
the  loss  of  the  Confederates  as  much  larger,  but  no  ex 
act  report  of  the  same  was  ever  made  by  anybody. 

Pope  began  at  once  his  operations  for  the  reduction  of 
Island  No.  10.  He  dragged  the  heavy  guns  captured 
from  the  Confederates  down  the  river  to  a  point  oppo 
site  the  extremity  of  dry  ground  on  the  Tennessee  bank, 


New  Madrid  and  Island  Number  Ten. 


ISLAND   NO.    10  315 

and  planted  them  here  in  battery,  in  order  to  prevent 
any  communication  from  below  with  Island  No.  10  by 
means  of  a  road  which  led  from  this  point 

A  Prepara- 

011  the  Tennessee  shore  up  to  a  point  on  the  tions  against 

,,      r.   ,        f  Island  No.  10. 

same  shore  opposite  the  island.  On  the 
east  side  of  this  road  lay  the  dismal  Reelfoot  Lake  and 
swamps,  which  cut  off  all  land  retreat  from  Island  No. 
10,  except  over  the  road,  the  lower  extremity  of  which 
Pope  now  closed  by  means  of  his  artillery  on  the  oppo 
site  bank.  The  Confederates  saw  the  trap  which  Pope 
was  preparing,  and  their  five  gun-boats  attacked  the  bat 
tery  with  great  determination,  but  Avere  driven  off,  with 
the  loss  of  one  of  the  boats,  and  with  much  damage  to 
two  others. 

Upon  the  advice  of  his  most  capable  engineer,  General 
fSchuyler  Hamilton,  Pope  now  ordered  his  engineer  regi 
ment,  commanded  by  Colonel  J.  W.  Bissell,  to  cut  a 
canal  across  the  neck  of  the  first  peninsula  made  by  the 
bend  of  the  river  at  New  Madrid,  in  order  to  enable  him 
to  bring  troops  from  Cairo  on  transports,  and  pass  them 
through  the  canal  and  down  the  river  to  the  place  on 
the  Tennessee  shore  mentioned  above,  without  danger 
from  the  guns  on  Island  No.  10.  This  great  work  was 
accomplished  in  less  than  twenty  days,  and  on  the  4th 
day  of  April  Pope  had  water  communication  between 
Cairo,  via  the  New  Madrid  canal,  and  his  position  below 
Island  No.  10  which  commanded  both  the  land  and  water 
approaches  to  that  island  from  the  south.  During  this 
time,  however,  the  Confederates  had  lined  the  Ten 
nessee  shore  between  New  Madrid  and  this  position 
with  heavy  guns  in  order  to  prevent  the  transports 
from  passing  down  from  the  lower  end  of  the  New  Ma 
drid  canal.  Pope  found  it  necessary,  therefore,  to  have 
some  gun-boats  to  precede  his  transports,  and  silence 
these  guns.  He  could  not  bring  them  through  the 


316  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

canal.  It  was  not  deep  enough.  They  must  run  past 
the  batteries  at  Island  No.  10.  Foote,  whose  fleet  was 
waiting  just  above  the  island,  hesitated  at  first  to  haz 
ard  the  experiment.  But  when  it  became  clear  to  him 
that  the  capture  of  the  island  required  the  risk,  he 
ordered  Captain  Walke  to  make  the  attempt  with  the 
Carondelet.  At  ten  o'clock  in  the  night  of  the  4th,  and 
in  the  midst  of  a  heavy  thunderstorm,  Walke  started 
on  the  perilous  mission.  Despite  the  Cimmerian  dark 
ness,  his  boat  was  discovered  and  fired  upon  from  every 
battery,  but  was  not  struck  by  a  single  ball.  In  the 
night  of  the  6th,  the  Pittsburg  ran  the  gauntlet  also 
untouched.  During  the  forenoon  of  the  7th,  these  two 
gun-boats  cleared  the  way  from  New  Madrid  down  the 
river  to,  and  below,  Point  Pleasant  against  the  most 
strenuous  efforts  of  the  Confederates  to  prevent  it. 
About  midday  Walke  signalled  to  Pope  that  the  Con 
federate  batteries  were  silenced.  The  transports  con 
taining  the  troops  now  came  down  and  crossed  over  to 
the  Tennessee  side  and  occupied  the  road,  which  was 
the  only  outlet  of  escape  from  the  island  by  land.  Be 
fore  midnight  of  the  7th,  almost  the  entire  Federal  army 
was  in  this  position. 

The  Confederate  Commander,  now  General  Mackall, 

had  left  a  small  force  in  the  works  on  the  island,  and 

under  cover  of  the  darkness  had  attempted 

The  capture  L 

of  the  island   to  escape  with  the  main  body  of  his  troops 

and  of  the.  r.  im 

confederate  by  crossing  over  to  the  1 6111168866  shore  and 
marching  down  this  road.  Foote  soon  dis 
covered  the  movement  and  proceeded  at  once  against 
the  works.  The  little  force  there  surrendered  without 
resistance.  Mackall,  of  course,  found  his  way  blocked 
by  a  superior  force.  He  surrendered  also  with  but  lit 
tle  resistance.  The  Federals  had  won  a  complete  vic 
tory,  without  the  loss  of  a  single  man.  Pope  reported 


ISLAND   NO.    10  317 

the  capture  of  about  seven  thousand  men,  one  hundred 
and  fifty-eight  cannon,  seven  thousand  stands  of  small 
arms,  and  an  immense  quantity  of  ammunition  and 
stores. 

There  is  no  question  that  this  bloodless  triumph  was 
planned  and  executed  with  remarkable  ability.  It  stood 
out  in  bold  contrast  with  the  bloody  barren 

,  .    ,  .,  ,.  ,     .  The    begin- 

victory  which  was  at  the  same  time  being  ning  of  Pope's 
won  at  Pittsburg  Landing.  It  is  not  at  all  populi 
astonishing  that  the  Administration  at  Washington  and 
the  people  in  the  North  were  greatly  impressed  with  the 
difference  between  the  two,  and  were  moved  thereby  to 
estimate  Pope's  ability  and  merits  higher  than  those  of 
Grant,  Sherman,  or  Buell,  at  that  juncture.  It  must 
not,  however,  be  forgotten  that  except  for  the  repulse  of 
the  Confederates  at  Pittsburg  Landing  all  that  had  been 
won  by  the  victories  at  Mill  Springs  and  Fort  Donelson 
would  have  been  lost  again,  and  perhaps  also  all  that 
had  been  won  at  Pea  Ridge  and  Island  No.  10.  Had 
the  Confederates  been  successful  at  Shiloh,  they  would 
probably  have  been  able  to  reoccupy  Tennessee  and  Ar 
kansas,  and  Southern  Kentucky  and  Missouri.  As  it 
was,  the  re-establishment  of  the  Federal  supremacy  over 
these  four  important  Commonwealths  was  made  secure 
and  substantially  permanent  by  this  great,  though  costly 
and  apparently  indecisive,  victory. 

Hal  leek  now  gathered  the  armies  of  Grant,  Buell  and 
Pope,  with  large  reinforcements,  together  at  Pittsburg 
Landing  for  the  capture  of  Corinth,  and  took  The  advance 
command  of  the  entire  force  in  person.  He  °nCorinth- 
had  all  told,  the  latter  part  of  April,  about  one  hundred 
thousand  men.  He  put  Thomas  in  command  of  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee,  and  made  Grant  second  to 
himself  in  command  of  the  whole  force.  On  the  1st 
day  of  May,  he  began  his  advance  on  Corinth.  The 


318  THE    CIVIL    WAR 

Army  of  the  Tennessee,  led  by  Thomas,  formed  his 
right  wing,  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  led  by  Buell,  his 
centre,  and  the  Army  of  the  Mississippi,  led  by  Pope, 
his  left  wing.  Beauregard  had  been  reinforced  by  the 
troops  of  Van  Dorn  and  Price  from  Arkansas,  and  by  part 
of  LovelFs  force  from  New  Orleans.  He  could  muster 
about  sixty  thousand  men.  He  had  fortified  the  place 
quite  strongly,  and  Halleck  was  thoroughly  convinced 
that  the  great  battle  of  the  Avar  was  to  be  fought  before 
Corinth.  He,  therefore,  proceeded  with  the  greatest 
caution,  advancing  his  whole  line  at  once  and  intrench 
ing  as  he  went.  Of  course  the  advance  in  this  manner 
was  very  slow,  on  the  average  about  a  mile  a  day.  It 
was  the  27th  of  May  before  he  got  up  near  enough  to 
Corinth  to  execute  his  plan  of  cutting  the  Mobile  and 
Ohio  Railroad  south  of  Corinth.  In  the  night  of  the 
27th  he  started  Colonel  Elliot  with  a  thousand  picked 
cavalrymen  to  do  this  work. 

On  the  29th,  the  whole  army  was  so  near  Corinth 
that  Halleck  thought  the  battle  might  take  place  on 
the  30th.  He  supposed  that  the  Confederates  were 
massing  on  his  left  to  attack  Pope.  But  Beauregard 
probably  never  had  any  idea  at  all  of  fighting  a  battle 
at  Corinth.  His  plan  was  to  draw  the  Federals  far 
ther  south,  away  from  their  base  on  the  Tennessee 
River,  thus  compelling  them  to  weaken  their  active 
forces  to  guard  their  long  lines  of  communication,  and 
then  fight  them  with  much  greater  advantage.  At 
any  rate  he  had  determined  upon  this  course  before  the 
middle  of  May,  and  during  the  entire  last  week  of  the 
month  he  was  shipping  his  stores  southward  as  fast  as 
possible  over  the  railroad.  Both  Grant  and  Logan 
knew,  on  the  28th,  that  this  was  going  on,  but  Halleck 
could  not  be  made  to  believe  it. 

About  four  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  30th  an 


Mississippi  Valley — Helena  to  Vicksburg. 


CORINTH  319 

escaped  Confederate  soldier  came  into  General  Nelson's 
camp,  and  informed  Nelson  that  the  Confederates  were 
retreating  from  Corinth.  Nelson  immediate-  The  retreat 
ly  ordered  his  division  to  advance,  and  ad-  federates  from 
vised  Buell  of  his  movement.  By  seven  Corinth- 
o'clock  both  his  division  and  McCook's  were  inside  of  the 
Confederate  works.  The  Confederate  army  was  disap 
pearing  over  the  ridges  to  the  south.  Colonel  Elliot 
struck  the  railroad  some  eighteen  miles  below  Corinth 
in  the  morning  of  the  30th  only  to  find  that  all  the 
trains  carrying  the  stores  and  war  material,,  except  a 
single  one,  had  passed.  Halleck  had  been  deceived  and 
eluded  by  the  more  astute  Beauregard.  The  Federals 
were  too  much  worn  out  by  their  work  with  the  spade 
to  make  any  effective  pursuit.  Halleck  sent  a  few  com 
panies  of  cavalry  to  harass  the  retreating  column,  but 
they  stopped  at  the  crossings  of  the  Tuscumbia  only  a 
few  miles  away.  Beauregard  halted  at  Baldwin,  some 
thirty-two  miles  below  Corinth.  Halleck  now  sent 
Pope's  army,  strengthened  by  one  of  Buell's  divisions,  to 
find  him.  Beauregard  retired  from  Baldwin  on  the  7th 
of  June  before  Pope's  advance.  Pope  very  nearly  forced 
him  to  battle  on  the  8th,  but  Halleck  restrained  the  im 
petuosity  of  his  subordinate,  and  Beauregard  escaped 
the  danger  which  for  a  moment  again  threatened  him. 
On  the  9th,  the  Confederate  troops  were  again  united  at 
Tupelo,  a  place  on  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Eailroad  some 
fifty-two  miles  south  of  Corinth.  Halleck  felt  that  his 
line  was  becoming  too  much  extended  and  called  Pope 
back  to  the  neighborhood  of  Corinth. 

The  fall  of  Corinth  led  naturally  to  the  fall  of  Mem 
phis,  not,  however,  without  some  fighting.     When  Pope 
started  from  above  Fort  Pillow  to  go  to  Hal-      Thc  fall  of 
leek  at  Pittsburg  Landing,   he  left  Foote's  Memphis, 
fleet  and  two  regiments  of  infantry  to  hold  the  river 


320  THE   CIVIL   WAK 

above  the  Fort.  In  the  morning  of  the  10th  of  May  the 
Confederate  fleet  which  held  the  river  below  the  Fort, 
consisting  of  eight  vessels,  under  command  of  Captain 
Montgomery,  steamed  up  the  river  and  attacked  the 
Federal  boats.  After  an  engagement  of  two  hours,  in 
which  two  vessels  on  each  side  were  much  injured,  the 
Confederates  were  compelled  to  retire. 

The  garrison  at  Fort  Pillow  evacuated  the  place  about 
the  4th  of  June,  in  consequence  of  Beauregard's  retreat 
from  Corinth.  The  Federal  forces  entered  the  Fort  on 
the  5th  and  the  way  to  Memphis  now  appeared  to  be 
open  to  them.  Montgomery,  however,  was  determined 
to  make  them  fight  for  its  possession.  The  Federal 
fleet  anchored  in  the  night  of  the  5th  only  a  mile  or  two 
above  the  city.  In  the  morning  of  the  6th  Montgomery 
moved  forward  to  contest  their  farther  advance.  The 
Federal  fleet  consisted  of  five  gun-boats  and  four  rams. 
On  account  of  Footers  illness,  the  gun-boats  were  under 
the  command  of  Captain  Davis,  and  the  rams  under  the 
command  of  their  inventor,  Colonel  Ellet.  The  battle 
lasted  about  two  hours,  and  ended  in  the  destruction 
of  seven  out  of  the  eight  vessels  of  the  Confederates. 
Ellet's  rams  did  the  work  for  the  most  part.  The 
city  was  occupied  by  the  Federal  forces  a  little  later  in 
the  day,  and  soon  became  the  head-quarters  of  General 
Grant.  The  Mississippi  was  now  open  to  Vicksburg. 

The  campaign  of  the  spring  of  1862  in  the  depart 
ments  west  of  the  Alleghanies  had  thus  been  highly 
successful  to  the  Federals,  and  had  brought  to  the  front 
the  men  who  were  destined  to  play  the  chief  roles  in 
the  future  conduct  of  the  war,  Halleck,  Grant,  and 
Sherman. 


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OVER 


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THE  COLONIAL  ERA 

1402-1756 

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THE  FRENCH  WAR  AND  THE 
REVOLUTION 

1756-1783 

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THE  AMERICAN   HISTORY  SERIES 


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1783-1817 

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Three  Volumes  by  Prof.  John  W.  Burgess 
of  Columbia  University 

THE  MIDDLE  PERIOD 

1817-1860 

By  JOHN  W.  BURGESS,  Ph.D.,  LL.D.,  Professor  of 
Political  Science  and  Constitutional  Law  in  Columbia 
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THE  AMERICAN   HISTORY   SERIES 


THE  CIVIL  WAR  AND  THE 
CONSTITUTION 

By  JOHN  W.  BURGESS,  Ph.D.,  LL.D.,  Professor  of 
Political  Science  and  Constitutional  Law  in  Columbia 
University.  With  maps.  i2mo,  in  two  volumes, 
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The  fifth  number  in  the  "American  History  Series  " 
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issues.  It  covers  the  interesting  and  most  important 
period  of  the  Civil  War  and  Reconstruction.  It  is 
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the  points  at  issue  in  the  light  of  public  law  and  political 
science,  but  it  is  also  a  stirring  and  graphic  account  of 
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ticipator).  An  especial  feature  of  the  book  is  its  brilliant 
and  searching  portraiture  of  the  great  personalities  con 
cerned  in  the  contest  on  both  sides, 

IN  PREPARATION 

RECONSTRUCTION  AND  THE 
CONSTITUTION 

By  Prof.  JOHN  W.  BURGESS,  Professor  of  Political 
Science  and  Constitutional  Law  in  Columbia  Uni 
versity. 


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